*1
Rеgents
U of M
REGENTS
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
COMPANY
v TITAN INSURANCE
(Calendar
1).
9,
Argued
No. Decided
March
Docket No. 136905.
31,
July
2010.
University Michigan
Morgan
at the
Nicholas
was treated
System following
Michi-
an automobile accident
2000. The
Health
Company
gan Assigned
Facility designated Titan Insurance
Claims
Morgan’s
personal protection
claim for
as the insurer to service
University Michigan
and
insurance benefits. The
system brought an action in the Washtenaw Circuit Court
the health
2006, seeking payment Morgan’s
against
medical treat-
Titan in
summary disposition, arguing that the one-
ment. Titan moved for
500.3145(1)
recovering
year-back
plaintiffs
rule of
barred
from
MCL
year
damages because all the costs had been incurred more than one
600.5821(4)
plaintiffs
argued
filed suit. Plaintiffs
that MCL
before
political
allows the state and its
subdivisions to file an action without
court,
one-year-back
supersedes
The
Melinda
limitation and
rule.
Morris, J., granted
Appeals,
The
Murray
Titan’s motion.
Court
(Davis, EJ, dissenting),
unpublished
affirmed in an
JJ.
Beckermg,
(Docket
276710),
curiam,
opinion per
issued June
No.
concluding
required
Liptow
to do
under
Farm
that it was
so
State
(2006).
Co,
App
Supreme
The
Mut Auto Ins
Court
plaintiffs’ application
appeal,
for leave to
wrote further to describe the of stare decisis to the may decision to overrule Cameron. Numerous factors be consid- determining justification compelling ered when whether a exists to precedent, dispositive. overturn and none is Chief Justice Kelly appropriate respect considered the factors with to Cameron and compellingjustification concluded that a existed to overrule it. majority opinion except Justice Weaver concurred in all of the part separately entitled “Stare Decisis.”She wrote to note that majority gave in addition to the overruling reasons the Cam- eron, it should also be overruled for the reasons stated in her give Cameron dissent. The proper Cameron failed to 500.3145(1). language one-year-back effect to the of MCL The rule period limitations, held; rather, is not a as Cameron it details apply tolling provision how to period in the actual limitations set forth in the statute. Justice Weaver also stated that stare policy decisis is a and not an immutable doctrine and that the wrongly consideration of stare decisis and whether to overrule precedent always decided includes service to the rule of law through judicial restraint, sense, the exercise of common and a sense of fairness. Justice majority analysis concurred in full with the Hathaway respect overruling and conclusion fully Cameron and analysis. concurred with Justice Weaver’s stare decisis Justice separately thoughts wrote to set forth her own Hathaway concern- ing proper analysis decisis, what noting constitutes a of stare principle policy subject is a and not a rule or law to a particularized approach test in all circumstances. The taken will depend presented. special on the facts and circumstances compellingjustifications overwhelming to overrule Cameron axe this case. M U of respond separate wrote a concurrence to Kelly Chief Justice concerning Young’s she had made discussion of comments Justice change membership. in the Court’s Corrigan, dissenting, agreed joined by Justice Young, separately to observe Markman’s dissent and wrote with Justice justices joining majority or in this case have overruled that the ignored precedents in a time and have recent short numerous expressed previously adherence to the doctrine abandoned their requires judges on the rule law to decide cases stare decisis. The personal principles in advance rather than basis of announced party subjective preferences against before them or for or subjective policy considerations. joined by Justices CORRIGAN Justice Markman, Young, disagreed Liptow over- dissenting, that Cameron and should be correctly the no-fault automobile insur- ruled. Cameron held that 500.3145(1), rule, damages- one-year-back MCL ance act’s hmiting provision because it rather than a statute of limitations “recover[edj.” only that can be limits the amount of benefits Therefore, scope tolling provision for minors it is outside 600.5851(1), persons in which addresses when and insane only may “bring rule serves [an] one action.” The recovery define a of benefits and does not a limitation on properly Liptow period a claimant file an action. *3 within which 600.5821(4) preclude does not relied on Cameron to hold that MCL 600.5821(4) one-year-back application rule because MCL only exempts political and its subdivisions from a statute the state bring Having right of limitations. an action is not having right equivalent an unlimited amount of to recover 600.5821(4), damages. political Under the state and its MCL time, may bring any but under the subdivisions an action rule, any one-year-back they portion cannot recover benefits for year they the loss incurred more than one before commenced judgment Appeals in case should be action. The of the Court of affirmed. — - One-Year-Back Insurance Personal Protection Insurance Benefits - by the State and Political Rule Limitation of Actions Actions Subdivisions. 500.3145(1), provides which that a rule of MCL personal protection insurance benefits claimant not recover year any portion than one before the for of the loss incurred more commenced, apply brought to claims action was does not political state or its subdivisions under MCL maintenance, care, persons in and treatment of recover the cost of various institutions. Opinion of the Court Tischler,
Miller & (by Tischler), P.C. Ronni for plain- tiffs.
Anselmi & Mierzejewski, (by Sowle), P.C. Mark D. defendant.
Amici Curiae: Nemeth,
Gross & P.L.C (by Gross), James G. for the Auto Club Insurance Association. Firm, Law
Speaker (by PLLC Liisa R. Speaker), Sinas Dramis Brake & Boughton & McIntyre (by PC Sinas) George T. for the Coalition Protecting Auto No-Fault. Cox,
Michael A. General, Attorney Restuccia, B. Eric General, Solicitor and Ann M. Sherman and C. Adam Purnell, Attorneys General, Assistant for the Michigan Assigned Facility. Claims Cox,
Michael A. Attorney General, Restuccia, B. Eric General, Solicitor Ianni, and Robert Raymond Howd, O.
and James P. Delaney, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Department Community Health.
Plunkett Cooney (by Mary Massaron Ross and Hilary Ballentine) A. for the Insurance Institute of Michigan.
Steven A. Hicks for the Michigan Association for Justice.
KELLY, C.J. We examine whether 600.5821(4), which preserves state rights entities’ bring certain claims, preserves also the right to seek recovery of all *4 damages incurred notwithstanding one-year-back 500.3145(1). rule of MCL We hold that MCL 600.5821(4) exempts the state entities it lists from the M u Titan Ins v Opinion op the Court we overrule consequence, As a one-year-back rule. Co,1 held to Ins which Farm Mut Auto v State Liptow of the Court judgment reverse the contrary, Ins Cameron v Auto Club also overrule Appeals. We exclusively decision relied Ass’n,2 the Liptow on which conclusion. reaching its HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL FACTS severely injured in an automo- Morgan was Nicholas He treated at the in March 2000. was bile accident days. for six Less University Michigan System Health accident, Morgan sought per- year than one after the the Michi- through insurance benefits protection sonal (MACF). Because he was Assigned Facility Claims gan policy, under a no-fault insurance not covered Company Titan Insurance designated MACF January his claims. In servicing insurer for System Health and the univer- University Michigan Titan, against seeking this lawsuit sity’s regents filed Morgan’s defendant medical treat- payment from full cost reimbursement of the sought ment. Plaintiffs they alleged which was Morgan’s hospitalization, $69,957.19. arguing summary disposition,
Defendant moved for
500.3145(1)3
of MCL
barred
one-year-back
that the
rule
recovering
damages.
the claimed
Plain-
plaintiffs from
600.5821(4)4
MCL
allows the state
tiffs countered that
limita-
and its
subdivisions to file suit without
political
Co,
544;
Liptow
Farm Mut Auto Ins
App
v State
272 Mich
726 NW2d
(2006).
Ass’n,
Ins
Cameron Auto Club
decision The majority concluded under MCR 7.215(J)(1), it was bound to follow the Liptow decision and uphold the trial court. Judge agreed DAVIS Liptow controlling, opined was but had been wrongly decided and that the Court should convene a 7.215(J)(2) (3). conflict panel pursuant to MCR Initially, we denied appeal,6 leave to but on reconsidera tion, order, we vacated the granted denial reconsidera tion, and granted leave to appeal.7 600.5851(1)
MCL PROVISION —THE MINORITY/INSANITY An analysis of rulings this Court’s on the issues implicated in naturally this case begins with Lambert v brought Michigan, Actions in the name of the state of people Michigan, any political of the state of or of subdivision Michigan, any state of or in the name of officer or otherwise for the Michigan any political
benefit of the state of
subdivision of the
Michigan
recovery
maintenance, care,
state of
for the
of the cost of
persons
homes,
hospitals,
schools,
and treatment of
and other
subject
state institutions
are not
to the statute of limitations and
brought
any
limitation,
provisions
be
time without
any
notwithstanding.
statute
Co,
Regents
Univ Mich
v Titan Ins
unpublished opinion per
curiam
(Docket
276710).
Appeals,
of the Court of
issued June
No.
Regents
Co,
(2008).
Univ Mich
v Titan Ins
CAMERON in 2006, Cameron, Court overruled Geiger In in this held that the majority 4 to 3 decision. The 600.5851(1) did not MCL minority/insanity provision of the one- application remove the claim from plaintiffs analysis stated: year-back rule.
8 (1975). 179; Calhoun, 394 Lambert v 332 Mich 229 NW2d 9 600.5851(1) part: MCL states 600.5851(7) (8)], provided Except [MCL if as otherwise entry bring person an action under
the
entitled to make an
or
first
years
age
at the time the claim
act is under 18
or insane
accrues,
person
claiming
person
under the
shall have
the
or those
otherwise,
disability
through
year
after the
is removed
death or
although
period
entry
bring
or
the action
the
to make the
limitations has run.
Co,
Surety
268;
App
Rawlins v Aetna Cas &
92 Mich
Accordingly, held statute governing when a party may bring an action does not affect the damages recoverable under one-year-back rule. Liptow, Court of Appeals examined the inter- 600.5821(4). play of the one-year-back rule and MCL Relying solely Cameron, on it stated:
Thus,
pertinent question
damages-
is whether the
limiting portion
500.3145(1),
of MCL
rule,
recovery.
limits the
ruling
[claimant’s]
This Court’s
Michigan
Univ
Co,
[v State Farm Mut Ins
719, 733;
(2002)]
App
state or its subdivisions
maintenance,
to recover the cost of
care,
persons
and treatment of
in state institutions “are
*7
subject
to the
may
statute of limitations
brought
be
any
limitation,
at
time without
provisions
any
notwithstanding.”
statute
that, by
plain
We conclude
import
language,
of this
Legislature
intended to ex-
empt the state from statutes of
bringing
limitations when
public
an action to
language
recover
funds. The
refers to
provides
statutes of limitations and
an action
be
brought
any
time. But the statute does not address
damage
provisions
any
limitation
limiting provi-
other
words,
sions. In other
minority tolling provision,
like the
600.5821(4)
MCL
during
concerns the time
which the state
12 Cameron,
may bring it “does not Cameron, brought.” once an action has been recoverable Accordingly, that MCL supra, Mich at 62. we conclude 600.5821(4), minority tolling provision of MCL like the 600.5851(1), one-year-back rule operate to toll the does not 500.3145(1). Cameron, 61-62. supra, 476 Mich at of MCL Therefore, [claim we hold that defendant is liable to the care, only patient’s] ant] [the for costs incurred maintenance, treatment in state institutions within year filing complaint.[13] one before the
ANALYSIS statutory interpreta- presents questions This case de novo.14 tion that are reviewed 600.5821(4) that MCL party disputes preserves No plaintiffs’ right bring the instant cause of action. 500.3145(1) re- question before us is whether MCL recovery damages year stricts incurred one plaintiffs’ plaintiffs before filed suit. The answer turns on the of the interaction MCL understanding correct between 600.5821(4). and MCL It is undisputed all of costs were incurred between March 18 plaintiffs’ Thus, and March 2000. if the rule one-year-back claim, plaintiffs to their are entitled to no applies damages. Liptow,
Defendant relies on which held that governs rule actions to which 600.5821(4) applies because that statute does not ex- state entities from its limitation on We empt damages. disagree.
Defendant’s
and the
rest
argument
holding Liptow
fundamentally
premise.
on a
incorrect
reasoned
Liptow
13 Liptow,
App
at 555-556.
LLC,
1, 7;
Dep’t Agriculture Appletree Mktg,
779 NW2d
*8
Opinion op the Court (1) 600.5821(4) MCL state exempts entities from (2) any limitations, statute of the one-year-back rule of 500.3145(1) limitations, MCL is not a statute of but a (3) 600.5821(4) limitation, damages and therefore MCL exempt governmental entity does not from the one- 500.3145(1).15 year-back-rule of MCL premise This Therefore, derived from our decision Cameron. we are required analysis. to revisit Cameron’s majority Cameron concluded that actions 600.5851(1) brought pursuant subject to MCL are to the one-year-back rule because that statute does not impli- cate when a plaintiff may “bring an action.” We con- 600.5851(1) clude that the statutory language MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL does not command the conclusion that the Cameron reached. with, begin
To
we conclude that
approach
Cameron was flawed because it read the statutory
600.5851(1)
language
isolation. MCL
does not create
its own independent cause of action. It must be read
together with the statute under which the plaintiff
cases,
seeks to recover. In no-fault
for example, 600.5851(1)
together
must be read
with MCL
500.3145(1).
so,
Doing
grant
the statutes
infants and
incompetent persons one year after their disability is
“bring
removed to
the action”
recovery
“for
of personal
protection insurance benefits . . . for accidental bodily
injury.
. . .” On the basis of its language, MCL
supersedes
all
limitations
in MCL
500.3145(1), including
rule’s limita-
tion on the period
recovery.16
Cameron,
See
Opinion
the Court
purpose
For what
might plaintiff “bring an action”?
*9
Surely not for the sole
of filing papers
satisfaction
in
A plaintiff brings
court.
a tort action to recover dam-
an
ages. Although
right
the
to
action would
bring
be a
one indeed if
hollow
a
plaintiff could
recover dam-
ages,
plaintiff
Cameron
limited a
Liptow
just
to
that
right. Therefore,
hollow
we
restore
under-
proper
600.5851(1)
standing of the interaction between MCL
and the one-year-back rule. We hold that the “action”
600.5851(1)
by
and “claim”
MCL
preserved
include the
right
damages.
to collect
As
explained
Justice CAVANAGH
Cameron,
in his
dissenting opinion
by
word
many
[t]he
“claim” has been discussed
this Court
past century.
instance,
times over the
For
v Bd
Allen
of
Auditors,
324;
122
(1899),
State
Mich
“ aggregate operative T. The giving facts rise to a right enforceable a court.... 2. assertion of existing right; any right payment equitable to or to an remedy, contingent provisional.... even if or 3. A demand money property right.... which one asserts a ” (7th ed).]’ Dictionary [Black’s Law
Opinion the Court pecuni short, then, of a a claim means “demandD nature,” “demand for “right payment,” and a ary money.”[17] here. equally applicable dissent is
Justice CAVANAGH’s case, 600.5821(4), also The statute issue Specifically, preserves actions “[a]ctions.” addresses It also delineates explicitly state entities. brought for the contemplated brought action is one incurred. MCL recovery for certain costs “maintenance, care, and costs those for the lists the homes, schools, hospitals, of persons treatment Thus, apparent . .” it is from other state institutions .. Legislature in- language the statute right more than the state entities’ preserve tended to *10 papers file court. predating Cameron also
Moreover, this Court’s caselaw the Cameron support majority’s holding. does not Cameron’s authority for only interpretation cited was relied on concurring opinion, Justice MARKMAN’S which in Howard v opinion lead dicta from Justice BRICKLEY’s Gen Motors Corp.18 Howard, analyzed one-year-back the justices
In two in the act to determine compensation rule workers’ 17 J., Cameron, dissenting). 476 at 100 Mich (Cavanagh, 18 (1986). Corp, 358; Howard v Gen Motors 427 Mich 399 NW2d Only opinion. Justice RlLBY concurred BRICKLEY’s argument the take no issue with Justice Markman’s that Cameron We “authority” majority support holding needed its other than “the no wrongly language the itself.” at 337. But claims that of statute Post he interpretation apprehend” principle statutory opinion “fails of this the language legislative that the actual of the statutes is the best indicator statutory contrary, the we conclude that the intent. Post 337. To interpretation language compel the does not reached Cameron majority. pages opinion. We make the additional See 298-300 support provides that no for the observation our caselaw also Cameron majority’s interpretation. U of M Titan Ins Opinion of the Court jurisdictional whether it awas affirmative defense akin to statute limitations. Justice BRICKLEY concluded interpretation “the ‘statute of limitations’ of the Kleinschrodt[19] ap rule offered in plied two-year-back Kingery[20] to the rule in Appeals] [in Howard the Court of contradicts our precedent subject plain earlier on as the well language By contrast, of the statutes.”21 in Klein justices opinion “[w]e schrodt, five stated are one-year-back provision that the defense, is a akin to the statute of . limitations . . ,”22 years sum, Cameron, for more than before opinions in all of the Court’s relevant saw no any treating provisions
basis for
of MCL
differently.
In Weltonv
Co,
Carriers Ins
we
among
provisions only
amade
distinction
to the
noting
extent of
that the section contains “two limita-
period
tions on time of suit and one limitation on
then,
Even
the WeltonCourt saw no basis
recovery[.]”23
treating
provisions
Indeed, the law
differently.24
was so well settled that the
defendants Cameron did
argue
not even
for different treatment until this Court
argument
heard oral
on appeal.25
Corp,
v Gen
Kleinschrodt
Motors
(1978).
20Kingery
Co,
(1982).
App 606;
v Ford Motor
116 Mich
302
487 Mich
Opinion
the Court
held
erroneously
that Cameron
Thus, we conclude
600.5851(1)
protect
plaintiffs
not
a
does
that MCL
also
that
one-year-back rule. We
hold
claim from the
the stat-
interaction between
understanding
between
to
interaction
equally applicable
is
utes
500.3145(1).
600.5821(4)
Therefore, the
and MCL
600.5821(4)
plaintiffs
preserving
of MCL
provisions
plaintiffs
right
bring
preserve
an action also
to
damages
year
than one
right
recover
incurred more
to
rule in MCL
is filed. The
before suit
such
inapplicable
is
claims.26
STARE DECISIS27
that
reasons, we conclude
For the aforementioned
rely
plaintiffs’ argument
reaching
today,
do not
on
our decision
we
Appeals’
Liptow
decision in Univ
that
was
with the Court
inconsistent
Co,
App
Mut
In determining whether a compelling justification
exists to overturn precedent,
the Court may consider
criteria,
which,
numerous evaluative
standing
none of
alone,
dispositive.
Historically,
have
courts
considered
(1)
precedent
whether the
proved
has
to be intolerable
Young
Finally,
quotes
again
years ago
statement made two
I
applies
altogether
impugn
it in an
my
different context to
motives
voting
concerning
as I have in
my
this case. But he
wisdom
has no
motives,
any concerning
do I
proper place
nor
claim
his. His attack has no
judicial opinion.
in a
28We
at a
argument
are
loss to understand Justice Markman’s
that we
“appropriate”
deem it
to overrule Cameron because Cameron overruled
Geiger.
clear,
at 337.
appropriate
Post
To be
we conclude that
it is
wrongly
overrule Cameron because it was
decided and stare decisis
support retaining
Thus,
do
weighing
considerations
it.
the merits of
overruling
overriding Geiger,
analysis
Cameron vis-a-vis
that his
in,
337-338,
engages
post
necessary
dissent
analysis.
at
is not
to our
He
also claims that our decision to overrule Cameron makes the
caselaw
Legislature.
our state less consistent with the
intentions of
Post
disputes
Court, including
one,
338. In most
that come before this
validity
undoubtedly
eye
of such a claim is
in the
of the beholder.
Magna
(2009)
Corp,
v
Petersen
because defies cause overruling it would on it is such reliance (3) prin- whether related hardship inequity, special precedent since the developed so far have ciples law of it has no than a remnant more pronounced was (4) have so *13 survived, and circumstances facts whether to differently, so as have or to be seen changed, come justi- or application of significant the precedent robbed (5) fication, have decided jurisdictions other whether (6) manner, up- whether a different similar issues to in serious likely is result holding precedent (7) interests, and public prejudicial detriment largely and abrupt decision was an prior whether the existing precedent. from then unexplained departure applicable given be in a may may These factors magic of factors that must Nor there a number case. requi- case in order to establish the overruling favor a Rather, this conclusion compelling justification. site case-by-case basis. be reached on should Here, proved has first consider whether Cameron we workability. Indeed practical intolerable it defies because provi- left MCL and similar it does. Cameron ostensibly protect- cases while many sions void of effect right file suit. This created an injured party’s an ing and, such, an and unworkable paradox indefensible Consider, hy- landscape. example, confusing legal injured age in a car boy of a accident pothetical case reaching he fully Upon 15. age recovered associ- attorney to file suit to recover the costs retains injuries, his on relying ated with the treatment of 600.5851(1). counsel, The defendant also retains who dismiss, that none filing arguing a motion to responds by The trial court damages of the are recoverable. plaintiffs filings determines that none of the parses the parties’ year in the before suit was plaintiffs costs were incurred filed. MU of Titan Ins Opinion of the Court Cameron,
Under plaintiff hypothetical in this indisputably suit, case was to file entitled because MCL 600.5851(1) preserved his right to do so. Yet Cameron gutted because, his suit any practical worth its under 600.5851(1), of MCL interpretation no plaintiff had any Thus, chance recover damages. plaintiff was the legal Legislature provided him, denied recourse the is, which after reaching his majority, to recover the damages he year incurred more than a earlier. Accord- ingly, we conclude that Cameron is frequently innately unworkable.
Second, we consider whether weigh reliance interests Cameron, overruling favor of We they conclude that do. Cameron is vintage, of recent having been decided years mere four ago. Hence, reliance on its has holding been of limited Moreover, duration. Cameron repre- sented a sea change in one area of the law toppled interpretations settled act no-fault that had existed almost since the adoption MCL 600.5851.32 *14 so, doing disrupted Cameron the reliance of interests the injured minors and incompetents who relied on its provisions to preserve their claims until of removal their disabilities. recognize
We that there exists a competing reliance interest the continuing validity of Cameron: that the defendants in no-fault cases. Yet Cameron’s evis- ceration of the of plaintiffs crux potential claim —the to recover damages effectively altogether removed — 600.5851(1). incentive to file as permitted by suit MCL that, We conclude while no-fault defendants’ on reliance interpretation this reasonable, it is not itself suffi- preclude cient to overruling Cameron given the еxtent of Cameron’s prejudice to plaintiffs. no-fault opinion. See n 35 of this Mich 289 Opinion op the Court principles law
Third, related we consider whether interpretation MCL since Cameron’s developed have inapplicable This factor is pronounced. was case, are as we aware analysis decisis this to our stare further sup- in the law that intervening change of no legitimacy. continuing or undermines Cameron’s ports and circumstances Fourth, examine whether facts we differently, come seen so or have to be changed, have so justifica- significant has robbed of that Cameron been factor, no or Like we discern factual previous tion. against for over- changes that counsel circumstantial Therefore, factor also is inappli- ruling Cameron. analysis. to our cable
Fifth, jurisdictions have we consider whether other This in a different manner. factor similar issues decided analysis. to our stare decisis inapplicable is likewise scheme is no-fault insurance Michigan’s comprehensive states share the to our state. While other unique system, judicial in- underpinnings of our fundamental indepen- of the no-fault act have evolved terpretations similar insurance dently of those of other states with Thus, interpretations jurisdictions’ schemes. other analysis are our in this unhelpful similar statutes to case.
Sixth, Cameron is upholding we examine whether public prejudicial detriment likely result serious heavily in weighs conclude that this factor interests. We drastically cur- overruling Cameron. Cameron favor Legislature the protection provided tailed enacting incompetents. minors 600.5851(1), conveyed its intention Legislature treat- groups unique in those protect individuals the culmi- represents the law. The statute ment under *15 process. deliberative Cam- Legislature’s nation of the provide to a Legislature’s decision eron undermined the U of M Opinion of the Court “year grace” incompetents recogni- to infants and inability legally tion until of their act their disabili- ties are removed.33 trap
Moreover,Cameron set an ironic for minors incompetents. astutely As Justice CAVANAGH noted dissent: person injured in
[I]f a is a motor vehicle accident while legally incompetent, an injuries infant and his a resolve year resolvеs, disability or more before his then \Cam- interpretation eron’s] completely of MCL will preclude person any damages that recovering from of the accident, and, completely from abrogate incurred thus claim.[34] his Legislature provision
Thus, what the as a intended preserve plaintiffs largely claims, a Cameron rendered meaningless. circumstances, In certain in- Cameron’s terpretation saving provision actually operates extinguish claim, a save it.
Finally,
represented
we consider whether Cameron
abrupt
largely unexplained departure
from
precedent.
weighs
We conclude that this factor also
heavily
overruling
in favor of
Cameron. Cameron over-
Geiger,35
Appeals
interpreting
ruled
Court
case
interplay
saving provision
between and the no-fault
Cameron,
J., dissenting).
See
act. was rule Cameron until one-year-back of the interpretation later.36 years it aside 24 unexpectedly swept noted, had of this Court Furthermore, majority one-year-back rule Cameron that the concluded before made preserved tolling. to claims We apply does we though even in Welton described decision 500.3145(1) as “two limitations on of MCL provisions recov- period one limitation on time suit and otherwise, it held ery[.]”37To the extent that Cameron Thus, firmly are implicitly also overruled Welton. we and abrupt convinced that Cameron represented from largely unexplained departure precedent. unworkable, has not summary, Cameron is often interests, reliance has caused serious engendered valid interests, prejudicial public repre- detriment and unexplained dеparture sented an and abrupt largely precedent. from conclude that a com- Accordingly, we pelling justification overruling exists for it.38
CONCLUSION
Court
We overrule our decision
Cameron and the
decision in
Entities
in MCL
Appeals’
listed
Liptow.
may bring an action
recover costs
notwithstanding
limiting provisions of
500.3145(1), including
rule. There-
nothing
Given
does
than
to its
that our decision
more
restore the law
state,
pre-2006
overruling
find
we
defendant’s assertion
Cameron
“devastating
highly questionable.
have
effects”
will
37 Welton,
-CAVANAGH, WEAVER Decisis”), JJ., “Stare concurred with HATHAWAY, Kelly, C.J.
WEAVER, J. (concurring). I sign concur all of majority opinion except the section entitled “Stare *17 Decisis.” I write separately to note addition to given the majority reasons the I opinion, also believe Ass’n, that Cameron v Auto Club Ins 476 Mich 718 (2006), NW2d 784 should be overruled for the reasons in my to dissent the Cameron decision. Id. at 104. Cameron,
In the majority give failed proper to effect 500.3145(1).1 language to the contained MCL As I my noted in dissent, “one-year-back Cameron the rule” is not a of period by limitations as interpreted the majority. Rather, Id. at “one-year-back 106. the rule” part of the statute that details to apply tolling how the provision contained in the period of out limitations laid 500.3145(1). in the first sentence of MCL Id. at 106-107. By holding that the rule was a period of
1 states: recovery personal protection An action for of insurance ben- payable chapter bodily may efits under injury for accidental year not be commenced later causing than after the date of the accident injury injury provided the written unless notice of given year herein has been the to insurer within 1 after the previously payment accident or unless the insurer has made а of
personal protection injury. insurance benefits for the If the notice given payment made, has been or a may has been the action be any year commenced time within after the most recent expense, allowable work loss or has survivor’s loss been incurred. However, any portion the claimant not recover benefits for of year the loss incurred more than before the date on which action was commenced. Opinion Concurring Weaver, J. mean- “give failed to majority Cameron limitations, 108. of the statute.” Id. at text ing to actual Cameron lack restraint of the to the of addition interpretation, judicial power majority’s use Kelly’s in this case majority opinion Chief Justice exercise majority failed to shows that the Cameron Justice and fairness. As noted Chief common sense case, resulted Kelly’s opinion in this Cameron majority minors Legislature’s saving provisions regarding in the becoming rights entities hollow governmental before year occurred more than injuries when was filed. lawsuit Young’s decisis, Justice dissent subject
On the of stare public. attempts It attempts in this case deceive together justices agree parts the four who lump previ- into had having some sort majority opinion fidelity justices decisis that those ously stated stare TAYLOR’s over- since former Chief Justice have abandoned whelming in the election. defeat state quotes past
Justice YOUNG’s dissent
various
ments,
justices signing
those
portions
made
criticizing
decisis and
regarding stare
opinion,
(former
“majority
the former
four”
Chief
*18
Taylor
and Justices
Markman).
Young,
Corrigan,
I
respect myself,
quotes
With
to
the dissent
a statement
in
disman
improper
made
to
unfair
response
law
contract
tling
longstanding
of decades of
insurance
in
v Auto
“majority
the former
of four”
Devillers
Ins Ass’n,
562;
Justice dissent uses Devillers statement my appears attempt try get what to be an to to people believe I changed my that have somehow view of stare decisis former Chief since Justice was defeated. TAYLOR misleading The dissent’s are incor- simply assertions rect.
My Devillers statement itself shows that I was criti- cizing disregard specific for stare decisis that case. My my Devillers statement is an example service to the rule of and a partial expression my law view of policy decisis, of stare which is past precedent generally that, should be followed but deciding whether wrongly precedent decided should be overruled, each case be at individually should looked on its through facts and merits judicial the lens of re- straint, sense, common and fairness. Young’s point dissent cannot to a statement
where I professed position some sort of stare regarding decisis as an immutable doctrine because I have not taken that position and therefore have no made such Young’s statements. Justice various dissents continue to mischaracterize my positions by making inaccurate statements, using partial quotations taken out of con- text, and omitting relevant information an apparent attempt to deceive readers.2
I agree with the recently sentiment expressed by Chief Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court in his concurrence to the decision in Citizens Comm, United v Fed Election S Ct US _, _; 876, (2010), L175 Ed 2d when he said people I Michigan judge my will leave it to the and determine law,judicial restraint, fairness, sense, commitment the rule of common independence. *19 289 487
312
by
Opinion
Concurring
Weaver, J.
command,”
“inexorable
neither
is
stare decisis
2472;
558,
S Ct
156
Texas,
[123
577
539 U. S.
v.
Lawrence
(2003),
formula of adher
mechanical
508]
nor “a
L Ed 2d
Hallock,
U. S.
decision,” Helvering
309
v.
ence to the latest
(1940)----If
were,
444;
604]
84 L Ed
119
S Ct
[60
wage
be
laws would
legal, minimum
segregation would be
wiretap
could
ordi
unconstitutional,
Government
obtaining warrants.
suspects
first
nary criminal
without
1138; 41 L Ed
[16
S. 537
S Ct
Plessy Ferguson, 163 U.
See
v.
Education, 347
(1896),
by
Board
Brown v.
overruled
256]
of
(1954);
686;
Adkins v.
873]
L Ed
S
98
[74
U. S. 483
Ct
394;
C.,
S
67
[43
rassment ought present that common law to —or —to judicial a conscientious traditionalist.... give graphic my feelings subject, To a illustration of on the I drunken, tend to think common a law as ancient toothless relative, sprawled prominently and a state a of nature on settee genteel party. garden Grandpa’s the middle of one’s presence is undoubtedly a only cause of to mortification the host. But since guests enough most ill-bred of would be coarse to comment on Grandpa’s presence condition, try ignore all simply concerned [Young, judicial law, him. A traditionalist 8 common confronts (2004).] Texas & Rev L Pol 301-302 4 past decade, principal by Over the tool used to this Court decide precedent when a should guidelines be is the overruled set of that was Detroit, 439, 463; (2000), laid out in v Robinson 307 NW2d opinion an written former Justice that Justices Taylor Corrigan, signed, and I I By and that have used numerous times. Young, Markman, guidelines “be-all, no means do I consider the Robinson end-all test” precedent that constitutes this Court be used this whenever Court overruling precedent. merely considers providing I view Robinson as guidelines analysis legal pertinent. this Court assist in its I when note my position way my position Devillers is in no inconsistent with case, on stare any position decisis in this nor is inconsistent with on cases, stare I have decisis that taken in such other as Robinson. Devillers “majority overruling precedent involving involved the of four” contract (20) interpretation nearly twenty years my from case that was old. In Mich Opinion Concurring Hathaway, J. decisis and end, of stare the consideration
In the always wrongly precedent decided to overrule whether applica- through rule of law service to the includes sense, restraint, common judicial and exercise tion for all. justice and a sense fairness — judicial applying law and serving the rule of restraint, sense, and a of fairness common sense join majority opin- hand, I agree case at with holding Cameron overruled. ion’s I Chief fully J. concur with (concurring). HATHAWAY, matter analysis and conclusion KELLY’s Ass’n, Club Ins overruling Cameron Auto support fully I also concur 718 NW2d in her analysis stare Justice Weaver’s decisis *21 separately express my I concurring opinion. write of decisis. thoughts on the doctrine stare own this Court amongst justices the of the debate Given the stare decisis concerning proper what constitutes I find how our United analysis, insightful it review treated doctrine. Stare Supreme Court has the States judicial is a that commands principle policy decisis the rules of for a court’s earlier decisions and respect States, Harris 536 they embody. that See v United law L Ed 2d 545, 556-557; 2406; 122 S Ct 153 524 US Hallock, 106, 119; S (2002); 309 60 Ct v US Helvering (1940). 444; preferred L Ed 604 “Stare decisis is the 84 dissent, agreed majority’s interpretation I I with that the Devillers noted incorrect, given precedent passage but of time since that the old was decided, specific precedent not disturb that Court should that was ingrained precedent longstanding the law had so because become parties reliance insurance it would harm the interests overrule entirely My position with the reliance in Devillers was consistent cases. My position guidelines. case is prong in the instant also of the Robinson prong guidelines of the since reliance Robinson consistent overruled, only Cameron, being decided four the case which is now was (4) years ago. U of M 2010] 315 by Concurring Opinion Hathaway, J. evenhanded, course it promotes because predict able, and consistent development legal principles, on judicial decisions, fosters reliance and contributes to perceived integrity actual and judicial pro Tennessee, cess.” Payne 808, 827; v 501 US 111 S Ct 2597; 2d However, 115 L Ed 720 balancing when depart need to from precedent with the need to adhere to established precedent, to bear important in mind that stare decisis is neither an “inexorable command,” Texas, 577; Lawrence 539 US 123 S 2472; Ct L (2003), 156 Ed 2d 508 nor “a mechanical formula of adherence to decision,” the latest Helvering, were, 309 US at “If it segregation 119. be legal, would unconstitutional, minimum laws would wage be and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal suspects without obtaining warrants. See Plessy Ferguson, v. first 163 1138; [16 U. S. S 41 537 Ct L Ed (1896), 256] by overruled Brown v. Education, Board U. S. 347 483 686; [74 S Ct L (1954); 98 Ed 873] Adkins v. Children’s C, Hospital 261 U. S. S L 394; [43 525 Ct Ed 785] of D. (1923), overruled Parrish, West Hotel Coast Co. v. 578;
U. S. 379
Ct
[57 S
81 L Ed
(1937);
703]
Olmstead v.
States,
United
I too believe stare decisis is a principle policy. As stated in Helvering-. *22 recognize
We important stare decisis embodies an policy. represents social continuity law, It in element of and is psychologic satisfy rooted in the need to reasonable expectations. principle policy But stare decisis is a and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the deci latest sion, recent questionable, however and when such adher 487 289 Mich
316 Concurring Opinion by J. Hathaway, embrac prior with doctrine more ence collision a involves sounder, intrinsically ing scope, in verified its experiencep[1] to stare decisis that any
I do
with
agree
approach
subject to
that it is a “rule” or “law”
suggests
implies
or
in all circumstances.
test to be used
particularized
decisis,
as the one
to stare
such
Any particular approach
Detroit,
439;
Mich
v
462
613 NW2d
taken
Robinson
(2000),
precedent”
“law” or “established
307
is not
overrule,
modify
or
its
reject,
us tо
require
would
decisis, just
stare
analysis.
Robinson
approach
300;
Corp,
in Petersen
Magna
the one taken
484
(2009),
among many varying
one
It is also worthy to note that only not has the United States Supreme Court historically not taken one single approach to the application decisis, of stare the Court has not felt compelled to discuss stare decisis in all cases precedent when is being Many overturned. landmark cases that overruled well-established precedent did not discuss or even mention the phrase “stare decisis.” For example, Brown overruled Plessy, thereby ending seg regation in our public schools, without mentioning the phrase decisis,” “stare much less articulating and fol lowing a particularized test. Similarly, Gideon v Wain wright, 335; 372 US 792; 83 S Ct 9 L Ed 2d (1963), which established rights of indigents to have coun sel all cases, criminal not merely capital offenses, overruled Betts v Brady, 455; 316 US 62 S Ct L Ed 1595 (1942), again without mentioning “stare decisis” or a particularized Instеad, test. both of these cases focused on the important policy considerations that weighed in favor of overruling precedent.6
With these principles mind, any analysis of the impact of stare decisis must focus on the individual case and the reason for overruling precedent. Thus, reasons for overruling Cameron paramount are to any articulated test and special and compelling justifi- cations to do so are overwhelming this case. As I Supreme See By Court Decisions Subsequent Decisions, Overruled available at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/048.pdf> (accessed July 28,2010), partial for a Supreme list of United States Court 2001) (covering period cases from 1810 precedent. that overrule examples Numerous additional can be found on this list of cases that do phrase not mention or despite discuss the “stare decisis” the fact that the precedent. case overrules 487 Opinion Concurring Kelly, C.J. expressed reasons well-articulated
agree
here.
them
repeat
I will
Chief
KELLY,
I
(concurring).
C.J.
authored
KELLY,
entirety.
it in its
join
in this case and therefore
opinion
Justices YOUNG and CORRIGAN
because
separately
I write
*24
I made
refer to a
off
misleadingly
to
statement
continue
ago
published by
nearly
years
two
that was
the bench
They
Free
seem to believe
this
Detroit
Press.1
insight
my motivation for
provides them
into
statement
has
subsequent case that
come
voting
every
as I have in
incorrect. To be
They
manifestly
are
before
Court.
“undo . . . the
clear,
my
remark reflected
desire to
my
as
of this Court
good reputation
done to the
damage”
tenure.2 My
the former
during
majority’s
institution
respect
to restore nationwide
only “agenda” was and is
civility.3
Court and to chart a new course of
Of
to this
His
course,
pen.
I do not
Justice
dis-
control
Young’s
1
Young
my
cited
on
at 322-323.
has
statement
numerous
Post
Justice
occasions,
my
voting
impugning
for
I did on each
motives
occasion.
485, 532;
See,
Ctr,
e.g.,
Hosp
O’Neal v St John
& Med
487 Mich
791
(2010) (Young, J., dissenting);
Mobility
Pollard v Suburban
NW2d 853
(2010) (Young, J.,
963,
Regional Transp, 486 Mich
dissent
Auth
965
(2010)
916,
J.,
Schwedt,
ing);
dissenting);
486 Mich
918
(Young,
Idalski
(2010)
Feezel,
184,
(Young, J.,
People v
486 Mich
221 n
Written serve an function in the judicial provide process: they a forum which the justices dissenting legal debate the issues raised in cases. Sometimes that debate on a focuses times, question. narrow Other the debate extends legal questions implications, broader with wider such as decisis, the doctrine of stare a particularly controversial matter.
It is secret no that the philosophical among divisions on justices now, are For deep. years Court some our disagreements legal on questions have erupted occasionally unpleasant heated and personal recrimina .4 tions. This case is a perfect example that, asked, if know both Justices YOUNG
I would agree my sentiments and would CORRIGAN deplore these justices Both fully outbursts. understand *25 story. day Justice, The after I specifically was elected Chief I was if asked referring I had my been to Chief former Justice Taylor statement. As explained: the Detroit Free Press hearing, Kelly pledged ground Outside the to seek common colleagues with her sleeping and said her comment about the on metaphorical, the bench was not meant as an the endorsement of Party attacking Taylor. Democratic ad She said she had not seen sleeping during Bell, him the the ad [Dawson case cited. Statewide-. GOP, Court, High 10 Years the Dem to Lead Detroit Free
After of Press, January 9, 2009, p 3B.] then, engage I my As I indicated will not in character of assassinations colleagues. current or former quotations by Young, post 12, accurately cited Justice at 328 n point strong language past out I have used in the criticize the former majority’s legal reasoning in various cases. But this is far different from Young’s today, purpose impugn my criticism the chief which is to reaching legal conclusions, attacking my motives in thus character. Opinion Dissenting Young, J. confi- public’s reduce the recriminations personal that and in the judges and wisdom of objectivity in the dence as an institution. Court mind, I them to re- urge these
With reflections ad attacks and utility the of their hominem evaluate confidence them. each has Surely significant eliminate arguments to allow those strength legal their in the merits, distracting on their absent arguments stand do noth- Moreover, personal their assaults props. attack us; they do legal resolve issues before ing to the Michigan the parties the to a case or citizens benefit serve. whom we these matters sincerely regret having
I address and that this were not place prefer opinion first would passively by But I and necessary. cannot stand allow me and YOUNG and CORRIGAN to accuse Justices majority” being unprincipled in the justices “new wrongly motives. Their attacks inappropriate driven and me accuse Justices WEAVER, HATHAWAY, CAVANAGH, all, many, outcomes in if not cases reaching predetermined law, do. following rather than as we are sworn to People respect judiciary only they insofar decide cases and without judges impartially believe ulterior motives. Justices YOUNG’S and CORRIGAN’s asser- have previous tions in cases that we “agenda” selecting overturning involves cer- Furthermore, tain is unfair and untrue. it precedents justices attacked and undermines both for respect those the unwarranted accusations. Most making judi- in the public reduces confidence importantly, ciary as whole. J. (dissenting).
YOUNG, Evidently, might governing what be standard is to be *26 Court, majority wisdom of a of this called unfettered 321 U of M Titan v Ins Opinion by Dissenting Young, J. case-by-case people revealed to an obedient on a basis. This only government not is of laws that the Constitu- established; government tion a of is not laws all. Scalia,
—Antonin
v
Morrison Olson1
agree entirely
I
dissenting
with Justice MARKMAN’s
in this case.
I write
opinion
separately
only to note
that,
today,
decade-long
shrill
of
pretense
several
my
colleagues’
“preserving
adherence
prece
dent”
is
concurring
opinions
over. The
Justices
Hathaway
WEAVERand
make clear
there
is no
longer any need for
to pretend
“precedent”
them
anything
majority”
sacred for
“new
of this
Court.2 That mask has now been cast aside.
After
CAVANAGH,WEAVER,
decade of
dissents
which Justices
and KELLY
the recurrent
played
they
thеme that
were
decisis,3
hawk-like adherents
to stare
attacking the then
TAYLOR,CORRIGAN,MARKMAN,and
—Justices
failing
me —for
to preserve
cases with whose results
1
(1988)
654, 712;
2597;
(Scalia, J.,
487 US
108 S Ct
322 by Opinion Young, J. Dissenting 4 an Nor longer is “issue.” today precedent no they agreed, colleague, Justice my for newest now issue precedent the although for election to campaigns her HATHAWAY, her prominently and Court featured Court this Appeals adamantly support an absolutist position proclaiming stare decisis.5 do as majority, is now free to majority, being new the majority it the new honor pleases
it
And
pleases.
them after
pledged
our new Chief Justice
agenda to which
TAYLOR in 2008:
Chief Justice
the defeat of
79;
(1990);
Jamieson,
61,
quoting People
Mich
NW2d
v
436
461
884
(2005)
622;
Ass’n,
562,
Mich
702
Club Ins
473
NW2d 539
Devillers v Auto
(“Correction
dissenting)
J.,
sake
make
for correction’s
does not
(Weaver,
why
the
not
the
should not adhere to
sense. The case has
been made
Court
case.”).
in
decisis
this
doctrine of stare
4
responses
charges
vigorous
each
to the
to these
addition
cases,
respective
gave
and
in our
justice
Corrigan,
Markman,
I—
Taylor,—
already
great lеngth,
general charge
explored, at
the
Justice Markman has
Rowland,
majority
disrespectful
precedent.
that the
was
See
former
J., concurring).
477 Mich
223-247
His conclusions demon
(Markman,
fact,
quite
opposite:
did,
prior
we
in
some
strate
the
that while
overrule
cases,
precedents
failed to
had either
follow even more established
those
appropriate
precedents
this
failed to
the
and
from
Court or
accord
meaning
of this state’s statutes
constitution.
text-based
the words
explicit
Moreover,
explaining
specifically
a test
the
we
set forth
standards
determining
overruling
by
be
which a case would
reviewed
whether
Detroit,
439;
appropriate.
v
613 NW2d
would be
See Robinson
(2000). Notably,
only
garner support
307
this test is the
test to
from
majority
Court,
majority
though all
of the new
now
of this
even
members
it,
many
alternatively,
among
varying approaches,”
as
ante at
treat
“one
See,
or,
still,
Lansing
e.g.,
not
at all.
Sch Ed Ass’n
316 worse
existent
Ed,
Lansing
Bd
NW2d 686
These standards
and,
majority
sharp
new
stand in
contrast
to the actions of the
concurring opinions today
particular,
legal
espoused
the
the
relativism
Weekly,
27,
Berg, Hathaway attacks, Michigan Lawyers
October
(“
is,’ Hathaway
‘People
know
law
said.
need to
what the
T believe
Something
drastically wrong for
must be
the court
stare decisis.
Hathaway,
”); Lawyers’
guide: Judge
Marie
Diane
overrule.’
election
Michigan Lawyers Weekly,
(quoting
October
Justice
Hathaway,
position
saying
running
Appeals,
“[t]oo
then
for a
on the Court
many
being
by judicial
are
appellate decisions are
decided
activists who
overturning precedent”).
Ins
v Titan
of MU
Dissenting
Young, J.
Opinion
Justices
Kelly
majority [Chief
the new
We
ship
get the
off
Hathaway] will
Cavanagh,
Weaver,
great deal of
course,
undo a
we will
on
shoals and back
has done.
court
Republican-dominated
damage that the
duties,
sleep
not
on
neglect
we will
only
our
will we
Not
bench.[6]
its
acting on
shy about
has not been
majority
The new
“Republican-
precedents
to “undo”
agenda
existence, the
its
months of
In the 18
court.”
dominated
on
making good
muscularly
has moved
majority
new
has
new
alone, the
in this term
Just
promise.
by this
recently decided
following cases
overturned
*28
Court:
184;
1. In People Derror, v 475 People (2010), majority overruled the new (2006). 316; 822 Miсh 715 NW2d Carrier, 180; Mich 795 NW2d 487 In v 2. McCormick Fischer, v Kreiner (2010), majority overruled 517 the new (2004). 109; 611 Mich 683 NW2d 471 Ed, 487 Lansing v Bd Ed Ass’n Lansing Sch (2010), majority the new 686 349; Mich 792 NW2d (at least) following cases: overruled Comm’rs, 464 Mich Co Bd 3. Lee v Macomb (2001); 726; 900 629 NW2d 250; Serv, 466 Mich Civil Dep’t v
4. Crawford (2002); 6 645 NW2d v Cleveland Federation 5. Nat’l Cliffs Wildlife (2004); 608; NW2d 800 Co, 471 Mich 684
Iron v Dep’t & Contractors Builders 6. Associated 117; 693 Dir, 472 Mich Indus Servs Consumer & (2005); NW2d 374 v Comm’r Council Chiropractic
7. Mich 363; Servs, Mich 716 NW2d 475 Fin & Ins Office of (2006); 561
6 She Said, 2A. December 10, p Detroit Free Press,
324 487 Mich 289 Dissenting Opinion by Young, J. Sch, Rohde v Ann Arbor Pub
8. 336; 479 Mich (2007); NW2d 737 158
9. Mich Citizens Water Nestlé Conservation v Inc, Waters North America 280; 479 Mich 737 (2007); and NW2d 447 Gill, Manuel v
10.
637;
481 Mich
11. In
Sports
455;
(2010),
Mich
487
12. majority new now overrules v Ins Ass’n, Cameron Auto Club Mich 55; 476 718 NW2d 784
And this list is
separate
distinct from those cases in
which the
majority
ignored
new
has
or otherwise failed to
other recently
follow
decided precedents
Court,7
of this
7 See, e.g.,
Saginaw
Servs,
Hardacre v
Vascular
(2009),
rence here and illustrated
recent
signed.
majority that she has
Moreover, the Chief
she
reference
very ugly
given
especially hypocritical
that
so
played
ads
“sleeping judge”
false
made to the
Chief Justice
to defeat
campaign
a role in the
prominent
remark was
that this
in
the context
2008. Given
TAYLOR
TAYLOR in the
Justice
defeat of Chief
just
made
after the
that
final comment
election,
Justice
last
Chief
Kelly’s
particularly
on the bench” was
sleep
will not
“we
former
distinguished
denigrating our
uncivil reference
during
present
Justice
was
colleague.14Chief
KELLY
falsely
it was
asserted
of the case which
arguments
knew, or
TAYLOR fell
and she
asleep,
that Chief
These
false.
known,
the claim was
should have
her current desire
square
impossible
facts are
the Court.
among members of
civility
improve
legal system
decisis],
integrity
itself
lip
[stare
the basic
service to
that,
history
this and of the vast
in the
is shaken.... So is
land, overrulings
precedent are infre
supreme
courts across
Michigan Supreme
Yet,
present
quite
opposite
true of the
quent.
that,
majority’s pronouncements to the
It is for that reason
Court.
contrary notwithstanding,
reasoned adherence
one
wonder whether
Court.”);
policy
may properly
of this
be considered
to stare decisis
(Kelly, J.,
dissenting
concurring
part
Robinson,
such issues to the public may attention. The judge majority’s whether the former majority’s or this new opinions provided greater predictability in the law and were more faithful to the language statutes, actual of the legislative whether the product” “work was disre- garded for the pet policies of the several justices who formed respective majorities. Indeed, these in a constitu- republic tional where judges elected, are it is the obliga- tion of the public just Otherwise, to do that. for the future, foreseeable public can look forward to more “damage control” in the form judicial of brash activism majority. from the new J., J.
Corrigan,
Young,
concurred with
MARKMAN, J.
I
(dissenting).
dissent from the instant
decision overruling Cameron v
Ass’n,
Auto Club Ins
Mich
718 NW2d
(2006),
which held that
no-fault automobile insurance
оne-year-back rule,
act’s
500.3145(1),
is a damages-limiting provision, not a
limitations,
statute of
and Liptow v State Farm Mut
Co,
Auto Ins
App 544;
442 (2006),
NW2d
which held that MCL
does not preclude the
application
rule.1
26, 2008,
case,
On November
appeal
this Court denied leave to
in this
Cavanagh
although Chief Justice
Kelly
and Justices
and Weaver would
(2008).
granted
appeal.
However,
have
leave to
MCL claim act, part: “[T]he provides, pertinent insurance of the loss any portion for may ant not recover benefits date on which the year before the incurred more than added.) This is (Emphasis action commenced.”2 was 600.5821(4), rule. MCL one-year-back as the known (RJA), provides, Judicature Act of the Revised part part: pertinent any brought political subdivi in the name of...
Actions recovery of the Michigan[3]... for the of the state of sion care, persons in maintenance, of and treatment cost of limitations statute of subject hospitals ... are not limitation, brought may any time without be notwithstanding. [Emphasis provisions any of statute added.] minority/insanity Cameron, Court held that the 600.5851(1), RJA, which MCL
tolling provision entirety, provides: In its recovery personal protection insurance benefits An action for injury may chapter bodily payable not be under this for accidental year causing the accident commenced later than 1 after the date of injury injury provided herein has been unless written notice of year given to the insurer within 1 after the accident or unless payment personal protection previously insur- insurer has made a injury. given payment If or a ance benefits for the the notice has been made, may any time within 1 has been the action be commenced at year expense, the most recent allowable work loss or survivor’s after However, may incurred. the claimant not recover loss has been any year portion than 1 the loss incurred more before benefits for the date on which injury the action was commenced. Thе notice of any may given required to the insurer or of its this subsection be agents by person claiming be entitled to benefits authorized therefore, give the name someone in his behalf. The notice shall ordinary language and address of the claimant and indicate in injured time, person place and nature of his name of the and the injury. [Emphasis added.] Michigan System undisputed University Health It is Michigan purposes political of the state of constitutes a subdivision this statute. 487 MICH Dissenting Opinion by Makkman, J. action,”4
addresses when one “bring [an] does not preclude the application of the no-fault automobile insurance act’s rule because the latter only limits the amount of benefits that can be recov ered, i.e., the one-year-back rule is a damages-limiting provision rather than a statute of limitations. See also Howard v Gen Motors Corp, 385-386; 399 (1986) (lead J.) NW2d 10 opinion by BRICKLEY, (explain *35 ing that the two-year-back one- and rules of the Work Disability er’s Compensation Act are not statutes of limitations).5 I continue to believe that Cameron was correctly decided. 600.5851(1), entirety, provides: MCL in its Except 600.5851(7) provided (8)], [MCL otherwise if person entry the bring first entitled to make an or an action under years age this act is under 18 accrues, or insane at the time the claim person claiming person the or those under the shall have year disability through after the otherwise, is removed death or entry bring
to make although the or period the action limitations has for in provided run. This section does not lessen the time 600.5852], [Emphasis [MCL added.] explained two-year-back As in Howard about the one- and rules of the Disability Compensation Worker’s Act: A “represents legislative statute of limitations determination period of that given reasonable of time that a claimant will be Detroit,
which to NW2d 9 160, 165; file action.” Lothian v Thus, relying very on these basic definitions of statutes of limitations, categorized. two-year-back may the one- and rule statutes not be so stated, Simply they are not statutes that limit the period may Rather, of time in which a they claimant file an action. period compensation concern the time may for which rights be awarded once determination of thereto has been made. Moreover, two-year-back the one- and rules do not sеrve the purposes typical same as do statutes of limitations. U of M by Opinion Dissenting Markman, J. of per- rule “limits the amount one-year-back The (PIP) recoverable to benefits insurance protection sonal the action was before year incurred within one those Cameron, Mich at 58 n 1. As Cameron commenced.” explained: 600.5851(1) terms, concerns
By unambiguous MCL its suffering insanity may “make person from when a minor or pertain to the entry bring the action.” It does not brought. damages once an action has been recoverable 600.5851(1) damages- is irrelevant to the MCL then 500.3145(1). provision limiting one-year-back of MCL tolling Thus, clear, minority/insanity provision in to be 600.5851(1) operate one-year-back to toll the MCL does 500.3145(1). [Id. 62.] rule of is, straightforward rule its That recovery only as a limitation on language serves which a benefits; period it does not define a within Therefore, claimant file a cause of action. limitations, not a statute of one-year-back rule is the RJA’s of what is affected scope lies outside the tolling minority/insanity provision. tolling provision of MCL tolls the *36 action”; applies “bring[ing an]
limitation that
the
however,
applies
toll the limitation that
to the
it does not
“recover[y
benefits,”
particular
limitation set
of]
the
500.3145(1).Accordingly,although plaintiff
a
forth in MCL
traditionally
perform
... The rules do not
the functions
asso-
they
operate
do not
ciated with statutes of limitations because
claim,
remedy
They
merely
a
limit the
obtainable.
do
cut off
but
may
recovery
petition
the
be filed
not disallow the action or
—a
may
response
long
injury
after an
and benefits
be awarded
granted.
they merely limit the award once it has been
thereto —
rules,
Therefore,
language
perceive
the
of the
we
on the basis of
two-year-back
characterizing
logical
reason for
the one-
no
[Howard,
Mich at 384-387
limitations.
rules as statutes of
J.).]
(lead
BRICKLEY,
opinion by
The majority apparently believes that
it is appropri-
ate to overrule Cameron because Cameron overruled
Geiger
Exch,
v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins
283;
114 Mich App
(1982).6 First,
Geiger was a Court of
Geiger], looking language the of the statute and behind understanding Legislature’s pur- focusing on its of the intent, purpose ported legislative the determined that minority/insanity tolling provision periods the behind only person’s preserve not cause of of limitations was to during period disability person’s the action the but also damage opined the statute in this claims. It that to read utility” “severely limit the fashion would minority/insanity tolling provision. The Court then con- that, policy cluded order to advance the of RJA “[i]n 5851,” minority/insanity tolling provision applies § the
prevent capping damages the under the 500.3145(1). rule of MCL ruling erroneous for the most
We believe this
was
reason;
uncomplicated
namely, that we must assume that
thing
Legislature
the
the
wants is best understood
reading what it said. Because what was said in MCL
600.5851(1)
clear,
and MCL
no less clear is
policy.Damages
only
year
the
are
allowedfor one
back from
enforcing
the
date
lawsuit is filed. We are
the statutes
may question
as written.
some
While
wisdom of
Legislature’s capping damages
fashion,
unques-
in this
it is
tionably
power
Legislature
that
has under our
injury
specific
notice of
to the insurer
that
include a claim for
does
Indeed,
Geiger
benefits.
no case other
than
has held that
minority/insanity
one-year-
tolling provision
applies
of the RJA
to the
Although
opinion
back rule of the no-fault act.
the lead
characterizes
holding
one-year-hack
apply
Welton as
“that the
rule does not
to claims
preserved by
applicable tolling
saving provision,”
and accuses
Welton,”
“implicitly overruling]
thing.
Cameron of
such
Welton held no
“[a]pplying
tolling
Welton’s statement
to both the limitation
period
period
recovery
clearly
and the
accords with common sense” is
Welton,
tolling
apply
dictum
in that case.
because Welton held
did not
Further,
judicial tolling,
Constitution. because conclusion that the minority/insanity tolling provision applies to extend the one-year-back contrary Legislature rule is to what the clearly 600.5851(1), in directed MCL and MCL Geiger [Cameron, is overruled. 476 Mich 63-64.] The majority here commits the same error that Geiger is, committed. majority That the believes that it can somehow discern the purpose of the statute from something other than its actual language, despite the fаct this Court has repeatedly held that constitutes an improper approach to statutory interpre- I explained tation. As in my concurring opinion in Cameron:
In Geiger
Exch,
v Detroit AutomobileInter-Ins
App
(1982),
J., concurring).] majority “[t]he criticizes Cameron on basis authority cited for was in only interpretation [its] concurring opinion, Justice MARKMAN’s which relied on opinion dicta from Justice BRICKLEY’s lead Howard v Corp.” very Gen Motors This statement much illus- majority’s approach statutory trates the flaw the recognize construction —it fails to that the best indica- Legislature’s tor of the intent is the language is, statute itself. That the best cited in “authority” either the concurring opinions Cameron *39 for their is the actual the interpretation language of statutes at issue. That the majority apprehend fails to principle statutory this first of interpretation suffi- in ciently speaks shortcomings analysis. to the its Finally, regard majority’s to the belief apparent it is somehow to overrule appropriate Cameron because Cameron overruled even if Geiger, Geiger were controlling precedent majority it is not —the —which errs by conflating precedents deserving all of equal respect. However, as I in explained my concurring in opinion Comm, Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd 197, 226; 41 (2007), Mich 731 NW2d “not all precedents Indeed, are built alike . . . .” “some are better reasoned others, than in grounded . . . some are the exercise of discretionary judgments and in interpreta- others the plain language, tion of some are thorough [and] their analyses superficial.” and others Id. As discussed ear- lier, while Cameron entailed a serious effort to interpret the of the language law to render our caselaw language, Geiger, consistent with this as also explained earlier, was in a principally grounded desire to advance the the policy minority/insanity tolling provision of over 487 Opinion by Dissenting Mahkman, J. rule of the no-fault act. policy one-year-back
the of the reasons, overruling Geiger For these Cameron’s can hardly equated majority’s overruling be with the entailed an to render the Cameron. The former effort caselaw of our state more consistent with intentions Legislature, while the latter renders it less quite grasped consistent. The has never the issue of stare decisis is one that cannot be viewed terms, exclusively quantitative but must also be in qualitative By indiscriminately placing viewed terms. equal footing on all decisions of this Court that overrule precedent, considering without whether each does so in order to further intentions of the lawmaker or to judge, further the intentions of the the majority com- municates well the flaws its stare understandings of judicial decisis and of the role itself.
In Liptow, Appeals, relying the Court of on this Cameron, Court’s decision in held that MCL 600.5821(4) preclude application does not one-year-back rule only because MCL ex- empts political state its subdivisions from a statute of limitations and the rule is a damages-limiting provision, not a statute of limitations. This Court appeal denied leave to Liptow, (2007), I agree with the Court Appeals’ decision. As the Court Appeals explained in Liptow: 600.5821(4) рrovides brought by that actions *40 maintenance,
state or its subdivisions to recover the cost of
care,
persons
and treatment of
in state institutions “are
subject
may
brought
to the statute of limitations and
be
any
limitation,
provisions
any
at
time without
the
that,
notwithstanding.”
statute
plain
We conclude
the
import
language,
Legislature
of this
intended to ex-
empt
bringing
the state from statutes of limitations when
public
language
action
an
to recover
funds. The
refers to
provides
may
statutes
limitations and
that an action
be
op
M
U
Dissenting Opinion by Markman,
J.
brought
any
at
time. But the statute does not address
damage
provisions
any
limiting provi-
limitation
other
words,
minority tolling provision,
In
like the
sions.
other
during
MCL
concerns the time
which the state
action;
may bring
pertain
damages
it “does not
to the
Cameron,
brought.”
once
been
recoverable
an action has
supra,
Accordingly,
The majority simply overrules because it Liptow relied on Cameron. Because I believe Cameron was correctly decided and that relied Liptow appropriately 9 Indeed, analogous сap rule be more to a on damages than it is to a statute of limitations.
340
487 Mich 289
Opinion by
Dissenting
Markman, J.
Cameron, I
Cameron or
on
would
overrule either
from
that the
Liptow.
opinions
As is obvious
the flood of
overruled,
recently
majority justices’
has
repeated self-proclamations of adherence to stare deci-
merely
they agreed
sis were
reflection of
fact that
particular
being
with the
decisions that were
overruled.
For a more
thorough
majority justices’
discussion
decisis,
past expressions
fealty
my
toward stare
see
Carrier,
180, 262-279;
dissent in McCormick v
487
(2010). However,
opinion’s
NW2d 517
the lead
reliance on Chief Justice KELLY’s
in
opinion
Petersen v
Magna
300;
(2009),
484 Mich
Corp,
NW2d
which only
joined,
Justice CAVANAGH
rather
than the
majority opinion
Detroit,
Robinson
(2000),
justices Petersen, themselves will not know this beforehand.” 484 Mich at J., dissenting). concurring justices’ “analytical Under the (Markman, approaches,” consistently applied process [wouldbe] there no . .. with which the
judge promises comply. may promise beforehand to He or she to be “fair,” fair, may and he or she seek to be but there are no rules for only promise how this fairness is to be achieved. There is judge [precedent] case-by-case basis, will address each on a using [“policy whatever considerations”] he or she believes are required suspicion simply in that instance. And the cannot be varying [“policy avoided that these and indeterminate consider- largely preferred by ations”] be a function of the outcome U of M Opinion by Dissenting Markmаn, J. is the lead go What also cannot without comment likely Cameron is “upholding conclusion that opinion’s prejudicial public to result serious detriment and, thus, weighs interests” that “this factor [Petersen] that the heavily overruling favor of Cameron.” Given *42 justices appropriate lead believe that it is consider interests,” their own their rela- conceptions “public telling regard “public tive silence is with to the inter- in the viability system. est” of our state’s no-fault It has repeatedly recognized been that because of the manda- insurance, tory Legislature nature of no-fault the in- tended that it be affordable.11 The lead opinion gives
judge
personal
parties
and
his or her
the
attitudes toward
and
Any [pertinent “policy
their
considerations”]
causes.
will be iden-
only
fact,
[“policy
may
considerations”]
tified
the
and these
or
after
resolving yesterday’s dispute,
not have been invoked in
may may
employed resolving
dispute. Any
not be
in
tomorrow’s
judge
decision;
can concoct an
for a
rationale
the
after-the-fact
judicial
however,
process,
predicated upon
is
ration-
before-the-fact
process
judicial process
place
ales. An ad
is
hoc
at all. In the
predetermined
justices]
concurring
[the
rules .. .
would substi-
[“policy considerations”]
[Id.
tute
to be determined later.
at
381-382.]
Although
many
“[t]here
Justice
is correct that
are
factors to
WEAVER
deciding
precedent,”
consider when
whether or not to overrule
equally
application
Hathaway
is
correct that the
of stare decisis
place
“case-by-casebasis,”
must take
aon
this does not obviate the need
reasonably attempt
apprise
parties,
least
and the citizens of
state,
might be,
this
these
what
factors
as this Court did in
before
fact
Robinson and as the Chief Justice and Justice
did in Petersen.
CAVANAGH
And whatever else can be understood of Justice
Hathaway’s
and Justice
“approaches”
decisis,
application
“ap-
to stare
of these
Weaver’s
proaches”
precedents
being
has
resulted
of this Court
overruled
during
precedents being
up
possible
this term alone and 6 other
teed
for
overruling during
term,
pace
dismantling
the next
doubtless a
record
the caselaw of this state.
(1984)
See,
Havlik,
е.g.,
350, 366;
Tebo v
418 Mich
NW2d
J.)
(opinion by
(recognizing
goal
primary
that a
of the no-fault
Brickley,
“provid[e]
equitable
prompt
injuries
redressing
act is to
method of
little heed to
of all insured drivers
this state.12
premiums
raise the
“MCL
also asserts
that because
majority
The
600.5821(4)
be
recovery may
lists the costs
which
[for
‘maintenance, care, and treat-
sought] as those for the
homes, schools,
and other
persons
hospitals,
ment of
”
institutions,’
“supersedes
state
all limitations
500.3145(1),
rule’s
including
MCL
words,
recovery.”
In other
period
limitation on
600.5821(4)
provides
contends that MCL
right
an absolute
to recover the enumerated costs.
however,
is that the stat-
problem
argument,
says
thing.
say
ute
no such
The statute does not
right
there is an unfettered
to recover the enumerated
Instead,
says only
costs.
that “[a]c-
brought.
recovery
tions
. . for the
of the [enumerated]
way
mandatory
coverage
in a
which made the
insurance
affordable to all
Co,
motorists”);
84, 89;
Celina Mut Ins Cov Lake States Ins
(1996)
system...
(holding
NW2d 834
that “the no-fault insurance
*43
assured,
designed
provide
adequate,
prompt repara-
victims
system”);
tions at the lowest cost to both the individuals and the no-fault
Co,
524, 547;
Farm Mut
Mich
O’Donnell State
Auto Ins
404
273 NW2d
(1979) (recognizing
Legislature
provided
that
the
has
for setoffs in
stating
first-party
“[b]ecause
the
act
that
the
no-fault
insurance
proposed by
important
compulsory,
the act was to be
it was
that the
premiums
charged by
companies
to be
the insurance
be maintained as
[o]therwise,
possible!;]
poor
disadvantaged people
low as
the
and the
of
insurance”).
might
necessary
the state
not be able to obtain the
12Indeed,
Company argued
overruling
defendant Titan Insurance
“devastating”
orderly adjustment
would have
effects on the
Cameron
of
viability”
Michigan Assigned
no-fault claims and “threaten the
of the
Facility
Michigan Catastrophic
Claims
and the
Claims Association be
nullifying
one-year
cause
the
back rule will lead
a flood of
decades-old
seeking expensive family
no-fault claims
attendant care benefits. For a
thorough
undoing
compromise
more
discussion of the stakes of
act, my
McCormick,
embodied in the no-fault
see
dissent in
487 Mich at
Fidelity Guaranty
279-287. See also United States
&
Co v Mich Cata
(On
1, 35-41;
stroрhic
Rehearing),
Claims
773 NW2d
Ass’n
(2009) (Young, J., dissenting).
Regents
MU of
Dissenting Opinion by Markman, J.
subject
. . . are not
to the statute of limitations
cost[s]
limitation,
brought
any
be
time without
is,
That
provisions
any
notwithstanding.”
of
statute
recovery
“the
of the
is in the
cost[s]”
reference to
actions are
describing
types
context of
what
of
statute of limitations —those
subject
“[a]ctions
to the
recovery
. for
brought.
[enumerated]
.
. .
.”
the statute is there any
cost[s]
. Nowhere within
Legislature
preclude any
indication that the
intended to
and all limitations on the
of
the state
money
amounts
Instead,
and its
subdivisions can recover.
be-
political
600.5821(4) only
cause MCL
to when an action
pertains
may be
it “is
to the
brought,
damages-
irrelevant
500.3145(1).”
limiting one-year-back provision of MCL
Cameron,
Plaintiffs also
was inconsistent
Liptow
Co,
Mich Regents
with Univ
v State Farm Mut Ins
of
(2002),
Mich
App
Legislature exempt political intended to the state and its Thus, [MCL subdivisions from all statutes limitation. 600.5821(4)3 exempts plaintiff from the statute limita- 500.3145(1)]. (empha- [MCL tions contained in [Id. at added).] sis
However, as the Court
Appeals explained
Univ of
Ass’n,
v Auto
unpublished opin-
Club Ins
per
ion
curiam of the Court Appeals,
issued March
(Docket
281917):
No.
Michigan Regents
[T]he
[v
decision in Univ
State
*44
limitation,”
Co]
Farm Mut Ins
concerned “statutes of
500.3145(1),
damages-limiting portion
“the
of MCL
although
tolling provision
instructs minors and insane
persons
they
year
that
are entitled to wait until one
after
legal
bring
their
disabilities have been removed to
their
actions,
wait,
they
they
only
civil
if
do
will
be allowed to
may
portion
damages
recover what
be a
of the total
[Cameron,
(Markman, J.,
incurred.
However, that, I concluded regardless my concerns thereof) (or statute, about the wisdom lack of the a judge is bound language. to follow this The same remains true here. Although to some it seem less optimal than such exempt plaintiffs entities from opinion Liptow The lead here likewise contends that Cameron and paradox” by limiting plaintiff “created an indefensible a to the “hollow right” being bring being able to a cause of action without able to any damages. interpretation recover It also states that “Cameron’s of the saving provision actually operates claim, extinguish a not save it.” However, opinion ignores plaintiff only the lead that a will be unable to damages plaintiff any recover if that has not suffered losses within the year preceding filing Contrary opinion’s of the action. to the lead contention, Liptow this does not make Cameron and “unworkable.” It just they differently justices means that work than the lead would like Furthermore, them interpre tо work. it is not Cameron or “Cameron’s saving provision” prohibits plaintiff tation of the recovering a from year filed; losses incurred more than one before the action was it is the Legislature’s adoption rule in the no-fault act. The opinion Liptow lead also states that Cameron and are “unworkable” they deny plaintiffs legal Legislature provided because “the recourse the [them], damages [they] which is ... to recover the incurred more than a year problem Legislature earlier.” The with this assertion is that the has provided Instead, right. Legislature only provided no such has certain people right bring period entities the a cause of action after the Nowhere, expired. however, Legislature provided limitations has has the people right these same and entities the to recover an unlimited amount money in those actions. 487 MICH Dissenting Opinion Markman, J. action, on but not also one-year bringing
a
limitation
action,
in that an
recovery
limitation on
one-year
from
done,
has
and it is
clearly
Legislature
that is
what
way
disapproval
in a
that is
entitled to act
viewed
judiciary.
members of the
this,
assuming arguendo that such is
relevant
Nor is
consideration,
to the extent that
an “absurd result.” Even
Michigan,16
exists in
a result
an “absurd result” doctrine
“
[the
if it is
only
‘quite impossible
“absurd”
result....’”
Id.
Legislature] could have intended the
*46
(MARKMAN, J.,
n
Pub
concurring), quoting
at 85 9
Citizen
Justice,
440, 470-471;
491 US
Dep’t
v United States
(1989)
J.,
(Kennedy,
L Ed 2d 377
109 S Ct
It is
that the
concurring).
entirely possible
Legislature
in Liptow.
could have intended the result reached
For
example,
Legislature “might
have intended these
afford-
results
order to make no-fault insurance more
Cameron,
(MARKMAN, J.,
able.”
[s]uch a have obligate lawmaker those who have expenses incurred medical to seek reimbursement on basis, relatively ongoing allowing rather than them to many years seeking compensation. wait Indeed, before might is conceivable that a reasonable lawmaker have earlier, later, wished to incentivize rather than causes of encourage action order those who have incurred expenses medical to act in a manner consistent with their self-interest, own financial and to ensure that their medical expenses expeditiously. were reimbursed (empha- at \Id. original).] sis in the “Finally, a reasonable lawmaker might have concluded problems that practical pertaining to evidence and *47 proofs in old claims required some balance between the interests of [claimant] and those of the Id. insurer.” (emphasis in the original). the majority
As “if acknowledges, one-year-back applies [plaintiffs’] rule claim, plaintiffs are entitled damages,” to no because all of their losses were “in- 1 year curred more than before the date on which the 500.3145(1). commenced,” action was Indeed, all of plaintiffs’ losses were incurred and yet plaintiffs until waited 2006 to file this cause of action. I believe, Because for the set above, reasons forth Opinion by Dissenting Makkman, J. claim, I plaintiffs’ apply rule does not recoverable. damages are plaintiffs’ conclude Court judgment affirm the Therefore, I would Appeals.
Corrigan JJ., concurred Markman, Young, J.