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Shavers v. Attorney General
267 N.W.2d 72
Mich.
1978
Check Treatment

*1 402 Mich 554 554 GENERAL v ATTORNEY SHAVERS 3, 57935, 57916, Argued 57931, 1977 57934. March Docket Nos. 14-17). June, Application (Calendar for 1978. Nos. Decided 31, August 1978. rehearing filed case”, concerns appeal, popularly as the "no-fault known This vehicle insurance act. constitutionality no-fault motor of the brought plaintiffs an action and other Shavers Catherine General, Attorney against the Secre- judgment declaratory [2-5, [1-5, [11, [10, [7] [8-10, [6, [4] [3, [9, [13] [18, [19, [1-5, [22] [23, [24, [1, [34] [27] [30] [32] [40] [43] [39] Am Jur 26] 7] 22 Am Jur Am Jur 11, 16, 17, 20, seq. 25] 21, 31, Insurance §§ plans. 38] Am Jur 22, 23, Validity and construction Jur 19] 490. 22 Am Jur 16 Am Jur 16 Am Jur 16 Am Jur 16 Am Jur 16 Am Jur 16 Am Jur 37] 11-24, 30-38, 41, 7, 11, 12, 16 Am Jur 7, 11, 25, 22 Am Jur Am Jur 21, 22, 32, Am Jur 22 Am Jur 2d, Am Jur 26] 2d, Am Jur 42 ALR3d 35-38] 34] 2d, New 2d, 12, 14-17, 22 Am Jur 28, New 2d, Am Jur New 14-17, 19-24, 26, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, References 2d, New 2d, Topic 4, 34. 29] 2d, 2d, Declaratory 16 Am Jur 2d, 33, Constitutional Constitutional 2d, Declaratory Judgments Topic Constitutional Constitutional Constitutional Constitutional Declaratory Constitutional New Topic Constitutional Topic 16 Am 229. New Declaratory 42, Constitutional 35] Service, 2d, 19-24, 26, 28, 29, Topic 2d, Declaratory Judgments Service, 44] Service, New Topic Am Jur Service, for Points Jur 2d, 16 Am Jur Judgments Service, Judgments No-Fault Topic 2d, of "no-fault” automobile Constitutional 28, 29, 31, 34, Service, No-Fault Insurance §§ Law 548§ Law § § Law 144 et Law Law Judgments Law Law § No-Fault Law § No-Fault 2d, Constitutional Law §§ Service, §§ §§ No-Fault in Headnotes New 6. 356 et 115 et 2d, Insurance §§ 542, 127. 83.§ No-Fault 25.§ 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, §§ Insurance et Constitutional 384, Insurance 11.§ Topic 545, 226. No-Fault §§ seq. seq. seq. seq. Law 35, 37, 38, Insurance § 79-86. 385. 550. Law 259 et Insurance Service, §§ §§ 1, 10-12, 500, 21.§ Insurance §§ 14, 16, 12,13. 2, 41-44] Law 490. 23, 501. 17. No-Fault 50. 25§ 24. 27. 41— § seq., Am § 44] et 2. Insurance, State, and several tary the Commissioner constitutionality challenging of the companies act, PA 294. Some motor vehicle insurance no-fault Court, cross-complaints. Wayne Circuit filed defendants *2 judgment Gilmore, J., declaratory granted which a Horace W. replace injury provisions personal generally upheld the reparations, unconstitutional system but found of tort the provisions. The damage provisions other property and certain (T. Burns, J., Lesinski, C.J., Quinn, J. M. Appeals, and Court of findings on the concurring), court’s some of the circuit vacated issues, standing plaintiffs those to raise grounds the lacked that unconstitutional, damage provision property is agreed that the motorcycles finding from that the exclusion reversed the justiciable it a as concerns is unconstitutional insofar the act 22918). (Docket 21238-21239, parties appeal. The Nos. issue Held: insofar as it is constitutional insurance act The no-fault acci- provides of motor vehicle benefits to victims partially it remedies which for tort dents as a substitute However, controlling the ratemak- the mechanisms abolishes. inadequate respects. constitutionally ing procedure in three (1) Legislature of Insurance have and/or the Commissioner statutory meaning given the exhortation to not substantial excessive, inadequate unfairly discrimina- or shall not be "rates (2) provisions inadequate statutory for a tory”. There are (3) rating There is no decision. to an individual motorist attack challenge adequate statutory provision to insur- for a motorist cancellation, refusal, assignment discriminatory or ance Facility. in effect The act will remain Automobile Placement Legislature months, during period the for 18 may remedy the constitutional Commissioner of Insurance will then re-examine deficiencies in the act. The Court have been deficiencies to determine if the constitutional matter remedied, appropriate order. and will enter an taxpayers standing raise plaintiffs to not have as 1. The do objections act because to the no-fault insurance constitutional not, face, expenditure contemplate its the act does on taxpayers’ governing statute The court rule and state funds. constitutionality standing give taxpayers to test actions do not expenditure inciden- state funds is of an entire act when the tal. broad, provide a Declaratory judgment intended to is 2. remedy more serviceable to make the courts flexible precedent people. controversy”, a condition which is An "actual relief, declaratory declaratory exists where the to invocation of Mich guide plaintiffs necessary future judgment conduct in is legal rights. preserve A court or her not his order issues, precluded reaching from hypothetical but is not decide plain- injuries have occurred. The or losses issues before actual minimum, alleging justicia- must, plead an actual facts tiff at a alleged controversy prove fact to show an adverse each ble sharpen enough raised. In this case the the issues interest (1) following standing whether parties issues: have to raise (2) constitutional; provision compulsory protection personal injury due scheme violates whether (3) damage property equal protection; process whether or (4) equal protection; process scheme violates due from cover- motor vehicles the exclusion of two-wheel whether (5) equal protection; age whether the under the act violates replacement reimbursement scheme vio- work-loss and services (6) protection; equal nonresident motorist and whether the lates equal protection. scheme violates carry requirement insur- all motorists no-fault 3. The police authority under the of the ance is within public. protect general power welfare of the state to only coverage compulsory the driver of no-fault insures vehicle, pedestrians, passengers, owners motor but also *3 properly parked property, vehicles. Fur- owners of fixed and vehicle, thermore, operation it affects of a motor even when the driver, danger results in serious and immediate no one but the large segment society. to a compulsory choosing for all 4. In to make no-fault insurance motorists, registration opera- Legislature and has made the dependent insur- on whether no-fault tion of a motor vehicle effect, equitable In insurance at fair and rates. ance is available Legislature companies car- are the instruments which merely general a This is not ries out a scheme for the welfare. sufficiently grant monopoly utility. close to a There exists a of a compa- insurance nexus between the state and the action of the fairly setting as be treated nies in rates that their action process protection. Al- to due that of the state itself invoke recognized though any traditionally this issue does not involve "liberty” concepts right, common-law or constitutional "property” protected process to be defined and are not sense, depend on the extent in a narrow or technical but dependence government activity has fostered citizens’ which activity. Legislature has made on that The and reliance vehicle, vitally operation registration a motor and life, day-to-day dependent important aspects on the affects equitable compulsory coverage rates. availability and at fair has, additionally, expectation Legislature fostered the The equitable fair rates. will be available at and no-fault insurance excessive, that rates shall not be The Insurance Code states discriminatory, guaran- inadequate, unfairly provides and or coverage will no-fault insurance be available tee that through procure ordi- person is such insurance who unable to nary methods. satisfy does the constitutional 5. No-fault insurance unless, process requirement at a of due minimum: (1) Legislature of Insurance and/or Commissioner rule-making present authority) give (pursuant substantial to his meaning statutory not be exces- standards "rates shall sive, inadequate discriminatory”. unfairly (2) rate, A filed or a rate determined on administrative review, provides judicial and sets forth: (a) premiums for the to insured and insurer reasonable coverage regard assertedly specific without to factors insured; among warranting premiums those differences in (b) properly may by the factors which be considered among insured; differentiating premiums and those insurer

(c) appropriate for each such the amount of differential factor. (3) publicized in such Such about each insurer is information readily every person can affected ascertain a manner applicable calculate of differentials and

factors amounts may charge. premium the insurer (4) opportunity prompt Every to obtain a motorist has the of an calculation and effective administrative review insurer’s factors, premium applicable as well as differentials and prompt for the and effective review of the basis administrative refusal or cancellation of insurance. holding requirement compulsory 6. The that the issuance of unconstitutional is effective 18 months from the (1) opinion. During the interim: Commissioner-may they deem Insurance take action whatever necessary remedy rate- in the the due deficiencies (2) making procedure; required no- to obtain Motorists will registering precedent

fault insurance as a condition (3) vehicle; operating constitu- a motor The no-fault act’s *4 tionally provisions, opinion subse- in and valid as declared legislative opinions, quent Until there is will remain in effect. deficiencies, response process agency the Commis- to the due regula- present actively sioner of Insurance shall enforce the opinion tory spirit the in order to assure scheme in the of this Mich equitable availability at fair rates. of no-fault insurance and All against by against rights their insurers accrued individuals Facility in this until the Placement the order case Automobile valid. is entered remain process remaining issues due 7. constitutional involve The equal challenges provisions protection to various and no- legislation whether enacted fault act. The test determine power comports process pursuant police with due is to the permis- legislation a bears a reasonable relation to whether the is, equal protection legislative objective. The test essen- sible challenged legislative judgment tially, The is ac- the same. constitutionality judicial inquiry presumption of and is corded a of facts known or which restricted to whether state either judgment. reasonably supports legislative the could be assumed remaining questions, deal with The constitutional facts conditions, relating particular commercial or industrial com- statistics, plicated facts of the motor and actuarial vehicle predicated on the or business should be factual insurance trade developed trial. record at test, namely whether 8. The traditional permissible legislation relationship a to a bears reasonable applied personal legislative objective, injury must be provide protection need not an ade- scheme. abolishing quate remedy before a common-law cause substitute system record the former tort of action. The shows resulting remedy personal injury from automobile accidents for many persons injured operational had several deficiencies: reparations received no under tort automobile accidents damages system system to collect under because any contributory negligence injured person had to be free person adjudged and the must caused accident have been fault; injuries over-compensated at to be minor were often delays injuries under-compensated; lengthy were serious often compensating injured often those in automobile encountered compensation prompt was accidents in cases where the need system imposed heavy strongest; burden on the state’s courts; recovery system liability discrimi- under the tort against persons income. The nated the uneducated and of low protection reasonably personal injury scheme relates to no-fault legislative legislative correcting purpose those evils. experiment personal injury reparation judgment to limit justified involving accidents motor vehicles victims of equal frequent test under the traditional persons property resulting use injury serious from motor vehicle motor The creation of two classes of vehicles. *5 559 victims, statutory permitting the "thresh- those above accident injuries, equal sue for does not violate old” to in tort their classification, along penalties imposed protection. the with This 3102(2) act, compliance the as an incentive for of serves § provision compulsory the because an uninsured with may injuries for the tort all suffered motorist be liable in injured persons by uninsured motorists victim. Uninsured personal Assigned injury the benefits under Claims obtain Facility. Although damage liability property switch from cover- 9. the age coverage may yield in some increase the effi- to collision payments, apparent ciency it a review of the record of is from provided relatively prompt equitable system com- that the tort damage resulting pensation property for from motor vehicle However, experiment Legislature the is as free to accidents. dealing subject hope ways the of with a in with other making good perceived system it a better as is to correct a evil. Legislature Testimony anticipated at trial established that the damage property would the abolition of tort action for that equitable premiums. ultimately The result in lower and more yet not evident does not diminish the fact that these effects are goals sought legitimacy of to be achieved or the reasonable- the adopted. important The consideration for ness means whether, legislation, adopting this Court is to determine legitimate legislative passage existed at time there purpose reasonably to the statute. The no-fault act’s related damage protection provisions property meet this test. These public purposes provisions reasonably relate to the valid vehicles, creating encouraging an safer motor incentive build rates, reducing by eliminating necessity group costs investigation. "fault” accident provides property that 10. Section 3121 of the no-fault act policy paid for all insurance benefits under one damage tangible property resulting from accident shall $1,000,000. Due neither not exceed This limit violates Equal appears It nor Protection from Process Clause. sought liability that limit absolute record $1,000,000 companies. limit was of insurance The of a choice standpoint. justified from an actuarial rarely motorcycles at fault in shows that 11. record accidents, motorcycles in a no-fault the inclusion of high system premiums as to so would result preclude motorcyclists purchasing insurance. from most coverage challenged motorcycles under from exclusion Mich reasonably legitimate no-fault act fore, related to interests. There- 3102(2) equal protection. § of the act not violate does plaintiffs complain 12. The of the act violates equal protection it of the laws because discriminates between workers in the home and those outside the home insofar as payable injury maximum in case of benefits are concerned. allege similarly recovery Plaintiffs that this section restricts injuries employed expenses "reasonably of those the home to replacement incurred” for services. The trial court did hear *6 testimony stipulations on this issue but based its on decision of pretrial conference; stipulations at fact made the these did not provide adequate determining factual context for the issue. Therefore, the Court remands to the trial court so that evi- may adjudged dence be received and under the "traditional” equal protection test. finding statutory 13. The trial court’s that the scheme con- cerning transient nonresident motorists and nonresident occu- pants registered Michigan of motor vehicles not in violates due process equal protection adequate and was on evi- based Therefore, dence. the Court remands to the trial court so that may adjudged evidence be received and under the "traditional” equal protection and tests. Appeals part The decision of the Court of is affirmed in and part. in reversed Remanded to the trial court for further development of the record. Ryan, Coleman, joined by concurring Justice who was Justice part dissenting part, juncture uphold in in at would this constitutionality the of the entire no-fault insurance act. requirement controversy” 1. The of an "actual for a declara- tory judgment something simply plain- means more than the guide tiffs’ "need to know” in order to their future conduct. It pursuance antagonistic connotes the of an honest and actual right by party against assertion of one another. A noncollusive adversary proceeding, distinguished as from a contrived lawsuit, critical, friendly pragmatically is both and constitu- tionally. plaintiffs requisite standing The have the to the raise opinion issues addressed in the of the Court because of the compulsory pleadings allege nature of the no-fault scheme. The parties financially of buy some the unable to the required coverage respect they in this limited position are in a adverse to the defendant state officials whose duty implement mandatory coverage provisions. it is to the party wishing unconstitutionality 2. A to make a claim of of compulsory the no-fault insurance scheme must raise it on appeal appellate before the court of review. The Court has precept appellate ignored elemental the function and of question sponte the sua "because of its basic thresh- addressed importance any constitu- to the no-fault act’s old decision” as act, experimental stages, tionality. currently is in its novel legislation people affecting in- millions of a billion-dollar beyond ability dustry ways utterly It the the Court see. proceed carefully imperative in a informed is the Court constitutionality declaring upon of the the manner before compulsory In no-fault insurance the absence scheme* record, arguments adequacy the in the briefs or on evidence regulation casualty has role the Court assumed strictly the constitu- and made a facial attack on an advocate compulsory tionality act. scheme of no-fault constitutionally opera- Legislature may condition 3. The upon procurement of no-fault tion of a motor vehicle damage protection personal injury property insurance. regulate upon police power travel the state its Under public highways. properly This control incudes the state’s inter- mitigating consequences est the detrimental of motor vehicle party’s through legislation designed to finan- insure a accidents responsibility as as to The no-fault cial to others well himself. part integral authority and interest of is also an scheme operators licensing and the vehicles motor vehicle the state they operate. The is vested with wide own and designed fairly protect what discretion determine public against might occur. evils which otherwise wisdom, desirability expediency, *7 the or the of means legitimate public adopted by Legislature the to advance inter- provid- strictly Legislature, the is within the discretion of ests safeguards. ing not the means chosen do offend constitutional reasoning 4. The error in the of the Court is in fundamental entitlement, assumption property is a or the that there interest sense, availability in no-fault insur- the constitutional the of equitable at fair and This interest is identified ance rates. entitlement”, majority "statutory there no .he as a because is assumption evidentiary upon predicate which the of basis to insurance, appellate unavailability of even the claim of nor argument claiming to it. A an entitlement claim statute creates governmental a if it under which benefit defines the conditions granted specific and sole the benefit must or if it sets out the be the under the be denied. Once conditions benefit received, cognizable the individual bene- benefit is conferred or property to ficiary interest in the benefit has a sufficient government process protection the in the event warrant Underlying attempts deny or the benefit. to withhold 402 Mich concept property of a to which is an interest there entitlement recipients governmental is the rationale that the benefits place upon receipt a reliance the continued of those benefits arbitrarily which must be There is a undermined. failure recognize property the Court to that the interest to which a has and citizen an entitlement which is in this involved case registering licensing from the the state in derives action of or a which, vehicle, conferred, permits motor a benefit once the use public highways. concept of a motor vehicle on the The of the present enjoyment appears benefit the to an essential protected property of the interest in attribute under the entitle- doctrine, recipient’s ment consistent with the rationale the dependency upon government activity. and reliance the The compulsory requirement insurance does not terminate or abridge person’s a registering entitlement to the benefits of a defines, merely part, perimeters but vehicle the or dimen- requirement the sions of benefit. The of no-fault insurance simply aspect eligibility conditions or one defines the for the requirement, Until benefit. an fulfills the individual he does not operate have a valid claim entitlement his vehicle in Michigan. long statutory requirement palpably So as the is not arbitrary unreasonable, process. it does not offend due suggest by enacting regulatory 5. To scheme for making equitable”, insurance "fair rates the property subject established a interest in the matter of the regulation constitutionally is unsound. But if it even did there showing compulsory provision has been no abridges act enjoy- of the either terminates the continued such declaring ment of interest. action of the Court compulsory insurance scheme unconstitutional is an anom- approach procedural assuring safeguards enjoy- alous for the equitable ment of benefits of fair insurance rates. It potential compul- elevates concern for the of the unfairness sory provision of the act to of a the level constitu- shortcoming justify judicial tional veto. Court has strayed from judicial authority the constitutional limits of its usurped legislative function. There a difference power today’s judgment between Court’s to make of uncon- stitutionality proper authority and its to do so. Ryan opinion majority 6. Justice concurred with the as to applicable equal protection tests of due and as to constitutionality personal injury protection scheme. property damage provisions, 7. As in accordance with process, inquiry only the traditional test of due is whether *8 legisla- permissible the bears a statute reasonable relation to a fixing objective. goal respon- In to financial tive addition the sibility tangible property, Legisla- damage for inflicted the goals them had in mind. One of involved cost ture other Legislature sought protec- make vehicle considerations. The equitable by allocating premium expense coverage tion more exclusively first-party coverage. protection collision for that premiums Essentially, is a resultant shift in insurance there coverage coverage. liability the to the vehicle collision from premiums Legislature that the intended would With shift closely the value the vehicle one while reflect drives more premium saving affording significant a who does more one coverage. purchase optional first-party vehicle Addition- the hoped liability Legislature from ally, that this shift to first- the might group coverage party make insurance feasible as well as crashworthy for more motor vehicles. Includ- create incentives moving tangible ing general property within class vehicles the affording third-party property benefits and them objectives significantly these without ad- interfere with would responsibility. vancing the of financial interest majority opinion Ryan the that 8. concurred with Justice coverage motorcycles the from under act is consti- exclusion of tutional. guarantees Legislature Equal protection mean that 9. may persons”, be termed a "natural class of not take what two, arbitrarily designate split then class original as two enact unit classes and severed factions treatment, when a natural for their but there is different rules circumstances of the two the situation or difference between treating persons, Legislature may justified in classes practical differently. for There is a reason them a between for work loss and to make distinction benefits ordinary necessary replacement services. Reimburse- the basis for lends to determination on

ment the former itself necessary wage scale, ordinary person’s prior of a while susceptible performed of valuation services in the home are not Moreover, ordinarily one cannot under same criterion. job perform the of the accident incur the of a substitute to cost requirement Additionally, statutory ordi- victim. necessary nary reimburse- services be incurred before must prophylactic has shown not been ment function serves Finally, limits maximum the different to be unreasonable. appear reasonably reim- imposed by related to their the act of this There need for remand is no bursement functions. taking of evidence. matter merely rec- motorists 10. of transient nonresident Exclusion *9 402 Mich 554 cognizant Legislature, ognizes the realities of the situation. The vehicles, authority the extent of its over out-of-state motor of reasonably mandatory coverage excludes from the scheme out- operated Michigan motor vehicles which are not in for of-state any aggregate days year. calendar an of more than Those voluntarily procure nonresidents who do not the no-fault cover- age quite reasonably the do not receive concomitant no-fault test, legislation presumed the traditional is benefits. Under any reasonably may state of facts be constitutional if be con- legislative justify the action and the strued to classifications in below, appear record made it does not it. From the that the presumption is overcome. No benefit has been shown to be gained by a remand of this issue for further trial court action. function, proper discharge judicial 11. The of the when evaluating legislation validity, very new for constitutional is narrow. It is to determine whether there is rational rela- tionship goals sought accomplished to be between the and the judgment by means chosen. Review and the Court must be such hamper unduly Legislature’s experi- as to not the freedom to by superposing judgment the ment and innovate Court’s as to legislation expediency or wisdom over theirs. This case brought before the act was one month became effective and is presenting necessarily deficient evidence of the actual im- pact plaintiffs produced of the no-fault scheme. The before the body trial court a of evidence similar to that considered body deliberating upon pro- was when priety adopting impre- the scheme. Much of the evidence is cise, it, highly speculative. Upon examining even all of consid- court, ering findings applying of fact the trial and law, principles established of constitutional over all of which is superimposed presumption validity, of constitutional Jus- Ryan persuaded constitutionally tice is that the act is sound. Fitzgerald, concurring part, Justice would hold at this act, time that the no-fault insurance under the traditional due process standards, equal protection legisla- is a reasonable assuring tive method of that victims of automobile accidents promptly adequately compensated. are Because this case is declaratory judgment, nothing gained an action for would be remanding fact-finding plaintiffs’ per- from for further on the ception system beyond of the evils of a which is not issue, experimental stages. procedural process due whether adequate guidelines provided setting, or not for rate is not properly plaintiffs before the Court because the did not chal- lenge appeal provide in their to this failure Court the process regulation mechanism due in rate or insurance Assuming arguendo availability. that this issue were before the Court, due-process a constitutional cannot be found violation in a without a factual record. Due does not exist Furthermore, vacuum. law on the entitlement doctrine is adversary presentation necessary to not so clear but that an is requisite decide exists and whether whether entitlement balancing present, state action is and for interests consumers, companies, Bureau Insurance satisfy deciding minimally required before what process. may precipitate time a crisis in Judicial action at this hasty automobile insurance at the risk ill-conceived in the reform. The Court leave the matter hands should *10 problems those the solutions until the who best understand and proce- properly ought issue is raised. The Court not follow the holding dure of the if act unconstitutional at some future date taken, legislative no or administrative action is because this impor- potentially junks problem a a workable solution to of Legislature population to in tance the entire and dictates seemly a manner neither nor called for. Coleman, concurring part dissenting part, in Justice and in signed opinion Ryan of concurred with Justice the Justice and Fitzgerald, separately express but she wrote to her concern expression aponte over doc- the Court’s sua of constitutional process insufficiency regulation trine due of the of facts, briefs, prior arguments, without of oral consid- benefit by any knowledge eration lower and of the court without plaintiffs opinion Court or defendants. The of the transforms management private industry the of a into a state function subject process regulation has reserved for to such as been agencies analysis state is based on a factual with an that, highly questionable premises. vacuum and The conclusion requires public purchase because the state the to a certain product private prerequisite engaging in from a as a business private activity, is thus certain the action of that business action, important dangerously necessary state the and blurs government. private enterprise public between distinction groundwork opinion lays The unsolicited of the Court government people regulation private industry as such of Court have under the never countenanced Constitution. peculiar experience expertise, lacks means or the it, impact Legislature acquiring of financial of to assess the creating right every to administrative dissatisfied motorist part requirements in review the decisions an insurer. The any present majority opinion necessary III of under are necessary concept law, they to accom- nor are of constitutional Mich 554 plish Changes no-fault insurance act ends fairness. should, Legislature, place they likely are where in the take hearings based on studies made held changes and the Governor determine what indicated years experience after the first five with the act. The Court aponte usurp should not sua their functions. (1975) App part, 65 Mich 237 NW2d 325 affirmed in part. reversed in

Opinion of the Court 1. Constitutional Process— Law —No-Fault Insurance —Due Equal Protection —Police Power. act, provides

The no-fault insofar as it benefits to regard to “fault” as victims of motor vehicle accidents without are, abolished, part, a substitute for tort remedies which constitutionally accomplishes goal; its the act does not exceed (US scope. Legislature’s power police the traditional 294). Const, XIV; 1, 2,17; Am Const art 1972 PA §§ Injury 2. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance —Personal Equal Protection —Due Protection. Process — personal injury protection scheme of the no-fault insurance act, comprehensive expeditious system, with its benefit reasonably legislative objective correcting related to the system deficiencies in the tort as shown evidence in an challenging constitutionality action of the act that under system negligence contributory the former the doctrine of high percentage denied benefits to a of motor vehicle accident victims, injuries overcompensated, long payment minor were delays overburdened, commonplace, system were the court was *11 persons with low income and little education suffered (US Const, 2, XIV; 1963, 1, 17; discrimination Am Const art §§ 294). 1972 PA Damage Property 3. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance — Equal —Due Protection. Process — property damage protection The insurance scheme of the no-fault reasonably public purposes act is related to the valid of calcu- lating repair rates on the basis of insured vehicle costs of the potential damage rather than on the to a vehicle of unknown value, vehicles, creating an incentive to motor build safer encouraging rates, group reducing by eliminating necessity investigating costs to the of accidents (US 1963, Const, XIV; liability determine "fault” Am Const art 294). 1, 2, 17; 1972 PA §§ Compulsory 4. Constitutional Insurance — Insur- Law —No-Fault Ratemaking—Due Process. ance — insurance act and the of the no-fault automobile mechanisms protect motorists to the welfare of Insurance Code purchase provide required fail by no-fault insurance to law (1) requirement statutory law the due of because unfairly "excessive, inadequate cannot or insurance rates discriminatory” by has rules not been clarified administrative Commissioner, interpretation the made the Insurance (2) courts, provisions definitions; statutory no or there are ratemaking adequate provisions participation motorist (3) rate; permitting no there is review a motorist’s insurance, challenge provision permitting of a refusal of cancel- lation, Facility assignment Placement to the Automobile higher presumptively other rates than automobile has 1, (US Const, 1963, 17; XIV; PA Const art § insurers Am 294; 500.2403[l][d]; 24.12403[l][d]). MSA MCL Ratemaking—Due 5. Law —No-Fault Insurance — Constitutional Process. for 18 act will remain effect

The no-fault automobile insurance opinion the which found the act months the date of from process; period providing at of this the end deficient in Supreme will the act to determine whether Court re-examine reme- Insurance Commissioner have appropri- enter an deficiencies and will died constitutional (US Const, 1963, 1, XIV; 17; PA Const art ate order Am 294). Standing—Taxpayer 6. Parties — Suit —Statutes—Constitutional Law. regulating "taxpayer do not court rule suits” statute and constitutionality plaintiffs challenge permit group expenditure any legislation merely of an incidental because (MCL 201.2[3]). 27A.2041; 1963, 600.2041; MSA GCR state funds Standing—Taxpayer

7. Insurance —Con- Suit —No-Fault Parties — Law. stitutional challenge standing, taxpayers, have as

Plaintiffs do not not, act, constitutionality which does of the no-fault insurance face, contemplate expenditure where state funds on its only alleged expenditure is incidental funds of state (1972 600.2041; MSA implementing act PA MCL 27A.2041; 201.2[3]). GCR *12 402 Mich Declaratory Judgment Controversy 8. —Actual and —Words Phrases. controversy”, precedent

An "actual which is a condition to invo- declaratory rules, general cation of relief court under exists declaratory judgment necessary guide plain- where a (GCR preserve legal rights tiffs future conduct in order to his 521.1). 1963, Declaratory Judgment Controversy 9. —Actual —Adverse Inter- est. precluded by A court controversy” requirement is not the "actual governing declaratory judgments of the court rule from reach- ing injuries occurred; however, issues before or losses have plaintiff must, minimum, allege prove at a facts which enough actual, show an adverse justiciable interest to show an (GCR 521.1). 1963, controversy Standing—Declaratory Judgment 10. Parties — —No-Fault Insur- ance. owners, motorcycle including Automobile and a retiree who cares wife, companies his disabled and automobile insurance have standing declaratory judgment to seek a on the constitutional- ity compulsory provisions act, of the no-fault insurance personal injury protection scheme, property damage protection scheme, the exclusion of two-wheel motor vehicles act, from the replacement-services the scheme for work-loss and reimbursement, provisions governing nonresident motorists (1972 521.1). 294; 1963, PA GCR Compulsory 11. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance — In- Equal surance —Due Protection —Police Power. Process — compulsory requirement of the no-fault automobile scope insurance act does not police exceed the traditional power; required the insurance only under the act insures not vehicle, the driver of a passengers, pedestrians, motor but also property; furthermore, operation owners of fixed of a vehicle, driver, motor even when it affects no one but presents pervasive commonly recognized dangers danger result in large serious and immediate to a section of society Const, (US 1, 2, XIV; Const Am art 1972 PA §§ 294). 12. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance —Due Process— State Action. sufficiently

A close nexus exists between the state and action companies establishing of insurance rate structures under *13 no-fault automobile insurance act so that the action the fairly that the Due be treated as of the state itself under comply compulsory the Process Clause where failure to with provisions may result in criminal no-fault automobile insurance sanctions, coverage specifies of to and civil the act the be extent benefits, provided payment the no- and the conditions of and assignment provide for the fault act and the Insurance Code risks; grant monopoly merely a of a to a claims and this is not effect, companies, utility, insurance in the but makes the Legislature by carries out a scheme of instruments (US Const, 1, XIV; 1963, 17; general § Am Const art welfare 294). 1972 PA Process —Protected Interests— Constitutional Law —Due 13. Words Phrases. and process to or due The existence of interests benefits entitled depends government activity protection on the extent to which dependence activity that in has citizens on their fostered lives; protected daily concepts "liberty” "property” and process are not to be defined in a narrow or technical (US Const, XIV; given application Am but are to be broad sense 17). 1, 1963, Const art § Ratemaking—Due 14. Law —No-Fault Constitutional Insurance — Process. availability compulsory and the statu- no-fault insurance subject tory regulating for insurance rates are scheme no-fault register scrutiny ability process to due because is, essence, significant operate motor vehicle as an interest a keeping a license once it has been as interest driver’s issued, coverage provides compulsory no-fault that will act Facility through be available the Automobile Placement methods”, person procure through ordinary is "unable to it who that insurance rates should Insurance Code declares (US "excessive, inadequate discriminatory” unfairly 1, Const, XIV; 1963, 17; 1972 PA MCL Am Const art § 500.2403[l][d]; 24.12403[l][d]). MSA Ratemaking—Due 15. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance — Process. process ratemaking compulsory procedure no-fault in the Due (1) minimum, requires, statutory amend- a that a at by the Insurance Commissioner ment or an administrative rule requirement meaning statutory give that substantial "excessive, inadequate unfairly discrimina- rates shall not be (2) premiums tory”; provide must reasonable rate 402 Mich specific and insurer coverage, insured for the properly may factors which be considered the insurer in differentiating premiums insured, among those and the amount (3) appropriate factor; of differential for each that such infor- publicized mation for every person each insurer must be so that readily affected can ascertain factors and amounts of differ- applicable premium entials himto and calculate the the in- (4) may charge; prompt surer and effective administra- every tive review be available to motorist of calculation of the factors, premium applicable differential and to him and of the (US Const, basis for the refusal or cancellation of insurance Am 294). XIV; 1, 17; Const art 1972 PA 16. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance —Due Process— Equal Protection.

The test to determine whether the constitutionally police power exercised its equal in accord with due enacting particular scheme under the no-fault *14 facts, insurance act is whether state of either known or assumed, reasonably supports could legislative be judgment police power rationally under the as related to a legitimate (US government Const, XIV; interest Am Const 1963, 1, 294). 2, 17; art 1972 PA §§ 17. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance —Due Process— Equal of Fact. Question Protection — complexity problems The judicial of inherent in a determination police power legislative judgments whether the enacting comply no-fault insurance act equal with due protection requires purely legal arguments a trial rather than may judicially or facts which be noticed because the determina- predicated upon complicated tion is statistics and actuarial (which facts consequences) have substantial economic of the (US motor Const, vehicle insurance "trade” or business Am XIV; 1963, 1, 2, 294). 17; Const art §§ 1972 PA Remedy 18. Constitutional Law —Torts—Abolition of —Due Proc- ess. Legislature provide adequate need remedy not substitute abolishing tort; before a common-law cause of action in constitutionality statutory of a abolition of a common-law remedy process test, is measured the traditional due legislation whether the permis- bears a reasonable relation to a (US legislative objective Const, XIV; 1963, 1, sible Am Const art 7). 17; 1963, 3, Const art § § 19. Law —No-Fault Insurance —Torts—Abolition Constitutional Remedy Equal Protection. of — equal protection by act not violate does The no-fault partially creating statutory classifications abolish- incidental remedy persons injured by ing for tort the common-law shows that motor where evidence motor vehicle tortfeasors consistently principal been the cause of have vehicle accidents state; the classification between the death in accidental and uninsured motor vehicle tortfeasors of insured victims compul- compliance of the incentives for with the as one serves provisions sory the act because an uninsured motorist of injury by the victim and in tort for all suffered be liable may still obtain uninsured victims of uninsured motorists (US Facility Assigned personal injury under the Claims benefits 294). 1963, 1, Const, XIV; art 1972 PA Am Const § Damage Property 20. Law —No-Fault Insurance — Constitutional —Due Process. experiment ways improve free to with damage by negligent system compensation property tort system though tort is not shown to even the former motorists anticipated inadequate; fact that effects lower and yet equitable premiums at an have not been achieved more operation early stage act of the no-fault insurance does improving legitimacy goals of the tort not diminish the adopted system recovery or reasonableness of the means 294). (US 1, 17; Const, XIV; PA Am art Const Damage Property 21. Insurance — Constitutional Law —No-Fault —First-Party Recovery Equal Protection. — aspect require every Equal the no- does provide first-party protection i.e., recov- fault insurance scheme insurer; involving ery by in accidents the victim from his own non-moving tangible property the motor motor vehicles and fault, usually act at and the no-fault vehicle is damage properly he does to makes the motorist liable for *15 property making in each a of fault such without determination 294). (US Const, 1963, 1, 2; XIV; art PA case Am Const § Damage Property 22. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance — Damages Equal Protection. —Limitation of — damage property provision act that of the no-fault insurance damage compensation paid policy all for benefits under one tangible resulting exceed property accident shall not from an appears $1,000,000 equal protection where it does not violate sought to limit the the record trial from at that 402 Mich 554 liability companies of absolute and the limit (US justified Const, standpoint chosen was from an actuarial XIV; 1963, 294). 1, 2; Am Const art § PA Motorcycles— 23. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance — Equal Protection. (motorcyles) coverage Exclusion two-wheel vehicles from under equal the no-fault insurance does act not violate produced motorcyles where evidence at trial established that rarely accidents, motorcyle, passen- at fault in drivers and gers injured severely are killed or in accidents at a rate twice automobile, motorcyles in an those inclusion in a no- system premiums high fault would result in insurance so as to (US preclude motorcyclists purchasing most from 294). Const, XIV; 1963, 1, 2; Am Const art 1972 PA 24. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance —Work Loss —Re- placement Services —Reimbursement—Due Ques- Process — tion of Fact. disposition challenges of constitutional to the scheme replacement reimbursement of work loss and services in the home nonresident motorist scheme the no-fault adequate insurance act must be on made factual record developed at trial in accordance with traditional equal protection upon inadequate stipula- tests rather than upon finding tions fact or trial court no (US Const, XIV; 1963, 1, evidence was offered Am Const art 294). 2, 17; 1972 PA §§

Dissenting Opinion by Ryan, J.

Coleman, J. Declaratory Judgment Standing—Actual 25. Parties — — Contro- versy —Words and Phrases. allege prove controversy Plaintiffs must an actual before grant relief; declaratory controversy" court can "actual means something plaintiffs’ more than the need to know order guide addition, conduct; controversy" their future "actual pursuance antagonistic connotes the anof honest and actual (GCR rights by party against assertion of one another 521.1). Judgment— Declaratory 26. Parties —No-Fault Insurance — Standing —Constitutional Law. operate who residents own and automobiles and who *16 Shavers v compelled criminal sanctions the threat of civil and are under insurance, are purchase some of whom no-fault automobile to coverage, compulsory ñnancially buy allegedly unable to the challenge standing the insur- the scheme of no-fault have to they declaratory judgment because ance act in a suit duty it position state officials whose to the defendant adverse (1972 coverage provisions compulsory PA implement the is to 521.1). GCR1963, Appeal Error —Constitutional Questions 27. Courts — Law — Decided. unconstitutionality wishing of a party a claim of to make A appeal; appellate court of ffnal and it on an statute must raise properly conjure up issues of discretionary not review does litigants "great importance" which the have even "interest" or decide. raised or asked the court to not Liability. Highways—Statutes—Police Power — 28. Automobiles — Legislature operation power the police to control The power highways upon to enact state includes motor vehicles reciprocal rights legislation affecting duties of all owners, occupants operators, those when vehicle motor operation. rights arise out of such and duties Power— Insurance —Police 29. Law —No-Fault Constitutional Automobiles. legitimate goal accomplish legislative The decision highway consequences mitigating motor the detrimental legislation designed through the enactment vehicle accidents responsibility party’s as well as others to insure a financial purchase by requiring automobile of no-fault to himself power police clearly and also is the state’s insurance is within licensing integral part authority motor and interest in of its 294). (1972 operators registering PA motor vehicles vehicle Equal Protec- Law —Statutes—Due 30. Constitutional Process — tion. only Legislature to deter- discretion not is vested with wide welfare, public but also to deter- mine what is inimical public against designed protect evils fairly mine what is wisdom, occur; expediency, might otherwise desirability adopted by of the means strictly legitimate public the discre- within advance interests Legislature, providing chosen do the means tion of the (US Const, XIV; safeguards Const Am offend constitutional 17). 2, 1, art §§ 402 Mich Compulsory In- Insurance — Law —No-Fault 31. Constitutional Equal Protection. surance —Due Process — requirement compulsory imposition no-fault insurance of a required upon registrants of motor vehicles to be all owners or *17 upon may something registered of a burden be in this state not, se, conditions, per this is persons certain but under certain unconstitutional; goal mitigating the detri- the to achieve insuring consequences a of motor vehicle accidents mental Legislature may responsibility condition party’s the ñnancial upon procurement operation of no- a vehicle of motor damage protection property personal injury insurance and fault 294). 1, 2, 17; (US 1963, Const, XIV; 1972 PA Const art §§ Am Process —Procedural Protection— Law —Due 32. Constitutional Property. property safeguard procedural protection process is a The due already acquired person security a has of interests that terminated, beneñts; speciñc when beneñts right hearing provides opportunity for a to a constitutional beneñts, procedural person his claim to such but to vindicate abridged required process a is not until beneñt (US 1963, 1, Const, XIV; Am Const art threatened otherwise §17). Process— Law —No-Fault Insurance —Due 33. Constitutional Property Interest. abstract, possess, property inter- not in the a An individual does upon highways; operation of his vehicle state est in the requirement conditions or deñnes one of no-fault insurance register- eligibility requirement aspect beneñt of of the for the vehicle, ing person a does not have a valid claim of a for which (US Const, requirement Am until the is fulñlled entitlement 294). 1963, 1, XIV; art 1972 PA Const § Compulsory In- Law —No-Fault Insurance — Constitutional 34. Process. surance —Due register obtaining statutory to condition of no-fault insurance The partial is no more than a determinant a motor vehicle registering statutory property a interest dimensions of the palpably vehicle; long statutory is not motor so as the condition (US unreasonable, arbitrary it does not offend due 294). Const, XIV; 1963, 1, 17; 1972 PA Am Const art Moving Vehicles 35. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance — —Property Damage Equal Protection. —Due Process — coverage payable damage compulsory third-party property Shavers v tangible damage prop- regard fault for indicted without vehicles, moving statutory erty, except motor creates a classid- rationally legislative objec- cation which is related to the valid dxing damage tangible responsibility for tives of dnancial vehicles, shifting premi- property indicted motor closely the car one drives ums more redect value affording saving purchase premium not to one who does while making group coverage, possibly optional drst-party vehicle feasible, creating buying more incentives (US 1, Const, XIV; 1963, crashworthy Am Const art vehicles 294). §§2, 17; 1972 PA Statutory Equal Pro- Law — 36. Constitutional Classification — tection. justided treating persons two classes of differently where there is a natural difference between classes; enjoys the state situation or circumstances of selecting, range distinguishing, classi- wide of discretion in fying, practical it is sufdcient if a classidcation is (US Const, 1, XIV; §2). palpably arbitrary Am Const art Law —No-Fault Insurance —Work Loss Bene- Constitutional 37. Replacement Expenses *18 Equal Protec- fits — for Services — tion. work The treatment under the no-fault insurance act of different replacement in the loss benedts and reimbursement for services guarantees equal home not offend the constitutional does wages be on the because lost determined scale, person’s prior wage ordinary and a but basis of performed subject necessary not services in the home are , under the same criterion because one cannot ordinar- valuation perform job ily of the of a incur cost substitute victim; the fact the home must accident services prophylactic func- incurred before reimbursement also serves unreasonable, and the tion which has not been shown to be reasonably imposed appear maximum limits related different (US Const, XIV; 1963, their reimbursement functions Am Const 294). artl, 2; 1972 PA § Law —No-Fault Insurance —Nonresident Mo- Constitutional 38. Equal Protection. torists —Due Process — Legislature, authority of the extent of its over out-of- in view vehicles, mandatory reasonably from the state motor excluded coverage act out-of-state motor scheme of the no-fault insurance operated aggregate than not for an of more vehicles which are days any year; non-residents who do calendar those Mich voluntarily procure quite coverage reasonably the no-fault do (US Const, not receive the concomitant no-fault beneñts Am 294). XIV; 1963, 1, 2, 17; Const art 1972 PA §§ Appeal 39. Constitutional Law — and Error. function, proper discharge judicial evaluating when legislation validity, very new constitutional is it for narrow: is relationship to determine there is rational whether be- goals sought accomplished tween the to be and the means chosen. Statutes—Separation

40. Constitutional Law — of Powers. judgment constitutionality The Court’s on the review unduly hamper Legislature’s statutes must not freedom to superimposing experiment judg- and innovate the Court’s expediency legislation ment as to the or wisdom of the over the Legislature’s judgment. Opinion by Dissenting Fitzgerald, J. Law —No-Fault Process— Constitutional Insurance —Due

41. Equal Protection. act, The no-fault insurance at the time it was considered process equal protection Court under the traditional due standards, legislative assuring is a reasonable method for promptly adequately victims of automobile accidents (US Const, XIV; 1963, 1, §§2, compensated Am Const art 294). 1972 PA 42. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance —Due Process. procedural

Whether motorists are entitled to certain process protection availability ratemaking due in the of and no-fault automobile insurance should not be decided in a case question where a factual record has not been made on the plaintiff no has claimed an to or a denial of due entitlement process; does not exist in vacuum and an adver- (US Const, sary presentation necessary to decide the issues 294). XIV; 1, 17; Am Const art 1972 PA

Dissenting Opinion by Coleman, J. *19 Courts—Raising 43. Constitutional Law —No-Fault Insurance — Sponte Sua Issues —Parties. not, Supreme declaratory Court should in an action for judgment challenges constitutionality of the no-fault Attorney act, constitutionality sponte the issue of the sua raise availability compulsory ratemaking of no-fault auto- of it a vehicle to affect the entire insurance and use as mobile marketplace justice system of the without civil and freedom counsel, record, briefs, arguments lower on the facts (1972 294). consideration, knowledge parties PA court Insurance —Due Process— 44. Law —No-Fault Constitutional Rates—Availability. State Action — registrants statutory requirement obtain that automobile compulsory does not transform automobile insurance no-fault essentially rate-making process private from an the insurance governmental supervision to that some series of actions with including subject controls which is state action right every to obtain administrative review for motorist (US 1, Const, XIV; Am Const art of an actions insurer 294). 17; 1972 PA Lopatin, Miller, Bindes, Freedman & Bluestone Heldman) (by C. L. and Victoria Sheldon Miller King Spearman, Cooper, Rine, Cockrel, Philo, plaintiffs. for & Atkinson Kelley, General, A. Robert

Frank J. Harry Derengoski, General, G. Solicitor Attorney General, de- Jr., Iwasko, Assistant Secretary State, and Commissioner fendants Insurance. Bogle Dahling (by Longley, Bodman, Theodore & Buschmann) for defendant R. Souris and James Com- Automobile Insurance State Farm Mutual pany. (by Wright, Cudlip McKean,

Dickinson, & Moon Phillips, Warren, Richard J. Dawn L. W. Gerald Schwartz) Meyers, for defendant L. and Robert Company. Allstate Insurance League General for defendant & Edwards Downs Company. Insurance *20 402 Mich op Opinion the Court

Dykema, Spencer, Trigg Gossett, (by- Goodnow & Tracy, McGuigan, Nancy James D. Michael J. Kurtz) C. for defendants Detroit Automobile Inter- Exchange Insurance and Riverside Insurance Com- pany of America. (Avern

Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn counsel) Kamins, Cohn and John M. ants Aetna for defend- Casualty Surety Company, The Indemnity Company, Travelers Hartford Accident Indemnity Company, Casualty and Company, Continental Indemnity Company.

and the Home Amici Curiae: E.

Robert Keeton. American Alliance, Foster, Mutual Insurance (by Collins, & Smith, Swift P.C. Webb A. David W. Schmedlen). McKeague, and Michael J. Michigan Company, by Elijah Mutual Insurance Poxson and James L. Schueler.

Progressive Casualty Company, Universal Un- Company, derwriters, Midwest Mutual Insurance Company, Balboa Insurance Northland Insurance Company, Company, Reserve Insurance and Na- Indemnity Company, by tional Plunkett, Insurance Cooney, Stanczyk (by Rutt, Watters, & Pedersen Huckabay). D. J. Watters and A. Charles Michigan J. The No-Fault Insurance Williams, Act, 1, 1973, which became law on October was legal response offered as an innovative social and long payment delays, inequitable payment high legal structure, and costs inherent the tort (or "fault”) liability system. goal of the no- Opinion op the Court system provide victims of was fault adequate, assured, vehicle accidents motor reparation prompt certain economic losses. goal most could be effec- believed through system compulsory tively achieved whereby every insurance, motorist required purchase no-fault insurance would be *21 operate legally in a motor vehicle unable to system, of motor this victims this state. Under would receive insurance benefits vehicle accidents injuries for their common- their as a substitute remedy in tort. law provides Act, as it beneñts

The No-Fault insofar without re- to of motor vehicle accidents victims (as gard for tort to "fault” a substitution remedies abolished), constitutionally part, are, ac- goal. scrutiny complishes After its intense this litigation’s record, Court holds that extensive this exceed the traditional No-Fault does not the scope Act Legislature’s police power. partial under the is consist- of tort remedies act abolition principles articulated ent with constitutional personal injury Court. The act’s comprehensive scheme, its with system, reasonably expeditious to relates benefit tort at trial that under the the evidence advanced liability gence negli- contributory system doctrine percentage high to a denied benefits injuries victims, minor motor vehicle accident overcompensated, injuries were un- serious were delays dercompensated, long payment com- were monplace, system overburdened, and the court was little education suffered those with low income and Likewise, V, See Part infra. discrimination. act’s ably ing damage protection property scheme reason- public purposes of creat- the valid relates to vehicles, safer motor an incentive to build reducing encouraging group rates, and costs 402 Mich Opinion of the Court eliminating necessity of accident "fault” inves- tigation. VI, See Part infra. theory,

However, is, while Act the No-Fault response problems affecting valid, rational to general pro- welfare, actual mechanisms for tecting Michigan the welfare individual motor- required by purchase ists, law no-fault insur- constitutionally failing ance, are deñcient provide process. Legislature, in the No- Fault Act and other sections of the Insurance recognized significance Code, of a motorist’s registration operation in the interest motor of a Michigan highways. on vehicle streets and compulsory were Measures no-fault insurance in taken assure that would be available equitable to motorists at fair and rates. These inadequate unfortunately, protect are, measures purchase motorists, individual who must no-fault private potentially insurers, insurance from from rates, unfair insurance refusal cancel- particular, lation. In under the No-Fault Act and the Insurance Code: *22 protection against statutory

1. The "excessive, inadequate unfairly discriminatory” rates is support clarifying without the rules established by tively legisla- Insurance, Commissioner without any history definition,

sufficient and without prior interpretation; legislative court man- (see date is thus reduced mere exhortation Part infra); III-B[1] inadequate statutory provisions

2. There are for attacking validity a motorist of an individual (see rating infra); decision Part III-B[1] adequate statutory provision per- 3. There is no mitting challenge an individual insurance re- assignment discriminatory fusal, cancellation, or Facility” to the "Automobile Placement with its (see infra). presumptively higher III-B[2] rates Part Shavers v Opinion of the Court status of the No-Fault Act The constitutional places extraordinary jurispruden- this Court in an position: Act, tial tially the No-Fault which has substan- Michigan every every motorist, in-

affected underwriting company motor vehicle in- surance Michigan, system of and our entire civil surance justice years, nearly is constitutional its for five general unconstitutionally deficient thrust but assuring compulsory no- its mechanisms for fault is available to motorists equitable at fair and rates. purposes necessary, it

We therefore believe general general jurisprudence, welfare justice, public and the administration of remain in effect hold that the No-Fault Act will opinion. for 18 months from the issuance of this During period, the Com- remedy the act’s defi- missioner of Insurance can taking necessary correc- ciencies constitutional assuring compulsory in- no-fault tive action equitable rates. at fair and surance is available necessary types to rem- corrective actions edy out in the act’s due deficiencies are set opinion. Part III-C of our period, re-

Toward the end of this this Court will Act to deter- examine status of the No-Fault present mine deficien- whether constitutional appro- time, an cies have been remedied. At that priate reflecting sta- order the act’s constitutional tus entered this Court. will be

I. 1973, the effective date of Prior October plaintiffs Act, in their own No-Fault 11 named representatives classes of behalf and as of several *23 against persons other initiated this action 402 554 Mich op Opinion the Court Insurance, Secretary State, the Commissioner representa as insurers named automobile industry the entire automobile tives of sought declaratory complaint Michigan. constitutionality judgment of the No- as to the against injunction the act’s Fault Act and an enforcement.1 Plaintiffs porary injunction sought initially a tem had against the act. enforcement denied. relief had been This pursuant complaint filed, was then An amended 6, 1973, court, on December to an of the trial order adding Michigan’s Attorney General as defend- following Additionally, amendments were ant. dropped eight plaintiff was one named made: others were added plaintiffs; and the as named injunctive rights declaratory and assertion relief plaintiffs of five of the named were added on behalf pursuant property taxpayers, to GCR as 201.2(3). insurers, All- 1963, of the defendant Two Company and State Farm Mutual Insurance state Automobile Insurance plaints,

Company, filed cross-com- challenging constitutionality damage property act’s 3121, 3123, 3127. scheme, §§ 3125 and Judge 1963, 301.6, W. Horace Pursuant to GCR pre- assigned all matters Gilmore was to conduct Preliminary try liminary to trial and to the case. pretrial on and final conferences were conducted days during 1973. and December four At November legal parties identified these conferences stipulated and factual issues to be tried and undisputed. pretrial state- facts which were of the conferences ment issued at the conclusion subsequently occasions amended on several was before

trial to include additional issues. brought subsequent of this Court’s 389 Mich action was to the issuance This Advisory Opinion Constitutionality 1972 PA re (1973). NW2d 469 *24 583 Shavers v op Opinion the Court commendably ably Judge conducted and Gilmore days, occupied from Janu- trial, 35 trial which given parties ary 21, 1974. The were 14 to March argument; every opportunity record the trial for transcript pages 5,000 of and over over includes exhibits. 200 Judge May 20, filed a learned 1974 Gilmore

On pages. thoughtful opinion of over standing plaintiffs to raise held that had court every pursu- objection they asserted constitutional (GCR "taxpayers’ rule, suit” and statute ant to the 27A.2041), 600.2041; 1963, MCL MSA 201.2[3]; 521.1). (GCR declaratory judgment 1963, rule Act held that the No-Fault did The court also penalize plaintiffs’ infringe significantly consti- "right held constitu- to travel”. court tutional tional: 3101(1), no-fault requires purchase of which § registration and precedent condition

insurance as a vehicle; operation of a motor non-compliance with the penalties imposed for (§ requirement 3102[2]); compulsory insurance act’s scheme; personal protection injury the act’s $1,000 for no-fault funeral and bur- the limitation of (§ 3107); expenses ial in the home

the classification between workers maximum bene- workers outside the home terms of (§ 3107); payable injury in case of fits delegation authority to the Commissioner provided in 3109a approve Insurance to deductibles as § act; 3102(1), requires motorists which that nonresident § Michigan for an maintain no-fault insurance when in year; aggregate days calendar of more than 3135, which, inter- light can be read § § personal injury preted paying an insurer to mean that from to reimbursement insurance benefits is entitled person to the extent recovery injured the tort of an damages for losses for which recovery the tort includes paid; personal injury were insurance benefits 402 Mich 554 Opinion of the Court requires person who suffers which § passenger injury operator bodily while accidental transport- engaged in the business of a motor vehicle personal injury insurance benefits ing passengers seek of the vehicle. from the insurer The court held unconstitutional: damage property act’s scheme; 3101(2), vehicles from excludes two-wheel which § act;

coverage under the 3107(b), replacement requires that the cost "reasonably necessary services be ordinary *25 reimbursement; incurred” before provided 3109(1), requires that benefits which § any of state or provided under the laws required to be personal from government be subtracted the federal benefits; injury insurance authority to the Commissioner of delegation of provided in as approve deductibles

Insurance 3109(3) act; of the § 3113, injured "transient” nonresident denies § purchased no-fault insurance or have not motorists who compliance certificate in insurer has not filed a whose benefits and tort personal injury with § 3135(2). recovery the threshold of below § the act that the sections of The court also held were severable. declared unconstitutional 1974, its 25, trial court issued June On judg- declaratory Upon entry judgment. of this plaintiffs ment, trial. After moved for a new hearing, by the court. this motion was denied appealed

Plaintiffs and various defendants Appeals. Court of

Application appeal Court for to this leave to Appeals prior by was filed to decision the Court of August 1974, was 21, all defendants and on 23, 1974. denied this Court December upon Thereafter, of the record review Attorney Opinion of Court hearing arguments, Appeals the Court of issued opinion 5, 1975.2 its November Appeals disagreed The Court of with the trial "taxpayers’ statute, that suit” rule and court applicable supra, were to the instant case. 65 Mich (1975). App 355, 362; 237 NW2d 325 The Court standing plaintiffs then under the de found had claratory judgment supra, challenge rule, limited number of issues.3 General, App Shavers v 65 Mich 237 NW2d 325 (1975). Appeals opinion "standing” The Court of its structured its analysis stated that shown a declaratory judgment. of the trial court’s The Court terms rule, plaintiffs, declaratory judgment under the had not required controversy” respect "case of actual with to "Para- C, D, E, F,

graphs judgment”. App and H of the court’s 65 Mich declaratory judgment, 363. In terms of the trial court’s this meant plaintiffs standing challenge: did not have 3107(b)’s requirement constitutionality —the the cost of § replacement ordinary necessary "reasonably services be incur- (Paragraph declaratory judg- before C of the red” ment); reimbursement delegation constitutionality authority —the to the Com- 3109(3) approve provided missioner of Insurance to as deductibles in § (Paragraph declaratory judgment); of the act D of the 3109(l)’s constitutionality requirement pro- —the that benefits § required provided vided or federal to be under the laws of state or the government personal injury be subtracted from (Paragraph declaratory judgment); benefits E of the 3113(c) 3135(2) constitutionality they —the of the act as § pertain declaratory judgment); (Paragraph to "transient” non-resident F of the motorists *26 act, interpretation pertains —the of 3116 of the § the recovery personal injury subtraction of (Paragraph from tort insurance benefits judgment); declaratory H of the Appeals plaintiffs’ declaratory the Court of held action for A, B, judgment Paragraphs on the issues found in G of the trial 355, judgment appropriate. App court’s graph part, was 363-364. Para- Mich stated, judgment pertinent declaratory A of the trial in court’s act, including thereof, provi- "the 3109a does not violate except the sion of hereinafter United States and Constitutions as specifically Paragraph B the exclusion declared”. declared coverage of two-wheel vehicles from the act’s unconstitutional. Para- graph property protection declared the act’s insurance scheme G Although Appeals plaintiffs A of the unconstitutional. the Court of held that standing challenge Paragraph had declaratory judgment, in all issues "found” i.e., by the all issues declared constitutional Mich op Opinion the Court Appeals held constitutional the The Court protection scheme injury (affirming act’s personal 365-367, court), 355, 65 Mich the App the trial compul- from vehicles exclusion of two-wheel act’s court), trial coverage (overruling no-fault sory 355, Court held uncon- App 65 Mich 367-368. The damage protection property stitutional the act’s court), 65 Mich (affirming App scheme trial 355, the uncon- The Court also held that 368-370. scheme was property damage protection stitutional 355, App Mich 372. severable. 65 25, 1975, filed motion plaintiffs On November Appeals challeng- rehearing for with Court ing findings Appeals of the Court its but, requesting more the Court opinion specifically, for Appeals testimony remand case further 820.1(5). 1963, GCR Plaintiffs’ mo- consistent with rehearing Appeals for in the Court of was tion 17, 9, 1976, January denied on December 1975. On motion leave to to this plaintiffs appeal filed a 27, granted May on 1976. Court. Leave was II. question plaintiffs’

A crucial threshold concerns standing to certain raise issues.

Plaintiffs to chal- standing first seek establish Act lenge constitutionality No-Fault rule creates a under court and statute which 201.2(3) MCL "taxpayers’ suit”. GCR identical, 600.2041; 27A.2041, deal MSA which are parties real statute with interest. rule and provide pertinent part: court, issues, namely, only of these trial Court addressed one personal injury protection constitutionality the act’s other found constitu- Court did not address the issues scheme. standing although plaintiffs tional the trial court stated had it them.

raise *27 op Opinion the Court in the name prosecuted shall be "Every action * * * further in interest party real "3) expenditure of illegal prevent An action constitutionality of a statute funds or test state relating * * * names of brought in the thereto property own this state who 5 residents of at least they county wherein by the direct taxation assessed for reside.” standing had plaintiffs held

The trial court constitu- every to raise the rule and statute under Ap- The Court asserted. they objection tional reversed, declaring: peals ruling that the trial court’s disagree with

"We Plaintiffs plaintiffs’ suit. provides a basis court rule of state illegal expenditure with the not concerned aggrieved by the taxpayers rule allows funds. The court standing traditional to hurdle the outlay of state funds permit- it as do not read taxpayers suits. We obstacle legislation merely be- challenge any ting group to funds; al- of state expenditure an incidental cause of GCR spending. public some legislation most all involves 201.2(3) 65 Mich litigation.” inapplicable to this 355, 362. App not, on its Act does The No-Fault agree.

We funds”. face, "expenditure of state contemplate rule suit” "taxpayers’ do not believe We standing give plaintiffs is intended and statute an entire act constitutionality” to "test inciden- alleged is of funds expenditure when v Rac- Compare Hertel implementation. to its tal 191; 242 NW2d Commissioner, App 68 Mich ing 402 Mich op Opinion the Court Commissioner, 56 Mich Racing (1976); Jones v *28 (1974).4 367 223 65; NW2d App cross-plaintiffs plaintiffs both Alternatively, 1963, under the GCR standing establish seek to 1963, 521.1 rule. GCR judgment declaratory 521.1 provides: jurisdic- controversy within its

"In case of actual a tion, state declare court of this any circuit party interested legal relations of rights and other seeking a or not relief is declaratory judgment, whether sought granted.” or could be rule was intended and declaratory judgment broad, provide to a liberally has been construed making with a view to courts remedy flexible 2 people. Honigman & more accessible (2d Hawkins, ed), Rules Annotated Michigan Court Comm’r of Revenue v Comment, 683; p Committee Co, 371, Grand Trunk WR 375; 326 Mich 40 (1949). NW2d 188 is a controversy” of an "actual

The existence declaratory invocation precedent condition controversy” exists general, In "actual relief. is neces- or decree declaratory judgment where in order future conduct guide plaintiffs sary rights. Updegraff Attorney v preserve legal his General, (1941); 48, 52; 298 NW 400 298 Mich 4 on the trial court not believe that the cases relied We do 204, Barrett, holding persuasive. reaching 206; v 412 Ill In Bode its (1952), 521, plaintiffs challenged 523 statutes 106 NE2d raising expenditure expressly funds. Blair of state controlled the (1971), 42; Pitchess, 258; Rptr involved 486 P2d 1242 v 5 Cal 3d Cal which, expendi though contemplating the not an attack on a statute county funds, immediately directly involve ture of state did However, taxpayers’ reject approach suits because we officials. standing, would, not adopted, virtually a result abolish the law of it clearly if 201.2(3) 600.2041; 1963, contemplated by MSA and MCL GCR 27A.2041. "taxpayers’ suit” the Illinois and California We also note that language "to statute’s similar to the statutes do not include test the relating constitutionality of a thereto”. statute op Opinion the Court Co, Flint v Consumers Power 290 Mich 309- (1939); also, see, 287 NW 475 Welfare Em- ployees App Comm, Union v Civil Service 28 Mich (1970). 343, 350-351; 184 NW2d requirement controversy” This of an "actual prevents deciding hypothetical a court from issues. precluded reaching However, a court from injuries issues before actual or losses have occur- Long, 1, 11-14; red. Merkel v 368 Mich 117 NW2d (1962). declaratory Also, granted, before affirmative plaintiff, relief it can is essential that a pleads entitling minimum, at a facts him to the judgment proves alleged, he seeks and each fact plaintiff allege prove i.e., a must an actual justiciable controversy. Detroit, See Kuhn v East *29 (1973). App Mich 213 NW2d 599

Therefore, what is essential an "actual contro- versy” declaratory judgment under the rule is that plaintiffs plead prove and facts which indicate an necessitating sharpening adverse interest the of the issues raised. plaintiffs

The five who testified at trial all owned purchased an automobile. Two had insur no-fault plaintiffs ance and three had not. the One of who purchased had insurance, no-fault Melvin Janase vich, testified that he was a retiree with no work paralyzed, income who cares for his wheelchair- complaint confined wife. Plaintiffs’ amended persons "motorcycle names three who are owners operators”; and defendants’ answer admits plaintiffs.5 undisputed Also, status of these it was Gentile, plaintiffs The five who testified at were who trial Eric purchased insurance; owned an automobile Melvin had but who not no-fault Janasevich, purchased who an owned automobile and who had insurance; Shano, automobile, no-fault John who an but owned who purchased insurance; Hullum, Raymond had not no-fault who owned purchased insurance; an Boyd, and automobile who had Frederick no-fault purchased who and no-fault owned automobile who had insurance. 402 Mich Opinion op the Court cross-plaintiff record that

on the validity prop- challenge companies who provisions damage erty Act No-Fault were policies compliance required in to issue insurance they to continue to under- the act if wished with Michigan. in write deeply appreciates

This that the No-Fault Court redefining radically Act, gan’s nature of Michi- profoundly insurance, vehicle motor importantly of our affects a crucial dimension constitutionality that the lives. We are also aware question since this action of this has act been August, light In 1973. was commenced cross-plain- plaintiffs, record and our belief that people tiffs, and the State challenges definitive a decision on the deserve as judiciously can Act as be afforded No-Fault parameters rules for above stated within the plaintiffs declaratory relief, we hold that standing cross-plaintiffs under have established following 1963, 521.1 to raise the issues: GCR 1) registrants requires whether operators to maintain of motor vehicles com prop pulsory personal injury protection insurance, damage erty protection insurance, and residual l;6 liability insurance, is constitutiona 2) injury protection personal whether the act’s process scheme violates the due he has to Plaintiff testified that he was retired and that Janasevich *30 paralyzed, wife. take care his wheelchair-confined "motorcycle operators” plaintiffs in three as owners and named Makella, plaintiffs’ complaint Steven Linda Chamber- amended were of this status lain and John Savard. For defendants’ admission 65a, 77a, answers, Appendix, pp 88a. their see Joint 6 purchased would be no-fault insurance Plaintiffs who have (see (see 3135[2]) penalties if exposed 3102[2]) civil § to criminal and § compulsory requirement the act is constitutional. under compulsory requirement the act is unconstitu- under If the tional, purchased plaintiffs insurance are entitled who no-fault have guide future conduct. to their a determination this issue in order to 591 Opinion of the Court equal protection Michigan clauses of the and (Const 1963, United States Constitutions7 art XIV); 2,§§ 17; Const, US Am 3) property damage protection whether act’s insurance scheme violates the due equal protection and Michigan clauses Constitutions;8 United States 4) 3101(2), excluding § whether two-wheel coverage act, motor vehicles from under the vio protection equal Michigan lates the clauses of the Constitutions;9 and United States 5) statutory whether the act’s scheme with re spect to work-loss reimbursement and reimburse replacement services, § 3107, ment for violates the equal protection Michigan clauses of the United Constitutions;10 States

6) statutory whether the act’s schemata with respect nonresident, to motorists, out-of-state 3102(1), requires § which nonresident motorists to they maintain no-fault insurance when are in aggregate days "an 30 of more than year”, § calendar 3113 inter read alia 3135(2), pertains §with to transient nonresi- purchased Plaintiffs have who no-fault insurance would be ex- posed liability to tort without if insurance reimbursement the tort protection immunity personal injury vis-á-vis insurance under the act is held unconstitutional. 8Cross-plaintiffs Allstate, they State Farm and if wish to under- damage property Michigan, write pursuant insurance in must do so 3121, 3123, 3125, Plaintiffs of the act. who §§ purchased exposed liability have no-fault insurance would be tort immunity without insurance reimbursement if the tort vis-á-vis the property damage protection insurance under held unconsti- the act is tutional. motorcycle operators might required Plaintiff be owners and (see purchase exposed 3102[2]) no-fault insurance or be § criminal (see 3135[2]) penalties and civil if the two-wheel motor vehicle exclusion is held unconstitutional. Janasevich, purchased Plaintiff who insurance and has no-fault caring wife, paralyzed, who a retiree for a wheelchair-confined might exposed statutory to discrimination under this scheme if he injured were in a motor vehicle accident. *31 554 402 Mich

592 op Opinion the Court equal process and motorists, the due violate dent Michigan protection and United clauses Constitutions.11 States they are not two issues because

We do not reach appear necessary have been to decision and plain Also, these we do believe abandoned.12 standing under the declara established tiffs have tory judgment Two three issues.13 rule as to properly this Court before these issues Inter-Insurance Automobile v Detroit Workman 11 be ex- purchased would no-fault insurance who have Plaintiffs if these liability reimbursement posed without to tort unconstitutional. are held schemata 12 (1) 3114, constitutionally whether, under it is § These issues are bodily injury suffering person require accidental permissible operated in the passenger vehicle operator of a motor while protection personal insur- transporting passengers to seek business (2) whether the the vehicle and the insurer of benefits from ance $1,000 expenses 3107 under § and burial limit for funeral maximum is constitutional. not addressed remand the issues that we do not We note (issues 1, 5, 6, standing Appeals have found for which we Court of importance supra) of the issues involved and because of prompt 852.1 and 865.1. public’s decision. GCR need for a issues, standing three to raise not established Plaintiffs have act, (1) Whether, tort claim 3116 of the under § the reasons stated: recoveries must be subtracted fits. There tort claim protection Whether, personal injury bene from any plaintiff proof had realized a is no on the record personal injury subtracted from which an insurer (2) he was entitled. he received or to which benefits which 3109(1) act, government must be benefits under § proof injury protection There is no personal from benefits. subtracted on the record that injury which had any plaintiff for an had a claim government received of the fact he denied or reduced on account been benefits. Whether (3) authority upon conferring Legislature, in 3109(3) approve under § Insurance to deductibles the Commissioner of and (added 72), constitutionally dele 1974 PA 3109a of the act proof legislative power. record that gated There is no on the its provi pursuant approved any to these had deductibles Commissioner sions. We note that delegation Appeals. (1977); 3109(3) a valid constitutes the issue of whether § properly Court of legislative power has been before Johnson, 497; App 257 NW2d 76 Mich See Davidson v (On 660; Rehearing), App 79 Mich v Johnson Davidson Co, Liability (1977); 80 Mich Mutual Porter v NW2d 887 (1977). App 145; 263 NW2d 318 Opinion op the Court Exchange, Docket No. and O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual, Docket No. 58833.

III. *32 important The first and most us, issue before 3101(1) general stated in terms, its § is whether of requires registrants operators act, the and personal compulsory of motor to vehicles maintain protection injury property damage insurance, in liability surance, and insurance, residual is constit utional.14 3101(1),requiring purchase The trial court held that "§ the of no- insurance, fault is constitutional”. expressly appeal Plaintiffs did not Appeals this to issue the of Court However, or to this Court. certain defendants admitted this issue was and contested of League Inter-Insurance addressed it in their briefs before Court. See Briefs Defendants-Appellees Company, 45-47; pp Allstate Insurance 17, Company, pp 35-36; General Insurance Detroit Automobile Exchange Company and Riverside Insurance of Amer- ica, 13-14; see, also, pp Progressive Casualty Brief of Curiae Amicus al, Company, p et 1. general impact A concern compul- with the of the Act’s No-Fault sory requirement underlying insurance has been a constant issue throughout litigation the repeatedly of this case. Plaintiffs have objection imposition compulsory voiced without of no-fault insurance regard impact. to its Complaint, financial See Plaintiffs’ and trial, Complaint. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended At the trial court barred testimony concerning application compulsory the of the insurance requirement impact, perceiving its solely financial at the as issue However, pretrial, recognized, one of law. agreed, parties the court and the " * * * adequate guide- the issue of whether there are guide clearly lines to the Insurance Commissioner is before the court determined, especially and must be in view of the fact that the requires carry provide statute now other opinion. all motorists to insurance or to security”. The trial court did not address this "sub-issue” in its Appeals, plaintiffs argued: In their brief before the of Court Legislature adequate guidelines "When the refuses to establish rates, tory actually encourages illegal it rate discrimination. Discrimina- guidelines are rates result end when no sufficient adequate guidelines established. Because the act does furnish to rates, setting

the Insurance Commissioner in and the act does not adequate guidelines Secretary approving establish for the of State security, the 'no fault’ act must be unconstitutional. There cannot be compulsory system guidelines a constitutional sufficient without establish, implement, operate legislative intent.” Appeals Plaintiffs, The Court did not address this "sub-issue”. Mich Opinion of the Court constitutionality perceive

We the issue requirement” "compulsory insurance 3101(1) essence, be, two-fold: (A) Legislature constitutionally, as a Can operation registration precedent condition purchase require vehicle, of no-fault aof motor prop- personal and no-fault erty protection insurance, or in alternative Secretary require security approved State?

(B) present regulatory scheme for com- Does the protect sufficiently pulsory no-fault operators registrants of motor interests Court, again it. once Appeal, pp reference to See brief before this made their Supplementary Plaintiffs-Appellants Brief 22 and on Appeal, pp 34-36. Brief on appeal plaintiffs expressly Although on the issue did not raise court, constitutionally, "Can the as decided condition require fault address it because of trial vehicle, operation [registration precedent of a motor and] *33 personal protection purchase no- of no-fault insurance and ”* * * compelled property feel to we basic, importance any its threshold to decision might constitutionality. render to the No-Fault Act’s we as process sufficiency forcefully challenged of the brief before the the due Plaintiffs court, regulatory its before the trial in act’s Court of scheme and, by reference, (during Appeals, before this Court oral requested argument plaintiffs use inadequate the trial court viewed this Court to that this Court "make reference Appeals brief on issues that were otherwise Court of [their] court”). reviewing supra, As indicated or deficient this "delegation” challenge a issue. The as challenge. plaintiffs’ Appeals of not even address crucial did years uncertainty constitutionality as of No- After five of to the Act, Michigan people of Fault opinion we believe the the State of deserve challenge which addresses this crucial constitutional regulatory Act’s No-Fault scheme head-on. challenge the act’s This could be considered on the basis of whether protections pass regulatory a contains to muster as scheme sufficient However, opinion delegation by Legislature. constitutional first, steps: analyzes plaintiffs’ requirement ance process challenge in does the due two Michigan purchase insur motorists must no-fault operate register to a vehicle create an order motor second, insurance; availability to entitlement fairness and such if face, entitlement, on on Act its there is such an its face cate does the No-Fault regulations, complemented by proper agency indi rules plaintiff process complied has with in terms of been discussion, III(B), See Part infra. motorists’ "entitled” interest. 595 v Opinion of the Court with vehicles accord the due clause of and United States Constitutions as (1) rates, the fairness of insurance (2) proper availability of insurance.

(A) Compulsory No-Fault Insurance insurance,

Before the advent no-fault power require all motorists to mandatory liability prerequi obtain insurance as a receipt driving site to of a license was well-establ Supreme recently ished.15 The United States Court Burson, observed in Bell v 402 539; US 91 S (1971): 1586; Ct 29 L Ed 2d 90 "If the statute barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists did not carry liability who insurance or who post security, not, did not the statute would under our cases, parte violate Fourteenth Ex Amendment. 30; 3; Poresky, 290 US 54 78 L (1933); S Ct Ed 152 Baking Woodring, 352; Continental Co v 286 52 US S Ct 595; 1155; (1932); 76 L Ed ALR 1402 Hess Pawlo- ski, 352; (1927).” 632; US S Ct 71 L Ed 1091 highest eight courts states have reviewed their states’ no-fault automobile insurance laws.16 15Michigan’s generally recognized "compul No-Fault Act is sory”, "mandatory”. distinction a semantic one made acquainted those tory” with insurance terms art. Insurance is "manda buyer in nature when the can choose whether or not insurance, purchase purchase insurance, purchase but if he chooses to he must specific type "compulsory” of insurance. Insurance is if the buyer purchase specific insurance, i.e., type buyer must has purchases no choice in whether or not he insurance. Altermatt, (1975), appeal *34 Gentile v 169 Conn 363 A2d 1 (1976); Daniels, 41; Montgomery 1041 dismissed 423 US v NY2d 38 (1975); Singer 387; Shepperd, 340 444 NE2d v 464 Pa 346 A2d 897 (1975); Co, (Fla, 1974); Lasky Farm So v State Ins 296 2d 9 Manza Bell, 589; (1974); Opinion nares v Kan 1291 of 214 522 P2d the 14, 1973, 205; (1973); May Justices 113 NH 304 A2d 881 Grace v Howlett, 478; (1972); Cleary, Pin nick 51 Ill 2d 283 NE2d 474 v Mich 554 402

596 Opinion of the Court the issue has considered of Every court police power, its can legislature, within a whether a condition precedent insurance as no-fault require vehicle, answered of motor has operation that the This Court also holds the in affirmative.17 its authority po has under Michigan Legislature of no-fault purchase compel power lice insurance. is concept em Act’s self-insurance

The No-Fault police scope the traditional within braced "sic utere tuo ut stated the maxim as power ("so you own that do your use non laedas” alienum another”). 2d, 16 Am Jur Consti that of injure not Law, 267, required 523. The insurance p tutional not only Act protects under the No-Fault vehicle, also passengers, a motor but driver property, fixed and owners owners of pedestrians, Furthermore, op parked vehicles. properly vehicle, it no a motor even when affects eration driver,18 in serious and immedi results one but large society. section West Coast danger ate Parrish, 379, 394; 578; 57 S Ct v 300 US Hotel Co (1937). principle, L 703 This those who 81 Ed required public highways may properly use (1971). also, See, 1; Rybeck Rybeck, 592 v 141 NJ Mass 271 NE2d 360 moot, (1976), appeal per Super 481; as dismissed curiam 358 A2d 828 State, 151; (1976), Super A2d 269 and Andrew 238 Ga 150 NJ 375 (1977). 233 SE2d 25, Pinnick, Gentile, Only the Courts in 360 Mass private 267, 302-303, approved expressly the involvement of Conn companies though However, Pinnick, al- insurance rate scheme. expressed opinion subject, court on the the Massachu- relied, compulsory. Act In Gentile the court setts No-Fault was examination, statutory protection against without on the existence underwriting assigned ratemaking abuses insurers and state’s plan. risk pre-no-fault recognize case law dealt We aforementioned liability exclusively mandatory third-party with distinguishable from the instant no-fault insurance scheme therefore which Woodroof, additionally compels first-party or self-insurance. See (New Squillante, Law & No-Fault Fonseca & York: Automobile Insurance 1974), Co, p Lawyers Co-operative Publishing 355. *35 597 v Opinion of the Court provide security may predictably for loss that be use, suffered properly others on account of such can require security

be extended to for the might loss that the state itself otherwise incur on account of such use.

(B) Due Process protections process of the can due clause

only be invoked when there been action. has state Metropolitan 345, Co, 419 US Jackson Edison v (1974). 349-350; Ct L 449; 95 S 42 Ed 477 2d compels The No-Fault Act all require comply vehicles; motor failure with this ment result in criminal and civil sanctions.19 specifies addition, In Act extent No-Fault coverage provided of payment to be and the conditions of Finally,

for insurance benefits.20 No- provide Fault Act and the for the Insurance Code assignment of In effect, insur claims risks.21 through companies ance are the instruments which the out a carries scheme general legislation goes beyond welfare. a a This grant attempt monopoly regulate of or an utility; sufficiently there "a exists close nexus challenged between the State and the action regulated [regu entity so that the action of the may fairly entity] lated be as treated that Metropolitan Co, State itself’. Jackson v Edison supra, 345, 419 US 351. plaintiffs

The interest of is affected compulsory previously no-fault insurance is not a recognized right. common-law constitutional MSA 500.3301 et 21 [20] 19 See MCL 500.3105 et See MCL See MCL 24.13135(2). seq.; 500.3102(2); 500.3171 MSA 24.13301 et seq.; et MSA seq.; MSA 24.13105 et seq. 24.13102(2) MSA 24.13171 and MCL seq. et seq. 500.3135(2); and MCL 402 Mich 554 Opinion of the Court Court, however, recognized

This has protected by concepts "liberty” "property” in a "are to be narrow defined given applica- broad technical sense but are Lake, 690; tion”. Bundo v Walled 395 Mich Regents (1976). See, also, Board NW2d Roth, 2701; Ct 33 L Ed 2d 548 92 S US *36 Sindermann, 593, v 601; Perry (1972), 408 US and (1972). 2694; 92 L S Ct 33 Ed 2d 570 The entitled to existence interests or benefits on the extent process protection depends due government citizen activity which has fostered and on the We are dependency activity. reliance the ancient institu reminded: "It purpose protect upon tion of those claims property lives, their reliance that people rely daily Board of not arbitrarily must undermined”. Roth, Supreme v 577. Regents 564, 408 US Court, Term, (1976); 1975 90 L Rev 86-104 Harv 514, 522; Tribe, Law, pp American Constitutional Coal Ass’n v Insurance Pennsylvania Mining (1977). 437; Dep't, 471 Pa 370 A2d 685 provided In Michigan independent mobility crucial, practical necessity; an automobile is a it is not a can person undeniable that whether or his operate a driver’s and register obtain license important aspects motor vehicle affects profoundly of his day-to-day life. cases, affecting the issu statutes and rules

ance of appreciation drivers’ licenses reflect an importance to motor vehicles.22 access State, Crampton Dep’t v 347; 235 395 Mich Secretary (1975), and Gargagliano v NW2d 352 State, (1975), 1, 11-12; Mich 233 NW2d App Kaufman, opinion N. J. J. licensing regulations carefully Various monitor statutes 257.322; 9.2020(a); 257.320(a); MCL of drivers in this state. MSA MCL 9.2022; MSA 1974 AACS R 257.1-257.5. v Opinion of the Court significant license, A issued, driver’s once is a subject process pro- interest to constitutional due tections. Bell Burson, 535, 539; 402 US 91 S Ct (1971). Although compul- 1586; 29 L Ed 2d 90 sory requirement of the No-Fault Act directly does not affect the issuance of a driver’s directly license, it affects the use of such a license: register operate a licensee a motor vehicle without no-fault insurance. A clearly, driver’s is, license of little use unless a register operate licensee can a motor vehicle. registering We believe that the interest operating significant a motor vehicle is as as the interest in the use of a driver’s license. choosing compul-

In to make no-fault insurance sory motorists, for all has made registration operation of a motor vehicle inexorably dependent on whether no-fault insur- equitable ance is available at fair and rates. Conse- quently process protections under the Michi- gan (Const and United States Constitutions XIV) operative. 1, § art Const, US Am *37 additionally, has, The fostered the expectation that no-fault insurance will be availa 2403(1)(d) equitable ble at fair and rates. Section the Insurance Code states that "Rates shall not be inadequate excessive, unfairly discriminatory”, 500.2403(1)(d); 24.12403(1)(d); MCL MSA 3301(1)(a) provides of the Insurance Code "guarantee” coverage that no-fault insurance "will any person pro be available who is unable to through ordinary cure such insurance methods”. 500.3301(1)(a); MCL MSA 24.13301(1)(a).23 23 separate independent This invoking process is a and basis for required purchase for motorists no-fault insur- Dep’t Service, 375, ance. See NW2d 387; Viculin v of Civil 386 Mich 192 (1971); see, also, Davis, 693, 710-711; 449 Paul v 424 US 96 S Ct 1155; (1976); Wood, Bishop 341; 47 L Ed 2d 405 426 US 96 S Ct 402 Mich 554 600 Opinion of the Court Michigan motorists conclude that therefore We constitutionally have no-fault insur entitled to are equitable basis. on a fair and made available ance availability and no- insurance of no-fault regulatory are, accord scheme rate fault insurance scrutiny.24 process ingly, subject to due (1) regu- scrutinizing statutory for scheme In underwriting companies’ lating and insurance beyond rate-making practices, look must we provisions of the Insur- itself to other No-Fault Act including Practices Trade Code, the Uniform ance Act, seq., seq.; 24.12400 et MSA MCL 500.2400 et seq. seq.; et MSA 24.12001 500.2001 et and MCL regulatory present scheme, rates Under supporting proposed rate-making factors are companies. private insurance filed material 24.12406. The Commissioner 500.2406; MSA MCL proposed approve reject of Insurance rate-making If he takes no ac- factors. rates filing days, however, "the shall 30 tion within chapter”. requirements of this deemed to meet 24.12408. 500.2408; MSA MCL filing provides that An alternative method upon company specify the date can an insurance 215, 226; Fano, (1976); 96 S 2074; 427 US Meachum v 48 L Ed 2d 684 Term, Court, (1976); Supreme 90 49 L Ed 2d 451 Ct (1976). L 86-104 Harv Rev have that consumers that at least two courts have held We note utility respect with interest to invoke due insufficient (D SC, 1973); Yonce, Supp v Iowa Sellers rates. Holt v 370 F 1974). (SD Iowa, Co, Light Supp these We believe & 372 F Power challenge distinguishable the no-fault from the instant cases First, underwriting rate-making insurance scheme. rate-making, inherently rate-making, utility discrimi- involves unlike among policies in accord are written individuals. Insurance nation with an insurance Serious history industry. company’s perception risk. of an individual’s Second, are, implicated. no thereby, equal protection issues rate-regulation respect exists with of careful Pennsylva- Lewis, Regulation in Insurance Rate Comment: Voice?, 304- L Rev 81 Dickinson Have a nia: Does the Consumer *38 (1977). Shavers v Opinion of the Court rate becomes effective. The Commis- days sioner Insurance then has 15 within which filing. filing disapproved If to act on that is not filing, days filing within "the shall be approved”. deemed 500.2430; to be MCL MSA 24.12430. provides rating

The Insurance Code also that plans may among any measure differences risks probable upon that a have effect losses or expenses. However, such rates shall not be "exces- inadequate unfairly discriminatory”. sive, or MCL 500.2403; See, also, MSA 24.12403. 500.2027; MCL MSA 24.12027. pertaining classifications,

Manuals rules and plans every rates, rate modification of foregoing filed must be with the Commissioner 500.2406; of Insurance. MCL MSA 24.12406.

The no-fault rate classifications adopted by industry allegedly the insurance are competition, governmental the result of not the process. companies are, Private insurance primarily making be, should concerned with profit, providing public while service. recognize Legisla-

We also it that is within the authority prescribe ture’s rates shall be primarily competition marketplace. set in the process, requires However, minimum, due at a inadequate not, fact, "excessive, that rates are unfairly discriminatory” per- and, further, sons affected have notice as to how their determined rates adequate regarding remedy that determination.

Although provided has some process protection, significant deficiencies remain. suspect. First, the entire rate structure is statutory against inadequate "excessive, stricture unfairly discriminatory” rates is without *39 402 Mich Opinion op the Court

support clarifying the rules established Com of legislatively missioner, sufficient defini without prior any history tion, court inter without of legislative process pretation. due mandate is thus to mere exhortation. When we add reduced any that the statute authorizes insurers to utilize "may any which measure classification scheme among probable may that have a differences risks added), (emphasis expenses” it effect on losses rates be established on becomes clear can proce satisfy due bases do not insubstantial legislative ss.25 Absent administrative rules or giving statutory definition lan substance safeguards guage, inadequate against there are arbitrary Davis, action or invidious discrimination. (col Seventies, § Law of the 6.13 Administrative cases). lecting regulation present system Second, of the rate attacking the denies due motorist the Filings supporting validity of a rate. informa- open public tion insurers are submitted inspection filing only after the becomes effective. certainly 500.2406; MSA 24.12406. This MCL process. questionable Also, under Insur- upon complainant, Code, administrative ance review, if a the Commissioner Insur- can convince statutory not meet the that a filed rate does ance requirements, determine will Commissioner period thereafter, such that "within a reasonable longer filing MCL no effective”. shall be deemed Commerce, Bureau, Michigan Department A Insurance See (1977), Report on Insurance in to the Governor Essential writes, p 35: Commissioner Insurance where the present provides completely importantly, insufficient law "Most insuring unfairly discriminatory. rates It autho- tools for ' * * * may companies any rizes utilize classification scheme which probable among effect risks that have a measure differences ” expenses.’ on losses Opinion of the Court complain 500.2420; MSA 24.12420. This leaves the unacceptable paying choice ant with filing from of the effective rate the date invalid filing subsequent is no date when until longer having taking the risk of not effective or process.26 certainly not due insurance. This is (2) affecting scrutinizing statutory scheme In again availability insurance, we no-fault beyond Act itself to the Insur- look the No-Fault Chapter 20, Code, Trade Prac- the Uniform ance seq.; Act, 24.12001 et MCL 500.2001 et MSA tices *40 Chapter seq., 33, the "Automobile Placement (or "assigned plan”), Facility” MCL 500.3301 risk seq. seq.; MSA 24.13301 et et Under 2027 of the Uniform Trade Practices Legislature statutorily Act, "[u]nfair defines deceptive competition and unfair or methods practices in the business of insurance” as acts including "[Refusing refusing insure, to to con- * * * tinue to insure an individual” for a number patently discriminatory 500.2027; reasons. MCL MSA 24.12027. establishing

In Placement Fa "Automobile provided cility”, expressly "the guarantee coverage that automobile insurance will person pro be available to who is unable to through ordinary such cure methods”. 24.13301(1)(a). 500.3301(1)(a); MCL MSA although However, § 2027 the Uniform Trade attempts, through good Practices Act offices of protect Insurance, from the Commissioner discrimination a motorist who is refused no-fault cancelled, insurance or whose no-fault insurance is provide the act does not such motorists with an challenging alleged legal remedy for individual discriminatory basis for the refusal or cancella-

26 Dep’t, supra. Pennsylvania Mining v Insurance See Coal Ass’n 402 Mich op Opinion the Court McDonnell, 539, 557-558; 418 US tion.27See Wolffv (1974). L Ed 2d 94 S Ct placed Furthermore, in the "Automo- a motorist Facility” as an classified "as- bile Placement statutory presumption subject signed is to a risk” higher charged than the will be the rates open marketplace. MCL for motorists in rates addition, motorist In 500.3365; MSA 24.13365. Facility” Placement "Automobile insured exposed made-, procedural substantive regulatory quacies facility’s scheme rate (which inadequa- essentially, are, as the the same regulatory scheme for motorists the rate cies of an insurance com- insurance from to obtain able pany facility marketplace). Also, this does in the coverage options provide varieties of the same Finally, there is no market. offered in the standard allowing statutory provision such a motorist assignment challenge the "Automobile his higher presumptively Facility” its with Placement rates. although may be

Therefore, no-fault insurance insur- available, can refused no-fault motorists cancelled without have their ance or challenging legal refusal or effective redress discriminatory Furthermore, motor- Cancellation. practice” Trade Practices 500.2029; Commissioner practices, include "isolated deceptive et pertaining protect cancellation under a "an unfair We seq.; Section also note that MSA 24.13204 insureds compulsory of a etc., MSA 24.12029. acts to automobile method of 2029 of the Uniform and allows cancellation affecting of Insurance with a means person Act, against incidents”, practices system. Chapter "[u]nfair et "engaged competition, seq., although potential discriminatory single liability However, i.e., 32 of the Insurance in the business of insurance” methods of individual. in the business instances of unfair Trade Practices Act or an unfair under conditions under it provides for competition and unfair or legal cancellation, 2026 of Code, of insurance”. MCL bases for insurance or statutory redress to acts or deceptive deceptive MCL 500.3204 the Uniform *41 provides the acceptable measures does remedy do not act or not Shavers v Opinion of the Court placed the "Automobile Placement into can be ists equita- Facility” of fair and an assurance without opportunity to rates, obtain without ble coverage options, variety without same right placement. challenge such to opinion, certainly deficiencies, most in our These process.28 deny due

(3) availability statutory defects as to the These regulat- for and the scheme no-fault insurance of ing the inade- rates illustrate no-fault insurance compul- present statutory system quacies of the process sory not define what but do "due”. necessary identify the feel it

We therefore any new must be addressed concerns which system rate-regulation "availability”, al- for negates process though very nature of due "[t]he universally procedures concept of inflexible imaginable every applicable Cafete- situation”. Union, Local 473 v & Restaurant Workers ria McElroy, 1743; 6 L Ed 2d 886, 895; 81 S Ct 367 US (1961). determining we con- is "due” In what sider: Michigan, Report the Governor on Essential Insurance In a states, p

supra, 35: the Commissioner of Insurance " * * * underwriting ignore regulation completely statutes the rate ignore know effectively Yet we cancellation decisions. standards and that rates as competitive equally and fair are as critical those decisions People against pricing or can- underwritten are decisions. higher pay of last rates in a 'market be forced to much celled resort.’” opines, p 11: The Commissioner "Many market because shunted into the residual have been underwriting arbitrary capricious cancellation application decisions.” rate-making present scheme Act’s the No-Fault Our conclusion constitutionally availability deficient echoes are his letter to the mechanisms Governor, p i: the belief of the Commissioner guar- regulation mechanisms for present system and the "[T]he seriously anteeing availability deficient.” *42 554 402 Mich Opinion the Court " * * * First, private interest that will be af- second, action; the risk of an

fected the official through of such deprivation interest erroneous value, used, any, if procedures probable and safeguards; procedural interest, and additional substitute or. including the func- finally, the Government’s tion and the fiscal and administrative burdens involved require- procedural the additional substitute Eldridge, 424 entail.” v US ment would 335; Mathews (1976). 893; 47 L 96 S Ct Ed 2d 18 person’s We are concerned that a interest registration operation and of a motor vehicle require- effectively suspended by legislative be registrants operators of motor ment that vehi- purchase cles no-fault insurance as a condition to operation if insur- of a motor vehicle no-fault equitable ance is not made available on a fair and basis. procedures of the Commissioner of current promulgation

Insurance for the of rates insur- companies provide ance do not sufficient assurance rate-making that rates and factors will be substan- tially justified. adequate procedures, Absent there danger persons similarly situated will respect ultimately differently be treated with recognized registering operat- their interest ing Davis, a motor vehicle. See Administrative Seventies, § Law of the 6.13. recognize time,

At the same we the insurance companies’ prompt adjustment need for of rates provide adequate capitalization state’s bur- desire minimize its administrative availability den. We are also concerned with the knowledge insurance. Individuals must have protect against necessary to themselves erroneous rate-making underwriting discriminatory Shevin, 67; 92 S decisions. See Fuentes v 407 US Opinion of the Court (1972). There L Ed must 2d Ct *43 adequate for such er- of redress means available Love, 431 US See Dixon and discrimination. rors (1977). L Ed 2d 172 There 105; 97 S 52 Ct adequate means redress also must be available discriminatory refusal, insurance for insurance assignment cancellation, the "Automobile or higher presumptively Facility” its with Placement rates. proce- objectives can be achieved and the

These the due with harmonized consistent dures ways. clause different minimum, Court holds

At a no-fault proc satisfy constitutional due insurance does ess unless:29 Legislature and/or the Commissioner

1. rule-making present (pursuant his Insurance authority, 24.12484), give 500.2484; MSA MCL meaning statutory standards substantial inadequate excessive, un "Rates shall not discriminatory”. fairly 500.2403; MSA See MCL 24.12403; 500.3340; MSA 24.13340.30 MCL rate, on

2. A or a rate determined adminis- filed provides judicial review, and sets forth: trative a) premiums and insurer reasonable to insured specific regard coverage without for pre- warranting assertedly factors differences among insured; miums those b) properly may be considered factors among differentiating premiums the insurer insured; those

c) appropriate the amount differential each such factor. following minimally required emphasize We wisdom, can, process. other

satisfy choose in its principles. assuring to the above enforcement adherence mechanisms Seventies, Davis, 6.13. See Law of Administrative 402 Mich Opinion of the Court publi

3. information for Such each insurer31 every person cized in such a manner that affected readily can ascertain the factors and amounts of applicable differentials premium to him and calculate the charge. insurer the. Every opportunity

4. motorist has the to obtain prompt and effective administrative review of an factors, calculation of the insurer’s differentials premium applicable prompt to him and a effective administrative review the basis for the refusal or cancellation of insurance.32

(4) holding "compulsory Act’s Our No-Fault requirement” unconstitutional because inadequacies present that exist in the statu- tory making system for no-fault insurance availa- *44 at fair and ble reasonable rates raises crucial jurisprudential and social considerations. deeply holding only

We are aware that our directly problems affects the of motorists and the state, insurance substantially in this it business but that also system affects our entire of civil justice. that,

We also assume because of our otherwise approval general statutory constitutional of the (e.g., per- schemata under the No-Fault Act the injury property sonal insurance and schemata), damage protection Legis- insurance the lature and the Commissioner of Insurance will 31 (if authorized), Legislature, The or Commissioner of Insurance so states, factors, might, uniformly applicable premiums as in other establish differentials or requirement to all insurers. This "minimal” proceeds assumption required on the that this will not be or autho that, now, factors, rized the as differentials premiums may experience. upon separate be established based the insurer’s 32 Legislature can, course, prohibit The of choose to an individual by requiring insurer’s refusal that an insurer establish a risk’ tive cancellation of no-fault 'high system equitable categories of for all (for persons legisla- which the insurer can receive some form of protection). 609 v Opinion Court remedy ar- the constitutional deficiencies to seek supra. ticulated purposes best, believe it

We therefore general general jurisprudence, welfare of justice public, in our and the administration require "compulsory state to hold (for unconstitutional of the No-Fault Act ment” supra) 18 effective as of the reasons articulated opinion.33 from the issuance months appropriate from time before 18 months At an opinion, re-examine of this we will the issuance be fixed.” 62 that save-harmless the Court should to the statement the tially withhold equal protection. tive so moneys ture fails to 414 US 976 terms 281 Legislature the the trial court did with of remedies. We prospective. incurred must not and some system, will be valid respects before our 395; 212 NW2d 711 33 Subsequent "The "We have had the benefit See Governor v State Treasurer "We retain adopted, judgment, A2d parties See Robinson decision directions. [287 state’s education identical in substance to our other than the or after present system toward a constitutional obligations we desire ruling A2d period (1973): as (1973). Robinson, enact, the Court NJ jurisdiction. Any including provision December this case and effective implement upon judiciary this, accordance of time the content of the the further views agree In be (1973). (1972)], hereafter Cahill, its 520-521. disturb Court, the Court issued legislated the December impaired. being financing scheme respect opinion argument may of the 1970 will 31, 1974, with the trial court cannot unravel question 62 order that with the terms of of further the unconstitutional, order incurred its party NJ to the 'minimum 1970 Act needed to establish another objective ones. A short the New 31, 1974, statutory And since order, as whether the (On if new whether, the distribution of holding, Act, may judgment”. This it "desired no later than Rehearing), argument. It pursuant moneys 303 A2d 273 declared: per circumstances so warrant.” notwithstanding Jersey the fiscal skein. move unconstitutionally legislation parties shall be distributed scheme unless government curiam if stated, NJ date for we such appropriated the further views Supreme support to Super come to the as to the content of 390 appropriate statutes. judiciary may, opinion referring July legislation existing 63 NJ is our compatible (1973), relief opinion, Mich argument appropriated [223] must aid’ and the 1, Obligations Court held view that statutory 1975. We 196, 198; 389, must be cert den In other violated statutes *45 Legisla- at subject legisla- go essen- relief, is not upon with 280- 394- will on, as 402 Mich Opinion op the Court the constitutional status of the No-Fault Act in remedying present process terms defi Any party person wishing ciencies. to file briefs timely inquiry or be heard shall make of the Clerk proper procedure.34 as to the This Court will take appears appropriate whatever action at that time. During period: the interim 1) and the Commissioner of In they surance necessary take whatever action deem remedy process the due deficiencies supra;35 articulated

2) 3101(1) 3101(4) §§ and of the No-Fault Act will effect, i.e., remain in motorists will still be re- quired to obtain no-fault insurance as a condition precedent registration operation of a vehicle; motor

3) constitutionally pro- the No-Fault Act’s valid opinion subsequent visions, as decided opinions, will remain in effect. legislative agency response

Until there is supra, the due deficiencies articulated Legislature, appropriate, in whatever manner it deems represented invited to be at this Court’s re-examination of the consti- tutional status of the No-Fault Act. 33, supra. See Robinson v Cahill and fn also, Sax, See The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Intervention, 471, (1970). Effective Judicial 68 Mich L Rev fn 268 Professor Sax most legislatures writes that "In the ideal world are the representative responsive public agencies; and to the extent judicial that citizenry legislatures ideal, intervention moves toward that notes, is well perceptively agree: served”. He then and we emphasized "It should judicial be properly function is principally which, invoked tend very important, to deal with issues while levels, low-visibility to be made at though they may even by very highly placed endorsed Conversely, officials. when there is high public visibility issue, on an when it is dealt with as a central matter policy, of state or national and when account has been taken open widespread public opinion quarters, judiciary from all ordinarily play does not perfector political have a role to as a process. cases, charge judicial In such intervention would displacement amount judgment co-equal of the considered added.) government (Emphasis branches has merit.” *46 Attorney General Shavers v Opinion Court of actively shall enforce Insurance

Commissioner spirit regulatory present of our scheme in the opinion availability no- to assure in order equitable during rates at fair and insurance fault period. this rights individu- accrued also add that all

We against against "Automo- their insurers als Facility” in until the order this bile Placement valid. is entered remain case

IV. Although Act’s "com- have held No-Fault we requirement” pulsory unconstitutional process protections, due of insufficient because the issuance of this of 18 months from effective as emphasize again opinion, our concurrent hold- we "[d]uring * * * period ing the No- the interim provisions, constitutionally as valid Fault Act’s subsequent opinion opinions, decided Accordingly, ad- we now remain effect”. will remaining properly in this issues case dress the before us. process remaining involve due

All the issues statutory equal protection challenges to various bottom, At these of the Act. schemata No-Fault question of directed at the issues are whether police constitutionally its exercised enacting particular statutory power scheme. employed the constitutional framework Because and discussed with "compulsory respect (i.e., process requirement” the facial due protections provided sufficiency in the act for avail- Code of the Insurance and other sections rates) equitable at fair and able no-fault insurance conceptually, na- constitutional was, a different applicable necessary ture, it that we discuss 402 Mich op Opinion the Court and equal tests for these remaining issues.

The test legislation determine whether en pursuant police power comports acted with *47 process due is legislation whether bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative Michigan Agricultural Canners v objective.36 See Board, (1976). 337, 397 Mich 1 343-344; 245 NW2d

The test to determine whether a statute enacted 36 cross-plaintiffs Plaintiffs and Farm State Mutual and Allstate rigorous apply process contend that this Court should a more test deciding involving in those issues of a abolition common-law cause They cite, authority, speculative of action in tort. as dicta in New White, 188, 201; 247; York CR Co v 243 37 S 61 US Ct L Ed 667 602 (1917), 1, 592, 15; Cleary, and Pinnick v 360 Mass 271 NE2d (1971). They require ask that we to afford an "ade- quate action in tort. remedy” abolishing substitute before a common law cause of disagree. "adequate required by We substitute” test not is Michigan either States 74 L Ed 221 the United States or Constitutions. The United Court, 117, Supreme Silver, 122; 57; in Silver v 280 US 50 S Ct (1929), White, a case decided after New York CR Co v flatly declared: constitution does not forbid the creation of new "[t]he law, rights, recognized by or the abolition of old ones the common permissible legislative object”. Pinnick, attain a In the Massachusetts Court, Supreme choosing apply adequate in a "reasonable and test”, recognized correctly substitute that the test was "not constitu- required”. 1, tionally forthrightly rejected cially, 360 Mass 15-16. Other state courts also have constitutionally required. espe- the test as See Daniels, 41, 444, Montgomery v 38 NY2d 340 NE2d 453 555 (1975); P2d Medicine, 859, 869; v Jones State Board of 97 Idaho (1976). 399, 409 recognize right Our Constitution does not a vested in the continu- existing injuries yet ance of 3, remedies for not suffered. Article 7 of laws section statute remain changed, our Constitution states that "the common law and force, constitution, repugnant now to this shall expire limitations, they force until their own or repealed”. 3, amended Const art 7. As Court this Co, 8, 13; stated in Mackin v Detroit-Timkin Axle 187 Mich 153 NW (1915): "Except rights, legislative power as to vested exists change existing statutory or abolish and common-law remedies. Com- only repealed.” mon and statute law remain in force until altered or See, also, Auditor, Myers County v Genesee 1, 7-8; 375 Mich (1965) (opinion O’Hara, J.). NW2d suggest Legislature may arbitrarily is not This that the abolish remedy. Leaving seriously injured persons common-law remedy may without concepts justice violate of fundamental fairness and part government. which are of the fabric of constitutional v op Opinion the Court with comports equal police power pursuant the United is, the same. As essentially, in United States Supreme Court declared States Moreno, 528, 533; 413 US Dep’t Agriculture (1973): 2821; 37 L Ed 2d 782 93 S Ct legis analysis, a equal protection "Under traditional sustained, if the classifica must be classification lative tion itself legitimate govern rationally related to a is omitted.)37 (Citations mental interest.” tests, it is axiomatic In the of these application is ac- challenged legislative judgment See constitutionality. presumption corded Board, supra, Agricultural Canners v of constitutional- "presumption 343-344. What means, police power challenged in terms of ity” face of a due legislation, legislative challenge, "where the equal protection *48 inquiry in a court’s question”, is drawn judgment state to the issue whether "must be restricted be reasonably could either known or which of facts 37 apply the "substantial- that this Court should Plaintiffs contend relation-to-the-object” & Trust Co v in Manistee Bank test advanced (1975). Manistee, McGowan, 655; we 636 In 394 Mich 232 NW2d challenged applicable in "the in those cases which stated this test is statute carves out a discrete exception general rule and the to a added). (emphasis longer experimental" 394 statutory exception is no Act, years 655, for five at not even in effect Mich the time of this tion "no old 671. The No-Fault legisla- writing, sensibly as cannot be characterized 45-year- way longer experimental” the in the same in which guest unquestiona- in Bank & Trust Co statute at issue Manistee bly was. legislation that this Court should review Plaintiffs also contend equal protection scrutiny” clauses of under with "strict Michigan interest”, a "fundamental States Constitutions because and United the travel, agree right with the trial involved. We is that equal protection Appeals clause under the the Court of court and a operating fundamental. person’s is not interest an automobile General, 355, 364; App 325 237 NW2d 65 Mich Shavers v migra- (1975). right protects in the sense of movement to travel transporta- tion, particular means of choice of a not the individual’s 250, 255-259; Hospital Maricopa County, 415 US v tion. See Memorial (1974). 1076; L 2d 306 94 S Ct 39 Ed 614 402 Mich 554 op Opinion the Court support for it”. United States v assumed affords Co, 144, 154; 304 US 58 S Ct Carolene Products (1938). corollary 778; 82 L Ed 1234 A this rule is legislative judgment supported that where the by "any either known or which could state of facts although may reasonably assumed”, such be facts legislative judgment "debatable”, must be accepted. Thomson, v 276 Carolene Products Co (1936).38 172, 178; Mich 267 NW corol In accord this axiomatic rule and its with constitutionality may uphold lary a court legislative police power judgments in the face of challenge by equal protection tak or indisputable, generally ing judicial notice of easily And, ascertainable facts.39 because or known constitutionality” "presumption is a rebutta challenging legisla party presumption, ble judgment may constitutionality attack its tive (if legal arguments legislative purely terms of judgment arbitrary is so and irrational as to ren face)40 legislation der unconstitutional on its by bringing show, to the court’s attention 726, 730-731; Ferguson Skrupa, See 372 US 83 S Ct 10 L (1963), Supreme Ed United 2d where the States Court stated: do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the "[C]ourts bodies, judgment legislative pass who are elected to laws. As' this opinion Court stated in a unanimous are not concerned 'We * *** wisdom, need, legislation.’ appropriateness with the Legislative scope experiment bodies have broad with economic problems, intolerable ment and the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure.’ to sit as a (Citations 'subject and this Court does not sit to the State to an supervision principles hostile to the basic of our Govern- wholly beyond general which the clause of * * * We refuse 'superlegislature weigh legislation’.” the wisdom of omitted.) *49 Co, Baldwin, 194; S See Borden’s Farm Products Inc v 293 US 55 (1934). 187; example Ct exercise of this NW2d 798 79 L Ed 281 For a of this Court’s recent Poucher, 316; principle, People see v 398 Mich 247 (1976). 40 Baldwin, 39, supra; Cleary, supra, v See Borden’s Co v fn Pinnick 36; (Tauro, C.J., concurring). 360 Mass 271 NE2d 614 Opinion of Court judicially notice, which court facts can legislative judgment basis.41 is without rational police are, however, in which There instances legislative judgments power be affirmed cannot legal arguments purely rejected on the basis easily indisputable, generally known or ascertain judicially In can be noticed. such able facts which upon of a instances, the existence which facts legislative judgment are rational basis for predicated "may subject properly be made the (United inquiry” judicial Prod States v Carolene 153). require may supra, ucts, Thus, a trial a court adequate findings of facts so that it establish plaintiffs hand, whether, on the one to determine legislative which reveal that have shown facts judgment basis, or, on the rational is without hand, reasonable state whether there is other produced in which can be of facts on the record legislative judgment.42 support of the necessary approach particularly is Such an legislation challenged police power when the leg- experimental important, complicated, novel or Co, Products Inc v Bald- islation. Borden’s Farm 204, 210, L win, 212; 55 S Ct 293 US (1934). supra, Cleary, 34- Pinnick v Ed 281 37 See also (Tauro, concurring). C.J., Justice As Chief writing Hughes declared, United for a unanimous Supreme Baldwin, in Borden’s Co v States Court supra: challenged, legislative suitably action is "[W]here partic- upon the predicated basis for it is

and a rational given industry, facts of a trade or ular economic notice, facts are sphere judicial these are outside the 39, supra. fn See Underlying the Constitution Note, The Presentation of Facts See Statutes, ality Legislative (1936); Alfange, The Relevance L 49 Harv Rev 631 (1966). Law, Facts in Constitutional 114 Pa L Rev 637 *50 402 616 Mich 554 Opinion of the Court subject findings. properly of evidence and of With expansion governmental scope the notable of the regulation, consequent and the of violation assertion important rights, increasingly constitutional it is that it necessary when the facts becomes for the Court to deal with

relating particular commercial industrial conditions, they presented concretely should be with evidence, upon appropriate determinations so that con- adequate clusions shall not be reached without factual ” added.) 194, support. (Emphasis 293 US 210. We believe that the No-Fault Act is substan analogous respect legislation in this tively challenged in Co v Baldwin.43 chal Borden’s lenged legislative judgments rational bases for the upon under the act are "predicated” complicated statistics and actuarial facts of the motor vehicle (which "trade” or business have sub believe, consequences). stantial economic We as did Baldwin, in v Supreme Court Borden’s Co in problems” inherent "complexity judi legislative cial determination of whether judg constitutional, ments of the No-Fault Act are it the more in imperative "makes Court its in discharging duty, sustaining governmental within its authority sphere enforcing and in indi rights, proceed upon vidual shall not false assump 194, Thus, 210-211. tions”. US as Justices concurring Stone and Cardozo stated in their memorandum in Borden’s Co v Baldwin: inexpedient

"We are in accord with the view that it is grave questions upon to determine constitutional motion, complaint, upon equivalent demurrer to a production if there is a reasonable likelihood that the questions evidence will make the answer to the er.” clear- US 213._ constitutionality At of the issue Borden’s Co v Baldwin was the New York Milk Control Law. op Opinion the Court recognized approach implicitly

This Court Board, supra. Michigan Agricultural Canners v Canners were "important At issue the consti- regarding impression first questions Agricultural and construction tutionality Act, MCL 290.701 et Bargaining Marketing 12.94(101) 337, 340. seq.”. et seq.; MSA 397 Mich court, however, the chal- The circuit dismissed *51 (erroneous) grounds. on lenge jurisdictional 337, 342, Mich 344-345. This Court declared: above, important plaintiff "As has raised mentioned constitutionality questions regarding the and construc- Marketing Bargaining Agricultural of the Act tion without would developing a factual record at trial which help provide a in which to consider these context questions. significant in "To these issues such a factual resolve imprudent appears would be where it that vacuum development substantially further factual would con- proper disposition tribute to the of the case. here, especially

"Such is the case that Bargaining Canners has claimed that the Act is uncon police power it the stitutional because exceeds particular requires develop full state. This claim ment of might support the of the facts which undermine claim that the statute is an invalid exercise 337, police power.” 397 Mich 342-343.44

Therefore, challenges in the face of due process Coleman, concurring approach, Justice in this declared: "Although accepted concept police power it is some- is that the nature’, danger what 'elastic far as to have no real which fosters the there is a here that it be stretched so meaning. Proposed that standards such as preserves people’ 'convenience and comfort of the improves community affecting and at 'social and economic conditions the large’ imaginable justify any could almost action. proposed exceeds the "Remand is because the claim that the statute police power agree development particular requires I 'in full of the facts’. providing judge develop those with the that the trial remand pertinent, of the constitu- facts deemed tional but I would leave discussion question until 397 Mich 351-352. we have the facts.” court, Therefore, asking parties "both we remanded to the circuit 402 Mich op Opinion the Court legislative judgments the No-Fault Act statutory schemata, our resulted in various

which task is double-edged. First, must determine we plaintiffs have us whether before from the record constitutionality by presumption of overcome showing legislative which reveal facts judgment basis, or, to the same rational is without whether the record effect, determine from must we supported judgment challenged legislative is justifying en- its facts state of reasonable whether Second, then determine we must actment. response legislative relation a reasonable bears objective. identified to this double-edged Similarly, in consider our task is challenges ing equal to the No-Fault from the record First, we must determine Act. plaintiffs have overcome us whether before showing constitutionality by presumption facts legislative judgment is with reveal that effect, we must or, the same out rational basis challenged whether from the record determine supported by any legislative judgment reasona legislative judg indicating set of facts ble *52 legitimate governmen exercise of a ment is the Second, determine must then interest. we tal challenged statutory classifications the whether legislative judgment result from legitimate governmental reasonably this related to interest.45

V. No- us is whether The second issue before development us which will allow of a factual context contribute to the constitutionality act”. 397 of the properly the issue of the resolve 337, 344. Mich necessary to is factual context does not believe a This Court present rate process sufficiency of the act’s due decide the facial regulatory procedural purely nature. of this issue’s scheme because Opinion Court protection personal injury Fault Act’s protec- equal violates the due scheme Michigan tion clauses of the and United States Constitutions. personal injury act’s insur-

The features to the resolution of the scheme relevant ance process challenges equal protection before us are: of a vehicle registrant 1. owner or motor re- Michigan

quired registered in must maintain to be payment personal injury security for protection insurance of benefits under 3101); (§ liability arising ownership, 2. from mainte- Tort Michigan of a motor nance or use within the State respect bodily abolished accidental vehicle is with injured except for "if the injury non-economic loss death, impairment of person body suffered serious has permanent disfigurement” function serious (§ persons 3135[1]), intentionally caused harm (§ 3135[2][a]), damage personal injury in excess of the (§ provided 3135[2][c]). under the act insurance benefits However, arising ownership, from the liability tort use this state a motor vehicle maintenance or within if respect bodily injury with is not abolished operator complied has not with the of the motor vehicle (i.e., if mandatory requirements act’s uninsured) (§ person 3135[2]); is owner, registrant operator of an insured

3. The bodily motor vehicle vehicle who suffers accidental state, Michigan he injury in or in another whether occupant injury in his vehicle or as an suffers of own occupant of vehicle is another or when he not an vehicle, personal is injury motor entitled to "spouse benefits. is true insurance any The same relative” the insured who "domiciled 3110). (§ 3114[1], as the insured see same household” However, registrant of a vehicle with an owner or compulsory requirements respect to which the (i.e., act motor- are not effect the uninsured ist) personal injury protection insur- is not entitled to ance benefits. *53 402 Mich 554 Opinion of the Court general,

In personal injury under the act provides: (a) expenses by inju- all occasioned medical costs and accident, including ries sustained in vehicle a motor (see

expenses 3107[a]); for rehabilitation (b) $1,000 up to a maximum of reimbursement a resulting month accident income from for loss of a motor vehicle period exceeding years. three This applied pro periods rata amount loss. for shorter of work (This may adjusted annually keep pace limit be (§ changes living.) 3107[b].) with injury protection the cost of Personal $1,000 provides up insurance also (§ expenses 3107[a]); for funeral and burial (c) replacement reimbursement for the cost of ordinary incurred”, necessary "reasonably services i.e., injured person reimbursement services the would performed personal have not for income but for his own benefit or the benefit of his household if these services act, "reasonably shown be incurred”. Under the injured person may be reimbursed for such services up to a limit day period for a maximum $20 (This years. adjusted three limit annually keep pace changes (§ living.) 3107[b].) with the cost of family injured person may receive the same 3108.) person (§ injured reimbursement should the die. (A) Due Process

Plaintiffs contend that the No-Fault Act violates by partially abolishing the common remedy law in tort for persons injured by negli- gent motor vehicle tortfeasors.

We disagree. supra,

As noted provide need not an "adequate abolishing substitute” remedy before Mackin v tort; a common-law cause of action in Co, Detroit-Timkin Axle 8, 13; 187 Mich 153 NW Lahr, Naudzius (1915); 216; 253 Mich NW Silver, Silver v 57; (1931); 280 US 50 Ct S (1929). 74 L Ed 221 The abolition of a common-law *54 621 Opinion of Court by remedy the traditional is measured tort legislation namely, bears test, whether legisla- relationship permissible to a a reasonable supra. IV, objective. discussion, Part See tive remedy the tort the abolition of that believe We resulting injury personal vehicle from motor for clearly justified in deficiencies was accidents system. tort presented documentary Testimony evidence and judgment legislative support apparent at trial reparations system for automobile of the tort operational deficien- had several victims accident cies: injured in automobile persons of high percentage

A1. system under the tort reparations no accidents received (to injured per system the damages under collect negligence and the contributory must be free of son adjudged person who caused must be accident fault);46 be at and serious over-compensated injuries were 2. Minor under-compensated;47 were injuries in system tort under Lengthy delays existed 3. in accidents— injured automobile compensating those 46 Hooser, of Insur- Commissioner Russell E. Van See Exhibit Conard, (1974), ance, gan, Mor- Automobile Insurance Statement on Pay- Pratt, Bombaugh, & Accident Costs Automobile Voltz & 1964) Press, (Ann University Michigan to the of Arbor: The ments injured "only persons accidents in automobile effect 37% recovery”. Michigan received tort provided by Professor W. exhibit court summarized the The trial University of Business School of the James MacGinnitie Admjnistration as follows: injuries under testimony of serious showed that for cases "His compensation; system, persons received no 11.1% tort of the 56.7% loss, received 50% received less than to of the economic 10.9% 50% anywhere received The balance of of economic loss. 20.3% 100% of economic loss.” from 100% 400% also, See, Department Transportation, Vehicle Crash Motor fatally reports Compensation, that "for their Losses and $10,000 more the injured persons seriously median losses of with economic only compensation was aggregate received from all sources 2674a, Appendix, p losses”. Joint of their total economic 35% Insurance, supra. Hooser, Statement on Automobile Van Mich 554 op Opinion the Court compensation prompt the need for

often cases where strongest;48 was heavy burden on system imposed

4. The tort system;49 court state’s discriminated, liability system terms of 5. The tort persons against those on

recovery, a low income the uneducated and scale.50 enactment legislative response, scheme, reason- personal

no-fault injury correcting these ably purpose relates alia, inter provisions provide, pay- evils. These regard days ment without to fault within medical and rehabilitation claim for all reasonable *55 wage replacement for loss and services expenses, of years, for a of three for survivor’s loss period services for three Such support years. pay- compensate personal all may substantially ments motor vehicle accidents for eco- injury victims of loss, victims of motor vehicle including nomic the accidents, were, un- system, who under the tort for their compensated undercompensated eco- provided for under Prompt payment nomic losses. under tort delays the act may remedy Testimony Deputy See of Chief Insurance Commissioner Robert Transportation study, Department Rowe of Motor Vehicle Crash Losses, average delay that of 16 months for effect there "an injuries”. Appendix, p and serious Joint 2675a. fatalities Department Transportation study, Automobile Accident See Litigation, Appendix, p Joint 2680a. 50The trial court found: percentage recovery by family as level of income increased "[t]he increased, family income and also increased as the level family example, education $5,000 income under increased. For those with family Those with recovered of their economic loss. 38% loss, $5,000 $9,999 incomes of those with income over By recovered education recovered some recovered of their economic 52% $10,000 economic loss. recovered of their 61% token, only grade education the same those who had school high with a school of their economic loss. Those 24% loss, their and those who had economic 53% college training recovered of their economic loss.” 70% See, also, Lindsey testimony Western of Dean Cowen of Case School, of the National Reserve Law Conference of Uniform Chairman of the Commission State Laws. Shavers v Opinion of the Court abolishing liability system. By partially tort personal injuries a result of those who suffer as may accidents, act lessen the motor vehicle personal injury of motor vehicle tort suits number prompt availability compen- in the courts. The the under- sation for relieve economic losses from educated or with income those lower pressure "legal” or economic—to settle serious — equitable prematurely and for less than an claims amount. personal reasons,

For these we hold injury protection under the insurance scheme No- abolishing partially Act, in common-law Fault persons injured by negligent remedy tort tortfeasors, motor not violate vehicle does clauses United States Constitutions.

(B)Equal Protection Act, the No-Fault Plaintiffs contend remedy abolishing partially the common-law negligent persons injured by motor vehicle tort for creating equal protection by tortfeasors, violates (1) impermissible statutory classifications: mo- two and all tor and their victims vehicle tortfeasors (2) victims; victims of other and their tortfeasors *56 and victims insured motor vehicle tortfeasors motor uninsured vehicle tortfeasors. disagree.

We The motor tortfeasors dif- treatment of vehicle ferently not violate from all other tortfeasors does equal protection. for Exhibits the traditional test motor introduced at trial show that vehi- were by consistently wide cle accidents have margin principal cause of accidental been Michigan. injury The State Police death in 402 Mich Opinion op the Court 360,000 in 1973 motor reported approximately that occurred, 2,215 in fatal- resulting vehicle accidents its experi- to limit legislative judgment ities. reparation ment to victims of personal injury motor vehicles is involving justified by accidents frequent and serious predictably injury resulting from the persons property use Co, v Lee Optical motor vehicles. See Williamson 483, 489; 461; L Ed 2d 563 348 US 75 S Ct (1955).

Second, classes of motor the creation of two an insured vehicle accident victims —victims of who not sue may motor vehicle tortfeasor below the threshold and victims of uninsured motor sue —does violate may vehicle tortfeasors who not classification, equal protection. along This with 3102(2) imposed serve as penalties may incentive in compliance compulsory with the because an uninsured motorist provision surance injury be liable in tort for all suffered Petrucci, 71 Mich App victim. McKendrick v (1976).51It significant 247 NW2d 349 this right granted of uninsured motorists to victims maintain an damages statutory marginal action for The sured motorists assumes below the threshold is of value. argument against unfairly that it discriminates victims of in- deny recovery them the same below-the-threshold erroneously right granted uninsured victims of comparable right from the motorists is of victims of insured motorists who as a responsible value to the withheld group likely are more to be ignores It than those who are insured. also have, perhaps part victims of insured motorists because of the in sanction, sanctions, including terrorem effect of the various recovery subject, which uninsured motorists are above than victims of uninsured motorists. The classification legislative policy a better source of policy required limits— threshold —within and above the reflects a victims, which, although it discriminates between judgment does not in our constitute an invidious discrimination offending equal clause. invidiously separate question It is a whether the classification among uninsured and discriminates insured uninsured tortfeasors or between tortfeasors, plaintiffs question by the and which not raised whether, if the we need not now consider. Nor need we consider discriminates, remedy invidiously be to would classification so *57 Shavers v Opinion of the Court Facility Assigned regard re- is Claims persons quired pay be to benefits to who injured by 500.3171 et MCL uninsured motorists. seq. seq.; MSA 24.13171 et No-Fault reasons, we hold

For these statutory classification between incidental Act’s and motor vehicle insured victims tortfeasors tortfeasors does motor vehicle of uninsured victims protection equal of the clauses violate the not Michigan States Constitutions. and United

VI. is whether No- The third issue before us protection property damage scheme Act’s Fault equal protection the due violates Michigan United States Consti- clauses tutions. damage property act’s insur-

The features of the due to the resolution ance scheme relevant process equal protection challenges before us are: re- registrant

1. The or of a motor vehicle owner registered to must maintain quired damage property under security payment of benefits for 3101); (§ protection insurance ownership, liability arising from the mainte- 2. Tort Michigan of a motor the State of nance use within damage property to respect with vehicle abolished damage property to except (§ 3135[2]); intentionally caused by a third Tangible ("non-moving”) property 3. owned accident party injured as a result of a motor vehicle as way parked motor vehicles such prop- damage are risk of entitled cause unreasonable $1,000,- up benefits erty damage recovery or to make the threshold the limitation on below eliminate they regard applicable without whether it to all tortfeasors are not insured. 402 Mich 554 op Opinion the Court against the insurer of the motor vehicle which damage (§§ inflicted the 3121, 3123[1][a]); *58 following damaged The property is not entitled to property damage protection benefits: property of the insured, including vehicle, the motor and tractor at- thereto, tached or any property of the insured in his (§ motor damage protection [a], [b]). Also, vehicle subds property 3123[1] payable benefits are not damage for (1) third-party parked motor vehicles which are such way a as to cause an damage, unreasonable risk of (2) non-vehicle property arising from out-of-state 3123). (§ motor vehicle accidents property damage

Because to an insured’s own motor vehicle is not by property protection covered benefits, the requires act optional insurers to offer first- party provide collision insurance to an insured reim- 3037). bursement damage for such (§ if he so chooses

(A) Due Process Plaintiffs and cross-plaintiffs contend that No-Fault Act violates due process by abolishing the common-law remedy tort for persons whose property is damaged by negligent motor vehicle tortfeasors. disagree.

We Again, in resolving process due challenge, we apply the traditional test, namely whether legislation bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective.

The trial found, court and the record tends support conclusion, its the weaknesses tort system of compensation personal for injuries suffered as a result of motor vehicle accidents52 did 52The trial system operated high court stated: former "[T]he at efficiency resolving property damage disputes arising from automo Eldred, bile crashes.” See Mehr Property & Should the Automobile Damage Liability System Preserved?, Insurance Be 48 Notre Dame (1973), Lawyer 162, 163, testimony Exhibits and the Kinkade, Appendix, p Richard Joint 1235a. op Opinion the Court compensation system’s property affect that property damage. Although from the switch dam- coverage coverage liability age to collision efficiency payments, yield increase in the some apparent of the record that the from a review it is prompt, equitable provided relatively system tort resulting damage property compensation motor vehicle accidents. from analysis by court and the Court of the trial suggests Appeals an identifia- there must be Legislature intends to correct. evil which ble constitutionally this is neces- do not believe We experiment sary. is as free to with hope dealing subject ways in the with other making good system as it is to correct a better system. perceived evil damage *59 property to achieve section seeks prompt, equitable goals in addition

several compensation. complete Legisla-

Testimony that at trial established anticipated action the abolition of a tort ture damage property four would have at least for resulting ultimately major in lower effects premiums. equitable more liability

First, to collision the shift from with resulting of tort lia from abolition insurance emphasis bility, the value be a new on there would repairability motor vehi of the insured’s own calculated on basis cle; rates would be repair liability vehicle, than, in rather as for that costs damage potential to a

insurance, on the value.53 of unknown vehicle 53 testimony W. James MacGinnitie: See of Professor " * * * equity that each in the sense will be achieved [G]reater damagea- premium paying the size and a related to individual will bility of his own vehicle. and characteristics which, large part, premium reflected past, paid in a vehicles with which "In the he’s might he be involved average an accident of all the other * * * . 402 Mich op Opinion the Court anticipated effect of relat

Second, additional ing premium car was that costs to the insured’s system incentives for safer cars.54 would create liability

Third, of tort eliminates the abolition investigations, necessity for accident because a payment is irrelevant determination of fault compensation. The elimination such investi hoped, gations, it was would result decreased savings and resultant on in administrative costs surance premiums.55 shifting liability

Finally, by to a from a no-fault emphasizes system insured, the risk to be exposure party, some unknown third not the Legislature anticipated group insurance Group would feasible. insurance has been become expensive to shown to be far less administer and likely Furthermore, in lower costs. more to result group large potential draw this life and group insurance underwriters into the resulting field, beneficial automobile competition.56 yet The fact that these effects are not evident legitimacy goals does not diminish equity thereby is "The that is achieved small car which has [that] value, relatively carry premium low would a lower for collision as car, opposed large high carry relatively to a value would [which] larger premium.” See, ULA, also, Laws, Civil Procedural and Remedial Uniform Act, 5(a)(4), Comment, 374, Reparations p Vehicle Accident testimony and the Rowe, Deputy of Chief Insurance Commissioner Robert Appendix, p Joint 486a. 202, Department, See Exhibit New York Insurance Automobile Benefit?, 119-121; pp Insurance —For Whose Exhibit United States *60 Department Transportation, of Motor Vehicle Crash Losses and Their (March, 1971), 97, 128-129; Compensation pp in the United States MacGinnitie, testimony Appendix, p the 2557a. of Professor W. James Joint testimony of Professor and Dean See W. James MacGinnitie Cowen, 1578a, 2072a, Appendix, pp Lindsey Joint and Uniform Motor Act, 5(a)(4), Comment, Reparations p Accident 374. Vehicle MacGinnitie, Appen testimony See of Professor W. James Joint dix, pp 2043a-2044a. Shavers v Opinion op the Court sought to be achieved or the reasonableness of the adopted. stage early means ing At this in the function- long-term develop- of the No-Fault Act these yet fully Indeed, ments cannot be assessed. this litigation resulting uncertainty itself, with its toas viability Act, of the No-Fault slow goals. achievement of the act’s Our decision supra, particularly Bank, Manistee is relevant aspect precisely this of the case: it because regulation in the economic field often deals with long-term developments that the Court treats such legislation great with deference. cross-plaintiffs emphasize

Plaintiffs and investigations fault have continued under the No- point Fault Act. But that fact is not at investigations may relevant consideration.57 Those merely vestigial. Similarly, plaintiffs cross-plaintiffs empha- appellee point testimony The trial court and State Farm of Kinkade, Farm, employee Richard witness for and of State who investigating property damage testified that the cost of fault for was $63,215, premiums, 3/10 of of State Farm’s 1% earned in 1972. A (Exhibit 53) report review of the State Farm on relied Kinkade paid expenses, reveals that adjustment in 1972 the allocated loss investigations, greater expendi- which includes tures for the injury from the substantially fault had category property damage bodily of connected with ($1,640,284) bodily ($1,577,069). injury alone It is not clear testimony $63,000 figure property damage whether the for investigation reflects those instances where a minimal fault was necessary, damage percentage figures property nor is it clear what bodily injury bodily injury were connected with investi- gations. figures Nevertheless a review of all the indicates that $63,000 investiga- sum was an inaccurate estimate fault view total property damage tions connected with that fault accidents. investigations are a substantial element the administrative costs of companies Cowen, testimony is in accord with the of Dean Act, Reparations contributor to the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident and W. James MacGinnitie, Professor of Actuarial Science and Direc- program University tor the Master of Actuarial Science at the Michigan. Finally, it should that Mr. Kinkade admitted in be noted testimony investigation his fault investigation that the cost of would be less under no- Thus, system. than it was under the tort even if some fault types coverage, it continues under no-fault for certain apparently will be less intensive or not as common as before. *61 402 Mich op Opinion the Court resulting premiums in collision the increase

size Whether of No-Fault. the enactment from the and whatever increase there has been such this Court cause, consideration important the existed there whether is to determine point at this re- reasonably objective legislative permissible the No-Fault find that We statute. lated to the meets scheme damage protection property Act’s dam- property and, hold accordingly, this test process. does not violate scheme age protection (B) Protection Equal that contend cross-plaintiffs

Plaintiffs creating by equal protection Act violates No-Fault (1) damage classifications: following statutory man- by not covered property is to vehicular act, i.e., dam- property under datory property kind of to this respect with age claims colli- optional first-party under solely are covered (2) prop- insurance, damage tangible sion while covered vehicles is parked motor properly erty (no-fault) dam- property mandatory third-party by to be $1,000,000 required age up damage. motorist who inflicted carried disagree. We challenge equal protection in the

Again, as Act, we of the No-Fault personal injury section test. equal protection the traditional apply protection cross-plaintiffs’ equal Plaintiffs’ has is, essence, that complaint persons equal providing violated a result damaged as property vehicular whose compensated to be vehicle accident motor collision purchase if have chosen to only they hand, Legisla- While, on the other insurance. prop- tangible persons whose provided ture Opinion op the Court erty properly parked damaged motor vehicle is a result of a motor vehicle are to as compensated up accident through mandatory $1,000,000 (no-fault) third-party property damage insurance required carried to be the motor who vehiclist *62 damage. inflicted the discussing equal protection challenge

In to damage property protection scheme, the essary it is nec- analyze logically misconcep- to first a basic first-party tion: no-fault and insurance are misno- property damage protection. inmers context of aspect every It is not that essential of the no-fault provide first-party protection, recovery i.e., scheme First-party the victim from his own insurer. protection only assuring prompt, is one method equitable recovery. property protection scheme,

Under the owners tangible property properly parked motor vehicles collect from the insurer of the motor damage. vehicle which inflicted the Owners of moving improperly parked may motor vehicles compensation insurers, collect their from own if they have chosen self-insure. moving

The different treatment of vehicles and tangible property properly parked vehicles is conceptual difficulty relating related to the second to use of fault in a no-fault act. Common sense indicate, would shown, actuarial studies have involving that in accidents motor vehicles and tangible property, usually the motor vehicle at Consequently, fault. the act makes motorist strictly damage tangible liable for the he does to requires property purchase him to damage.58 for such possible It is a will that motorist’s insurer be liable the owners animals, stray non-stationary tangible property trains other equal not, damage. protection

which in this occasion The clause does context, require statutory that classifications be drawn with 402 Mich Opinion the Court however, regard without functions system, is, no determination That there is each fault. Thus, appellation at fault.

accident of who was if concentrates only is misnomer one "no-fault” responsibil- on allocation of legislative the initial effect However, operational if one looks at ity. act, it of insurance with- system remains out fault. provides 3121 of the Act No-Fault

Section paid benefits under property damage tangible property for all policy one resulting from an accident shall exceed $1,000,000. equal limit not violate pro This does (nor It from the process). appears tection to limit sought record companies.59 of insurance liability absolute $1,000,000 of a limit was from an justified choice standpoint.60 actuarial these hold that the No-Fault

For reasons we *63 of whose vehicular persons Act’s classification as of a motor vehicle damaged a result property (who if have chosen compensated they are accident insurance), first-party collision purchase persons tangible property properly whose those (who damaged parked motor vehicles are are com- $1,000,000 pensated up through mandatory damage third-party, property no-fault in- carried the motorist who required by the equal not violate damage), flicted does Michigan and United clauses Constitutions. States Dukes, 297, 303-304;

great precision. 427 96 S Ct Orleans US New (1976). Ed 2d 49 L 511 Hooser, testimony Van of former Commissioner Insurance See p Appendix, 2393a. Joint Hillhouse, testimony Jerry the differ revealed See $1,000,000 $10,000 coverage limit providing a in a limit or ence was with insignificant. Shavers v Opinion of the Court VII. 3101(2) us is whether fourth issue before Act, motor excluding two-wheel

of the No-Fault act, violates coverage under from vehicles clauses equal protection States Constitutions.

United 3101(2) of the provides: No-Fault Act Section "(2) chapter, except for in this vehicle’ as used 'Motor trailer, vehicle, including oper- means a section ated or upon public highway operation designed for more power which has power other than muscular added.) 500.3101(2); (Emphasis MCLA than wheels.” 24.13101(2), PA 329. by 1975 as amended MSA is that complaint plaintiffs’ The thrust of vehi- Act, limiting coverage to those No-Fault pro- equal 2 wheels violates "more than cles with it treats owners impermissibly because tection owners) (i.e., differ- motorcycle two-wheel vehicles more than two from owners of vehicles with ently wheels. disagree.

We tends to show actuarial data the record at fault in motor vehi rarely are motorcycles Also, testimony extensive cle accidents.61 there was involving motorcy effect that in accidents passengers motorcycles the drivers and cles exceeding at a rate twice severely injured killed or in automobile accidents. involved that of those in a no-fault of motorcycles Thus the inclusion so premiums would result system *64 pur- from motorcyclists most high preclude as to 61 Rowe, Deputy testimony Insurance Commis- Robert Chief See sioner, p Appendix, 364a. Joint 402 Mich 554 Opinion op the Court

chasing pur are, believe these for insurance.62 We poses protection, legitimate satisfying equal governmental motorcy interests. The exclusion of coverage is, cles from quite under the No-Fault Act legiti evidently, reasonably related to these mate interests. 3101(2) § hold that therefore No-Fault

We excluding coverage Act, in from two-wheel vehicles equal protection.63 act, under the does not violate VIII.

The fifth us issue before is whether the No-Fault statutory respect Act’s reimbursement scheme with to work-loss replace- for reimbursement equal protection services, 3107, ment violates clauses of and United States Consti- tutions. plaintiffs’ complaint

The thrust constitutional (A) equal protection: § 3107 is invidiously violates because it discriminates between workers home and workers outside the home in terms of payable injury; maximum benefits in case of (B) arbitrary statutory it because creates an classi- by restricting recovery injuries fication to those 62See, Chastain, especially, testimony of Professor James L. Profes sor of Insurance and Director of the Insurance Studies Center at 170a, University, Appendix, pp Drake effect, Joint 1697a-1698a. To the same Deputy see Chief Insurance Commissioner testi Robert Rowe’s 182, mony, Appendix, 365a-366a, See, also, pp Joint 1857a. Exhibit (1973), 1, Bodily Injury Motorcycle Tab The Extent of Riders 4-5, Summary, pp study performed by the Insurance Studies Center University. of Drake holding, agree Appeals In so we with the Court of that: deprive "In our delicate task of constitutional review we should not ability aspects the deciding 471; of its to consider the economic when Williams, Dandridge how far to extend 397 US its reform. added.) (1970).” 1153; (Emphasis 90 S Ct 25 L Ed 2d 491 Mich App 368. See, also, Co, Campbell, Wyant Foundry Gauthier v & Cannon (1960). Mich 104 NW2d 182 *65 Opinion of the Court expenses "reasonably employed in the home to replacement incurred” for services. (A) "the classification The trial court held that *

* * compensation those who work for between compensation not work for and those who do it [not] so invidious as to strike inside the house is (B) Equal Clause”; Protection under down 3107(b) portion requiring that the cost of "that replacement services must be incurred subse- quently is unconstitutional as violative reimbursed Equal Protection Clauses of both the Four- Michigan and the Constitu- teenth Amendment Appeals tion”. The Court of did not consider this on the merits. issue court,

At the threshold we observe that the trial deciding issue, this twofold did not hear testi mony. Rather, court its decision on based * * * "stipulations of fact entered into at pretrial conference”.64 supra, IV, we ruled that as a matter of

In Part challenges policy, in constitutional constitutional legislative judgments under the No-Fault to the Act, requires, minimum, Court at a that evi- provide adequate produced at trial to an dence be might support factual context which either legislative judgment undermine the claim that the question police is an invalid exercise of the power.

Although on the trial court did make its decision * * * stipulated person "It was there are times when a working performs equal to the services of within the home services home, working compensated those same extent as those that outside the and are not agreed working It outside home. was further pecuniary there are economic losses in the death or and/or person exceeding injury of a the amount allowed under the statute for recovery at least one get help payments.” stipulated there is on a no-fault basis. And it was also person in the State of who would be unable help person, paying daily household to assist that without for such money daily cash and who does not have the to make such 402 Mich 554 op Opinion the Court "Stipulations Facts”, the basis of the noted we stipulations provide adequate do not feel these factual context in which we can decide the difficult equal protection regarding § issues raised 3107. example, stipulation For that "there are times person working performs when a within a home equal services that are to the services of those working home, outside the and who are not com- pensated working to the same extent as those *66 outside the home” does not indicate whether this happens of the time. This is a factual could, 90% 10% obviously, present determination which an important stipulation And, consideration. that person "there is at least one in the State of Michi- gan [obtain who would be unable to such services pay credit] [cash on and who does not have the gives response, them]” rise to the "De minimis ("The non curat lex” considerations”). law is not based on minimal necessary Therefore, it we deem to remand to the trial court so that evidence relevant constitutionality of this two-fold issue constitutionally received that court and ad- judged equal pro- in accord with the "traditional” supra. IV, tection test articulated in Part jurisdiction We retain as to issue.

IX. The sixth issue before us is whether the No- statutory respect Fault Act’s schemata with nonresident, motorists, § out-of-state which 3102(1), require nonresident motorists to maintain no-fault aggre- they Michigan insurance when are in days "an gate year”; any than more calendar § § and pertains read inter alia with 3135(2), motorists,

to transient nonresident violate Attorney General Shavers v op Opinion the Court equal process due clauses Constitutions. Michigan and United States The trial court held: (1) of either the finds not violative "The Court § Equal Protection Clauses of Four-

Due Process teenth tion. motorists Amendment, Michigan or those of Constitu- in the treatment of out-of-state The difference days any aggregate purposes to the essential year reasonably related one of discriminatory. No arbitrary and is not act discriminatory is established.” invidiously classification "the provisions The trial court also held 3113(c) recovery a nonresident transient denying insurance, depriv- and also personal protection recovery of tort below ing such transient threshold, court reasoned is invalid”. The treatment of resident and nonresi- disparate "[the] motorists, passengers, their violates dent dis- equal protection standards The court then opinion”. cussed earlier in this no evidence "[tjhere was stated, correctly, treatment was reason- disparate offered that such nor proper legislative purpose, ably related *67 the classifica- justify was evidence offered to any added). tion” (emphasis in trial

In the lengthy extraordinary case, plaintiffs developed neither nor defendants respect an adequate factual record with mo- pertaining schemata nonresident statutory cannot, a allow the policy, torists. We as matter challenges disposition of these constitutional or fail on that basis. succeed Therefore, to the trial court so we remand constitutionality evidence relevant that court and by above schemata be received the "tra- in accord with constitutionally adjudged 638 402 554 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Ryan, J. equal protection

ditional” due tests supra.65 IV, in articulated Part jurisdiction We retain as to this issue.66

Conclusion Appeals The Court of and the trial court are part part in affirmed and reversed in as indicated holdings opinion’s parts. our in this individual appropriate reflecting An order the constitu tional status of the No-Fault Act will enter 18 opinion. months from the issuance of this GCR 866.3(b).67 1963, public question being costs, No involved. Kavanagh, C.J., Moody, Levin and Blair Jr., JJ., J. Williams, concurred with (concurring part, dissenting part).

Ryan, J. in in judgment my colleagues I dissent from the in holding compulsory unconstitutional 3101(1), section, of 1972 PA known hereafter juncture as the Act or the No-Fault Act. At this I uphold constitutionality would of the above provision challenged provi- as well as the other sions of the Act. analysis, my opin-

For succinctness and ease of bring We wish to to the attention of the trial court the fact that inconsistency requirement exists between the that a nonresident present Michigan obtain no-fault of requirement "for a aggregate insurance when for "an days more than 30 year” (§3102[2]), calendar and the persons operating "pleasure” vehicle in period exceeding days” register their vehicles this state (MCLA257.243[c]; 9.1943[c]). MSA respect (see discussion, With to the issues remanded Part VIII part), proceed and this premise trial court shall on the that the specific statutory schemata involved are severable and will not be Legislature. revised If schemata, sees fit to revise either or both the trial court can then dismiss the suit as to these issues as moot. 23, 1978, January Amended effective 402 Mich cxlviii. *68 Ryan, Dissenting Opinion J. correspond the into sections with is divided to ion opinion. respective majority of the sections Part I. Introduction opinion. majority with I concur the Standing II. Part prior the 1972 PA 294 be month to date One plaintiffs brought effective,1 the initial came action challenging constitutionality Act, asking injunctive declaratory and relief. while for Subsequently, pleadings were amended arrange parties in an to a were added effort better challenge. Plain more constitutional exhaustive standing pursuant 1963, to GCR tiffs claimed 201.2(3) alternatively, or, 1963, 521.1. GCR 201.2(3) permit designed 1963, to five or

GCR property own more residents of this state who county for taxation where assessed direct bring prevent they to reside to an action illegal expenditure to funds or state test relating constitutionality agree I thereto. statute majority 1963, with the conclusion GCR 201.2(3) contemplate expenditure does not regula- operation funds state incidental required tory Because the funds scheme. state merely expended Act are under No-Fault implementation and costs those enforcement of the incidental plaintiffs Act, do have challenge constitutionality standing the Act’s under that rule. declaratory plaintiffs alternative,

In the seek pro- pursuant judgment 521.1 which GCR vides: injunctive declaratory complaint on relief Plaintiffs filed a 1, 1973. 28, 1973.

August Act effective October The No-Fault became 402 Mich *69 Dissenting Ryan, Opinion by J. "In case of controversy jurisdic- actual within its

tion, any circuit court of this state declare the rights and legal other relations of interested party seeking a declaratory judgment, whether or not other sought granted.” relief is or could be (Emphasis added.) granted Before relief can rule, plain- under this tiffs must allege prove justiciable "actual controversy”. "Actual controversy” encompasses something more than simply plaintiffs’ "need to in guide know” order to their future conduct. addition,

In "actual controversy” connotes pursuance of an honest antagonistic actual assertion of right one party against another. A noncollusive adversary proceeding, as distin guished from a lawsuit, contrived friendly is crit ical, both pragmatically constitutionally, to the proper performance of the judicial function. Outside of the provision constitutional for advisory 1963, opinions, 3, 8, Const art this Court limits its resolution of controversies to instances where the stakes of the disputants are committed and issues developed in adversary proceedings upon Request trial. for Advisory Opinion on the Consti 108, of 1977 PA tutionality Mich (1977). NW2d 436

Despite the manifestly contrived nature of the action, instant I would allow plaintiffs standing under GCR 521.1 because of the compulsory nature of the no-fault scheme. Resident plaintiffs who operate own and compelled automobiles are under threat of civil and criminal sanctions to purchase the no-fault pleadings insurance. The allege that parties various are unable financially buy to no-fault coverage and are there- fore subject to those sanctions. We need not hy- pothecate future in determining events that some Shavers v Dissenting Opinion Ryan, J. respect very plaintiffs in limited position antagonistic factually or adverse imple- duty it is named state officials whose coverage provisions. compulsory ment Although controversy” solely out arises "actual plaintiffs coverage provisions, compulsory of the provisions standing challenge other also have specific their interest those the Act because of integrated allegedly provisions and because Accordingly, in an effort of the scheme. nature prove constitutionally infirm, 1972 PA 294 requisite standing plaintiffs to raise the have the opinion. majority in the issues addressed *70 Compulsory Part III. Insurance ma The addressed first substantive issue opinion jority § 3101 of No-Fault is whether registrants requires of Act, or motor owners compulsory personal injury vehicles to maintain protection damage property insurance, liability insurance, is constitutional.2 and residual upon Presumably number theories there a of might upon challenger fashion an attack which a the might constitutionality It of 3101. be claimed protec- applied equal that violates the statute as guarantees Constitu- tion of the state and Federal applied, simply tions, or denies due as arbitrary statutory or mandate. an unreasonable required registrant to be of motor vehicle "The owner registered security payment of benefits in this maintain state shall insurance, property protection personal under liability Security effect shall be in continu- and residual insurance. period registration ously during vehicle.” MCLA of the motor of 24.13101(1). 500.3101(1); MSA regis- majority erroneously has in terms of framed issue actuality, only operators. In Act mandates owners trants and re- registrants quired are not their motor vehicles. Individuals to insure operators security being of provide of no-fault virtue to motor vehicles. 402 Mich Ryan, Dissenting Opinion by J. challenge There be other bases for as well. theory however, attack, Whatever the and no specific might party matter what claims a make in judicial challenge constitutionality a provision, to the principle orderly

one fundamental appellate govern: wishing party review should A unconstitutionality make a claim of on must raise it appeal appellate before the court of a review. There are number of reasons for such rule including, proposition course, the fundamental appellate discretionary that an court of final performance proper not, review does in the of its conjure up function, great issues of interest or even of importance litigants which the have not raised or asked the court decide. majority ignores precept this elemental appellate acknowledging and,

the plaintiffs function that the expressly ap

did not raise the issue on peal, compelled "feel it address because of its importance basic, threshold decision we might render as to the No-Fault Act’s constitutiona lity”.3 acquiesce legitimatizing I cannot such approach appellate just function. It is day sort "this ticket for train for this only” appellate ad hoc rule for review which has long invited the on criticism this Court is often policy judicial and short on restraint. currently

It Act, *71 is manifest that the No-Fault experimental stages, say in revolutionary, novel, its is and some

legislation affecting literally mil- people industry lions of a and billion dollar 14, p majority opinion Footnote of the states: "Although plaintiffs expressly appeal did not raise on the issue by court, Legislature constitutionally, decided the trial 'Can the as a precedent vehicle, [registration operation condition require to of a motor and] purchase personal protection the of no-fault insurance and no- ’ * * * property compelled fault insurance we to feel basic, importance any it address we because of its threshold decision to might constitutionality.” render as to the No-Fault Act’s Dissenting Opinion Ryan, J. our to foresee. It is beyond ability ways utterly proceed in a this Court imperative therefore declaring upon manner before carefully informed no-fault compulsory constitutionality the disregarding proper the By scheme. insurance review, the ma- appellate of scope and conditions of precluded possibility the deliberately has jority court the trial informed decision. Because a better supporting any claim heard no evidence whatever regulation, inadequate casualty of the amici the nor parties since none of "compulsory the insur- argued either briefed issue, to raise and majority the was able ance” factual record by any the issue unburdened resolve speculation. In the absence freewheeling and upon give meaning illuminate factual basis to it applied, 3101 and the manner which § strictly has facial attack majority the fashioned doing majority In so upon constitutionality. its of the advocate rather than has assumed role reviewing court. In assum- impartially that of the has ing posture, jeopardized, the majority abandoned, neutral objective indeed necessary proper performance so stance result, function. inevitable judicial course, ability forsaken its is that Court has dogged as evidenced its reach a sound decision and resolve an issue determination raise preserved, and its was neither contentious nor of that adoption of a most anomalous resolution issue. of the constitution-

My brothers discuss issue "compulsory requirement” ality questions: framework of two of 3101 (a) a condi- Legislature constitutionally, as Can the of a motor registration operation precedent tion personal pro- vehicle, require tection insurance and of no-fault purchase protection in- property no-fault *72 644 402 Mich 554 Ryan, Dissenting Opinion by J. or, alternative, require in the security approved surance

by Secretary the of State? (b) present Does regulatory compul- the scheme for sory no-fault sufficiently protect the interests registrants of operators of motor vehicles in accord with the due States Constitutions as to rates, clause and United (1) the fairness of insurance (2) proper availability the of insurance? benefit, I the shall For reader’s address the issue within the same framework.

(a) Legislature constitutionally, Can the as a condi- registration precedent operation tion of a motor vehicle, require purchase personal pro- the of no-fault property protection tection insurance and no-fault surance in- or, alternative, require in the security approved by Secretary of State?

Authorities abundant and unanimous police power under the state may regulate Stapleton v Inde upon public travel highways. its Brewing Co, pendent 170; 198 Mich 164 520 NW Bowerman v (1917); Sheehan, 95; 242 Mich 219 69 (1928); People Thompson, v 109; NW 259 Mich State, DeVries v of (1932); 242 NW 857 Secretary (1950). 68; 329 Mich 44 872 NW2d The power to control the operation of motor upon vehicles highways this state includes to enact power legislation affecting recipro owners, rights cal all operators, and duties of occupants arising out of operation. such This sphere outgrowth control is the of the state’s interest in mitigating detrimental conse quences of highway motor vehicle accidents and is expressed through of legislation enactment designed to insure a party’s responsibility financial to others4 as well as to himself.5 The legislative 4 State, State, Secretary supra; Secretary DeVries v v Larr See (1947). 121; 317 26 Mich NW2d 872 5 Davis, Helvering v 619; 904; See 1307 301 US 57 S Ct 81 L Ed Co, Carmichael & (1937); 495; v Southern Coal Coke Ct US 57 S (1937). L Ed Dissenting Opinion Ryan, J. legitimate goals by accomplish those decision mandating purchase of no-fault insurance *73 registrants Michigan is vehicle owners and motor police power. clearly The consti- the state’s within properly validity scheme is of the no-fault tutional regulation, power only police but not as a assessed authority integral part and of the also as licensing vehicle motor interest the state operate. they operators own and and the vehicles "compulsory imposition Obviously of this the regis- requirement upon all owners or insurance” registered required to be of motor vehicles trants something of a burden in this state well work upon persons certain conditions. under certain imposition not, is However, per of such a burden the Legislature is vested se, unconstitutional. only is to determine what discretion with wide public welfare, also to deter- but inimical protect public designed fairly the is mine what against might occur. The otherwise the evils which desirability, expediency, wisdom, or even the the specific sense, fairness, of the in the abstract the legit- to advance the means selected public strictly the discre- within imate interests is subject lawmaking body and not tion of the providing judicial do not veto, the means chosen pursuance safeguards. In offend constitutional goals accomplish stated determination to its heretofore, Legislature may validly condition procure- upon operation of a motor vehicle personal injury ment of no-fault damage protection property insurance.

(b) compul- regulatory scheme for present Does the protect the interests sufficiently sory no-fault insurance in accord registrants of motor vehicles of owners or Michigan and United process with the due clause (1) of insurance the fairness States Constitutions as to (2) rates, of insurance? proper availability 402 Mich Ryan, Dissenting Opinion J. question regard that I believe with to this It is seriously reasoning my erroneous most brothers’ today’s consequence action is of which explain identify attempt, first, taken. I shall reasoning the ma- must have which fathered jority opinion how the to demonstrate and then upon principle constitutional well-known misapplied. depends majority has been "compulsory majority insur- holds requirement § 3101 denies ance” necessary government certain takes unless the steps pur- persons required all to assure that opportunity to do have an no-fault insurance chase so on "fair” terms.

Although positing the view some operation are, effect, denied motorists inability to of an their motor vehicles because *74 justified, rates, the reasonable insurance at obtain majority support a such a conclusion with does not being no There none exists. factual record because evidentiary predicate upon the which to basis unavailability assumption of insur- of the claim of claiming argument appellate it, the ance, nor even analysis majority to an involved is forced to resort identify attempt by fair and is made to which an equitable "interest” war- rates as an insurance proc- ranting procedural under the due provisions and Federal Constitu- ess of the state Accordingly, the the "interest” identified tions. majority alleged "statutory entitlement” equitable basis. on a fair and no-fault insurance "statutory Although arguing persons have a equitable rates, insurance to fair and entitlement” defining meticulously majority or delin- avoids the eating scope "statutory entitle- of the term Supreme Concededly, United States ment”. "statutory explicitly never defined Court has Shavers v Dissenting Opinion Ryan, J. property entitlement”, nor does this form of inter- easy However, est lend itself to definition. certain "statutory attributes of a ciently entitlement” are suffi- Supreme established United States extrapolate Court decisions to one to enable concept. tentative definition A statute creates an entitlement claim to a governmental benefit if it defines conditions granted under which benefit must be or if it specific sets out and sole conditions under cogni which the benefit be denied. Once the received, zable benefit is conferred or the individ beneficiary property ual has a sufficient interest process protection the benefit to warrant due government attempts the event the to withhold or deny Underlying concept the benefit.7 of a property interest to which there is an entitlement recipients governmen is the rationale that place upon tal benefits a reliance the continued receipt of those benefits which must not be arbi trarily undermined.8 attempting identify enjoyment

In of fair equitable insurance rates as such an entitle- majority ignores interest, ment certain abso- lutely interests, essential attributes of entitlement focusing hereafter, will be discussed while extensively upon declaring other In attributes. there exists an entitlement in fair interest equitable rates, the Court focuses upon two factors which it claims raise important rates from an if abstract con- economic *75 6 Goldberg Kelly, 254; 1011; See v 397 US 90 S Ct 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970) ; Kennedy, 134; 1633; Arnett v 416 US 94 S Ct 40 L Ed 2d 15 (1974). 7 Roth, Regents 564; 2701; See Board of v 408 US 92 S Ct 33 L Ed (1972); v Burson, 1586; 2d 548 Bell 402 US 91 29 L Ed 2d 90 S Ct (1971) . Goldberg Kelly, supra. See Mich Ryan, Opinion Dissenting J. protected property constitutionally inter- to a

cern (1) dependency est, upon and reliance to wit: a citizen’s equitable rates; fair no-fault and (2) fostering Legislature in and the action expectation no-fault insurance will equitable at fair and rates. available dependence finding necessary In citizen simply my reliance, reason that because brothers "independent provided mobility by an automobile ” * * * practical necessity and is a crucial person not a can obtain a driver’s "whether or operate register his motor vehicle license or important aspects day-to- profoundly affects his constitutionally day life”, therefore a there exists registration property protected interest in such operation. step my is to The next brothers take conclude property one found interest that because new operating registering motor vehicle has upon pro- upon highways conditioned constitutionally insurance, of no-fault curement applicable procedural guarantees are also based The result of enable one to fulfill the condition. reasoning, provision course, is that such pur- Legislature (compulsory established insurance) chases of no-fault as a condition constitutionally protected entitle- exercise of the (registering operating mo- ment one’s interest through upon highways) is, boot- tor vehicle argument, strapping itself elevated to constitu- tionally protected entitlement interest. recognizing

Apparently of citi- that the element standing not sufficient zen reliance alone is proc- create interest to which due the entitlement sepa- protections majority attach, "a ess finds invoking proc- independent rate and basis *76 v Dissenting Opinion Ryan, J. protection required ess motorists purchase legislative insurance”, viz., no-fault en independent compulsory actments, of the no-fault expectation insurance scheme which "fostered the that no-fault insurance will be at fair available equitable and rates”.9

That somewhat convoluted route leads Court perceives that because of it conclusion what inadequate procedural protections guarantee- to be ing availability of no-fault insurance at fair equitable "compulsory rates, insurance” requirement §of 3101 is unconstitutional. reasoning in error of the fundamental

majority assumption is in the that there is a property entitlement, or interest in constitu- availability sense, tional in the insur- no-fault equitable ance at fair rates.

Essentially, pro- "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment’s property safeguard cedural is a of the security person already of interests has added.) acquired specific (Emphasis benefits”. Regents Roth, 576; Board v 408 US 92 S Ct (1972). L33 Ed 2d 548 When such benefits right terminated, the constitutional to a hear- ing provides opportunity person for a to vindi- Regents cate his claim to benefits. Board of such supra, Obviously, procedural proc- Roth, 577. 9"(1) following All rates shall made in accordance with the provisions: "(d) excessive, inadequate unfairly Rates shall not be MCLA discrimina- 24.12403(1). tory.” 500.2403(1); MSA "(1) Every writing insurer authorized to write and automobile bodily injury liability damage property liability participate organization purpose state shall in an for the of: "(a) Providing guarantee coverage that automobile insurance any person procure will be available to who is unable to such through 500.3301(1); ordinary insurance 24.13301(1). methods.” MCLA MSA 402 Mich Ryan, Dissenting Opinion J. abridged required until benefit is

ess otherwise threatened. concluding very my err in

At the outset brothers mandatory insurance scheme is no-fault abridgment property interest one has an registering operating motor his vehicle. *77 analysis improper of the error is the result of an analysis is of entitlement interest. essence an respects. in two deficient recognize First, is that the there a failure property a citizen has an entitle- interest to which case, ment, and involved in derives which is registering in or the action of the state from licensing vehicle, which, motor a benefit once a upon permits conferred, the use of a motor vehicle public highways. the concept of the of the present enjoyment appears of the to be an essential attribute

benefit protected property in under the entitle-

interests present enjoyment doctrine. The attribute of ment recipient’s with the rationale of the is consistent dependency government upon and reliance activity. issued, case, their "Once licenses petitioner’s as in possession

continued pur- essential become Burson, added.) v Bell (Emphasis suit of a livelihood.” (1971). 535, 539; 29 L Ed 402 US S Ct 2d procedural "The Fourteenth Amendment’s safeguard security of of interests property of is a acquired already specific person benefits.” that a has Roth, supra, Regents v Board supplied.) at (Emphasis 576. clear; emerging underlying principle once "The received, govern- cognizable

a benefit is conferred or deprive employed mental infringe upon must not be action prior right that some form without unaware, however, hearing. authority of any We are v Dissenting Opinion Ryan, J. proposition panoply the protections that the full government every

attaches time takes on action which confers a new status some ual individ- request Scarpa or denies a for a status.” different (CA Parole, 5, States 477 F2d United Board 1973). Second, there is failure to appreciate that legislative command no-fault as a precedent register- obtained condition ing of a does not or even abridge vehicle terminate benefit, one’s entitlement but de- merely fines, perimeters in part, or dimensions of the benefit. abstract,

An possess, individual does not in the property operation interest his vehicle Rather, Michigan’s upon highways. property interest lies in his registrant status as a or li- recipient censee Until entitled benefit. individual such acquires licensure his proves *78 it, he eligibility legitimate does not have a Essentially, claim entitlement it. the require- ment of no-fault insurance simply conditions or defines one aspect eligibility for the benefit. Until an individual fulfills the eligibility require- insurance, ment of obtaining no-fault he does not have valid claim of to operate entitlement his in Michigan. vehicle

The property interest at was created by issue and, Legislature the within limita- constitutional tions, the Legislature is free to define its dimen- Regents Roth, sions. Board of supra, v 577. The obtaining insurance, condition of no-fault which is applicable registrants, to all motor no vehicle is more than a partial determinant such dimen- long sions. So as the condition is not palpably unreasonable, arbitrary it does offend due Mich 554 402 652 Ryan, by Dissenting Opinion J. Board, Agricultural Canners

process.10 Grocers Dairy (1976); 1 337; 245 397 Mich NW2d Director, Agriculture Department Co v 377 Products Carolene (1966); 71; Mich 138 NW2d (1936). Thomson, 172; Co v 276 Mich 267 NW such a license To so the issuance of condition afoul of Fourteenth Amendment run does not guarantees. procedural to all the issuance of licenses

"If barred the statute carry liability insurance or did did not motorists who not cases, not, security, under our post the statute would Bur Amendment.” Bell v the violate Fourteenth son, supra, 539. Legislature recog- that majority implies interest protected property a constitutionally nized legisla- it enacted equitable in fair and rates when Moreover, that because of tion toward end. rates, and equitable claimed interest in fair must guarantees opines procedural that majority making in the rate be effectuated connection with process. by majority, the statement validity recognized that has

implying interest by rates equitable in fair and expectation no-fault "foster[ing] (a), expressed question is As in the condition of no-fault insurance reasonably mitigating interest the detrimen related state’s Moreover, consequences highway tal motor accidents. vehicle regu underwriting guidelines currently employed state various alleged arbitrary casualty or discrimina lated tory challenge insurers are not to be plaintiffs appeal. Although majority on either case, not made in the instant it is made Connecticut’s Shavers, Altermatt, counterpart 363 A2d Gentile v 169 Conn (1975). court, relying regulatory virtu The Connecticut on a scheme challenge Michigan, rejected ally to that enacted identical *79 underwriting guidelines process and the the equal under traditional 38-201c, tests. Conn Gen Ann amended See Stat 1978) (Supp 38 the Conn Gen Stat Ann since Gentile decision. See . -201c Shavers v Dissenting Opinion by Ryan, J. equitable rates”, will be available at fair and is dependent upon necessarily showing that the alleged explained Since, interest in fact exists. as above, exist, abstract, there does not in the an equitable rates, interest in fair and the allegedly recognized by rates, interest Legislature, in such exist, all, must if at within frame- statutory Accordingly, work of this scheme alone. provi- statutory we must determine whether majority sions cited create an entitlement such interest rates. provisions legislative

The relevant enact- upon rely my ment ing: brothers follow- "(1) All rates shall be made in accordance with the following provisions:

"(d) excessive, shall inadequate Rates not be or un- fairly 24.12403(1). 500.2403(1); discriminatory.” MCLA MSA

"(1) Every writing insurer authorized to write and bodily injury liability property damage automobile liability organization participate insurance in this state shall purpose

for the of: "(a) Providing guarantee insur- that automobile coverage ance any person will be who available to is unable procure through ordinary such insurance methods. "(b) Preserving public price the benefits

competition by mal maximum encouraging of the nor- use private system. "(2) organization chapter created shall under 'Michigan place- be called automobile insurance ” 24.13301(1). facility.’ 500.3301(1); ment MCLA MSA suggestion enacting regulatory that, property scheme, established a regulation subject interest in the matter of the *80 554 402 Mich 654 Ryan, Dissenting by Opinion J. explained

constitutionally earlier, a unsound. As government to a an entitlement statute creates the under it declares conditions benefit when granted the condi- must be which benefit may be denied. the benefit tions under which creating recognizing the existence Rather than provision, property interest, cited the first of a 2403(1), casualty insur- for sets standards of Insurance follow ers and the Commissioner making casualty insurance rates. when (footnote pp majority 23, The cases cited support opinion) majority 599-600, claim in equitable "fair that there in exists interest my view, for rates”, not, in stand do separate proposition "a there exists stated independent invoking due basis for pur- required motorists for Rather, insurance”. cases chase no-fault proce- clearly instances in and limit which narrow guarantees to situations attach dural upon only dependency or reliance there is not recogni- alleged legislative interest, but the tion of also Davis, Paul v 424 US interest at issue. (1976); Bishop 1155; 47 405 v 693; 96 S L Ed 2d Ct Wood, 341; 2074; 426 96 48 L Ed 2d 684 US S Ct (1976); Fano, 427 96 S Ct US Meachum (1976); Supreme Court, 2532; 49 L Ed 2d (1976). Term, L 86-104 Harv Rev 24.13301, the ma- 500.3301;

MCL MSA cited (p jority majority opinion) independently as recognition supporting legislative the claim of equitable merely rates, fair an interest "Michigan provides automo- the creation of the facility”. provision placement bile insurance assignment compels participate in the insurers to high coverage available in order to make risks public preserving all, the benefit while Shavers v Ryan, Dissenting Opinion by J. price competition through the maximum use of the private system. citing normal Outside provision independent the context its argument, majority explain basis does not how recognizes equitable it an interest in "fair and insurance rates”. majority concluding

Even if the was correct in constitutionally protected is a there entitle- *81 equitable ment in interest "fair and insurance showing rates”, pulsory has there been no the com- provision of insurance the ter- Act either abridges enjoyment minates or the continued of heretofore, such interest. As indicated Fourteenth procedural protection property Amendment is a safeguard person already of interests a has ac- quired procedural applica- is not ble until a to state threatens terminate or other- abridge Although majority wise the benefit. the alleges equita- property that a in interest "fair and exist, ble in rates” does fact their discussion is any demonstrating without illustration how no- compulsory abridges fault’s insurance scheme majority terminates discuss the essential this interest. The does not factor of termination abridgment property triggers of a interest which procedural guarantees, the because it obvious is compulsory that the insurance scheme in no sense abridges equitable in interest fair and insur- declaring ance rates. action of the Court in compulsory insurance scheme unconstitutional say approach is, least, to an anomalous to assuring procedural safeguards enjoyment for the of such benefits. summary, persuaded require-

In I am security imposed upon ment of all vehicle motor prece- Act, owners the No-Fault as a condition operation vehicles, dent motor does not Mich 554 Ryan, Opinion by Dissenting J. guar- procedural Fourteenth Amendment violate require- the statutory More specifically, antees. face, even Fourteenth ment, on its raise does process questions. procedural due Amendment of unconstitutional- In novel declaration today’s futuro, safeguards, procedural for lack of ity objec- defined issues majority inquiry, initiated tives, has to coerce a solution. attempted being claims before the

There no adversarial decided today, the issue is concerning Court is struck down compulsory provision claims, upon but adjudication specific not by an approach to abstract inherently generalized problem. weaknesses, inequities, uncertainties

Perceived potential and a concern for the unfairness the Act are compulsory provision shortcomings of constitutional elevated level upon the judicial Impingement veto. justify glari today’s legislative judgment function Lacking power ng.11 appropriate plenary purpose, effectuate the desired the Court’s declara futuro, as is used unconstitutionality, tion motivate, bludgeon compel, even *82 regulate the and the Commissioner of Insurance with casualty industry conformance the will of the To my Court.12 this end brothers Kramer branch shall exercise to make (1959). enact laws. School District of the except plied.) tive, 338, 353; Judicial Constitutional [12] 11 "The Article executive and as powers majority Bros 247 NW binding power expressly provided 3, Freight 2 duty is of the 1963 Constitution characterizes government orders and the judicial. of courts is to 247 NW 787 powers properly belonging Lines, Inc, authority No judgments respecting are divided into three branches: in this constitution.” their person exercising City of 357 (1933). hear bludgeon interpret Mich and decide controversies Pontiac v provides: 254, 258; as an and to another the Pontiac, apply them. Johnson v attempt (Emphasis sup- powers of 98 NW2d 586 law, 262 Mich to soften legisla- branch not to and one 657 v Opinion Dissenting Ryan, by J. proffered plan have even a "minimal” unburdened experience, expertise understanding myriad implicated the factors which are the making process industry. rate the disposition issue, In its of this the Court has strayed judi- from the constitutional limits its authority usurped legislative cial function. the power There a difference between the Court’s today’s judgment unconstitutionality make its proper authority to do so. In the at instance given way hand, latter the has the former price weakening is further erosion of the ever judicial doctrine of self-restraint. Equal Part IV. Due Process Applicable to the No-

Protection Tests Fault Act majority opinion. I concur with the op Constitutionality V. Part Personal Injury Protection Scheme Under No- Act Fault majority opinion. I with concur op Constitutionality Property Part VI. Damage Protection Insurance Scheme Act Under No-Fault majority. I concur in the result reached holding the blow in the No-Fault Act unconstitutional at some future necessary legislative date if the taken action isn’t in the interim period. Cahill, 473; cites majority Robinson 62 303 A2d NJ 273 (1973), support approach. of such subsequent an review of A history impropriety approach. case evidences of such See II, 196; III, (1973); 35; 63 Robinson NJ A2d 65 306 Robinson 67 NJ IV, (1973); 333; (1975); 335 A2d 67 6 Robinson NJ 193 A2d 339 V, 449; VI, 155; (1976); 69 NJ 335 A2d 70 NJ Robinson 129 Robinson (1976); VII, (1976). A2d 400 Robinson NJ A2d *83 Mich Ryan, Dissenting Opinion by J. specific with re- issues raised constitutional damage protection spect property scheme follows: as (a) No-Fault Act violates Whether the Michigan and United States clauses of by abolishing common-law rem- Constitutions damaged persons property edy tort for whose negligent by tortfeasors; vehicle motor

(b) equal No-Fault Act violates Whether and United clauses following by creating the stat- States Constitutions utory (1) prop- damage to vehicular classification: by mandatory erty is not covered optional first-party insurance, while collision under spect solely property are covered kind of

to this optional first-part insurance, while collision under (2) damage tangible property properly to other mandatory by parked no-fault vehicles is covered damage up property $1,000,000 re- quired inflicted on the vehicle which to be carried damage. test to the so-called traditional

In accord with comports the no-fault scheme determine whether inquire only process, we whether with due permissi- to a a reasonable relation statute bears judge, legislative objective. The learned trial ble focusing upon question inquiry his rather than statutory a reasona- the new scheme bore whether permissible objectives, relationship directed ble inquiry efficiency former tort his property into the

damage system. After con- idemnification operated cluding system the traditional tort adequate efficiency, "that the trial court held with objective to no be served there was social rights property abrogating dam- tort of owners aged negligent of this Because tortfeasors”. analysis overly the constitutional restrictive *84 Dissenting Opinion Ryan, by J. legal issue, the trial court’s conclusion was erro- neous. opinion, majority

As elucidated "The Legislature experiment is as free to with other ways dealing subject hope of with a in the of making good system as it to better is correct a perceived system.” evil When the trial court’s analysis only upon focused the latter considera- inquiry possible legislative objectives tion, its into incomplete. Upon necessarily reviewing was majority legitimate goals record, the found several justify property which would the enactment protection approach scheme. Under the deferential inherent agree in the traditional test, I legitimate objectives, there were other by court, than those noted the trial to warrant legislative action. respect equal protection

With to claim, plaintiffs cross-plaintiffs argue Legis arbitrarily subject has lature treated the of dam age moving highway differently to vehicles from upon tangible property. that inflicted other As was insurance), (compulsory III observed in Part legitimate mitigating has a interest consequences the detrimental of motor vehicle Generally speaking, accidents. this is the funda objective quick mental of the No-Fault Act. A perusal of the Act makes fact evident the that the designed party’s is scheme to insure one financial responsibility to others as well as to In himself. objective, accord with this the no-fault scheme provides compulsory third-party property for dam age protection payable regard without differently, to fault. Stated the Act mandates the registrant required owner a motor vehicle to registered Michigan13 procure third-party addition, regis- In the Act mandates the nonresident owner 402 Mich Opinion Dissenting Ryan, J. regard insurance,14 without payable beneficiary his motor vehicle inflicted damage fault for tangible this class of Out of tangible property. of vehicular exception there carved property public highw on a operation designed property15 is excluded Damage property to this class ay.16 benefits. Plaintiffs from property statutory that such classifica cross-plaintiffs argue a valid objective related to rationally tions are not the No-Fault Act. agree. I do not goal assuring financial

In addition *85 inflicted damage motor for vehicular responsibility had other Legislature property, to tangible involved cost consider- of them in mind. One goals Legisla- by majority, As elucidated ations. protection coverage vehicle sought to make ture allocating premium expense by equitable more collision exclusively first-party protection protection damage rates would Vehicle coverage. the basis of strictly repair on calculated thereby vehicle, including rather than own for one’s costs potential a for the coverage in the cost liability permits operated operates his motor vehicle to be in this who or trant days year aggregate than 30 calendar from an of more state 3Í02(1). continuously security payment of maintain for the benefits. § company, liability of the insurance In to limit the absolute order $1,000,000 ceiling mandatory Legislature a on the the third-party property ceiling established $1,000,000 damage The choice of the insurance. justified standpoint. from an actuarial was parked way is in such a as not cause Unless the vehicle 3123(l)(a). damage occurred. unreasonable risk of the § exclusion, prop- 3123 excludes from § In addition vehicle person "[pjroperty erty named in a owned insurance benefits spouse property protection policy, his household, person if the of either domiciled in the same relative named, operator owner, registrant spouse or the relative was the his out of involved in the motor vehicle accident a vehicle arose”, 3123(l)(b), damage damage "property property § which the state”, occurring arising out of from motor vehicle accidents 3123(2). § Opinion Dissenting Ryan, J. and therefore a vehicle unknown damage unascertainable value. there a resul- Essentially, premiums tant shift in from liability coverage to the With coverage. vehicle collision this shift premiums intended that would more reflect closely value of the vehicle affording one drives while significant pre- a more saving mium purchase to one who does not coverage. optional Additionally, vehicle first-party the Legislature hoped liability this shift from to first-party coverage might group make insur- ance as for buy- feasible well as create incentives ing highway more vehicles. crashworthy

Including moving within highway vehicles general tangible property affording class and them frus third-party property protection benefits would trate the signifi aforementioned without objectives cantly responsib of financial advancing the interest ility.17 3101(2)

Part VII. Whether the No- Fault Act Which Excludes Two-Wheel Coverage Motor Vehicles from Under Act is Constitutional *86 I concur with majority opinion. the 17 "parked way Because of the fact that in as not to vehicles such a damage logically cause unreasonable risk of the which occurred” are blameless, treating similarly parked and because such vehicles tangible property significant impact other on the would have a premium objectives, Legislature reasonably aforementioned the af- parked property protection forded such vehicles no-fault benefits. "[Ejvery by legislature might line drawn some out that leaves however, discretion, well have been included. That exercise is a of legislative, judicial, Boraas, Village not a function.” of Belle Terre 1, 8; 1536; (1974); US 416 94 S Ct L39 Ed 2d see New 797 and Dukes, (1976). 297; 2513; Orleans v 427 US 96 S Ct L Ed 49 2d 511 Mich 554 402 Opinion Ryan, Dissenting J. Constitutionality No- Part VIII. the of Statutory Act’s Scheme with Fault

Respect the Work-Loss Reimbursement Replacement and Reimbursement for 3107) (§

Services (1) plaintiffs’ complaint is: The essence equal protection § that the clauses violates Michigan be- and United States Constitutions invidiously it between workers cause in discriminates outside the home the home and workers payable in case of of maximum benefits terms injury; 3107(b) (2) equal violates protection and United clauses of arbitrary it States Constitution because creates restricting recovery injuries for classification expenses employed in "reason- those the home replacement ably for services. incurred” simplest, equal Reduced to its guarantees of both constitutions mean that Legislature may may termed a not take what persons”, split two, "natural that class in class arbitrarily designate factions and then severed thereupon original of unit as two classes and of each. enact different for the treatment rules However, be- when is a natural difference there of the two be tween situation or circumstances persons, justified classes treating enjoys differently. them The state range distinguishing, wide ing, select- discretion classifying, if a it sufficient classifi- arbitrary. practical palpably cation is and not Daggs, 281; Ct Orient 19 S Ins Co v US (1899). L Ed 552 practical Legislature to There is a reason for the work loss make a distinction between benefits necessary replacement ordinary and the it- lends services. Reimbursement for the former *87 DissentingOpinion by Ryan, J. on self determination the basis of an individu- prior wage ordinary necessary scale, al’s while performed susceptible services the home are not Moreover, valuation under the same criterion. replacement ordinary whereas costs and neces- sary being susceptible incurred, services are one ordinarily cost cannot incur the of a substitute to perform job of the accident victim. Addition- ally, ordinary necessary fact services must incurred before reimbursement only function, serves not but valuation also a prophylactic function which has not been shown to Finally, be unreasonable. the different maximum imposed appear reasonably limits the Act re- lated their reimbursement functions. my view,

In there is no need for a remand of taking this matter for the of evidence. Constitutionality IX. Part of the No-Fault Statutory Respect Act’s Scheme with Non-Michigan Transient Motorists Occupants of Motor Nonresident Vehicles Registered Not Essentially, plaintiffs complain statu- tory equal protec- scheme violates due guarantees by denying tion no-fault benefits transient nonresident who has not obtained insur- ance from an insurer who has filed a certification compliance §with 3163 the Act. agree.

I do not representing arbitrary Rather than and ca- pricious legislative power, exercise of this exclu- recognizes merely sion the realities of situa- Legislature, cognizant tion. The authority the extent its vehicles,

over out-of-state motor reason- ably coverage compulsory excludes from the 402 Mich Ryan, Dissenting Opinion J. motor vehicles out-of-state

scheme *88 aggregate more operated of for year. days any Those nonresi- calendar than voluntarily procure no-fault the who do not dents coverage quite reasonably the con- receive

do not the traditional Under no-fault benefits. comitant legislation presumed if constitutional test, to be is may reasonably any construed to be state of facts legislative justify the classifications action and below, it does not the record made therein. From presumption appear is overcome. that the gained by Again, perceive no benefit I action. further trial court this issue for remand of

Conclusion finding constitutional, I am Act In the No-Fault following explicit compelled observa- to make dispositive holdings of the tion. The above challenges constitutionality Act No-Fault plaintiffs by and in this lawsuit as leveled Upon by majority, no more. and raised plaintiff, predicate, in the another different factual produce arguments future, well raise pre- persuade me that evidence sufficient weighs validity sumption of constitutional applied, today heavily that, as is overcome unconstitutional. act is reviewing us, been I have the issues before

In discharge proper acutely conscious that the legislation evaluating judicial function, new when very validity, It is narrow. is for constitutional relation- rational there is determine whether accomplished goals sought ship to be between stated chosen to do so. Our and the means restated deference legislative function, as presumptive doctrine in the familiar embodied validity, Its verbalism. is no mere constitutional Shavers v Dissenting Opinion Fitzgerald, J. separation powers source is the doctrine judicial its life blood is self-restraint. We are not revolutionary concept free to strike down this new compensation injury for motor vehicle caused damage may think it because we to be unwise personal or even at odds with our notions of what fair. If is We test for constitutional collision. there ought none, not, it or like we to decline to legislative otherwise, disturb the will. Stated our judgment review and unduly must be such as to not hamper Legislature’s exper- freedom to superimposing judg- iment and innovate our legisla- expediency ment as to the or wisdom of the necessary policy tion over theirs. This of deference Legislature ample scope putting affords the prophecies its proof.

to the test of The case before us *89 brought prior is a contrived lawsuit one month to the date 1972 PA 294 became effective and is necessarily presenting in deficient evidence of the impact, board, actual across the of the no-fault Essentially, plaintiffs produced scheme. the before body trial court the a evidence similar to that by body when considered the was deliberating upon adopting propriety legisla- included, alia, scheme. That evidence inter expert opinion, facts, data, tive projections actuarial fiscal professorial theorizing. Much of imprecise, highly speculative. the evidence is even Upon examining considering findings it, all of applying court, of fact the trial those principles established of constitutional law which I superimposed discussed, have over all of which is presumption validity, the persuaded I of constitutional am constitutionally

that the Act sound. is J., J. Coleman, Ryan, concurred with (concurring part, dissenting in in J. Fitzgerald, 554 402 Mich 666 Fitzgerald, Dissenting Opinion J. to few brief I

part). I write make a observations. of the chal- uphold constitutionality would et 294, PA 500.3101 provisions MCL lenged seq., At seq.; 24.13101 et MSA as amended. this proc- juncture, act, under our traditional standards, a equal protection ess and is reasonable assuring that victims of auto- legislative method of promptly adequately accidents are mobile compensated. plaintiffs’ about gist many complaints a is that the act is heavy-

no-fault act in problems solution to non-existent handed point. tort miss the system. workable Plaintiffs Bank Manistee & observation Justice Levin’s McGowan, Co v Trust Mich (1975), pertinent: NW2d proceed cautiously should defer "Courts should judgments Legis- legislative lature quired reasonable. experiment being must be without re- free in its nicety’ to attain 'mathematical formula- problems.” of remedies social and economic tion of the issues this I would remand for a factual determination. Because case case declaratory judgment posture, arises gleaned to be on remand must necessarily "facts” I nothing speculative. be somewhat see gained for more current discourse by remanding perceived system. evils of no-fault plaintiffs’ on stages. yet experimental is not beyond The act *90 too, I, procedural am about due concerned cannot, however, I process issue. conscientiously posture reach the merits of that issue in the opinion 14 the majority this case. Footnote compulsory no- constitutionality shows rate-setting proce- fault insurance in the context The "actual not to this Court. appealed dures was 667 v Dissenting Opinion Fitzgerald, J. requirement controversy” of a declar for issuance might plaintiffs atory judgment well be met had standing the issue.1 Plaintiffs have raised ripe question may for the issue raise decision, and the plaintiffs fact remains that did but the process regula question procedural due in rate availability. suspect I the liti tion surprised gants quite at the outcome of this will be case. arguendo

Assuming the issue of the merits insurance/procedural process compulsory due us, I not find a constitutional due before can was process a factual record. I do not violation without process possible on due violations based address upon by major- doctrine relied the entitlement ity square my does not with because do so litigants conception process that is due from system. the court question process protec- say of due

I cannot plaintiff no has in a case where tions arises process. or a denial of due claimed an entitlement does not exist a vacuum. Due leading ruling spring from a

entitlement cases plaintiff. example, See, to the Bundo v adverse (1976) Lake, 679; 395 Mich 238 NW2d 154 Walled (refusal license); liquor Burson, Bell v 402 to renew (1971) 535; 1586; 29 L Ed 2d 90 US (suspension S Ct license); Goldberg Kelly, of driver’s rule, 1963, 521, declaratory judgment GCR is to be While administered, granting declaratory liberally construed and of a judicial judgment is still a matter of discretion. To raise an issue sua appeal declaratory judgment sponte from a lower court is extraor on majority’s dinary. puzzled by the statement that "before affirma I am granted, plaintiff, declaratory it at relief can be is essential that a tive minimum, entitling judgment pleads him facts he seeks i.e., allege alleged, plaintiff prove proves must each fact Detroit, controversy” justiciable to Kuhn v East and reference actual (1974). (1973), den, App Iv 391 Mich 815 I 50 Mich NW2d deciding procedural strong authority for not read Kuhn as process issue here. *91 402 Mich 554

668 Opinion Dissenting Fitzgerald, J. (1970) L 1011; 25 Ed 2d 287 254; 90 Ct 397 US S (termination benefits); Regents Board of welfare L 548 Roth, 564; 2701; US 92 Ct 33 Ed 2d v 408 S (1972) (refusal tenure); Kennedy, grant Arnett v to (1974) L 1633; 40 Ed 2d 15 134; 416 94 Ct US S (dismissal servant); Bishop civil Federal L 341; 96 S 48 Ed 2d 684 Wood, US Ct 426 (1976) (dismissal policeman). is not so

The law on the entitlement doctrine presentation adversary is an that I feel clear but necessary to whether an entitlement exists. decide presentation Likewise, is needed to decide such a requisite present.2 action is state whether Moreover, determining process protec what due required by ought to the Constitution tions are balancing consumers, of the interests of involve insurance

companies agency charged and the state industry.3 regulating I the insurance would with concerning following Pennsylva- offers the observation One author scheme, rate-making appears essentially simi- nia’s insurance lar to our own: regulation despite procedure, "Pennsylvania’s its insurance rate go public hearing provide into notice and before rates failure to effect, challenge appear susceptible process to under due does unlikely It is that a court would clause of the fourteenth amendment. consider the state’s if the property Nor, to state role in constitute action. analogy utility employed, public do consumers have a is in fixed insurance rates.” interest goes say: He on to objections present "The serious constitutional to the rate- lack of suggests problem may making legislative that the lie scheme resolution judicial rather hands.” than Lewis, Regulation Pennsylvania: Does Comment: Insurance Rate (1977). Voice?, L Have a 81 Dickinson Rev the Consumer pertinent The Insurance Commissioner has indicated some considerations: availability regulation "The for essential concern ways glance which at first seem unrelated. manifests itself Some several Others, necessary people easily at cannot find the all. insurance, unfair, charged though they either in absolute terms can find feel that rate comparison charged rate or in company category of consumers find their choice of others. A third limited would quality they they they unable select the of service so among shop companies prefer, because or are hesitant Shavers v Fitzgerald, Opinion Dissenting J. prefer interests are4 before those to hear what required satisfy minimally deciding what is process. people a time when come

While there opinion on deserve the State of question *92 requiring litigants, by us not raised record, the instant case in the facts not assume judicial I initiative. would such does not warrant precipitate today judicial a crisis action to take not hasty At ill-conceived reform. and the risk of at perceive juncture as what some I would leave this understand of those who best in the hands a crisis problems and solutions. proper case, when the at another time In a properly raised, procedural issue is developed so that we can a factual record * * * , in or not "rates whether determine unfairly inadequate 'excessive, fact, discriminatory’ my ”, be otherwise. decision could proper its time until This Court should bide case arrives. attempt accept majority’s to soften

I cannot holding by at the act unconstitutional the blow agency legislative action if some future date no procedure, authority Robin- for that is taken. As (1973), is Cahill, A2d 273 62 NJ 303 son v questions coverage. public also of their fear cancellation marketplace. government On in the and nature of involvement extent hand, dispute government intervene should is little that marketplace the one in the free there by act marketplace itself will where strong hand, public there is a the other in the growing interest. On in government regulation to intervene has come sense negative influence. unnecessary in fact be cases where it is Michigan, be exam- pertinent and must All of these concerns are public policy if is to exist.” ined sound Bureau, Report Insurance Essential A to the Governor: Insurance (1977), p 4. in in Comment: are listed to be balanced Some of the considerations 89,’ Law, L J Entitlement, 1974 Duke Enjoyment, and Due Process 120-122. 402 Mich Dissenting Opinion Coleman, J. decision, invalidating

cited. That New Jersey’s financing schools public through method local ad valorem taxation property, real is now commonly referred to as Robinson I. A look at the later of that case me that history convinces ought Court not follow a similar procedure. sum,

In action today’s majority poten- problem a workable to a tially junks solution to the importance population entire and dictates to seemly a manner neither nor The Court perilous called for. embarks on a course of grave consequence to everyone. (concurring part; dissenting J.

Coleman, part). Although I have signed opinion of Jus Ryan provides tice because it analysis detailed approach Part III majority’s "No-Fault” (MCL seq.; et Insurance Act 500.3101 MSA seq.), 24.13101 et I concur also with Justice Fitz gerald’s addition, forthright opinion. In I express *93 a separate concern which embraces the whole of this heretofore unperceived constitutional doc trine, grown born full today without benefit of facts, briefs, arguments, oral prior consideration of any lower court and without knowledge of plaintiffs or defendants. 5 (1973) (court II, 196; See Robinson 63 NJ 306 A2d 65 not would statutory previously disturb Legislature scheme held unconstitutional unless 31, 1974, by legislation compati- failed to enact December (1975) (court I); III, 35; ble with Robinson Robinson 67 NJ 335 6A2d remedy year); declined to determine a for the 1975-76school Robinson IV, (1975) (court 333; provisional 67 NJ 339 A2d 193 mandated year). provisional remedies for the 1976-77 school The remedies were put Legislature statutory not scheme into effect because the did a enact designed remedy the constitutional noted in Robin- defects V, (1976), 449;

son I. In Robinson 69 NJ the court found A2d constitutional, facially assumption the new statute that When freezing spending on the conditioned complete funding jurisdiction. would The court retained follow. complete funding injunction did not court issued an follow the schools, VI, Jersey’s public for New 70 NJ Robinson (1976). injunction by 358 A2d 457 9, order on The was dissolved July enacting provided funding by 1976 because the (1976). tax, VII, 464-465; a state income Robinson 70 NJ 360 A2d Dissenting Opinion J. Coleman,

I says: the truth when he Justice Williams writes compul- plaintiffs "The interest that is affected previously recognized sory no-fault insurance is not a right.” common-lawor constitutional truly warns: He also holding only deeply aware that our "We problems directly ance business in this and the insur- affectsthe of motorists substantially state, it but that also (Emphasis system justice.” of civil

affects our entire added.) giant step govern- it It Indeed does. is a towards management private enterprise through ment judicial mandate. With no facts and little or no expertise industry, in the claimed power sweeps majority assumes a stance of management out to transform the of an entire private industry into a state function and there- regulation subject. fore served for state to such as has been re- agencies. majority finds that legislation goes grant monopoly beyond "[t]his attempt regulate utility” or an action of the automobile insurance and so

industry must "be treated as that of the state itself’. legal day alchemists, Court has

Like modern rate-setting managed the insurance transform pri- essentially from a series what was governmental supervision vate actions with some opens magical to that "state action” which constitutional controls. door to "state action” astonishing *94 bootstrapping display used to of requires the the state achieve this feat —because public pri- product purchase from a certain 402 Mich Dissenting Opinion Coleman, J. prerequisite engaging vate business as a in a private activity, certain the action business dangerously is thus state sary enterprise blurs the neces- action — important private distinction between public government. (as By analogies "apples oranges”1 de minority opinions) scribed the other and an analysis highly based on a factual vacuum and questionable premises,2 a new face has been 1E.g., compare licenses, licenses, liquor with the issuance of driver’s Fitzgerald’s opinion. etc. discussed in Justice 2(1) protects "excessive, against inadequate The Insurance Code or unfairly throughout rates”, discriminating commonly employed a standard country Michigan. Nevertheless, majority and in “legislative finds the standard a "mere exhortation” in the absence of definition” and "without any history prior interpretation”. court First, unlikely circumstances are equitable prices”, any single like "fair and "definition” is possibilities. to cover the innumerable factual Facts and necessary against which to test standards. lacking here, understandably expected Facts are the sioner of so we were, parties statutory protection to test the in a vacuum. The Commis- judiciary judge fairly will be able to what is an "excessive, inadequate unfairly discriminatory or rate”. The words ordinary widely regulations. are used in statutes and Even if it history interpretation” were true that there is "no of court of this standard, ask, history begin?” one has to "How does such a Noting apply Michigan, that the same standards to all many years, finding and have inadequacy I wonder how this industry. will affect all other areas of the (2) majority say inadequate provisions statutory that there are attacking validity for a rating motorist of an individual decision. I upon see no bar to an individual’s attack the base rate nor an attack upon arbitrary capricious premium assignment or individual or risk. 500.2027; Also the Uniform Trade Practices Act in MCL MSA specifically 24.12027 against includes within its discrimination Among prohibitions individuals. other "(a) insure, Refusing insure, refusing limiting to continue to coverage the amount of available to an individual or risk because of following: of the * * * "(i) Race, color, creed, status, sex, origin marital or national . "(ii) residence, age, handicap, occupation or lawful * * * individual or the location of the risk .” (iii) property protections, including See for additional charging refusal to insure or to continue to insure and of different rate. (3) complaint alleging The third is similar to the second "no *95 673 Dissenting Opinion Coleman, J. 3 concept process”. painted It is not of "due on the dangerous. practical. becoming. It It is is II dangerous unbecoming it even because It is Michigan Supreme precedent Court sua is for sponte to use it contrive an "issue” and as justice” system of the entire civil vehicle to "affect and, Michigan. marketplace incidentally, in freedom manipulate people can, unsolicited, If four Legislature in to the Constitution so as precise dictate removing the method of one indus terms effectively competitive try of free from the field industry enterprise, or will be what business next?4 govern- groundwork opinion lays for

The regulation private industry (judicial?) such ment "Super- people as our regulation” have never countenanced. kind —name be a suitable —and would concept. for the

Ill opinion only III as to Part is not unbecom- challenge adequate statutory provision permitting an individual refusal, cancellation, assignment discriminatory or higher Facility’ presumptively rates”. with its 'Automobile Placement In addition to the 500.3220, Act, MCL Trade Practices see Uniform 24.13244, 24.13220, statutory procedure 500.3244; for insur- MSA being argued is ance Legislature An even more strict bill cancellation. writing. at this Constitution Fourteenth Amendment of United States provides life, deprive person liberty, property, any "nor shall State process without due of law”. 1, provides: Michigan, In art Const ** * life, property, liberty person deprived "No shall be without due of law.” industry. suspect may 4 I it of the insurance remainder 402 Mich Coleman, Dissenting Opinion J.

ing dangerous judiciary to a free soci- ety, impractical costly it but because it uses a fly”. instance, kill "blunderbuss to a For it creates (in right every dissatisfied motorist 1975 there registered 5.7 were million vehicles drivers) and 6.0 million licensed to obtain a "prompt and effective administrative review” experience insurer. Because this Court lacks the expertise membership within its or the means *96 peculiar Legislature acquiring it, we impact upon cannot assess the financial the cus- (often general taxpayers tomers and the same people). anticipate minimum,

aAt we must for this requirement corps a alone of additional adminis- judges, attorneys sides, trative law for court both reporters quarters, equipment staff, and other other necessities. rights by

Note also that "all accrued individuals against against their insurers or the 'Automobile ” Facility’ Placement order will "remain valid” until the entered, the Court is a so formidable backlog very beginning. already will exist at the any requirement event, In this alone can be taxpayers calculated to raise costs to and raise premium present high costs which even at bargain nationally level are ge.5 for unexcelled covera (the report A recent State Insurance Bureau to the Governor report majority) cited is concluded: paying "No-fault insurance is more benefits to more accident vic- timely any tims in more system manner than other automobile insurance country. per saving in the No-fault is also $45 about million year poten- in insurance costs because of benefit coordination with a savings tial $105 at least million. providing people options "No-fault is collision also more with through self-insuring portions control their insurance rates their coverage. repairing making people only equity by pay It also increases for more * * * repairing average their own car and not car. "Finally, directly responsible no-fault has not for increases been Shavers v Dissenting Opinion Coleman, J. certainly requirements III are Such Part present concept necessary under of constitu- necessary accomplish they Nor tional law. are 2). (see fn the ends of fairness including Perhaps us, com- all of changes panies, act. would like to see some extraordinary judicial tack, Even without changes they place likely to take where should are Legislature. —in the upon imposes may, majority it us

Be as governmental regula- philosophy "the more its broader, tion, I rather the better”. believe perimeters tighter, regulatory are basic than competitive produc- expensive, efficient, more less especially me- fact, tion. In small business — sinking already in a sea of dium-sized business — tape. costly bureaucratic, red crippling trying fly, to kill we While marketplace. dealing to a free a mortal blow impact complete of this deci- cannot We know upon this other business. The sion making have studies and and the Governor been changes hearings holding determine what *97 years after the first five indicated the act usurp sponte experience. We not sua their should functions.

IV greatest summary, separately my ex- In and The rates has been insurance rates. increase in insurance comparable increases in other states —both consistent with rate Also, past Michigan over the tort and insurance rates in no-fault. products years rapidly prices as several the insurance have not increased as addition, purchases. $70 almost In no-fault has saved public system. per year costs tort million from the of a increases, phenomenon, a rate but this is national concerned about independent Bureau, Report A Gover- of no-fault.” Insurance Michigan: and Per- Consumer Attitudes nor: No-Fault Insurance (1978), pp 60-61. formance Mich Dissenting Opinion by Coleman, J. pressed opinion majority concern with the is two- (1) precedent fold: Part III is for our Court to make removing very decisions foundations of our legal process arguments facts, briefs, without knowledge counsel, lower court consideration or (2) parties, of the and in the course of such show of power, precedent blurring it becomes also a for private almost to extinction of the lines between enterprise governmental Indeed, and action. opinion private industry converted a into a func- government tion of the and warned us of more to quite unnecessary come—and all this to the de- sired end.

Although agree I do not with —or even unders arguments require tand6 —some of the other and my deeply ments, concern runs so towards enhanc ing, undermining, freedoms, our and not basic including marketplace, I that of the that have (after briefly having quickly focused read all 6E.g., requirements, Part III sets forth certain 2 of which seems to (a) requires premiums contradict itself. out Subsection Subsection be set "with- regard assertedly warranting premiums”. to factors (b), however, requires differences in a statement of factors which be differentiating premiums among considered the insurer in those (c) requires appropriate insured and each such factor”. "the amount of differential 2(a) requirement premiums Does mean that all for the same (as coverage 2(b) person company)? same as to each to the same Do (c) specified specified specified allow classifications for risks at (a) so, (b) (c)? amounts? If how does correlate with Also, it expected is not clear "shop whether a consumer is among competing companies willing around” greater for one to take a charge premium. risk or provide lesser The words seem to motorist”) anyone ("every aggrieved who feels the first offer can hearing demand a full-scale judge before an administrative law subsequent rights appeal provided by as Proce- Administrative dures Act. expectations purchaser expectations are not at all like person shopping automobile, for the from which these new constitu- (?)rights spring. tional *98 Dissenting Opinion Coleman, J. by references)7 upon opinions other this basic principal opinion. flaw in Therefore, part. part I and concur dissent attempts legitimatize Justice Williams discussion of the due sufficiency process regulatory of the act’s scheme reference in fn 14 argument plaintiff at oral opinion to counsel’s statement his of requesting Appeals Court the briefs filed this Court to utilize inadequate in this or deñcient otherwise issues that were "on added.) no issue before (Emphasis was such reviewing this There court”. "inadequate” “reviewing or "deficient”. court” to be (The concerning act’s only raised below .due issue delegation improper theory regulatory of an based on the scheme was legislative authority. and state action doctrine entitlement of theories used below.) majority today were not issues

Case Details

Case Name: Shavers v. Attorney General
Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court
Date Published: Aug 31, 1978
Citation: 267 N.W.2d 72
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 57931, 57935, 57916, 57934. (Calendar Nos. 14-17)
Court Abbreviation: Mich.
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