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Howard v. General Motors Corp.
399 N.W.2d 10
Mich.
1986
Check Treatment

*1 427 Mich 358 v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION HOWARD 4). (Calendar 4, Argued March No. Decided Docket No. 73876. 29, 1986. December benefits, 1977, sought Harry compensation In workers’ Howard aggravation alleging disability because of of a back condition of and the of his he contended arose out course which Corporation. hearing employment A ref- with General plaintiffs day the as of last of eree awarded benefits Compensation Appeal employment The in 1973. Workers’ concluding disability affirmed, work-aggravated Board that a supported by the evidence and the defendant’s failure was plaintiffs prior the claim not to to assert injury brought years within of his waived defense. two Appeals, P.J., Shuster, B.R. Hood, and Court of Burns curiam, JJ., opinion holding per a that absent affirmed in an explanation compelling to for the defendant’s failure raise hearing applicability ref- rule before the of (Docket by there was of the wcab No. eree 68670). no abuse discretion appeals. The defendant opinions joined by by Riley, Brickley, Justice Justice joined Boyle, Chief Justice Williams and Justice Justice Supreme Cavanagh, Court held: waiver, finding requiring a There was no basis for of reversal to and remand the board. joined by Riley, Justice Justice stated that compensation one- and rules of the workers’ act period a are not statutes that limit of time which rather, may action; they period an concern a for claimant file compensation upon may a of which be awarded determination limitations, right compensation. They a to not are statutes of possessed legislative scope authority but limitations on the of body awarding compensation by a workers’ benefits. compensation any period paid 1. Workers’ not be for immediately years preceding time earlier than two date application which an for is filed with Bureau Compensation. purpose Disability of the rule is Workers’ provide prevent employers notice stale claims. An ordering compensation analogous proscribes further compensation paid period more than one once has been General Motors Howard v filing application year prior further an date explic- compensation compensation. The workers’ act does proce- provide application itly of the rules can be whether the during proceedings durally a failure to raise them waived sought. *2 periods provided by do not refer to 2. rules both statutes seeking petitions, persons must file of time in which benefits proscriptions or board to to a referee but address ordering compensation prohibit payment or the precluding periods prior years, one or a statute of time to two interpretation. the same Nor do the rules serve of limitations Rather, they represent purposes of limitations. a as statutes authority legislative scope to award limitation on the of the neglects Procedurally, a defendant raise benefits. where appeal specifically application rules on limits of the issues, have not been other and where the rules applied prior appeal, may he held to have the defendant right to raise the rules in defense. The waiver waived the upon implicit acceptance of the result based on the defendant’s plaintiff may have relied. which the joined by Chief Justice Williams and Justice Boyle, Justice dissenting part, concurring part in stated Cavanagh, in petition hearing gave plaintiff’s no notice that because the period prior a to the two of an intention to seek benefits for filing, finding years preceding its there is no basis for a opportunity had to raise the waiver. The first the defendant The defense is not rule was before the wcab. giving required prior plaintiffs notice of a to be raised rule, addition, one-year-back claim to such benefits. In rule, while to the is not identical. Issues similar relating one-year-back decided in this to the rule should case; nor should Kleinschrodt be overruled. part, part, reversed in and remanded. Affirmed joined by writing separately, Levin, Archer, Justice Justice compensation rule is a defense stated that a workers’ "back” nonjurisdictional. that can be waived nonassertion and is (1984) 639; App part 132 Mich 348 NW2d 286 affirmed part. reversed in Rosenberg, Vigiletti, McCrandall, Gebauer & Rosenberg), plaintiff. (by M. P.C. Theodore for the (by Nobaeh, C. Mc- Munroe & P.C. Cameron Comb), for the defendant. Mich J. case, In this workers’ the rule of Should question: one major we address Corp, v General (1978), 402 Mich 965 reh den

381; 263 NW2d interpretation (1978), proper governing 418.833(1); MSA rule, MCL and, the two- 17.237(833X1), applied by analogy, 418.381(2); MSA MCL year-back In addi- 17.237(381X2), or overruled? be modified defendant-appellant’s argu- tion, consider we Ap- Compensation the Workers’ regarding ments disability. finding of a work-related Board peal the evidence summarized The Court hearing referee: presented employment with defen- his Plaintiff commenced Blanc on Body plant Grand its Fisher dant at April October, 1956, and, began to 23, 1953, he his duties Plaintiff described a die setter. work as *3 being extremely strenuous. as a die setter with six-foot bars. prying heavy dies job included 1960’s, plaintiff was during early the Sometime place when he moving a die into pulling a bar and He went to the snap pull in his back. and felt a station, given heat treat- he was where first aid ments, time from work he did not miss injury. because of following injury he that Plaintiff claimed pain pain have in his back. continued that, 1963, forced to he was so intense

became recuperated for six months surgery. Plaintiff have on returning job as a die setter to his before successful surgery 1963. The was October require plaintiff additional the extent did Plaintiff, injury. from time off however, work because pain continued. claimed that the cross-examination, plaintiff explained During his paid some of health insurer had that his surgical paid balance. that he had bills and letter written into evidence a The defense entered insurer which stated plaintiff to his health Howard v General Motors Bkickley, his back trouble was not ment. employ- related to his writing signature Plaintiff identified the own, as his but stated that he did not remember writing the letter. March, 1967, In plaintiff requested a transfer position operator of crane because he believed job injurious working

that as a would be less than request granted. die setter. This was Plaintiff get stated that in order to into the crane he had to forty-foot climb a ladder. He estimated that he up climbed day and down the ladder to 15 times a pulling climbing and that involved put Moreover, ladder a strain on his back. order get signals to plaintiff ground, from the workers on the up had to stand and lean over the cab placed additional stress on his back. Willis, supervised Roland plaintiff who at Body plant, Fisher mony plaintiff’s contradicted testi- operation as to the of the cranes. Willis plaintiff stated that operate would only one or two day, necessitating cranes a of only a limited amount climbing. addition, the crane could be turned 180 degrees, enabling operator to see down from the side of the leaning cab without out over the front of the machine. Willis further testified only in the cabs about four hours day only and that the reason for him up to stand legs was to stretch they got his if tired. 5, 1966, On plaintiff again December injured himself slipped when he icy pavement in the plant’s parking lot. Plaintiff fell on his tailbone experienced and right shooting pains hip in his leg. Plaintiff plant’s went first aid station and informed them of slippery condi- tions in parking Although plaintiff lot. claimed that he continued pain to have right leg his accident, because of the he admitted on cross-ex- right amination that leg his previously had been *4 injured during World War II. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff receiving was from government the Following injuries for right leg. to his slip fall, arranged gmc plaintiff to see Dr. resulting pain. Harris about the Mich 358 9, on plant’s records reveal that December im- 1966, reported was "much plaintiff that he appointment be requested that proved” he hearing, plaintiff that At the denied cancelled. had ever made request. such a any further medical did not receive Plaintiff a he July, until when suffered treatment During plaintiff’s 90-day conva- ruptured appendix. following experienced he an surgery, ex- lescence leg. pain in his back and acerbation addition, began feeling brief transient plaintiff Notwithstanding physical his pains infirmities, his chest. crane plaintiff to work as a returned a job for about operator. month, remained on the He pain forced to leave because but was Herzog, the leg. to Dr. Plaintiff back his went operated plaintiff’s on originally physician who x-rays back, Herzog Dr. took for an examination. myelogram, ultimately determin- a and conducted ing his this to allow him Plaintiff heart disease also to work. surgery on required additional plaintiff that that, after testified even lower Plaintiff back. intense pain in his back was too surgery, operator. a crane to continue as admitted, however, intervening that his returning from prevented him day work at General Following plaintiffs last 13, 1973, plaintiff was examined July concluded physicians. Dr. VanBrocklin several provided plaintiff he was that could return work did not placed job. VanBrocklin a "sit-down” possible to continue believe that was climbing operator ladder a crane because as might plaintiffs affect heart condition. VanBrock- pain in might noted that also be some lin there during climbing. plaintiffs back Irving Young’s Dr. examination revealed limitation of be- plaintiff suffered no movement narrowing pain. x-rays cause of back showed might space spurring anterior disc nature precipitated by have been strenuous Young found early 1960’s. plaintiffs work plaintiffs injury further back no evidence aggravated by employment. his *5 363 Howard v General Motors 1986] Brickley, J. by Opinion plaintiff Dr. Leon Friedman determined participate significant physical could not activ- ity because of his advanced cardiovascular disease. believed, however, plaintiff Friedman could perform satisfactorily sedentary a semi-sed- entary job. Although Dr. Friedman’s examination ailment, plaintiffs on focused noted that pain. heart the doctor plaintiff complain continued to of back Although plaintiff originally claimed that his back, employment aggravation ap- caused to his heart, pendix, lungs, he deleted all claims except relating disability those to his back. The aggra- accordingly solely award was based on the vation of back condition. v General his [Howard 639, 641-644; Corp, App 348 (1984).] NW2d hearing the Bu- plaintiffs petition 24, June Compensation

reau of Workers’ was filed 1979, 21, hearing August 1977. After a 1979, 27, August referee issued his decision on awarding plaintiff compensation aggravation day employ- his back condition as of his last ment, 13, 1973. July referee

determined that aggravation was due disabled causally condition back related employment. proved his Plaintiff was credible and disability by preponderance his of the evidence. appealed Compensa- Defendant to the Workers’ 8, Appeal tion Board on Except October 1979. for a modification of the rate and interest award, the board affirmed the award. plaintiff’s The board concluded 1973 work-aggravated that a supported the evidence. disability addition, as to defendant’s assertion 418.381(2); rule of MCL MSA 17.237(381X2), the board held that 427 Mich [b]y its failure invoke 381(2) court, has the trial defendant Section before defense, non-jurisdictional

waived that affirmative It cannot thus akin raise that issue for the a statute of limitations. first time before Co, App 116 Mich Kingery v Ford Motor board. 606, (1982), see also Klein- 613-615 NW2d [323 Corp, schrodt v General Motors (1978); Mich Hospital, 100 v Detroit General Bordas *6 (1980). 31, 33 App NW2d [298 655] Appeals appealed to the Court of Defendant Howard, and that Court affirmed. granted, leave supra. sufficiency

The first defendant’s panel addressed The of the evidence claim. Court reviewed it expert and found "sufficient sustain testimony Id., 645. of fact.” As findings wcab’s argument plaintiffs that defendant’s was employ- heart that his continued prevented disease ment, the Court held that intervening independent, resulting in a an event disabling problem new does alone medical continuing

justify the denial of benefits work- injury. Corp, Casco related Mich Powell v Nelmor (1979). 332, 354-355; 279 NW2d 769 argument panel rejected also defendant’s should been denied on the benefits have basis in- plaintiffs representations inconsistent his surer in 1963.

Regarding application supra, the Court rule of applied Kingery, Kleinschrodt, supra, upheld the wcab’s deci- sion. The Court reasoned required

the for the first time case, is not issues raised consider wcab of this it. On the facts before compelling where the record is devoid of Howard v General Motors explanation for defendant’s failure to raise the applicability of rule before the hearing officer, we find no abuse of the wcab’s supra, [Howard, p 647.] discretion. appeal Defendant for leave to in this except Court, 9, and it was 1984, denied November that the case remanded to the Workers’ Com- (419 pensation Appeal [1984]) Board Mich 948 any recomputation part of the interest light award in of Selk v Detroit Plastic Products (On Resubmission), 32; 348 NW2d 652 (1984). remand, On the board did not alter its interest reconsideration, award. On this Court va- granted cated its earlier denial and leave to (1985). on June 1985. 422 Mich 936 i defendant-appellant first maintains that the "finding” of the board and the Court of last-day-of-work occupa- sustained a *7 aggravation "contrary support tional is In law.” appellant highlights plaintiff’s claim, of its arguable credibility lack of on the basis of his contradictory company claim to his insurance in appellant 1963. The asserts that the board in this findings specific case did not make its factual and clear. appellant

The also maintains that "the record support finding personal occupa- does not injury plaintiff’s day tional It as of the last worked.” argues "[t]he that evidence the record fails to plaintiff continuing establish that has a work- orthopedic disability” related and left appendectomy work 1973 because of an and problems, cardiac not because of his back.

Our review of this issue is limited both constitu- 427 Mich 358 by 6, 28 of the statutorily. Article tionally § provides: Michigan Constitution Findings in workmen’s of fact proceedings conclusive the absence of shall be provided by otherwise law. fraud unless 17.237(861) governs: 418.861; MSA also MCL acting findings by of fact made board fraud, powers, in the absence of shall be within its supreme appeals court of and the conclusive. The court shall have power questions review law .... many

This Court has noted on occasions if are conclusive "[findings by of fact [board] v presented.” Hlady supported the evidence Co, 374; 224 Wolverine Bolt NW2d (1975). case, of a work-related finding In this the board’s A re- brief supported by the record. disability our conclusion. supports view of evidence deposition Irving Young of Dr. states definitely in the 1960s "was plaintiffs back trouble lifting straining aggravated heavy his He further commented: work.” pain my judgment, episode initial of back his aggravated perhaps precipitated had strenuous nature of the work that he doing been years. for some

Degenerative disc disease and herniated disc is aggravated by physical la- characteristically [sic] puts spine. I bor that stress on the lower therefore work, he feel that this man’s described being period employ- heavy initial his ment, aggravating in the must have an factor been *8 development of his disorder. Howard v General deposition Dr. VanBrocklin contra- The James Young. opined: that of Dr. He dicted patient appears to be disabled from his operator history on the basis of a work as a crane rather than on the basis coronary artery disease of of disc laminectomy. disease and lumbar physician, did not Dr. Leon Friedman The third problem, plaintiffs focused back but evaluate only on his heart disease. plaintiffs

Thus, the work-relatedness of as to dispute disorder, reduced to a battle back experts, Dr. chose to believe and the board Young. applicable does not standard of review permit quibble with that assessment this Court to resulting findings of and the fact. compensable found a work-related

The board Young’s deposition disability of Dr. on the basis plaintiffs testimony. It refused to dis- own plaintiffs testimony merely because he had count no in 1963 in an effort to claimed work-relatedness obtain medical insurance benefits. might express

While we reservations about the reviewing board’s conclusions were we this case de applicable novo, review, under the standard of we question credibility will not the board’s assess- ment.

Regarding plaintiffs intervening disease, heart Appeals we find that the board and the Court of properly applied the rule of Powell v Casco Nel- Corp, supra, pp ap- Powell, mor 354-355. In we proved of the Court of statement event, independent, intervening which follows

[a]n personal injury arising out of and the course denial, employment, justify of suspension, does not alone reduction, disability or increase of ben- continuing injury. efits for a work-related *9 427 Mich 358 368 Opinion by Brickley, J.

Thus, finding of work-related given record, and given supported by is disability problems subsequent health the plaintiff’s benefits, on his entitlement legal have no effect board, we of the findings we are bound Court judgment affirm the would turn to the more substantive this issue. We now on the two-year-back regarding application issue rule.

ii provides: The rule (3)[1] any if Except provided in subsection act, payment sought compensation is under period of time earlier made shall than preceding the date years immediately 2 application for a employee an filed which 418.381(2); MSA the bureau. with [MCL 17.237(381)(2).] to pro- rule "is purpose stale prevent notice to the employer vide Corp, 118 . .” Fuchs v General . . claims (1982), citing 547, 554; 489 App 325 NW2d Mich Co, Gas Michigan v Consolidated White (1958) the one- 201, 212; (referring 89 NW2d rule). year-back rule after analogous one-year-back applies stopped, injured employee have

payments It provides: filed for additional benefits. has made, than payment If other (3) provides: Subsection nursing Payment made for care shall not be attendant year any period application an is more hearing the date than before with the [MCL for a is filed bureau. 418.381(3); 17.237(381)(3).] MSA Howard v General Motors expenses, medical compensation application and an for further bureau, is later filed with the no compensation shall be any period ordered for which is filing year prior more than 1 to the date of application. of such 418.833(1); MSA [MCL 17.237(833)(l).[2] Plaintiff petition Howard’s for a hearing was filed June 1977. Had the two-year-back applied, been the award period would have com- 24, 1975, menced on June rather than as of his *10 last day 13, of employment, 1973. July The defen- dant failed to level, raise the issue at hearing and the rule was not applied. The board refused to the rule of Kleinschrodt. it under apply Thus, general question posed by this case in regard to proper construction of the one- and statutes is whether can they be procedurally waived a failure to raise them at some point the proceedings. Legislature might have explicitly provided, not, but did for a "failure to raise” waiver rule in the statute.3 Therefore, our choice is interpret the statutes being either "akin limitation,” to statutes of following the Klein- waived, and thus raised, if not schrodt reasoning, or as limitations on the author- ity of the board and not waivable._ 2 provides The same statute overpayment also if that there is an of benefits, recoupment money period "no shall be allowed for a year prior is taking more than 1 to the date of such action.” MCL 17.237(833X2). 418.833(2); MSA example, For statutory Florida has a waiver rule: Notwithstanding provisions (1), of subsection the failure period prescribed

to file a claim within the in that subsection right objection shall not be a bar to such unless to such failure hearing parties is made at the first of such claim in which all given opportunity interest are reasonable notice and an to be Ann, 440.19(2).] heard. Stat [Fla § period claims, filing This statute refers to the time not to a two- or one-year-back rule. Mich continuing viability Regarding the Klein- argues appellant that first case schrodt appellant Alternatively, should be overruled. maintains guished may the instant case be distin- Kleinschrodt, rule in that the waiver from raise the failure to case its level, at referee issue "back” than the board. rather before holding recently, Klein- indicated As we expressly limited the circum- "was schrodt Copper Pine Franks v White stances of that case.” (1985). Div, 674; 375 NW2d easily Accordingly, Franks, case, like question pre- important distinguished.4 The more reasoning of sented, however, whether (by appli- at all direct Kleinschrodt remains viable by analogy) in where defendants cases cation particu- expressly limited their have not question Providing to that lar an answer issues. the Klein- of the basis for involves reconsideration that have built and of cases schrodt decision upon foundation. the Kleinschrodt

A *11 to have case that be said earliest presented Lynch general question addressed the Briggs Mfg Co, 168; v 329 Mich 45 NW2d (1950). parts case, In we vacated certain plaintiffs one-year- the award on the of the basis back rule. finding

Lynch primarily the dealt with whether plaintiffs disability supported by of the total 4 Kleinschrodt, one-year-back appeal raised In board had the sponte. not it Defendants in Kleinschrodt did raise before sua Moreover, defendants did the in the instant case. board as defendant issue, disability explicitly limited their appeal. did so limit whereas defendant its Howard v General Motors Opinion by Brickley, was, evidence. It found that but that "the period compensation for which could be retroactively awarded . . . could not extend be- yond year prior upon . . . the date plaintiff’s present petition plaintiff was filed.” The separate applications compensa- had filed three Lynch tion. stated that power compensa- [t]he of the commissionto award expressly [one-year-back

tion is limited rule]. [Id., 173.] In Bauman, Loucks v 514; 97 NW2d (1959), question "waivability” 321 one-year-back specifically

rule was addressed. At justices least three in that case found the rule to authority, be a limitation on the board’s and not waivable. plaintiff Loucks,

In had been awarded com- pensation specific leg in 1948 for a loss of his left injury. plaintiff a 1947 filed for an adjustment claim, of his and the referee "open finding plain- made an award, end” that the disability tiff had a further but that he was not compensation entitled to no because he had suffered disability-induced wage subsequent loss to 1953 (one back). year appealed The defendants the find- ing disability, modifying affirmed, the board grant the award on its own motion to disability including periods benefits, total time prior to 1953. The defendants claimed one-year-back rule should be to disallow any period prior to 1953. split. opinion by The Loucks Court was An Chief Justice in which Justices Carr Dethmers, Kelly joined, held that the rule was applicable. justices issue,

On the waiver these three stated: *12 427 question the statute in does provision of actions, fixing a time limit impose a limitation brought, may be within which actions to assert failure be deemed waived defendant’s defense, it but, contrary, places a on the appeal board which power on the limitation [Id., 517-518. Em- parties. pp waived cannot be phasis added.] to issue failure raise the before

Defendant’s ground on the that justified board one-year-back referee had that, therefore defendant, appeal no

there was occasion for from compensation appeal board the workmen’s ..., urge finding disability referee’s time of the statute to bar [Id., antedating period. p 1-year 517.] However, grant that opinion that also noted limited appeal expressly had been leave of the rule. It observed applicability point . . defen- [p]laintiff . has not raised the argue statutory bar dant failed raise or appeal properly It is before us on before the board. [Id., appeal. 518.] in the separately Justice Edwards concurred compensation. agreed He partial denial applicable rule was and that waiver, it. Regarding referee had properly applied noted, he did, have apparently, board the issue Howard v General Motors *13 Opinion J. it,

before year since its makes order reference to the 1- applied by limitation date the referee. What- ever reason appeal the be for the board’s omission, view, my language in the of the amend- and, indicated, ment is clear as the referee it bars recovery presented in the fact any situation as to compensation prior [Id., p to November 1953. 531. Emphasis added.] remaining opinion

The Black, by Justice concurred, which Justices and Voelker Smith maintained the should Court not review question presented Id., first to p not the board. 524. Justice believed that the Court should Black "insist on the benefit of the board’s view before it on interpret undertakes certiorari and apply” Id., the p workers’ law. 527.

The of the sign view three who did not justices the opinions applying one-year-back the rule in Loucks stemmed from a concern that the Court should not address question the unless the board first an opinion id., issued it. 527. See Had the opinion Loucks, board issued an explaining its failure to apply one-year-back rule and using a waiver analysis, had it alternatively, affirmed the hearing application referee’s of the Justice and those who joined Black opin- his ion, would have presumably deferred board’s expertise.

Thus, it cannot be justices said the three who did not apply the one-year-back advocated, advocate, Loucks or were even likely to waiver by failure to remaining raise the issue. four justices interpreted the "back” rule as a limitation of authority. Co,

Kushay 69; v Sexton Dairy time5 next we (1975), represents NW2d issue, of inter- by way mentioned specifically majority Loucks. portion The final preting presented issues Kushay addressed opinion referee, board, Court of or the claim defendant’s of these was Appeals. One had rule. The defendant under could not one-year-back provision argued that Loucks. was held waived, defendant citing have preserve issues13 and that properly to these failed therefore, is, no need to address merits there *14 of those issues._ 5 Co, supra, support Hlady Bolt as for his v Wolverine Plaintiff cites one-year-back Hlady rule position. that refers to the it is true While id., 381, limitations,” the case does not of a "built-in statute as address waiver the fact, stemming it. In from failure raise of the rule sponte application opinion appears of the rule to endorse sua one-year- Appeals. discussed the of This Court the board or the Court Hlady rule as follows:

back in case, judicata apply did not in this Even if the doctrine of res Compensation prevents this Court Act itself our Workmen’s awarding plaintiff. forth benefits to the As set from further decision, one-year-back previously rule this act contains a in provision. provision prevents this the courts or effect payment Appeal awarding of beneñts for Board from Sling period prior year one of time back from hearing. plaintiff 16,

petition filed her In the instant case petition year-back Department on November 1967. The one- with prevent applicable, if from would Court covering prior awarding any period time to Novem- benefits 16, at 1966. Yet the act itself mandates that an absolute ber maximum, may any period Mary Hlady compensated for not be extending 18, beyond of time 500 weeks from October 1945. any period plaintiff Thus beyond no benefits be awarded [Id., pp year Emphasis 1955. 380-381. added.] emphasized language supports interpreting The grant authority rule as a limit on the act. of the workers’ Hlady to While the reference to the "statute of limitations” in view, supports pro-Kleinschrodt a the fact we we some extent language applied used waiver because of Hlady, with the the "back” rule combined require finding applicable support it a that would not rule failure to raise the rule. Howard v General Dairy justices Sexton relies on the statement of three Bauman, 514, 517-518; (1959), Loucks v 356 Mich 97 NW2d 321 proposition one-year-back provision for the is not a defense which can be waived. That view did not then and does support majority not now have the of a of the Court. [Id., p 77.] interpretation

We do not find the of Loucks that helpful Kushay is offered in footnote on this Again, justices issue.6 three of the in Loucks ex- plicitly advanced the view that "back” authority. awas limitation of Justice Edwards noting separately concurred the board "had it” issue before and that the rule "bars recov- ery.” remaining justices expressed opinion no question regarding waiver, on the substantive but willingness go instead, seemed to indicate their along with whatever the board decided. per opinion majority

Our curiam in Klein- supra, p Motors, schrodt v General did not Chrysler Corp, discuss Loucks or Baldwin v App (1976), 61; 240 NW2d 266 but instead Kushay relied on footnote 13 of when stated one-year-back provision "that defense, ais akin to the limitations, statute of which can be jurisdictional.” waived. It is not 6Apparently interpret the Court Kushay did not overruling NW2d 266 authority. Chrysler Corp, 61; Loucks. App In Baldwin v *15 (1976), applied one-year-back it the rule as a limitation of plaintiff, Baldwin, injured was in 1943. Defendant volunta- rily paid elsewhere fits. any that, plaintiff benefits until 1947. employed After was plaintiff until 1970. After filed for further bene- Quoting benefits one-year-back rule, Appeals the Court of held that prior awarded to 1971 were not authorized law. The Court reasoned: [one-year-back provision] We do not read the as a statute of limitations, but rather Compensa- as a limit on the Workmen’s Appeal authority tion payment Board’s to order the of benefits. [Id., p 62.] 427 Mich finger injured was his in 1962 and compensa- voluntarily ninety-three paid weeks of disability compensation being put on tion before developing 1972, he a tumor. In brain 1964 after the hand related to benefits additional injury. referee

The issue before use of the industrial had lost whether held that he had The referee hand 1962. his of benefits. awarded weeks appeal in Klein- board, the defendant On arguments explicitly its confined schrodt point, disability on that affirmed board issue. one-year- of the on the basis denied benefits but sponte. The Court it invoked sua back (after ultimately Appeals from remand affirmed granted), as on leave Court consideration holding rule constitutes that "the appeal authority board limit waived.” and cannot be award (a paraphrase supra, p Kleinschrodt, opinion). unpublished Court of citing Kushay reversed, 13 of footnote We explicitly emphasizing lim- had that the defendant its to the board one issue. ited brief circumstances, hold that defen-

Under these we one-year-back rule dant the defense of the waived failing [Id., board. to raise before 384.] one- considered the The Kleinschrodt dissent provision year-back "a limitation on Appeal Compensation Board’s Worker’s Quoting opinions authority . . . .” Id. from the and Edwards Loucks Justices Dethmers Baldwin, from the dissent observed: *16 Howard 377 v General Opinion Brickley, J. Kleinschrodt, today In the Court has overruled Loucks Baldwin on the basis of a alto- ., Kushay . . gether accurate footnote a foot- appended note which was to the statement Kushay] properly pre- defendant “failed [the serve” certain issues "and that is, therefore,

there no need to address the merits of those issues.” The opinion hangs Court’s on this slender thread. It legal justify policy does not its conclusion on grounds. unconvincing I uphold find it and would Loucks and Baldwin. reasoned conclusions [Id., pp 385-386.]

Subsequent Appeals cases the Court of have the Kleinschrodt expanded rule and have Co, Pipe v Leese Tool & Die scope. its Mich 90 (1979), 741; 282 App NW2d rev’d on other 510; (1981), grounds 302 NW2d 526 again applied board had rule Kleinschrodt, sponte. Citing sua the Court of Ap- held, peals

Defendants’ failure to raise this defense consti- tutes a protections waiver of the statute’s precludes sponte. [Id., it sua raising the wcab from p 744.]

In Bordas v Detroit General Hospital, 31, 33; App (1980), 298 NW2d 655 the Court of construed the two-year-back implic- the itly applying rule by analogy without ever citing that case. is similar to the statute of limitations. Just as the statute of limitations is filed,

tolled when suit so is rule. Mich discussing panel Kleinschrodt, distin-

Without guished Lynch.7 *17 expand- disapproved minority of this Court

A Sulphite ing v Detroit Piwowarski Paper Pulp Co, 716; 316 NW2d & (1982), one-year-back rule. construed the which opinion per Although majority the curiam request that a bene- limited to the issue "whether permanent disability paid is a total fits request for and compensation,’ the where ben- for 'further paid specific-loss previously benefits[,]” were efits the dissent question of addressed the waiver. plaintiffs had Piwowarski, decedent been specific injured loss in 1948 and was awarded permanent petition for total and benefits. His 1970 disability the referee on was denied benefits grounds. appeal, the board did not factual On issue, but instead decide one-year-back factual deny The Court of rule to benefits. remanded on the basis reversed and remand, a found total On board Kleinschrodt. permanent disability and awarded benefits. majority unnecessary it This Court’s found as- [defendant’s] failure to address "whether one-year-back its defense at first sert rule opportunity permanent a waiver of constitutes authority cited for its that the two- The Bordas Court no assertion Yet, year-back rule "is similar to the statute of limitations.” went way distinguish supra, p Lynch, had that out of its the which held power "expressly rule "the of the commis limited” compensation.” sion to award (1) distinguished grounds Lynch was it involved the one- receiving year-back acknowledges already (2) petition, petitions Lynch benefits from an earlier did Bordas; "continuing petition in not involve a the the second claim” did petitions Lynch two first were dismissed. Lynch While the factual differences between and Bordas are valid provide good allowing "tolling” reasons in one case and not other, they provide any do not for the fundamental differ- basis essentially analogous statutory ence in characterization provisions. two 1986] Howard v General Motors Opinion by Brickley, appli- Id. defense.” The dissent found the rule cable, and therefore addresssed the waiver issue. interpreted application The dissent of the Klein- unjustified schrodt in rule, Piwowarski as an exten- sion of that and would have at least limited application the rule’s to a failure to raise the issue board, before the not the Id., referee. 727 and n 5. Despite preference the Piwowarski dissent’s

limiting experienced Kleinschrodt, the rule a ma- jor Kingery supra. extension in Co, v Ford Motor Kingery, plaintiff In occupational was awarded benefits for

lung part by disease caused in his employment by employers. ap- two defendant On peal, adjusted apportionment the board liability employers between the two and held that *18 two-year-back the tronic rule by advanced Ford and Wel- "being a nonjurisdictional affirmative de- fense, was not prior raised appeal” to and was [Id., p

waived. 612.] Affirming apply the board’s refusal to the two- year-back Appeals agreed rule, the Court of "that the rule is akin to a statute of limitations and was p Kingery panel Id., waived.” 613. cited Klein dispositive schrodt as of the issue. It noted: Although Kleinschrodt distinguished can be present from the case because the wcab raised sua sponte the issue while here Ford raised the issue in its delayed application review, we find that the Kleinschrodt applicable. case is totally A new issue, not decided judge, administrative law is akin to a statute of limitations and cannot be raised by request either sponte. or sua We con- sider, by analogy, that while this Court reviews novo, cases in equity de we will not review an issue first appeal. Therefore, raised on we find that because operates as a stat- 427 Mich 358 380 limitations, Hospi- Detroit General ute of Bordas v (1980), 31, 33; tal, App 298 NW2d Mich Kleinschrodt, raise the issue Ford’s to failure judge law constituted before the administrative declining apply to did not err waiver. The wcab [Id., rule. 615.] Kleinschrodt, applied Appeals The Court of also discussion, Copper Pine Franks v White without (1982), Div, 177; 332 NW2d 447 App Mich (1985). 636; 375 NW2d rev’d Mich Franks, the setoff was whether primary issue pre- awards that the act to provision of date. On we appeal, effective provision’s dated on the Court of substantive reversed the issue held: in the unable concur Court We also are had waived the

Appeals holding that defendant .... two-year-back rule 674.] [422 "to circumstances We limited case,” id., noting wcab, in Klein- defendant [the only failed to raise what have schrodt] complete been the defense specifically the issue be consid- limited question disability. ered the board [Id.] of Franks similar to those of facts were Piwowarski, Loucks. in Loucks As according referee had awarded benefits *19 rule. re- applicable "back” did not quest of the The defendant appealed review award. on other then the grounds, board board sponte, making modified the referee’s sua order Using the commencement date six earlier. years reasoning similar to that the dissent employed Piwowarski, disagreed in the in- we with board’s Howard v General Beickley, terpretation another We saved for of Kleinschrodt presented day in case.8 the instant the issue Concurring majority Franks, in Justice with the Riley have overruled Kleinschrodt would might applied, one-year-back applies in both Emphasizing two-year-back the rule and language cases. provision, two-year-back and con- of the struing similarly, Justice the language opined Riley of the statutes legislative limit the author- intent to "indicates a hearing ity awarding [board] referee and payment Id., 686. benefits.” Riley the Court Thus, would have had Justice adopt Kleinschrodt, dissent Justice Coleman’s case, could not circumstances of this defendant Under the appealed ruling two-year-back wcab, on the rule to the

have because the decision to its referee was favorable anticipate position to a need that rule. There was no reason argue prior the determination that Mr. Franks that issue Although majority benefits. was entitled Kleinschrodt viewed this defense as additional nonjurisdictional, there is requiring authority in the first it to be raised a void no 2.116(D)(1) Compare responsive pleading or be waived. MCR 2.116(D)(2). Sulphite Pulp & See Piwowarski v Detroit (1982) (Coleman, Co, 716, 727; Paper 412 Mich 316 NW2d C.J., dissenting). agree of Justice We with the admonition costly it would be "a mistake to extend Coleman holding beyond presented in that in Kleinschrodt the facts (The majority issue in its resolution of case.” did reach this case.)27 The Court of has the rationale of rule, holding majority that it waivable, not is "akin to a statute of limitations” and is Co, App jurisdictional. Kingery v Ford Motor 116 Mich (1982); 615; Corp, 132 323 NW2d 318 Howard v General Motors 639; (1984), App on other 348 NW2d 286 remanded (1984). grounds As issue need not be decided case, opinion in this these decisions. We hold we intimate no as to the correctness that, assuming arguendo merely waivable, Appeals ruling rule is the Court clearly that it waived in this case is erroneous. [Franks, supra, pp 676-677.] *20 427 Opinion proceedings reasoning to include her "extend hearing Id., n 3. referee.”

before B purposes Preliminarily, that, for find we would applicability analyzing a Kleinschrodt- of of type two-year-back rules rule, the one- waiver language operative indistinguishable. of are the the case of issue made meaning. essentially conveys the same rules specifically two-year-back at rule "payment bar, shall not be in the case at any period than of time earlier applies, years . .” . . When period compensation be ordered for shall "no prior year . . . .” Both is more than which hearing proscriptions to the address their statutes referee or ordering "payment” prohibit they

board; periods earlier than to a time not refer The rules do indicated. seeking persons must file their benefits oppor- petitions. Accordingly, decline the we would solely finding tunity no to make a of waiver one-year- addressed the that Kleinschrodt basis involves the. rule, the instant case back whereas two-year-back rule. reject analysis

Likewise, that would would an we application raise the rule to a failure to limit the issue before the

board, rather than the argue bar, In the case at the defendant did referee. the fore there- rule before the board and might sufficiently preserved be held to have the issue. foregoing mind,

Rather, we with the cases prefer foundation, or lack to reexamine rule, thereof, assess its for the Kleinschrodt and to involving continuing viability in either cases at either level of administra- "back” tive consideration. Howard v General Brickley, J. were statutes rules

If the one- and them, analogous or highly limitations in would be rule set down waiver suit, a statute In a civil appropriate. logical in the party’s raised must be limitations defense *21 or it is waived. first motion However, the one- neither of the themselves, provision other rules, nor contains Act Compensation Disability Workers’ provide the court rules language similar in a civil action.9 for such waiver reconsideration, find that we would Upon of the one- interpretation of limitations” "statute in Kleinschrodt rule offered year-back Kingery and Howard subject on precedent contradicts our earlier of the statutes. plain language well as the Lynch did not overrule Loucks. Thus, latter case that the statement limitation on the "place[] rules a the "back” 2.111(F)(2), part: provides in See MCR which party against of action has been asserted A whom a cause cross-claim, third-party complaint, assert against claim must counterclaim or party responsive pleading the defenses the has a responsive A in the the claim. defense not asserted waived, pleading provided by or motion as these rules except jurisdiction subject for the defenses of lack of over action, on matter of the relief can be and failure to state a claim granted. 2.116(C), party move See also MCR for dismissal of or grounds upon which allows a to a civil action to claim, summary judgment specifying on a certain may which such a motion be made. The defenses of lack jurisdiction, process, process insufficient and insufficient service of party’s must be raised in a the first motion under this rule or in first, responsive pleading, they party’s whichever is filed or 2.116(D)(1).] are waived. [MCR 2.116(C)(7), limitations, grounds, including the statute of MCR Other must be raised responsive pleading. party’s no later than a MCR 2.116(D)(2). 427 Mich power cannot board which be of the good where de- law all cases waived” remains explicitly limited the issues to be fendant has not appeal, of the to the exclusion considered interpretation provisions rule. This "back” Compensa- keeping prior Workers’ is also in with Appeal tion Board statements.10 plain language the "back” rules also interpreting against them as statutes militates limitations. "represents legislative

A statute of limitations period of time of that reasonable determination given in an claimant will be which to file that a action.” Lothian v Detroit, 160, 165; (1982). NW2d 9 limiting A limitations is an act statute of brought. be

time within which an action shall However, prescribing a limit of every statute performed an time within which act *22 necessarily a statute of limitations action taken is CJS, Limita- ordinarily as that term is used. [53 1, Actions, p tions of § 900.]_ 10 1975, opined empowered apply In the board that was two-year-back it before the sponte, rule sua where a defendant had failed to raise Chrysler Corp, referee or the board. Smith v However, apply 1975 WCABO 300. it did not the rule in that case final; because the award had become the board found that it had award, making longstanding prohibition erred in against reviewing but noted the its own decisions. Defendant Smith had cited Div, 2580, Townsend v Pontiac Motors 1972 WCABO in which the benefits, board had cited the rule and without it to the award of explanation. Moreover, 360, Corp, in Wheeler v General Motors 1980 WCABO decision, post-Kleinschrodt the board seemed to adhere to its earlier It view. stated: authority, limitation ema- back rules constitute on our Act, nating from nowhere but to award benefits. When attention,

brought applied. they appropriately to our must be [Citing [Id., an Kleinschrodt and earlier decision board.] p 363.] Howard v General connection, "limitation,” has in this The term the end of which being the time at been defined as equity can be main- or no action at law suit Actions, 2, 2d, p Am Jur Limitation of § tained. [51 592.] way: another

Expressed yet to a fixed inter- statutory limitation reduces [A] right the accrual of the val the time between the commencement short, a true of the action. period prescribes a time statute of limitations brought upon an action must be within which [Id., rights to be enforced. claims or § 599.] Thus, definitions of very on these basic relying limitations, the one- and statutes categorized. Simply not be so may rule statutes stated, period limit are not statutes they file an action. of time which a claimant Rather, period time for which they concern the once a deteroiina- compensation may be awarded rights tion of thereto has been made.11_ keeping wording typical limitations is in with statutes of example, For the statute of limitations for these basic definitions. part: of contract actions reads in breach person may bring any No or maintain action to recover contract, damages or sums due for breach of or to enforce the specific performance contract unless ... he commences periods prescribed by within the action of time section. 600.5807;MSA [MCL 27A.5807.] Likewise, damages person may] bring or maintain an action to recover "[no injuries persons property unless . . . com- [he periods prescribed the action . . . within the of time . . . .” mences] MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805. perusal A of the limitations of actions section of Revised that, above-quoted examples, Judicature Act reveals like the most require statutes of limitations "be commenced” within actions *23 periods. Generally, period certain time the time the claim accrues.” MCL contrast, "the of limitations runs from 600.5827; By MSA 27A.5827. point of reference is for the one- and rules filing application. play only the date of the of the The rules come into if is awarded. two-year-back rules do

Moreover, the one- and purposes typical do statutes serve the same not of limitations. are by statute periods created Limitations policy considera- worthy

grounded in a number recovery of encourage prompt They tions. damages have .; penalize plaintiffs who they .. pursuing their industrious not claims demands vorable to a been against stale .; security they . . "afford unfa- would be when the circumstances .; . . and decision” just examination prolonged fear of of the they relieve defendants claims .; prevent fraudulent litigation they . . .; they . being . from asserted " result- general inconvenience . . . the 'remedy legal right of a ing delay in the assertion from ” [Lothian, supra, practical to assert.’ pp 166-167. Citations omitted.] purpose rules of the one- and prevent employer provide and to is to notice Although supra. supra; White, claims, Fuchs, stale penalizing claimants rules do have the effect the who have pursued timely claims, their not unexpected liability employer’s they limit an while for the fear of employers compensation, they do not relieve prevent litigation, they nor do fraud delay. remedy The rules do the inconvenience traditionally perform associated the functions not they limitations because do with statutes of merely operate remedy claim, limit to cut off a but They the action do not disallow obtainable. petition long recovery may after be filed or the an —a response injury awarded and benefits merely they limit the award once it has thereto — granted. been language Therefore, of the basis perceive logical rules, izing reason for character- we no two-year-back rules as statutes the one- and *24 1986] Howard General v J. Opinion reject any lan- therefore would We of limitations. implied guage have in Kleinschrodt employed was so in that case rule the waiver premised. legisla- described are better rules

The "back” possessed scope authority the of on tive limitations compensation granting body benefits. workers’ a system is a creature workers’ seq.; generally, 418.101 et MCL statute, see, of MSA 17.237(101) authority seq. to make et by statute, "back” limited is also awards the represent the of limitation one kind rules Legislature power the to constrain has chosen law, grant matter of substantive As a benefits. bene- the board awards referee or when they rules, one of the "back” of fits in violation may permissible to have exceeded be said authority. statutory scope their of neglects Procedurally, to raise if a defendant appeal, rules application where the rules on of specifi- applied below, and in been have not fact appeal issues, cally limits as was other an may be Kleinschrodt, the defendant then case right the "back” to raise his to have waived held a defen- is Such waiver based rule defenses. dant’s upon implicit acceptance below, the result plaintiff may relied. The have further. no should be extended of Kleinschrodt Franks, indicated As we unique facts must limited waiver rule important being the defendant’s case, the most grounds explicit from of the articulation board, of the to the exclusion decision of the interpretation Any rule defense. "back” rejected. limitations is statutes of "back” rules as precedent contrary analysis and contra- Such dicts tion. ques- provisions plain language 427 Boyle, J. in part and reverse part affirm We would re- Appeals. We would of the Court decision Compensation Ap- the case to the Workers’ mand accord- of the award recomputation Board for peal rule, MCL the dictates of the ing to 17.237(381X2). 418.381(2); MSA Riley, J., concurred with *25 dissenting (concurring part J. Boyle, part). hearing before the petition for plaintiffs does Compensation Disability Bureau of Workers’ period prior years for a to two not claim benefits It filing petition. merely of the preceding the as he sought that Mr. Howard "such relief states Com- Disability is to under the Workers’ entitled notice Michigan.” There is no pensation Law damages intention to seek be- whatsoever of an 418.381(2); for MCL provided the extent yond 17.237(381)(2): MSA act, sought under any [I]f period of time payment earlier shall not be made for preceding years immediately than 2 the application employee date filed an the hearing

for a the bureau. with Upon appeal the held that the wcab, wcab defendant on MCL ability rely lost its 17.237(381)(2) because, 418.381(2); MSA the issue hearing had not been raised before the referee: By its failure to invoke the rule of 381(2) court, Section before the trial defendant has defense, nonjurisdictional waived the affirmative akin to a statute of limitations. It cannot thus appeal raise that issue for the first time before board. is, petition

Because the "complaint” —that 1986] Howard Motors v General Levin, Separate Opinion concerning hearing gave issue no notice of an — two-year beyond of MCL limit benefits 17.237(381X2), 418.381(2); no basis for there is MSA pleading responsive finding in this case. No waiver 2.110(B) an to such made could be under MCR implic- referee Since unstated claim. itly the nature of raised opportunity of the benefits, the first the award of two-year-back rule was to raise defendant v General In Kleinschrodt before wcab. (1978), Corp, held we 381; 263 NW2d one-year-back MCL rule of failure to raise 17.237(833) board before 418.833; MSA such a not hold that in a waiver. We did resulted gives even before a must be raised defense notice that benefits period prior sought are filing petition. preceding years Such a of a two requirement mockery of the rules of make a would process possibly procedure violate due civil Therefore, I with the reversal concur law. the remand of the Court decision Appeal Compensation Board. to the Workers’ Finally, and the rule similarities, while the *26 they are some rule bear related to I not decide issues not identical. would Thus, I instant case. the would overruling

disagree of Klein- with the supra. schrodt, J.,

Williams, C.J., concurred Cavanagh, J. Boyle, with opinion). (separate to the view I adhere Levin, Corp,

expressed v General (1978), 381; 263 NW2d 246 where 402 Mich compensation "back” a held that workers’ Court rule is a tion by nonasser- waived defense that can be jurisdictional. and is not 358 427 390 by Separate Opinion Levin, J. jurisdiction subject be cannot matter

While suggestion waived, the Workers’ there is no subject Appeal Compensation Board without by jurisdiction the claims asserted to hear matter plaintiff Harry Certain constitutional Howard. guilty.1 plea of even claims cannot be waived concept exceptions apart,2 narrow Those right per- nonassertion of as a result of waiver jurisprudence and is not limited meates statute of limitations. defense of the spoke supra, Kleinschrodt, the Court of limita- to the statute rule as "akin back right in "akin” to the rule is also tions.” back right by jury and to the case to trial a civil appellate review, waived of which be both right. timely to assert failure plead timely defense, an affirmative A to failure suppress evidence claimed to file a motion of constitutional obtained violation have been rights, object evidentiary objections, toor to make many instructions, others are waived nonassertion. impor- rights so waived are as that can be positive formulation as in their verbal

tant the back rule. The generally

statutes of limitations bring person may example, provide, "[n]o beyond the time limited. or maintain action”3 change A in the Kleinschrodt rule would legislative objective of ac- inconsistent with cording greater finality of the trier to the decision proceedings.4 of fact workers’ 1 (1986). New, 482; People 398 358 See v 427 Mich NW2d readily mind. are others that do not come No doubt there 600.5803; See, 600.5801; 27A.5801, e.g., MSA MSA MCL MSA MCL 600.5807; 27A.5803, 27A.5805, 600.5805; MSA MCL MCL 27A.5807. 571, 621; Labor, Dep’t See Civil Service Comm v (1986). NW2d *27 Howard v General Separate Levin, J.

We affirm the Court of decision would upholding award workers’ plaintiff. benefits to the J.,

Archer, Levin, concurred with

Case Details

Case Name: Howard v. General Motors Corp.
Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 29, 1986
Citation: 399 N.W.2d 10
Docket Number: 73876, (Calendar No. 4)
Court Abbreviation: Mich.
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