*1
Ins Ass’n
v Autо Club
ASSOCIATION
INSURANCE
AUTO CLUB
CAMERON v
3).
(Calendar
18,
No. Decided
Argued
October
No. 127018.
Docket
28,
July
2006.
Cameron, minor,
Cameron,
coguardians Daniel
James
Diane and
against Auto
Circuit Court
brought
in the Washtenaw
an action
Association, seeking
under the
to recover benefits
Insurance
Club
rendered to
for attendant care
insurance act
automobile
no-fault
August
The defendant moved
August
1999.
1996 to
Daniel from
claim, brought
summary disposition
basis that the
on the
for
500.3145(1) limiting the
rule in MCL
barred
the
was
protection
benefits in an action
recovery
personal
insurance
year preceding
dining
commencement
incurred
losses
Kirkendall, J.,
granted
court,
instead
N.
John
action. The circuit
saving
plaintiffs
basis that the
summary disposition
on the
for the
(RJA),
600.5851,
MCL
Act
provision in
Revised Judicature
500.3145(1)
the no-fault
period
in MCL
of limitations
tolled the
Appeals,
JJ.
(Fitzgerald,
act. The Court
Schuette,
Bandstra
600.5851(1)
reversed, holding
J., concurring),
does not
that MCL
E
500.3145(1). The Court also
one-year-back rule of MCL
toll the
600.5851(1)
apply
tolling provision
does not
of MCL
that the
held
also set
applicable
for no-fault actions
of limitations
to the
statute
(2004).
500.3145(1).
Supreme
App
The
out in MCL
appeal.
application
plaintiffs’
for leave to
granted
Court
Mich 899
joined by
opinion by
Justices
Chief Justice Taylor,
In an
Supreme
held.-.
Court
and Markman,
Corrigan, Young,
MCL
Appeals properly concluded that
The Court of
600.5851(1)
provision
in MCL
did not
toll
500.3145(1)
sought
damages
that,
here
ah
that were
because
back,
damages
year
could be recovered.
no
for more than one
were
reversing
Appeals
court’s
the trial
Court of
decision of the
summary disposition and
motion for
the defendant’s
denial of
summary
entry of
remanding
trial court for
matter
to the
However, because
disposition
must be affirmed.
for the defendant
unnecessarily
the issue whether
Appeals
addressed
the Court
600.5851(1)
tolling
rendered
of MCL
the 1993 amendments
600.5851(1)
inapplicable
of action
to causes
provision of MCL
result and minors insane a of damages Although by majority the incurred. the result the reached properly cannot be characterized as an “absurd result” for which judicial might appropriate, light limited reformation be of these concerns, Legislature holding the should the ascertain whether present this case is its consistent with intentions. part part. Affirmed in and vacated in Cavanagh, dissenting, saving Justice stated that the when RJA provision despite expiration a to allows claimant sue the the of limitations, period saving provision no-fault act’s of the has a corresponding one-year-back effect on the rule. There little to no point saving provision preserves person’s to a that a or action despite period claim fact the that the of on of limitations the cause expired, saving provision merely preserves has if action that the right papers right to damages file rather than the to recover during being impose accrued time claim the was To the saved. one-year-back limiting damages rule the disabled’s defeats the very purpose saving provision, preserving legally of the which is incompetent person’s claim, including damages, person while the disability. Legislature saving is under When enacted the provision, person’s it intended to save the whole of the disabled provision, saving judicially claim. Without those are who precluded incapable protecting legal and deemed their own rights justice. would be denied to access dissenting, disagreed one-year-back Justice that the Weaver, applied By plain language, one-year-back rule in this case. its integral part tolling provision rule is an of the contained in MCL 500.3145(1) timely for situations in which the insurer receives Ass’n Auto Club Ins Cameron v plaintiffs previously paid injury benefits. The of an notice rather, they allege tolling provision applies; raised did not 600.5851(1) defense the statute of limitations. as a issue, tolling provision rule Because the not may apply, plaintiffs benefits that accrued recover does and Appeals they year suit. The Court of than one before filed more reversed, judgment stipulated in favor should decision be plaintiffs should be reinstated. Cavanagh, dissenting, joined stated Justice Justice Kelly, Cavanagh’s dissent, but wrote she concurred with Justice majority’s interpretation creates point of the statutes out that the opinion deny majority is to absurd result. The effect an persons benefit of their causes and insane the full children monetary recovery. action, allowing an little or Such them no Legislature’s Justice result have been the intent. absurd cannot agreed also Justices with Kelly Cavanagh, Markman Weaver, part Michigan important rule is that the absurd results an jurisprudence Justice stated that and should reinstated. Kelly Mclntire, People repudiation absurd rule in results overturned, (1999), Michigan return to the Mich 147 should be majority recognize rule. states that such a vast — — — op Act *3 Limitation Actions Insurance No-Fault Revised Judicature Act. 600.5851(1) minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL operate in MCL Act does not to toll the rule Revised Judicature 500.3145(1) insurance limits of the no-fault automobile act that recovery protection personal benefits in an action insurance during year preceding losses commencement of incurred action. Pollard, Loge- & P.C. Robert E. Logeman, Iafrate (by James A. Iafrate), man and plaintiffs. for Gross, Silverman, G. Nemeth & P.L.C. James (by Schoolmaster, Killeen, Horn, Siefer, Arene & Gross), and Kramer) (by Michael G. the defendant. Hoehn for Amici Curiae: Coté, Yeager, A. Matthew
Willingham PC. John (by & ok, Letter), Leon J. Insurance Institute PayK. for Michigan. Opinion of the Court Smith) Johnson, &
Smith Louis A. Attorneys (by Coalition Auto Protecting No-Fault.
Dykema Gossett PLLC Jill M. Wheaton (by Erhardt) Joseph Catastrophic for Michigan Claims As- sociation.
TAYLOR, C.J. leave in granted We this case to deter- mine the minority/insanity tolling provision whether (RJA), the Revised Act 600.5851(1), Judicature MCL to toll applies “one-year-back rule” in MCL 500.3145(1) of the no-fault automobile insurance act.1 The Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court’s denial of defendant’s for summary disposition, motion held not, it does further but concluded that the tolling provision at issue does not apply to the applicable statute limitations for no-fault actions that also set 500.3145(1). out MCL affirm the
We Court Appeals determination that defendant to summary is entitled but disposition, on grounds. matter, narrower decide To the Court of 600.5851(1) Appeals only needed to address whether MCL 500.3145(1). one-year-back tolls the provision in MCL 600.5851(1) Because we conclude MCL cannot toll rule, damages sought and all here were back, for more year than one no damages could be recovered and that disposes of this Accordingly, matter. was dicta for the of Appeals Court to address the effect of 600.5851(1) on the statute of limitations MCL 500.3145(1) portion and we vacate ruling of its while affirming its conclusion that defendant is entitled summary disposition this case. *4 (PIP) personal protection rule This limits amount of insurance year
benefits recoverable to those incurred within one before the action was commenced. Ass’n Auto Club Ins Opinion Court FACTS
i. injury minor, a closed head Cameron, a suffered Daniel automobile when an disorder resulting cognitive in a accident, At the time of in 1996. bicycle his struck insur- a no-fault automobile maintained parents Daniel’s Associa- Auto Club Insurance defendant policy ance with 2002, In coverage. eligible for Daniel was tion under which his old, filed suit on parents his years Daniel was when rendered to attendant care PIP for seeking benefits behalf 1999. August August 1996 to Daniel arguing summary disposition, moved for Defendant one-year-back claim was barred that plaintiffs’2 500.3145(1). denied The circuit court rule in MCL summary and, instead, granted motion defendant’s Thеreafter, the circuit plaintiffs. in favor of disposition favor in the judgment plaintiffs’ entered a court by the $182,500, stipulated an amount amount of parties. which Appeals, the Court of to appealed
Defendant
tolling
under
held
Appeals
The Court
reversed.3
600.5851(1)
bringing
the date for
does not affect
of MCL
rule
or limit
an action
500.3145(1).4
therefore concluded
The Court
them,
behalf,
to
Although
parents
his
we refer
Daniel’s
filed suit on
Daniel,
“plaintiffs” for ease of reference.
rather than
App
60
This granted plaintiffs’ Court for leave to application appeal.5
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW review de novo a trial grant We court’s or denial of a summary motion for disposition.6 Questions of statu- tory interpretation are also de reviewed novo.7 As always, our when primary goal interpreting statutes is to discern the intent Legislature by focusing of the on intent, best indicator the language the Legislature adopted the statute.8
III. ANALYSIS above, As stated plaintiffs filed suit seeking no-fault automobile insurance benefits for attendant care rendered to August Daniel from 1996 August 1999. Defendant asserts that this action is barred 500.3145(1), MCL which provides relevant part: recovery personal protection
An action for
insurance
payable
chapter
benefits
bodily
under this
for accidental
injury may
be
year
later
1
commenced
than
after
causing
injury
date of the accident
unless written
injury
provided
notice of
given
herein
been
has
to the
year
1
insurer within
after the
accident
unless the
previously
payment
personal
insurer has
amade
protec-
injury.
tion insurance benefits for the
If the notice
been
given
payment
made,
may
or a
has been
the action
any
year
commenced at
time
1
within
after the most recent
[6]
Id.
[7]
[5]
Nastal v
Ass’n and one limitation action commencing an time for recovered: may be benеfits for which period on the “(1) protection [PIP] insurance personal An action *6 year after later than one not be commenced benefits must gives notice accident, written unless the insured of the date for benefits previously paid [PIP] injury insurer or the injury. made, “(2) given payment or has been notice has been If year any time within one may at be commenced the action incurred. recent loss was after the most “(3) during the incurred Recovery limited to losses is ”[10] of the action. year commencement preceding one commenced must be for PIP benefits Thus, an action gives the insured unless of the accident year within PIP received previously or injury notice of written given pay- or If notice was from the insurer. benefits commenced within action can be made, the ment was however, is Recovery, loss. most recent year of the one during year before incurred limited to losses filing of the action. filed their case, although plaintiffs
In the present
date of
after the
2002,
year
than one
in
more
complaint
that it
dispute
1996, defendant does
in
the accident
injury
previously
or
notice
received written
either
9
562, 574;
702 NW2d
Co,
Devillers,
Ins
supra
v Carriers
quoting
Welton
Devillers,
grounds
(1985),
other
571, 576;
overruled on
365 NW2d
Welton).
supra
(emphasis
paid plaintiffs benefits and that commenced their action one year within after the most recent loss was incurred. Thus, defendant’s sole is that one-year- assertion claim back rule bars plaintiffs’ because the period the plaintiffs recovery which seek for their losses is This, August August 1996 to 1999. course, period than year more one before the 2002 commencement Thus, date their argues, action. defendant and the of Appeals agreed, damages Court no are recoverable. response, plaintiffs In contend 600.5851(1) minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL applies toll the regard rule with 500.3145(1) and, damages MCL as a result, the losses incurred August between 1996 and August 1999 are disagree. recoverable. We 600.5851(1) provides part: in relevant person entry bring
[I]f
first entitled to make an
or
years
an action
act
age
under this
is under
or insane
accrues,
at the time the claim
person
claiming
or those
person
under the
year
disability
shall have 1
after otherwise,
through
entry
removed
or
death
to make the
bring
although
period
action
has run.
limitations
600.5851(1)
By its unambiguous
terms, MCL
con-
when
cerns
a minor or person suffering
insanity
*7
may
entry
“make the
or bring the action.” It does not
pertain to
damages
the
recoverable once an action has
600.5851(1)
brought.
been
MCL
then is irrelevant
damages-limiting
the
one-year-back provision of MCL
500.3145(1). Thus,
clear,
the minority/insanity
600.5851(1)
tolling provision in MCL
operate
does not
500.3145(1).
to toll the one-year-back rule MCL
of
note
Geiger
We
v Detroit Automobile Inter-
Exch,11
Insurance
our Court of Appeals reached thе
11
(1982).
App 283;
Mich Mirac, Inc, 415, 431-438; Phillips 685 NW2d *8 476 MICH
Opinion of the Court to contrary Legislature what the directed clearly in 500.3145(1) 600.5851(1), MCL MCL is over- Geiger ruled.
Because we
minority/insanity
conclude
the
toll-
600.5851(1)
ing
in
provision MCL
does not
to
apply
the
500.3145(1),
rule
we find it
unnecessary in
case to
question
this
reach the broader
whether the legislative amendments in
IV RESPONSE TO JUSTICES CAVANAGH AND KELLY Justices and KELLY choose to attack our CAVANAGH law-driven conclusion proffering why they reasons think the one-year back rule should be tolled for minors persons. they insane What should be seen as arguing that all the disciplines judges, lawyers, lay and even use people giving meaning docu- and distinguishing ments in a principled fashion be- tween potentially conflicting instruments are to be disregarded and eyes instead we are raise our page, weigh tedious who is compelling most litigant, and “effect begs intent.” This question, they answer, which no why have Legislature words the used do not do that better than their efforts to Moreover, find “real intent.” with a system mandatory automobile no-fault insurance such the Legislature enacted, has it just may be, because required work, economies to make it Legislature’s “real intent” was to set up strict rules unfortunately, that can unаvoidably but if you want insurance, no-fault sad produce some outcomes. Auto Club Ins Ass’n Cameron v Opinion Court harsh, they that are provisions If the statute that were ham- compromises undoubtedly reflect *9 mandatory the time Legislature out in the mered by enacted insurance was no-fault coverage automobile cast for the stat- Votes were Michigan Legislature. the compromises that on the basis by legislators ute not them, legislators, It for be honored. was would and interests” weigh “competing us, judges, to descrip- use Justice CAVANAGH’s “chose the result” to interests of “ignoreD do not doing In this we tions.15 insur- “protecting are not just as we the insured,”16 and court that looks to the statute should a ers.”17 Nor ignoring “weighty public charged it be with follows Moreover, “refusing to acknowl- a court is policy.”18 to two statutes19 that there is a conflict” between edge up imaginary an complicit conjuring refuse read two judge’s not a task to Similarly, it is conflict. of claims statutes, tolling one about very different in an insurance damages allowed and another about or that they that are unharmonious action, and assert a “frame of refer- special them requires to understand by of this sort Justices Reproaches CAVANAGH ence.”20 lead, betray their refuse to follow and because we Kelly misunderstanding judicial legis- profound who establish legislators It is the lative roles. exclu- legislative power statutory law because revise, amend, deconstruct, or theirs.21 We cannot sively to our responsi- and still be true product their ignore 15Post at 96.
16Id.
17Id.
18Id.
19Id. at 97.
n 10.
Id. at 98
1963,
4, §
Const
art
1.
bilities
our
theory can we not recognize
what
these undeniable
truths? The
one is that we have the
constitutional
they
enacted,
we rule
power,
raw
because
after
have
they
to honor the bargain
refuse
struck. This is an
indefensible
whose
position
illegitimacy
classically
was
outlined
Chief Justice
Marshall
the celebrated
(1 Cranch)
Madison,
case of
Marbury
5 US
(1803),
As
additional
Justices CAVANAGHand
argue
KELLY
the result reached
following the
statutory language
contend,
“absurd”
effec
tively,
we should rewrite the
order
statutes in
reach
result
that better comports with their own
*10
personal policy
or,
preferences
they
as
to
would have
it,
describe
what
the Legislature must
really
have
regardless
intended
of
they
what
it said. While
and
McIntire,
urge
Justice WEAVER
us to
People
revisit
v
(1999),
Opinion of the Court proponents that the down to is all comes this What this Court petitioned have who positions the dissents’ They go should wrong place. in the are simply assistance costs to premium the increased There Legislature. to the they the revisions occasioned of this state the drivers measured can be mandatory insurance for this seek af- things, of, among other goals important the against neither We have mandatory insurance. fordability of and we that balance authority to strike the tools nor change will proponents that the may it. It be recognize Legis- in the may or it Legislature in the prevail justify burden will not the benefits lature’s wisdom driv- more uninsured potentially and premiums increased But, changes sought. that will be occasioned ers Court, any or on this no one emphasized, it must be again, our view on balance impose to other, has warrant Legis- Legislature it law. The and make striking struck this That it has power. alone has lature as the dissents way in a that strikes past in the balance is, we as or “absurd”24 unsupported”23 “inexplicable cases, types in these here, and before explained have irrelevant. read the statutes conclusion, we have judges,
In willing are a thumb on scale. We without issue just plain It is has enacted. Legislature enforce what or hostile are indifferent imply that we wrong say recognizing are are not. We disabled. We rights them, and no Court lawgivers gave rights do more or less. should TO WEAVER RESPONSE JUSTICE
V inap- *11 in her dissent argued WEAVER Justice case. We rule to this one-year-back plicability Post Post at at 102. 103 n 12. op Opinion the Court flawed, discuss, argument believe her is as we will but that, significant problem the more with it is even if it is correct, it cannot to these She apply litigants. argues one-year-back that the rule limits the amount of dam- can in if ages that be recovered no-fault cases plaintiff beyond year able to its action one bring the date of the accident because it provided notice or was in previously paid benefits as set forth MCL 500.3145(1), and that rule does not if the time for apply bringing action was extended by application of the minority/insanity tolling provision 600.5851(1). in MCL From this she starting point, then that the one-year-back apply asserts rule does not in case plaintiffs because relied on 600.5851(1) minority/insanity in tolling provision MCL one-year to extend the period limitations for bringing the action. The record support does not seem to Justice assertion, however, plaintiffs that relied оn Weaver’s the minority/insanity tolling provision MCL 600.5851(1) one-year to toll the period of limitations 500.3145(1) that accrued on the date of merely accident rather than taking advantage of that one-year statute’s other period began limitations on the date expense. most recent allowable This because record indicates that defendant admitted that plaintiffs’ complaint was timely filed accordance 500.3145(1) with the period limitations of MCL accrued on date of the most recent allowable ex- pense because defendant had notice previ- received or Thus, ously paid benefits.25 it appears from the record plaintiffs only attempted rely on the 25 Defendant stated in affirmative its defenses that “Since notice was given, made, payment previously may has been Plaintiffs not recover (1) any alleged expenses year benefits for incurred more one than before commenced, pursuant date on which the was action to MCL 500.3145(1).” added.) (Emphasis *12 v Auto Club Ins Ass’n Opinion of the Court 600.5851(1) in MCL tolling provision minority/insanity for rule, period not the time the one-year-back to extend their claim. bringing interpreted support if could be
But even the record on the that relied plaintiffs Justice contention WEAVER’S 600.5851(1) in MCL minority/insanity tolling provision action, her their period bringing extend the in only applies rule that the conclusion period of the later advantage take plaintiffs cases where recent that at the time of the most begins of limitations This Court has consis- is incorrect. expense allowable 500.3145(1) containing three tently interpreted MCL on the of limitations: two limitations periods distinct (one half of the the first filing provided time for suit on the 500.3145[1] of MCL that starts first sentence accident, second, provided later one date of the and at of MCL starts 500.3145[1] the second sentence if the expense time of the most recent allowable the insurer has injury notice of given insured benefits), and one limitation on the previously paid (the one- may be recovered period for which benefits in the third sentence of MCL year-back rule contained 500.3145[1]).26 explanation, minimal Justice With precedent,27 that we should overrule this argues WEAVER Welton, Devillers, supra supra quoting at 576. baffling argues here that we should overrule It is that Justice Weaver Devillers, change interpretation given to MCL and Welton and 500.3145(1) years, given argues that we that she so often for over they are, erroneously simply because should leave decided cases intact Devillers, J., words, precedent.” supra “longstanding at 620 (WEAVER, her dissenting). stranger is that in Devillers this Court What is even statute, part inconsistent with the but overruled of Welton that was although ground Welton and its dissented on the Justice Weaver they wrongly they progeny be overruled because were decided should not case, however, argues long Id. In this she in effect for a time. had been part no concern whatso another of Welton with that we should overrule Moreover, for the long in effect. she lobbies for how it has been ever Mich 55 Opinion of the Court
contending that first half of first sentence only 500.3145(1) limitations, of MCL is a while the period a tolling remainder first sentence is provision 500.3145(1) the second third sentences of MCL are merely “details” of it is to be applied.28 how 500.3145(1) language of not support does Justice Weaver’s assertion second and third 500.3145(1) sentences MCL do not forth separate set periods of The reason limitations. is that the first *13 plainly an sentence states that action must be com- within year menced one of the date the of accident given unless notice is or the insurer previously paid has commonly benefits. word “unless” is defined as meaning that,” under the “except circumstances but; Thus, save.”29 “except; cases where insured given has notice or the insurer previously paid benefits, the one-year of that period limitations starts on the date accident is not as tolled Justice Rather, WEAVER asserts. plaintiff excepted period and, instead, that subject limitations separate and distinct period filing limitations suit at the starts time of the most recent Similarly, loss. because the word does a tolling “unless” not create period, one-year-back rule is not a “detail” merely a tolling is, period asserts, Justice WEAVER but as this always held, Court has its own distinct of limi- period tations. argues one-year-back
Justice WEAVER also
applies
rule
subject
actions
to the
period
later
begins
limitations that
on the date of the most recent
overruling
any analysis
engaging
of Welton and Devillers without
500.3145(1)
interpretation
practical
whether their
of MCL
defies
work-
Detroit,
(2000).
ability.
439, 464-467;
Robinson v
able.33 to utilize the last anteced- ent rule to limit the one-year-back rule’s application the manner proposed by Justice WEAVER“is consistent with the Legislature’s overarching commitment in the act, amendments, no-fault and its later to facilitating benefits, reasonable economies in the payment of thus causing the costs of mandatory auto insurance be more affordable.”34
VI. CONCLUSION
We hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision
in MCL 600.5851(1),
terms,
plain
its
only addresses
when an
may
Therefore,
action
be brought.
it does not
500.3145(1)
apply to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL
that provision
because
does not concern when an action
may
brought but, instead,
limits the amount of PIP
person injured
benefits a
in an automobile
may
accident
recover. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals reversing the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
motion for summary disposition and remanding this
case to the circuit court
entry
of summary disposi-
tion in defendant’s favor is
However,
affirmed.
because
the Court of Appeals unnecessarily addressed the issue
whether
amendments
of MCL
600.5851(1) in
Ins
524, 547;
(1979);
Attorney
404 Mich
Shavers v
MARKMAN, minority/insanity toll- that the analysis and conclusion Act, MCL the Judicature ing provision of Revised the rule of 600.5851(1), one-year-back not toll the does 500.3145(1).11 act, insurance no-fault automobile analysis majority’s on the to elaborate separately write the concerning reservations express and tо certain opinions. decision reached these (1) of this consequence I am concerned that as a decision, tolling provi- afforded protections increasingly illusory. provision This may sion become bring civil actions persons minors and insane allows legal after their disabilities have been year within one However, rule of the no- removed. persons fault insurance act allows such automobile during year incurred the one only recover those losses words, In the commencement of the action. other before minors and tolling provision instructs although until one they insane are entitled wait persons removed to legal after their disabilities have been year actions, wait, they if will be bring they their civil do may of the total portion allowed to recover what damages incurred.2 disagree opinion, I in this do with For the reasons set forth legislation or is not “ab
majority opinion’s
that whether
statement
Ante at 67.
surd” is “irrelevant.”
ordinarily
expenses
largest portion
will have been
of medical
rather than
aftermath of a covered accident
incurred in the immediate
immediately
filing
during
year
preceding
tolled cause of
younger
Indeed,
longer
period tolling— example, the
action.
(4) Finally, I am concerned that aas consequence of decision, this legal will border on malpractice for an attorney ever to recommend reliance on the the child at the time of the portion covered accident— the smaller the expenses ordinarily overall medical that will during have been incurred one-year-back period. Ins Ass’n v Auto Club Opinion Concurring Markman, acting tolling period, person minority/insanity whose person too late that may reliance learn such regard in this been protecting he is interests In compensation. years’ worth of several deprived seem to be more tolling provision would regard, this a protection. a snare than concerns, I agree end, however, despite these In the of MCL tolling provision majority with 600.5851(1) rule of MCL toll the does not 500.3145(1). mandated conclusion is I that this believe there statutes, and that of these plain language support rationale arguable least an result. More- producing reasonableness of statute judicial author- possess that I over, I do not believe might view some, including myself, impose what ity “rational,” or a more a more “logical,” more as a *17 statutes. for these “consistent” structure 600.5851(1) part: provides, pertinent MCL entry bring or entitled to make an person [I]f the first years age of or insane under this act is under an action accrues, claiming or those person claim at the time the disability year have after person under the shall otherwise, entry to make the or through death or removed although period of limitations has run. bring the action [Emphasis added.] 500.3145(1) part: in pertinent provides, any portion may for not recover [T]he claimant benefits year date than 1 before the on incurred more
of the loss
[Emphasis added.]
commenced.
the action was
which
construction
statutory
of
principle
long-accepted
It is a
conflict are to be
may appear to
which
“[s]tatutes
reconciled,
People
if possible.”
together
read
55, 68;
475 NW2d
Bewersdorf,
may
controversy
appear
statutes
Although the two
The tolling provision person allows a “bring although action has period [an] limitations long run” as as the is brought [otherwise] action within one year legal after the disability minority insanity time, At the been removed. same the one-year-back rule prohibits person “recovering] benefits any portion of the loss incurred than 1 year more before the date on which action was commenced.”
Although tolling provision temporarily delays the operation limitations, of the statute of one-year- back rule is not a plainly limitations, statute therefore is not the plainly subject tolling. As the lead opinion Howard v Corp, Gen Motors (1986) 385-386; 399 (holding NW2d the one- year- and two-year-back rules of the Disability Worker’s Compensation Act are limitations), not statutes of ex- plained: stated,
Simply they are period not statutes that limit the of time in may Rather, which claimant they file an action. period concern compensation may the time for which awarded rights once a determination of thereto has been made.
Moreover, two-year-back the one- and rules do not serve the same purposes typical as do statutes limitations. perform
The rules do not traditionally the functions they associated with statutes limitations because do not *18 operate claim, merely a to cut off but limit remedy the They obtainable. do not the disallow action or the recovery— may petition long a injury be filed after an may benefits in response they be awarded merely thereto— limit the once it granted. award has been Club Ins Ass’n Cameron v Auto by Opinion Concurring Markman, J. in- of the no-fault automobile one-year-back rule The one-year- from the indistinguishable act is surance Disability Compen- rules of the Worker’s two-year-back latter, the its As do the former serves Act. sation the a on only as limitation language straightforward benefits; not define a within period it does recovery Therefore, file a cause action. may which a claimant limitations, rule not a statute of one-year-back the the affected of what is scope and it lies outside tolling provision. minority/insanity 600.5851(1) tolls of MCL tolling provision The action”; applies “bringing an] that to the limitation however, applies it does not toll the limitation that benefits,” in the limitation “recover[y particular of] 500.3145(1). a Accordingly, although set forth MCL “bringing] not from plaintiff may prohibited be “recover[ing] action,” plaintiff prohibited more than any portion of the loss incurred benefits com- year the date on which action was before menced.” majority
I with the that the two statutes agree In the final this is compel analysis, this conclusion. Court, that the will of or conclusion reflects justices, one that the will of individual but reflects through Michigan acting their people is the majority’s conclusion representatives. one, meaning accords my judgment, reasonable laws, actual language opposed as law have but might of the been enacted language contorts, if Only ignores, was. this Court never fairly rule of the can language tolling provi- language within the encompassed sion.3 argument having “aided” me at oral describes Justice Cavanagh argument. devising fair character- an This is a
defendant alternative *19 Mich 55
78
476
by
Concurring Opinion Markman, Moreover,
unlike
I
not
Justiсe
do
believe that
Kelly,
fairly
can
by
majority
the result reached
be charac
an
terized
“absurd result” for which some
as
limited
4
judicial
be
might
appropriate.
reformation
Unlike some
only asking question concerning
ization of what occurred
if
a matter
parties
previously given thought
of the
neither
had
can be
having
party.
my questioning did,
fact,
described as
“aided” a
While
in
getting
meaning
right,
“aid”
this Court
it did
law
apparently
producing
dissenting
“aid” in
the result
desired
justices.
4 The “absurd results” rule has been described as one that asserts
always
presumed
legislature
“[i]t
will
... be
that the
intended
exceptions
language,
consequences].”
its
[absurd
which would avoid
(1868).
Kirby,
482, 486-487;
United States v
74
L
US
19 Ed 278
Supreme
consistently
United States
Court has
adhered to this rule. As
early
1819,
Sturges Crowninshield,
as
Court asserted
v
17 US
122, 202-203;
(1819),
absurdity
4 L
interpreta
Ed 529
that the
of an
departure
plain meaning
tion warranted a
from
of the words. See
Kirby, supra; Armstrong
also
Paint & Varnish Works v Nu-Enamel
(1938) (“[T]o
Corp,
315, 333;
191;
305 US
59
L Ed
S Ct
83
195
construe
glaringly absurd,
long
judicial
to avoid
statutes so as
results
been
has
function.”).
Story
observed,
[the
Justice
law’s]
has also
“Where
words
clear,
determinate,
plain,
they require
interpretation;
are
and
no
therefore,
admitted,
interpretation]
should,
all,
[such
if
at
with
great
only
necessity,
escape
caution
either to
some absurd
consequence,
guard against
Story,
or to
some fatal
1
evil.”
Commen
(5th ed), §
taries on the Constitution of the United States
405.
addition, Michigan
always
rule,
In
adhered
to the “absurd results”
apparent
McIntire,
People
147;
its
least until
v
461
reversal
Mich
599
(1999),
referencing
NW2d 102
a case
none of our
decisions in
earlier
this
regard.
early
Graves, Doug 351,
(Mich, 1844),
As
1
Green v
354
stated, “The
lawgiver
Court
reason and intention of the
will control the
“absurdity.”
strict letter of the law” when the latter would lead to
To
cases,
Campau Seeley,
57,
(1874);
name
a few
see
v
also
30 Mich
62
Labbe,
People
520;
513,
(1918);Attorney
v
202 Mich
However, the “absurd results” rule must not be merely disagreement, invoked is whenever court strongly felt, however the policy judgments with This, in Legislature. judgment, essentially my what Justice here sub CAVANAGH does silentio and what expressly. Although Justice KELLY does here the Court’s holding in this case maintains a law within our state contrary which seems to me most I rational, and although have doubts concerning whether individual Legislature members of the 71st law,5 had in genuinely mind this I do believe that a lawmaker conceivably reasonable could have intended these results. lawmaker,
Such a
for example,
have
might
intended
these
results
order to make no-fault insurance more
See
affordable.
v State Farm Mut Automobile
Griffith
(2005)
Co,
521, 539;
Ins
NW2d
(stating
always
this Court has
cognizant
been
the potential problem
“cost
containment
for this
mandatory coverage” when
interpreting
no-fault
*21
act), citing Shavers v
402
Attorney General,
554,
Mich
(1978)
599;
Conceivably as insurers, and solvency to maintain the have intended *22 Concurring Opinion Markman, J. ability to enhance their to undertake planning, future by protecting them from multimillion dollar lawsuits many years filed after medical have expenses been incurred, relatively after month- manageable been expenses develop to-month have allowed to into extraordinary more decade-to-decade Such a expenses. might sought obligate lawmaker have those who have incurred medical to seek expenses reimbursement on a ongoing basis, rather than relatively allowing them to many years wait for seeking before In- compensation. deed, it that a conceivable reasonable lawmaker might earlier, have wished to incentivize rather than later, encourage causes of action in order to those who have incurred medical expenses to act a manner self-interest,6 consistent with their financial own and to expenses ensure that their medical were reimbursed expeditiously.
Finally, reasonable lawmaker have might concluded that practical problems pertaining to evidence and proofs in old claims some required balance between the interests insured and those of the insurer. I am inclined to believe the principal purpose of the minority/insanity tolling provision tois afford mi- persons nors and insane an to be opportunity made whole litigatively once their disabilities have been re- However, moved. I what discern as principal pur- pose of the tolling provision cannot be allowed to trump language. its actual To allow such a would result enable judge impose on law his own сharacterization of its “purpose” unstated and trump the actual words of 6 Indeed, tolling provision play it seems certain that the come will into only very portion minor/insanity expense small of all medical no-fault cases, timely, most claimants file will actions on a “untolled” basis, expenses because whoever has incurred on of a behalf minor or person being insane will have an financial obvious interest in reimbursed expenses possible. expeditiously for such as Ass’n v Auto Club Ins Concurring Opinion Markman, J. believe, I it must assumed that Instead, the law. *23 “purpose” of the better address the actual words these divined the broad characterization than some statute tolling provision language judge.7 of the The actual right “bring [an] merely preserves action”; what- the to might suppose in the minds of to have been ever I might speculate legislators, and whatever I individual says nothing purpose law, the law of this as the itself protected person litigatively making the whole. about Although tolling general purpose is to of statutes the beneficiary action, of the whole his cause render purpose precise this this issue in case is whether one-year-back is, here, as a remains intact where there one-year-back applicable equally rule.8 The an rule— interpretative by majority accommodation reached provisions, approach gives meaning to both while the give present meaning no in the would dissents one-year-back to statute or the context either “bring language tolling in the the action” statute. Geiger Exch, 114
In
v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins
(1982),
App
283; the Court
NW2d
tolling
minority/insanity
provi-
Appeals
that the
held
one-year-back
of the no-fault
does toll the
rule
sion
course,
“purpose”
problems,
of the
a focus on the
One
with
statute,
language,
opposed
its
the former can he
as
to
actual
widely
If the
different levels of remove from
statute.
characterized
tolling
compelled
“purpose”
its
of the
statute is not to achieve the ends
words,
“purpose”
period
plain
to toll
instead
limitations
is the
place
regard
Is it to
minors and insane
for other statutes?
without
position
filed
for
persons in an
others
have
claims
identical
with
who
immediately
expenses?
expenses
upon incurring
it to
such
Is
medical
persons
litigative opportunities
file
optimize
for minors and insane
to
good things
persons?
generally
Is it
to do
for minors and insane
lawsuits?
statutory
only
one-year-back rule. See MCL
I am aware of
one other
(the
418.833(1)
Disability
one-year-back
Compensa
rule of the Worker’s
Act),
opinion.
this
There is no decision of
tion
referred to earlier
this
any applicable tolling provision.
reconciling
provision and
Court
automobile act. insurance reason it gave reaching contrary such conclusion is that “[a] severely utility rule would limit the of the minority saving provision. ...” Id. at 291. I do not necessarily disagree tolling with that not Geiger one-year-back may rule “limit the utility” tolling provision, well perhaps “severely,” even but that is what happens often are when there statutes that are in tension with one can argued another. It be just easily that to do the rule, to toll opposite, one-year-back be would to “severely limit the utility” rule. Indeed, it can argued toll the one-year-back merely rule is not “severely utility,” limit its but do greater damage it even by vitiating language its alto- end, gether. In the the Geiger rationale is not even a *24 legal all; rationale at it rather, is little more than a by statement majority Geiger preferred that it a different statute than the one actually by enacted Legislature. In regard, is this it no different than the dissents in this case.
This Court the authority lacks to alter a statute simply because it is confident that such alteration will better fulfill supposed some purpose. While I believe an Court has obligation to avoid genuinely results,” “absurd a statute that simply is well- less a crafted than judge believes it could have been is not for that reason “absurd.” Something is “absurd” as a law, matter of justifying the extraordinary remedy of judicial reformation, only “utterly if it is obviously or senseless, illogical, untrue; to all contrary reason or sense; common laughably foolish or false.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary Justice Sca- lia has being described results as they “absurd” when “unthinkable,” are “bizarre,” or “startling.” v Green Co, Laundry Bock 527; Machine 490 US 109 S Ct (1989) 1981; 104 L Ed (Scalia, J., 2d 557 concurring); v Auto Club Ins Ass’n Concurring Opinion Markman, J. Inc, Service, & Garage v Ours Wrecker City Columbus Ed 2226; 153 L 2d 430 424, 450 n 122 S Ct 536 US (2002) He (Scalia, J., dissenting). has described stat- meant “cannot have been as when it ute “absurd” mean” it what literally,” rationally... or when “cannot Green, supra it mean. 528.9 seems to contrast, effectively Justices CAVANAGH KELLY, merely imper- one that is define as an “absurd result” merely to im- flawed, susceptible one that fect or is, Unencumbered, as this Court provement. compromise branch to engage need of the many social in- give-and-take competing between an terests, and KELLY invoke “ab- Justices CAVANAGH legisla- that the simply results” rule on basis surd view, what, in is a law produced tive their process than it “consistent” and less “effective” less could have been. above, however, there are a number of explained
As intended the Legislature might have why reasons actual lan- derogated. Because the Geiger statute that minority/insanity of the tolling provision guage of the no-fault does not toll the rule RJA act, and because such result automobile insurance “absurd,” I that this fairly cannot be said believe (5th ed) Dictionary “absurdity” “[a]nything Black’s defines Law unnatural, irrational, or inconvenient cannot be whiсh is so ordinary supposed to intention men of intelli have been within the variety gence There of alternative formulations of and discretion.” are a See, Harrelson, 55, 60; e.g., 282 US “absurd results” rule. Crooks *25 (1930) (“so 49; general gross to the moral 156 shock S Ct 75 L Ed 2d (“so monstrous, sense”); Sturges, supra at 203 that all common or hesitation, rejecting application”); would, in the unite mankind without impossible Citizen, (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“quite supra at 471 Public Green, result”); supra Legislature] the at [the could have intended (“can’t Green, J., (Scalia, says”); supra at 527 it 511 mean what (“an concurring) disposition”). unthinkable Concurring Opinion Markman, J. authority
Court lacks the to reform this statute and to it contrary language.10 construe in a manner to its end, In the I cannot read the minds of those who the I question, enacted two statutes do not profess to may secretly understand what have been harbored in The these minds. most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the actual words the statutes are “the best indicator of Legisla- Fischer, 129; intent.” 109, ture’s Kreiner v For NW2d the reasons set forth above, the actual words the two statutes here lead me agree to with majority minority/insanity provision tolling does not toll the However, rule. also the reasons set above, forth I respectfully would urge present Legislature to review opinions this case to ascertain whether holding Court’s is consistent with the Legislature’s present intentions. approaching Justice who insists on the instant matter from Kelly, perspective second-guess of one authorized to branch, inquires, post legislator at 130 n “What would find by leaving reasonable reduce the cost of insurance children and the added.) recovery injuries?” (Emphasis insane with little or no for their opinion, As I have made clear I doubt that I would if I awere legislator, but, and it seems that neither would Justice Kelly, course, legislators. Bather, judges. Therefore, arewe not we are proper inquiry rather, quite is not that of Justice but “Is it Kelly impossible quite legislator or is it unthinkable that a would enact this legislation?” See, Citizen, Green, e.g., supra supra Public at at 511. by ignoring virtually every Justice Kelly, conceivable rationale for 600.5851(1) majority opinion, set forth in this and in the beyond recognition, transforms the “absurd result” rule all but through indefensible, her characterization of this law its most defensible, obligated judge, rather than at its most as she do as a inappropriate willingness judgment demonstrates an to substitute her Legislature. Legislature for that is entitled to make dubious policy judgments myself, being thereby without Justice Kelly, authorized act as lawmakers-in-chief. *26 Ins Ass’n v Auto Club Opinion by Dissenting Cavanagh, J. essentially the case is (dissenting). This CAVANAGH, attempt to further of defendant’s installment1 second to having pay and other insurers immunize itself injured insured— to their owed indisputably benefits premiums with diligently paid policy who have people injured, their thаt, they should expectation the expenses. them for all allowable insurer will reimburse who had targeted people in Devillers defendant While case, delay, of insurer not filed because suit legally incompetent. and the targets infants defendant the automo- 500.3145(1), a no-fault provision act, is known as the contains what bile insurance states that when “one-year-back provision rule.” The a claim for plaintiffs injury insurer on notice of an year after reimbursement, plaintiff the has one expense incurred to was expense the most recent allowable bring expenses. an to recover accident-related action the cannot provision also states that claimant any portion of the loss incurred “recover benefits for the on the action than 1 before date which year more latter that portion commenced.” Id. It is that was one-year-back known as the rule. Devillers, a of this Court held that supra, majority
In
from recov-
prevents
plaintiff
rule
deadline
ering expenses
one-year
incurred before
filed is
has not been
because
even when
reason suit
yet
plaintiffs
has not
denied
company
the insurance
words,
gave
In
insurers an
majority
other
claim.
to an insured’s
delay
invitation
open
responding
can profit
so that
it
long
claim
however
wishes
people
going
are
prudent
from the fact
most
hearing
from their
into court before
least
rush
denied.
their claim
been
company
insurance
Ass’n,
(2005),
Club
Devillers v Auto
Ins
NW2d
was the first.
Normally, submitting insurer, after claim to Devillers, insured waits for a if response. But under unwary thus, person nothing and, hears does not file — a year, suit —for over loses the person right collect one-year period benefits accrued before the preceding Turning eye suit.2 a blind to the no-fault act’s goal reducing litigation, majority categorically *27 onslaught ensured an resource-wasting peremptory previously lawsuits that were unnecessary under Lewis Exch, Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins a (1986), NW2d 167 case that had effectively balanced rights insurer and the insured for nearly 20 years. on Devillers,
Close the heels of argues defendant now 600.5851(1), that MCL a provision Revised Judi- (RJA) cature Act that preserves the claims of minors year and the insane until one after the disability is removed,3 brought should not to claims apply under the no-fault differently, act. Stated argues defendant plaintiff diligently pursues response if Even the from the insurance company actively negotiating insurer, or is with the the result is the year, same. If the insurer holds out for over a in reduction owed begins. benefits provision states: (7) Except provided (8), as otherwise if subsections and person entry bring first entitled to make an or an action under this years age accrues, act is under 18 or insane at the time the claim person claiming person year or those under the shall have disability through otherwise, after the is removed death or to make entry bring although period or the action of limitations has provided This run. section does not lessen the time for in section 600.5851(1).] [MCL 5852. derangement “Insane” is defined as a condition of mental such prevent rights comprehending as to the sufferer from or she he is dependent otherwise bound to know and is not on whether or not person judicially [Id. has been declared to be insane. 5851(2).] § Club Ins Ass’n v Auto Opinion Dissenting Cavanagh, J. inability to un- infancy injured person’s an despite from the excepted rights, person derstand his 500.3145(1), saving provision so the rules meaning- protect groups these crafted specifically Thus, argument, infants under defendant’s less. “wait” for more than one who legally incompetent precluded owed them are damages to file year suit incurred outside the one- recovering damages all Apparently, their precedes filing. year period view, no reason to distinguish there is defendant’s their full faculties from age and with people between being legal under those who have misfortune disability. argument, at oral defen-
Aided Justice MARKMAN argument on devised an alternative eventually dant briefing argu- accepted supplemental we which theory, argues defendant ment.4 Under this alternative the RJA not reach the issue whether that we need the damages because all the no-fault act applies were incurred before the this case plaintiff requests then, no logic, Under defendant’s one-year-back period. *28 objects my characterization of his statements Justice Markman to certainly asking “aiding” party party. a no bar to a While there is case, legal theories, particular in this counsel for about various disagreed explicitly in his brief to this Court at oral defendant argument any made distinction could or should be between that one-year-back of and the rule in context of statute limitations Clearly, then, saving provision defendant MCL 600.5851. under of prevailing legal precedent accepted that stood and as sensible preserve incompetents claims in to their full minors and allowed longstanding rule a “claim” encom no revisit the saw reason to lawsuit, ability filing to passed only a but also the the mere of words, alleged damages to In counsel saw no all be owed. other recover Rather, to, not, challenge law. counsel endeav settled reason and did being persuade settled law after this Court to overturn ored to seeing golden opportunity a do so into to “aided” Justice Markman sequence peculiar successfully. of context that I find It is in that disconcerting. events Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, are for
unique underage considerations made or men- tally insureds with to incompеtent respect the no-fault on damages. words, act’s rule In other if person even incapable, by disability, is virtue his protecting rights by his bringing suit until disability removed, person prevented is is still from recovering any damages that were incurred than a more year before date the does person manage bring suit.
Having already assisted the defendant’s coup cutting off when the benefits defendant’s delay own the impetus plaintiffs for a delay suit, in filing see Devillers, supra, the majority now approves cutting off owed benefits not plaintiffs because lack dili- gence and not in even the face of delay an insurer’s tactic, but simply because it to drastically chooses curtail protection provided by Legislature for infants and the incompetent. majority issue the today dismisses finds its
genesis in v Calhoun, Lambert 229 NW2d In Lambert, this Court held that the RJA’s saving provision applies causes of action created statute, even when the statute sets forth its own period. limitations When this Court in determined there was no indication that the Legislature in- tended saving provision to apply only to common- action, law causes of it explained as follows: desirability The need and saving in one case are the same as in the other. or persons Infants insane are under disability the same whether their actions be common-law statutory; generally defendant one case no greater need than the defendant in the protection other of delay commencement the action. We are unable distinguish the two or to Legislature cases ascribe to the [Lambert, such an supra intention. at 191.] *29 Club Ins Ass’n Cameron v Auto Opinion Dissenting Cavanagh, J. right of comparing the the Lambert Court was While action cause of bring to a common-law person a disabled lack one, the right bring statutory a to to person’s that course, is, of distinguish the two to between reason a bring capacity to person A without universal. bring to capacity without equally claim is common-law Likewise, capac- person a without suit under statute. other act is without bring equally suit under some ity to the no-fault act. bring suit under capacity the subsequent in a case when As much was found provi- saving held the Appeals explicitly Court of the act. Rawlins v Aetna Casu- no-fault applies sion 268; Co, App & 92 Mich 284 NW2d alty Surety (1979).5 the examining interplay Further the between act, and the no-fault the Court saving provision Exch, Inter-Ins Geiger Detroit Automobile Appeals, (1982), discussed App 318 NW2d limita- one-year act’s purposes period no-fault rule, saving tions, the RJA’s its In detailed the reason- provision. analysis, panel its saving its ultimate conclusion when the ing behind claimant despite expiration allows a to sue provision limitations, saving period of the no-fault act’s one-year- effect provision corresponding has a on thе back rule: now, language holding despite amendatory disturb I would not changed person make an “if the first entitled to
the RJA that clause entry entry bring any person an action” “if the first entitled to make or added.) plaintiffs (Emphasis bring ...” As an action under this act. courts, jurisdiction prescribes explains, “The RJA brief procedural guidelines jurisdiction, our and various other within basis justice system. prescribes disputes It also a method for to be resolved civil 600.1901, through filing Specifically, the RJA of a civil at MCL action. by filing states, complaint court.’ with the ‘a civil action commenced brought Therefore, procedure civil that all lawsuits filed are it is basic i.e., act,’ ‘under this RJA.” Mich 55 *30 Opinion by Dissenting Cavanagh, act, 3145(1), First, § things.
The no-fault two it does an provides [personal injury that action to collect PIP year protection] within benefits must be commenced one of period after the date the accident. The is if a tolled given year. proper notice to the within insurer one Second, may provides that a claimant ben- recover year efits for than losses incurred more one before the date the action was commenced. discussion, §
From the above we know that RJA 5851 injured during minority allows an insured who is his year attaining age commence an action within one after majority, notwithstanding one-year of period that the of 3145(1) § expired. limitations in question The under present § consideration is whether RJA 5851 that allows person expenses to collect PIP for benefits all and losses accident, incurred from the notwithstanding date of 3145(1) generally recovery § that precludes expenses for year prior and losses incurred more than one to the date the action Although was commenced. is apparently this a question impression, of minority first we that believe saving provision apply § of RJA 5851 should to the “one year 3145(1), one-year § back” rule as well to the period of limitations therein. one-year
The
purpose
period
of limitations is to
encourage
persons acting
claimants or
on their behalf to
bring their claims to court while those claims are still fresh.
Co,
App 663;
Burns v
Auto-Owners Ins
279 NW2d
(1979),
Co,
v
App 83;
Aldrich Auto-Owners Ins
year
As the person’s a preserves that saving provision to a point period that the the fact despite “claim” “action” or if that expired, action has the cause of limitations on to file merely right the preserves saving provision damages that to recover right than the rather papers being “saved.” time the claim was during the accrued intended not have surely would Rather, Legislature the a for under people saving provision a hollow to enact the sliver, any, a if only “save” disability which would rule as interpret To claim.6 disabled’s very pur- defeats damages limiting the disabled’s a incom- legally preserving saving provision: of the pose is the nature of which very claim —the petent person’s par- a is under person damages seeking —while disability. ticular concurrence, person if a correctly by in his noted Justice As Markman legally or an infant injured accident while in an motor vehicle disability year injuries before his a or more incompetent, resolve and his 500.3145(1) will majority’s interpretation resolves, then the damages recovering any of the person completely preclude from that abrogate accident, and, completely his claim. thus incurred from by Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, J. my
The finds as as that majority reasoning, that well panel, solely of the Court of is based on Geiger Appeals personal preference and not informed the rules of statutory by creating saving provi- But construction. insane, sion infants and the the Legislature has conveyed important its conviction there is some that reason to individuals in these protect groups —some characteristic sets these individuals apart giving By very merits them treatment. unique its exist- ence, saving provision recognizes that infants and the mentally differently infirm should be treated than applies. presence others whom statute saving provision on the statute books is unrivaled of legislative evidence intent to the claims of “save” disabled, and it is our obligation to discover what “save” means. endeavor,
Should one undertake this
one would find
that a saving provision
preserves
the claims of the
legally disabled until
disability
their
removed cannot
be dismissed
a mere
Rather,
whim.
saving provision
necessary
is a
counterpart
to the rule
created
Court
prohibits
minors and the
incompetent
bringing
on
lawsuits
their own. MCR
2.201(E)(1)(b).7
rule,
Under that
minors and incompe-
tents who
pursue
wish
cause
action have no
choice but to be represented by a
conservator
next
friend.8 Through
saving provision of MCL
600.5851(1),
Legislature
has recognized
*32
prohibited
that this
is
group
suing
own,
on its
but
incompetent person
If a minor or
does
have a
conservator to
represent
person
plaintiff,
appoint
the
competent
as
the court shall
a
responsible person
appear
behalf,
next
friend on his
and the next
responsible
friend is
for the costs of the action.
appointment
persons
disability.
The
of these
does not remove the
Erhart,
(1983),
App
Rittenhouse v
everything is
there are
exists and
that a conflict
utes reveals
could be resolved. Not
in which the conflict
ways
several
recognize
so much as
majority
refuse to
only does
case that
to this
conflict,
it chooses
resolution
*33
In *34 600.5851(1). By the character MCL true of considers function, “tolling” as a having the statute portraying incorrect conclusion. misguided into an majority the is facially it rational to although seem may This is because cannot “toll” some- “tolling” provision that a conclude limitations, one-year- of the thing period other than a rule, 600.5851(1), “tolling” provision. a MCL is not back a through Legislature granted It a statute which the is and “year grace” legally incompetent to infants the inability act until their recognition legally of their to App Honig Liddy, disabilities are removed. (1993).9 to 1, 3-4; year grace This acts NW2d claim, not limita- person’s period “save” a “toll” the words, the the tions that to claim. In other applies a saving does more than defeat provision periоd the claim preserves protected person’s limitations. It abrogation. prevents and the same total there is conflict By refusing acknowledge to 500.3145(1) 600.5851, MCL the MCL and between case; it holds that majority open-and-shut this an finds 500.3145(1) otherwise, say MCL the because does might to those who other- one-year-back applies rule This, asserts, it is protected by MCL 600.5851. wise be 9 Notably, majority acknowledge to its refuses mischaracterization saving provision, insisting calling “tolling” provision. This on it a obstinacy majority’s analysis it and renders inaccurate. derails the recognizing Perhaps majority differ favors this course because design tolling saving provisions and effect ences between the require actually engage straightforward discussion it to in a would one-year-back operation saving provision regarding rule. on Mich 55 Opinion by Dissenting Cavanagh, J. majority’s
“plain unambiguous.”10 conclusion First, must be for several reasons. questioned MCL 500.3145(1) explicit contains no statement rule in the applies same manner to 600.5851(1) persons under whose claims are saved it those as does to whose claims are not saved. Nor does saving any provision explicit contain statement merely right papers alleging saves to file damages, but not the to enveloped right damages. collect those Likewise, that, context, there no indication in this right bring to a “claim” the right does not include to sue damages Thus, for all incurred. when read in conjunc- tion 600.5851, must, genuine with MCL as we ques- tion regarding arises whether the Legislature viewed the right to recover damages encompassed within the broader to right bring suit when it crafted the saving provision saving provision that the operate so would preserve a entirety. claim its And because reasonable minds can differ harmonizing with respect these two provisions, their interpretation open legitimate *35 Labeling debate. “personal preference” this as is noth- ing more than a way convenient to dismiss sound legal analysis.
Oddly,
majority
chastises me
examining
both
statutory provisions, apparently preferring to ignore
one of them. See ante at 64. It claims that there is no
recognized
statutory
method of
construction that per-
10
observed,
astutely
As
‘plain
unambigu
this Court
“What is
and
depends
ous’ often
on
one’s frame
reference.”
v Bd
Ed
Staffer
(1974).
Gibraltar,
190, 194;
majority’s
393 Mich
100
476 Mich 55
Dissenting
by
Opinion
Cavanagh,
then,
Considering
together,
two statutes
our
must
job, we
determine whether the “action” and
600.5851(1)
by
“claim” that is saved MCL
encom
pass
right
damages.
to collect
The word “claim”
has been discussed
this Court
times
many
over the
century.
instance,
For
past
v Bd
Allen
State
Auditors,
324;
(1899),
“1. The operative giving right facts rise to a by a enforceable court.... 2. The of an existing assertion right; any right payment equitable remedy, or to an even contingent provisional.... if money or 3. A demand for property right.... to which one [Black’s asserts Law (7th ed).]” Dictionary In short, then, a claim means a a “demand[] nature,” pecuniary a “right payment,” and a “de- mand money.” These definitions suggest when incompеtent’s minor’s or “claim” is saved MCL 600.5851(1), it is that person’s demand for monetary right relief and preserved. obtain that is *37 Ass’n Auto Club Ins by Opinion Dissenting Cavanagh, J. indeed for ironic that it would be noting It is worth particular for these trap set a to have Legislature the as a trap the disguised to have and groups people majori- the exactly that is what But measure. protective rely to choose For when one would holding implies. ty’s that one’s saving provision promise on the clear disability after the year one until preserved claim is that, certain in to find removed, one would come extin- actually circumstances, saving provision the opinion. n 6 of this claim, it. See the not saved guished conclude that when above, I would Given indeed saving provision, enacted Legislature person’s the whole of disabled to save intended right bring to severely devitalized claim, merely not a are those who saving provision, the claim. Without incapable protecting deemed and judicially precluded to justice, be denied access rights would legal their own who unchallenging. Insureds I find this conclusion so are, under- full mental faculties and age possess are of time filing within a capable of suit standably, deemed all right their to recover preserve frame that would 500.3145(1). If an insured owed to them. MCL damages suit, the has seen Legislature to file nonetheless waits damages recover ability to fit to limit the insured’s price This is the the lawsuit.11 Id. the year preceding insured, capable presumably an that is exacted when entirety preserve in a manner that would filing suit damages, does not do so. of his abrogation saving provision prevents a But when claim, and when disadvantaged person’s legally aof an insured why reason statutorily recognized there is a recovery equitable preclude course, it is I do not believe that Of notify by its filing failure to delay caused an insurer’s suit is when the Devillers, supra at 594-620 See has been denied. that a claim insured J., dissenting). (Cavanagh, Mich 55
Dissenting by Opinion Cavanagh, suit, file e.g., infancy insanity, why not does a full person precluded recovery should the same manner in which a who is person culpable both suit in bringing timely manner and is not under who disability is inexplicable by unsupported language. choice, with a statutory majority Faced prohibitively chooses a narrow construction results sanctioning persons whom this Court has deemed Legislature unable suit. The recognized the need file layer protection for an additional for infants and the incompetent provided one saving claims of these until act persons they can their unencumbered *38 Nonetheless, disabilities. the majority returns infants and incompetent the to the same those footing as not so afflicted, only but under the act, no-fault because the believes one majority legitimate cоnstruction of these is possible. statutes As difficult it is for the majority accept, recognize I legitimate would another construction and choose the one that both avoids abro- gating the claims of minors and legally incompetent the Legislature’s effectuates intent. contrary “[A] holding unjustifiable would constitute tampering with the significant public clearly policy reflected MCL 600.5851(1) protection and preservation of the —the rights substantive mentally of [minors and] incompe- tent persons.” Paavola, supra at (discussing 14-15 why the appointment guardian of a negate does not saving provision).
In discussed, addition to the I already reasons would also give weight to the fact that the latter construction has gone unchanged by Legislature Geiger, since drastically Had we supra. misconstrued the Legisla- meaning ture’s and created turmoil in the no-fault system by allowing infants and the incompetent their court, day in certainly Legislature would have seen fit that grave to correct error. ASS’N V AUTO CLUB INS CAMERON Opinion by Dissenting Cavanagh, J. the disabled rights for the majority’s disregard the full effect
—indeed, right of their abrogation cursory manifest system judicial of our —made law, immensely unjust overruling years of the purpose discords with And the result sad. be ob- and what should protection. Cogent, legislative issue vious, extending protections reasons for recognized by have been require them persons who of a nearly quarter and honored for Legislature saving the reconciliation century. So sensible was that defen- in Geiger with the no-fault statute provision challenge it until such challenged never dant itself But the argument. at oral to defendant suggested was the legis- proclaims omnipotent percipience majority completely while intent lative behind 500.3145(1), function of into the any inquiry purpose disregarding to this And for those attentive saving provision. that the decisions, surprise it come as no should Court’s from its to distract the reader again chooses majority unsupportable incorrect and legal analysis defective merely promot- are disagree that those who accusations ing personal agendas. their own door to the courthouse that the
And so is
precluded
judicially
made wider
those
—legislatively
slammed
today
judicially
been
bringing
suit —has
reasons,
I respectfully
these
dissent.12
shut. For
*39
Kelly concludes,
majority’s
Further,
in this case
result
as Justice
catalog
peruse
need
Justice
is absurd. One
Markman’s
majority’s analysis
on this
to he convinced
that
from the
absurdities
flow
majority’s analysis
Thus,
point.
that
I concur
her conclusion
intolerably absurd results.
fosters
thorough analysis
Moreover,
fully
Kelly’s
with Justice
concur
I
validity
tool of
results” doctrine as a
pertaining
of the “absurd
to the
view,
always
I take this
statutory
I have
held this
While
construction.
participate
disavowal of
erroneоus
opportunity
in the overdue
The Court of Appeals reversed. The majority affirms, holding that under the “one-year-back rule” in MCL 500.3145(1) of the no-fault automobile act, insurance plaintiffs may not recover damages incurred more than one year before they filed suit. The majority further holds the saving provision in 600.5851(1), which preserves the claims of minors and the insane until one year after the disability removed, does not apply to the one-year-back rule.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding and analysis.1I would hold that the one-year-back rule, MCL 500.3145(1), in the no-fault automobile insurance act does apply in this case because the tolling provisions 3145(1) found § are not applicable. Because the one-year-back rule does not apply, plaintiffs may re cover benefits that accrued more than one year before they filed suit. repudiation of the "absurd accomplished results” doctrine this Court
People McIntire,
(1999).
v
461 Mich
The sentence any for of the loss may portion ant not recover benefits date on year incurred more than before the which commenced,” origin “one-year- action was is the before us. back rule” that is at the heart of case sentence, majority “one-year-back The treats this rule,” period limitation on the for which separate as a an incorrect may be recovered.2 But this is benefits reading of the statute. majority limitations on states that the no-fault act contains two period commencing limitation on the
the time for an action and one may benefits be recovered: which “ ‘(1) protection personal [PIP] insurance ben- An action for year after the date of commenced not later than one
efits must be
There is period § one limitations that the brought action must be one year within accident. This is stated in the first sentence: “An action for recovery personal protection insurance benefits *41 payable under chapter this for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the causing accident the injury .. . .” 3145(1) §
This statute of in limitations contains its own tolling provision, also in provided the first sentence of the statute: “unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within year after the accident or unless the insurer has previ- ously made a payment of personal protection insurance injury.” benefits tolling This provision takes (1) effect when one of things two occurs: the insurer is given written notice of the injury year within one of the (2) accident or the insurer previously paid personal protection insurance benefits for injury.
The 3145(1), second, § remainder of third, fourth, sentences, fifth detail tolling how this provision is to be The applied. so-called “one-year-back rule” is not a separate limitation on the period for which benefits may Rather, be recovered. integral is an part of the accident, gives injury unless the insured written notice of or the previously paid
insurer
injury.
[PIP] benefits for the
“ ‘(2)
given
If
payment
made,
notice has been
has been
may
any
action
year
be commenced at
time within one
after the
most recent loss was incurred.
“ ‘(3) Recovery
during
is
year
limited to losses incurred
the one
”
preceding commencement of
(emphasis
[Ante
the action.’
at 61
omitted).]
making
summary,
majority
In
quoting
this
from Devillers vAuto
Ass’n,
562, 574;
(2005),
Club Ins
473 Mich
The third sentence of
other three
in context with the
case,
be read
must
tolling
be
detailing
provision
how
sentences
statute,
the Court must
interpreting
When
applied.
word or
meaning of the critical
plain
both the
“consider
placement
purpose
as ‘its
as well
phrase
”
Ward,
Valley Foods Co
statutory scheme.’ Sun
(1999) (citation omitted).
If has been or a the notice made, may any commenced at time within the action loss year expense, recent allowable work after the most However, claim- been incurred. or survivor’s loss has *42 any the loss may portion ant not recover benefits for on which the year than 1 the date incurred more before injury by required commenced. The notice of action was any of may given to the insurer or its this subsection be claiming to entitled to agents person be authorized therefor, in his behalf. The notice someone benefits of the claimant and give the name and address shall ordinary person name of the language in indicate injury. time, injured place and nature of his and the [Emphasis added.] beginning at the of the word “however”
The use “However,” used as when significant. sentence is that; in “nevertheless; yet; spite means conjunction, Second Dictionary, New World all the same.” Webster’s (1982). “however,” conjunction, This Edition College it, preceding which an to the sentence exception shows under the may brought forth when an action sets Dissenting Opinion by Weaver, 3145(1).3 tolling provision § contained within Therefore the exception contained “one-year-back within the rule” takes effect tolling when the provision is being used. This Court should overrule the interpreta- Welton, tion of given the statute supra, followed Devillers, supra, give meaning to the actual text of the statute.
In determining whether case, overrule a prior pursuant to the doctrine decisis, of stare this Court should first consider whether the earlier case was wrongly decided. If it wrongly decided, was the Court should then examine reliance interests: whether prior decision defies “practical workability”; whether the prior decision has embedded, become so so funda- mental to everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations; whether changes in the law or longer facts no justify decision; the prior and whether the prior decision misread or misconstrued a statute.4
Correcting
point
statutory
interpretation in
Welton and Devillers wоuld effectively leave the
law
its current state. The Court Appeals
has held that the
saving provision
§in 5851 applies to the
act,5
no-fault
and that this saving provision tolls the “one-year-back”
Thus,
rule.6
restricting
“one-year-back”
rule to
apply only
3145(1)
tolling
when the
provision within §
is relied on would preserve the
quo,
status
and cause no
“practical real-world dislocations.”
rely
I
rule,
do not
contrary
on the last
majority’s
antecedent
to the
hypothesis, ante at 71-72.
Detroit,
Robinson v
(2000).
464-467;
462 Mich
For this would trial court’s denial of reversing the Appeals Court of summary and rein- disposition motion for defendant’s entered in favor of judgment the stipulated state plaintiffs. I with Justice CAVANAGH’s odissenting). concur KELLY, majori- out that the opinion point I write this
dissent.
result,
that the
an absurd
one
ty’s interpretation creates
It
to conclude that
permit.
Court should not
is absurd
of children
jettison
intended to
no-fault claims
Legislature
mentally impaired persons.
I agree also with Justices MArkmAN, WEAVER,
impor-
rule is an
CAVANAGH the “absurd results”
and should be
Michigan jurisprudence
tant
part
that the absurd results
justices
reinstated. Four
believe
assessing
a case. The
rule is
and can be used
valid
fact that
is unaffected
accuracy of this statement
arguing
plaintiffs
summary disposition,
Defendant moved for
500.3145(1),
one-year-back provision
of MCL
claim was barred
Welton,
interpretation
of the statute
consistent with this Court’s
given
payment
Although
supra.
that notice was
asserted
defendant
made,
previously
plaintiffs
it as a defense to the
never raised
had
been
3145(1).
one-year
period
§in
limitations
*44
been reached in this case. McIntire1should be overturned.
ABSURD RESULTS principle that statutes should be construed to manifestly avoid absurd results that are inconsistent legislative with intent is not a new or radical innova contrary, tion. On the it was well-established jurisprudence Supreme of the United States Court century. Holy before the twentieth In Church Trinity unanimously States, v United the Court stated: rule, It may is a familiar thing that a be within the letter yet the statute and statute, not within the because not spirit, within its nor within the intention of its makers. asserted, This has been often and the reports are full of illustrating application. cases its This is not the substitu- tion of judge the will of the legislator, for that of the frequently general meaning words of statute, are used in a enough words broad to include an act in question, yet a consideration of the legislation, whole or of the circum- surrounding enactment, stances its or of the absurd results giving which follow from such meaning words, broad to the makes it unreasonable to legislator believe that in- tended particular to include the act.
Likewise, more recent case law of the United States
Supreme
recognizes
Court
that situations exist when it
appropriate
depart
strictly
interpre-
from a
literal
statutory language
tation of
to further
in-
example,
tent. For
States,3
Lewis v United
the Court
statutory interpretation
considered an issue of
involv-
ing the federal Assimilative Crimes Act. As the Court
(1999).
147;
produce
tend to embarrass the
results, if it would
or mischievous
necessary legal
and serve to defeat
justice
course
required by
adopted
not to be
unless
remedies,
ought
any
not aware of
law, and we are
rule of
positive
some
most
some of the
rule.” Id. at 372.
holding by
This
such
Court continued
of this
highly regarded justices
part
rule that became
results
of the absurd
application
4
by a
recognized
would he caused
that an absurd result
Court
The
if the act were read
indicated that
interpretation
of the act. It
literal
might
assimilated
against
be able to be
literally,
murder
law
state
law
of a federal
of the existence
This could occur because
under the act.
assault. Id.
against
at 161.
5
(1871).
112
Mich 55
476
Dissenting Opinion by
Kelly,
Michigan
early
law as
Graves,
1844. See Green v
1
1844).
Doug
(Mich,
354
holding
in Alvord continued a trend that lasted
until
years
1999. Fourteen
Alvord,
after its decision in
again
this Court
heard a case
an
raising
absurd results
issue. In
v
Cummings
Corey,6
Court followed the
Alvord,
holding in
thus cementing the use of the rule in
Michigan. Again,
1904, the Court cited and followed
Lambrecht,
Alvord. See In re
450;
137 Mich
The trend there, and, did not end fact, the Court has affirmed the application of the absurd results exception repeatedly during the last century. Cases in 11 1910s,7 1920s,8 1930s,9 1940s,10 1950s, 1960s,12 1970s,131980s,14and 1990s15show its continual use. It was Court, 1999 that Mclntire, in People v overruled this longstanding part of Michigan law.
In Mclntire,
gave
the Court
legal justification
no
not following Michigan precedent.
Instead,
it quoted
“
Justice Antonin Scalia stating,
agree
‘[We]
with Jus-
(1885).
494;
58 Mich
Justice Scalia’s
binding
not
on
is not and was
interesting,
perhaps
while
it, and Mcln-
Nonetheless,
adopted
the Court
Michigan.
clearly
law that was
tire caused
Michigan
a ripple
However, Mclntire’s
decided.
at the time was
apparent
has done and
damage
that it
very
now
clear.
effect is
stemmed,
juris-
Michigan
to do should be
continues
track.16
on the correct
put
should he
back
prudence
OF THE FRAMERS
UNDERSTANDING
PRESUMPTIVE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE MICHIGAN
the drafters
presume
must
person
A reasonable
Michi-
expected
constitution
and ratifiers of our state
rule
construc-
results
apply
courts to
absurd
gan
it was well-
This is because
Michigan
tion to
statutes.
construe
1963 that
courts
should
established
and at times should
to avoid
results
statutes
absurd
statutory
literal
strictly
application
from a
depart
includes no
Also,
Michigan
Constitution
language.
Accordingly,
principle.
language disapproving
consistent
principle
was
approval
Court’s earlier
the state
intent of the drafters of
original
with
constitution.
Services, Inc,
Community Emergency
Med
Recently
in Costa v
(2006),
question
called into
the Court
716 NW2d
Michigan by using an absurd-results-
relevance of Mclntire
continuing
analysis
reaching
type
its decision.
*47
Notably,
a time much closer to the
adoption
the current Michigan Constitution than
present,
Court, in a majority opinion joined by six justices, stated:
“[It
a] fundamental
rule of statutory construction that
departure
from
literal construction of a statute is
justified when such construction
produce
would
an absurd
and unjust result and
clearly
would be
inconsistent with
the purposes
policies
question.”
the act in
Salas v
Clements,
103, 109;
RESULTS RULE OF CONSTRUCTION IN AMERICAN STATES A review of the case law of our sister states reflects the wide extent Michigan which departed has traditional of statutory norms construction. Ari- Thе zona Supreme Court aptly has summarized the tradi- tional approach to applying statutory language American law. It emphasized has that a court should look first to the words of the statute and apply its language if But, it is unambiguous. the Arizona court counseled, other clear indicators of legislative in- tent can require a departure from the literal meaning of statutory language that unambiguous seems on its face: primary The statutory rule of construction is to find and
give
effect to
intent. We look first to the statute’s
ordinary
words. Words
their
have
meaning unless the
context of the
requires
statute
otherwise.
language
Where
unambiguous,
normally conclusive,
it is
clearly
absent a
expressed legislative
contrary.
intent
to the
[Mail Boxes
Etc,
Arizona,
USA v Industrial Comm
119, 121;
181 Ariz
(1995) (citation omitted).]
116
476
55
Dissenting
by
Opinion
Kelly,
ois,26
Indiana,27
Louisiana,28
Maine,29
Massachusetts,30
Nev
Minnesota,31
Missouri,32
Montana,33
Nebraska,34
meaning
contrary
plain
unless
intent
leads to absurd
results.”).
26
(2003)
DF,
223,
(declining
See In
208 Ill 2d
802
re
NE2d 800
apply “plain language
reading”
statutory provision
or literal
principle
by
at issue
reference to
with
that a court “is not bound
language
produces
the literal
of a
that
statute
a result
inconsistent
clearly expressed legislative intent,
yields
with
or that
absurd or
unjust consequences
contemplated by
legislature”).
27
2003)
Duggan,
1034,
(Ind,
(explaining
See
v
State
793
1038
NE2d
examining
statute,
necessary
“it
often
to avoid excessive
meaning”
legislature
presumed
reliance on a strict literal
and that the
“is
language
applied
to have
logically
intended
used
the statute to be
result”).
bring
unjust
and not to
about an
or absurd
Assoc,
Gaming
Bd,
See
Metro Riverboat
Inc Louisiana
Control
2001)
(La,
656,
(construing
potential
So 2d
avoid the
statute “to
questions
interpretation”
constitutional
a literal
raised
and “to avoid
reading”).
the absurd
results
would result from such a
Inc,
Guiggey
Paper,
(Me,
See
v Great Northern
A2d
1997) (noting
statutory interpretation
is controlled
a statute’s
*49
results).
plain meaning
plain meaning
unless the
leads to absurd
30
Wallace,
708;
705,
See
431
Commonwealth v
Mass
118
Mich 55
476
Opinion by
Dissenting
Kelly, J.
Rhode
South
South
Oklahoma,43
Island,44
Carolina,45
Dakota,46
Tennessee,47
Texas,48
Utah,49Vermont,50
43
2000) (“The
Bishop
Corp,
459,
(Okla,
P3d
n
See
v Takata
12
466 30
plain meaning
statutory language
except
of
is conclusive
in the rare case
produce
demonstrably
in which literal construction
a result
will
odds
Legislature.”).
with the intention of the
44
Co,
687,
(RI, 2004), quoting
See Park v Ford Motor
844 A2d
692
1998) (“We
1131, 1134(RI,
Rodgers,
Co
Providence Journal
v
711A2d
do
‘ “interpret
legislative
literally
not
a
when
do so
enactment
would
’ ”).
provide
legislative
a result at
with
odds
its
intent.”
45 Hodges Rainey,
79, 91;
(2000), quoting
See
v
341 SC
it would
It
that
to
an absurd result.
stated
language
avoid
and
intends a reasonable
legislature
that the
presumes
statutes
so as
accordingly “interprets
result and
just
v
Black
State
Iowa Dist Court
absurd results.”
avoid
2000).
Co,
575,
(Iowa,
Similarly,
Hawk
616
578
NW2d
statute,
interpreta
purpose
are
to a
of the
we
not confined
literal
....”).
Watch,
State,
108, *16;
2005 Vt
892
See also Judicial
Inc v
tion
(2005)
191, 199
(standing
proposition
for the
that
absurd results
A2d
not, however, provide a license to substitute this Court’s
doctrine “does
“
Legislature”
judgments
policy
of the
and that it
‘should
for those
judiciary
displace
sparingly
it entails the
that the
used
because
risk
will
speculation
legislature
legislative policy
not
basis of
that the
could
on the
unmistakably
”),
Singer,
quoting 2A
meant
said’
Suther
have
what it
(6th ed),
Statutory
46.07, p
§
Statutes
Construction
199.
land’s
51
Miller,
473, 479;
v
345
See Shelor Motor Co Inc
261 Va
544 SE2d
(2001) (“We
Assembly
intent
must determine the
of the General
from
statute,
contained in
unless a literal construction of the statute
words
result.”).
yield an
would
absurd
52
Eagles v
Fraternal
Grand Aerie Fraternal Order
See
Order of
(2002)
224, 239;
(stating
Eagles,
P3d
148 Wash
59
655
that the court
2d
unlikely,
reading
literal
of a
“will avoid
statute which would result
absurd,
consequences”).
or strained
53
Ed,
780, 787;
Taylor-Hurley Mingo CoBd
209 Va
551 SE2d
See
v
W
(2001),
Meadows,
20, 24;
quoting
rel Frazier
193 W
454
702
State ex
v
Va
(1944)
statutory
recognition
depart
(stating
SE2d 65
a
of the need to
“
” and,
language
accordingly,
exceptional
‘in
courts
circumstances’
that
“
plain
‘may
beyond
meaning
venture
of a statute in the rare
clearly
expressed
in which
is a
intent to the
instances
there
”
“
application
contrary’ or
‘in
a literal
would defeat or thwart the
which
”).
statutory purpose’
54
(2003)
Hamilton,
458, 478;
v
261 Wis 2d
Interestingly, appears Pennsylvania that the courts statutorily are bound to construe to statutes avoid Hence, absurd they required results. are depart to application literal of a that statute would create am absurd result. re See In Nomination Papers of Lahr, 577 1, 7;
Pa
(2004),
an approach statutory to construction that would al- apply ways meaning the literal of a statute the following thoughtful explanation of its approach to statutory construction: Auto Club Ass’n Cameron v Ins Dissenting Opinion by Kelly, statutes at construing compensation the workers’
In
statutory interpretation
issue,
method of
we follow the
Courchesne,
v.
“In
we
with
statute,
language of
because that is
examination of the
so,
doing
In
important factor to be
we
the most
considered.
and,
range
meanings
attempt
plausible
its
determine
range
appear most
possible,
if
to those that
narrow
not, however,
language.
We
plausible. We do
end with
further,
purposes
recognize,
purpose
broadly
language,
legislation, and the context
under-
*53
stood,
meaning
directly
language
are
to the
of the
relevant
Burlington
Factory,
[Hatt
v
Coat
263 Conn
statute.”
(2003).]
279, 290;
260
819 A2d
vein, the
Court has
Supreme
In a similar
Kansas
“
intent, courts
determining legislative
that
‘[i]n
stated
of the language
to a mere consideration
are
limited
of the
used,
background
the historical
but
look to
enactment,
attending
passage,
its
the circumstances
the effect the statute
accomplished,
purpose
be
”
suggested.’
the various constructions
may have under
122
476
55
Dissenting Opinion by Kelly,
Barnes,
364, 375;
v
(2003),
State
Kan
[W]hen there is some as to whether a literal interpretation language really used in the statute purpose legislation, would consistent with the we may beyond look meaning. that literal In such a circum- stance, court, seeking intent, “the legislative ascertain may consequences resulting consider the mean- one ing another, rather adopt than that construction which result, illogical avoids an or unreasonable or one which is State, [Brown inconsistent with common sense.” 359 Md 180, 189; (2000), quoting Mayor 753 A2d Kaczorowski v Baltimore, (1987).] 505, 309 MD A2d discussion, From this it strongly appears that 48 of the 50 American states adhere to the traditional prin- ciple a court should construe a statute to avoid They absurd results. agree should courts not follow rigidly a approach literal to statutory construction that inconsistent with intent. remaining state, aside from Michigan, is Missis- It sippi. appears Mississippi might not allow a departure from literal application of a even statute avoid absurd results or to further legislative intent. My research found precedent no Mississippi clearly recognizing the traditional absurd results rule of con- struction, and the Mississippi Supreme Court has “ stated that if plain statute ‘is and unambiguous there no room construction....’” Pit Bull- & dogs Prop Co, Other v Prentiss 808 So 2d *54 Ass’n v Auto Club Ins Opinion by Dissenting Kelly, J. 2002), v State ex rel (Miss, quoting Clark 973-974 Ass’n, 1046, 1048 2d Med 381 So State Mississippi 1980). (Miss, overwhelming adhere
Hence, jurisdictions American that should con- statutes principle the historic depart- if it means to avoid absurd results even strued certainly This fact interpretation. ing from literal jurisprudence the recent question into calls from that the state’s Michigan Supreme departs Court of in the mainstrеam American decades-long position matter. on this jurisprudence
A OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S“TEXTUALISM” CRITIQUE rigidly approach applies plain A literalist at odds drastically of a with language statute em- Supreme the United States Court approach It federal statutes.56 is also at odds ploys interpreting overwhelming of American states. majority with the from Hence, it is that recent case law this Court curious of the traditional American departed approach from statutory construction. courts of change perspective It that the cause appears Court rooted in the views of Associ personal United Su ate Justice Antonin Sealia States Mclntire, Michigan Supreme In Court preme Court. its the Court dissent in that adopted Appeals own currently prevailing This distinction federal case law and between Michigan regarding statutory important case construction is law Michigan Holdings Michigan hear courts at all levels to in mind. Michigan generally Supreme require to a Court lower courts to adhere rigidly application language Michigan statutes even if this literal However, produces decisions of the United absurd results. there are indicating Supreme appropriate depart States Court it is interpretation congressional absurd to further literal to avoid results or apply Michigan these courts intent. It is axiomatic that decisions when statutes, happens. interpret on to federal as sometimes are called Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. a by Michigan justice
case written Court while Supreme so, doing he was a member that Court. In *55 Supreme rejected the earlier Court statement of the Celements, 109, v supra “depar Court Salas at ture from the literal construction of a justified statute is such construction an produce when would absurd and unjust clearly result and would be inconsistent with of purposes polices question.” the act See McIn tire, at supra 156 n 2.
The stated
for rejecting
rationale
Salas
was
majority’s agreement with Justice Scalia’s disdainful
“
of
treatment
as an attempt
rule
‘to divine unex-
Id.,
pressed
legislative
nontextual
intent....’”
Scalia,
citing
A Matter
Federal Courts
Interpretation:
of
(New
and the
Jersey:
Press,
Law
Princeton University
1997), 21. The
p
quoted
Court
Justice Scalia as opining
“ ‘
that such attempts
“nothing
were
an
but
invitation
’ ”
judicial
Mclntire,
to
lawmaking.”
n 2.
supra
But the
why
Court offered no explanation
personal
views of Justice Scalia
prevailed
should have
over
Michigan
established
jurisprudence
regard
with
con-
struing a
to avoid an
statute
absurd result. Neither was
given
consideration
to the principle
decisis,
of stare
respect
precedent.57
which is
for established
A brief review of Justice Scalia’s book reveals that his
are
by
views
marked
internal
inconsistencies. Justice
Scalia’s main thesis
regard
statutory
with
construc-
law,
tion is
“[t]he
text is the
and it is the text that
Scalia,
must be observed.”
at 22. He
supra
asserts that
legislature
what
as opposed
meant
what
signed
opinion
I
recognized
realize
I
in Mclntire. I have since
my
rejected
statutory
mistake and have
on
views
construction
expressed
opinion.
Bahn,
572, 588;
in that
See Halloran v
470 Mich
(2004)
J.,
Services,
dissenting);
NW2d
Koontz v Ameritech
(Kelly,
(2002)
Inc,
304, 326;
J., dissenting);
466 Mich
anAs “criminal defendant” “defendant” when stating canon error that the scrivener’s agree Id. I makes sense. determining tool in an appropriate of construction an honesty requires But intellectual intent. from the departure that it involves a acknowledgement by Congress. Legislature language used actual defends the use vein, Scalia Justice In a similar *56 he are that states of construction canons traditional the canons textualism, including with often associated one of (expression alterius est exclusio unius expressio others) ejusdem generis and of exclusion thing implies of the same sort to items language (limiting general 25-27. I Id. at language). by specific contemplated of construction canons that traditional certainly believe are often but only appropriate, are not as these such in- legislative ascertaining in tools extremely helpful tent. are not they that acknowledged
However, it must be
Rather, it
text itself.
statutory
typically required
expects
Legislature
fairly understood
may be
employ well-established
judiciary to
intends the
and
Thus, it
construing statutes.
of construction
canons
canons
using the
reasonably be concluded
cannot
apply-
adherence to
rigid
a
accords with
construction
legislative
actual
regard
without
the text of a law
ing
intent.
These contradictions Justice Scalia’s an internal losophy inconsistency seemingly reflect rigid thoughtful endemic to textualism. As commen- tator has stated: generally legislative history, they textualists avoid
While dictionaries, freely consult make assorted use of various linguistic arguments linguistic study, without benefit selectively employ statutory interpretation canons of analyses. plain meaning their textual The advocates of any textualism do principled so without benefit methodology justifying extra-statutory [Ca- these tools. vanaugh, text, context, multiplicity: Order in Aristotle on (2001).] law, 577, rule NC L R 595-596 acknowledges Scalia Justice also the principle judge’s objective that a in interpreting a statute is to give Legislature effect to the intent of the back “goes Scalia, least as far as Blackstone.” at 16 n supra Blackstone, citing on Commentaries the Laws of England 59-62, Hence, the principle that may courts from depart a literal interpretation legislative statute effect intent was a recognized facet of the law before our nation was founded.
Accordingly, departure this historic principle is a remarkably position. Indeed, activist as one commen- noted, tator has Justice statutory Scalia’s views on construction expressed in A Matter are Interpretation extreme. Justice compares judges Scalia who use tradi- guides tional statutory construction to ascertain (other rigid intent than a adherence to the statute) “plain language” of to the despotic Roman Emperor Nero.58 *57 Cavanaugh, supra (referring language See 593 n 50 to the relevant noting important recognize “[i]t in Scalia’s hook and that is that for appears interpretation by Justice Scalia there no distinction between (elected not)
judges tyrants”). or and the edicts of In the referenced Ass’n Auto Club Ins v Opinion Dissenting Kelly, place adherents and his Scalia essence, Justice In construction statutory on views idiosyncratic their of American norms traditional adherence above the law must course, many aspects Of jurisprudence. occa- Accordingly, appropriate is time. over develop alter common-law courts to for sionally, example, However, this realities. of new social light principles principle abolishing a bedrock from apart is worlds that a statute as the rule such construction statutory inconsis- results to avoid absurd be construed should intent. legislative with tent note, does Justice MARKMAN, worthy to
It is also em- certain times has at himself Justice Scalia Corp K mart rule. See results the absurd braced L100 Inc, 2;n 108 S Ct Cartier, US (1988) part (Scalia, J., concurring Ed 2d 313 my strengthens fact further This dissenting part). to follow should not continue that this Court position Mclntire, the rule. rejected which TO THIS CASE ABSURD RESULTSRULE OF THE
APPLICATION minority on appeal. to the case I now return 600.5851(1) of the found in MCL saving provision (RJA). that a provides person It Act Revised Judicature was person an action if the bringing to defer entitled work, judicial construction of he refers to portion Scalia’s of Justice step as “one intent concern for actual informed statutes engage posting Emperor in: Nero was said to the trick the worse than Scalia, easily they be read.” high up pillars, could not on the so that edicts meaningfully course, position does supra this extreme at 17. Of typically concerned acknowledge judicial of a statute is construction greatly imposing an edict application. differs from It the details its with expecting basis for have no reasonable area in which a citizen would in an prevent Also, protections statutes can constitutional a court decision. way imposes applied unforeseen being interpreted in a parties. on harms *58 Mich 55 Dissenting Opinion by Kelly, years age or the under of insane the time claim making accrued. The a person, someone claim the has one after person, year disability is removed to bring action, statutory if the of period even limita- run. tions has The obvious intent of this section of the to provide RJA is minors and time the insane with bring they a cause of action once are legally capable of bringing it. 500.3145(1) is the statute no-fault act’s tolling provision.59
limitations and As Justice WEAVER explains, part rule of the no-fault tolling provision act’s and applicable is not in this case. majority it, But insists we apply thereby creating a injured situation in which children and the may likely insane be robbed benefit of their of action. The ruling Legisla- causes assumes that the ture intended to grant persons minors and insane a right bring a hollow no-fault action. patently It is preposterous any sane legislator intended the law to be construed as it has been construed the majority in this case. The result reached is absurd.
As this Court has stated on occasions, numerous a clearly result is absurd it is where inconsistent with the 3145(1) provides: Section of the no-fault act recovery personal protection An action for insurance ben- payable chapter bodily injury may efits under this for accidental year not be commenced than 1 later after the date of the accident causing injury injury provided unless written notice of given year herein been to the insurer within 1 after the previously accident or payment unless the insurer has made a personal protection injury. insurance for the benefits If notice given payment made, may has been or a has been the action be any year commenced at time within 1 after the most recent expense, allowable loss or work survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, may any portion claimant not recover benefits for year the loss incurred more than 1 the date on which the before [Emphasis was added.] action commenced. Ins Auto Club Ass’n Cameron v Dissenting Opinion Kelly, J. Salas, in question. of the act policies purposes Co, 210 U R General Detroit supra Attorney at 109. See omitted) (citation (1920) 227, 254; 177 NW (“ statute, ordinary in its language ‘Where construction, leads grammatical meaning of the apparent purpose contradiction of the manifest may put which enactment,... upon a construction words, and even meaning modifies the ”). no question sentence.’ I have serious structure of the *59 case majority in this the result reached but that the minority/insanity with the intent of is inconsistent of the It a manifest contradiction saving is provision. clause, saving help is to apparent which purpose their losing insane from prevent children and the rightful claims.60 legal minors provision provide
The intent behind the to they time an action bring injuries and the insane to for to for them- they bring suffered were unable it while Nothing signals Legisla- the statute that the selves. something less provide people ture intended such a cause of action. It is inconceivable complete than had reason to a vehicle Legislature good a create later whereby could sue but disadvantaged people monetary recovery. little or no would have nine-year-old boy injured a was example, For assume years an automobile accident and needed seven brought day 18 and recover. If he suit the he turned nothing, he recov- prevailed, he would recover because years two before. Had ered from accident treat in this actually intended to Legislature person this policyjudgment, personal here a Markman I not advance as Justice do judgment saving policy Legislature. I do of the insists. The clause was a not, asserts, “imperfect or define result” as as he an “absurd one that could have been.” or “less ‘consistent’ and less ‘effective’ than it flawed” My given Court. definition result” is one Ante at 85. of “absurd Opinion by Dissenting Kelly, J.
way, it have it clear. legisla- would made No reasonable expect tor would the Court to assume a perverse such intent. suggests
Justice MARKMAN there is no absurd result here because there are why “reasonable” reasons legislator might provided by have wanted the outcome the majority. judge The reader can him- herself legislator whether a any would have embraced of the imagined reasons Chief Justice MARKMAN and Justice Taylor offer.61
CONCLUSION majority The result that in this reaches case is absurd. It is Legislature inconceivable intended create hollow cause of action for some our most helpless powerless citizens.
I believe that the Court should reject Mclntire’s treatment absurd results rule. should rein- We state in Michigan the rule apply in this case. The idea that the rule is outside this Court’s constitu- authority tional is indefensible. all Throughout our constitutions, various people of this given state have its power knowing that, it, this Court included is the *60 ability to construe statutes avoid absurd results. spirit should law control. The absurd results rule should applied to this Since it case. applied, not been absurd, the result is unjust, manifestly contrary public policy.
CAVANAGH, J., with KELLY, concurred legislator What would find reasonable to reduce the cost of by leaving recovery insurance children and insane or no with little injuries? quite legislator their It is unthinkable that a would intention ally vote bill that for a did that.