JOHNNY TERRELL CLAYTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SCOTT COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 16-1559
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
Filed October 11, 2017
Mark D. Cleve, Judge
Petition for writ of certiorari challenging the denial of a motion to correct illegal sentence. WRIT ANNULLED.
Les M. Blair III of Blair & Fitzsimmons, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli Huser, Assistant Attorney General, for appelleе.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
In September 2010, Johnny Clayton was convicted as a habitual offender of robbery in the second degree, in violation of
In 2016, the General Assembly amended the sentencing statute for robbery in the first or second degree. See 2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1104, § 8. In the prior sentencing scheme, those defendants, like Clayton, convicted of robbery in the first or second degree were required to serve seven tenths, or seventy рercent, of the maximum term of the person‘s sentence before becoming eligible for parole or work release. See
The question presented is a narrow one. Clayton concedes the sentencing amendment is not retroactive. He contends, however, the failure to apply the ameliorative sentencing statute retroactively violates his right to equal protection under the United States and Iowa Constitutions. See
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Article I, section 6
The essential promise of equal protection is that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Racing Ass‘n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2004). “More precisely, ‘the equal protection guarantеe requires that laws treat all those who are similarly situated with respect to the purposes of the law alike.‘” Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 757 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009)). “Although we have ‘generally applied the same analysis to federal and state equal protection claims, [Iowa appellate courts have] not foreclosed the possibility that there may be situations where differences in the scope, import, or purpose of the two provisions warrant divergent analyses.‘” Id. (quoting In re Det. of Hennings, 744 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Iowa 2008)). However, absent an argument to the contrary, we generally decline to apply divergent analyses under the two constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008). Here, Clayton makes no argument for a different standard under the Iowa Constitution.
“The first step in an equal-protection analysis is to determine the appropriate standard of review.” State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 202 (Iowa 2002). “Unless a suspect class or fundamental right is involved, any
Undеr the rational basis test, “[t]he plaintiff has the heavy burden of showing the statute unconstitutional and must negate every reasonable basis upon which the classification may be sustained.” In deference to the legislature, a statute will satisfy the requirements of the equal protection clause
“so long as therе is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”
Although the rational basis test is “deferential to legislative judgment, ‘it is not a toothless one’ in Iowa.” The rational basis test defers to the legislature‘s prerogative to make policy decisions by requiring only a plausible policy justification, mere rationality of the facts underlying the decision and, again, a merely rational relationship between the classification and the policy justification. Nonetheless, the deference built into the rational basis test is not dispositive because this court engages in a meaningful review of all legislation challеnged on equal protection grounds by applying the rational basis test to the facts of each case.
Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 879 (citations omitted).
Clayton does not contend this is a case involving fundamental rights or suspect classification. We therefore proceed under rational-basis review. See also State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1998) (determining consideration of section 902.12 does not implicate a suspect classification),
The “threshold” test in any equal protection analysis is to determine whether the plaintiff is in fact similarly situated to the class of persons receiving differential treatment. See Robbins v. Becker, 794 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir. 2015); Kout, 854 N.W.2d at 708 (“A demonstration that people are similarly situated is a threshold test; failure to make this showing requires no further consideration of the alleged equal protection violation.” (quoting Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882)); see also Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep‘t of Corrs. & Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating “[t]he similarly situated inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated to another group for purposes of the challenged government action“). Clayton argues he, as а person convicted of second-degree robbery prior to July 1, 2016, is similarly situated to any person convicted of second-degree robbery on or after July 1, 2016. As such, he argues, he is entitled to be treated alike under the amendment to section 902.12.
We conclude Clayton is not similarly situated to those persons not-yet convicted of robbery in the first or second degree as of July 1, 2016. His conviction was final on the date the law went into effect. “Our supreme court and the U.S. Supreme Court have both upheld classifications of litigants based on the status of their case—i.e., whether a litigant‘s direct appeal was made final before or after—a change in the law.” Hillman v. State, No. 14-0158, 2015 WL 5278929, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2015). More specifically, our case law recognizes finality as a material distinction between classes of defendants for the purposes of determining whether a change in law should be made retroactive.
Even if Clayton were similarly situated to those convicted of robbery in the first or second degree after July 1, 2016, his equal protection claim would still fail. “The rational basis test defers to the legislature‘s prerogative to make policy decisions by requiring only a plausible policy justification, mere rationality of the facts underlying the decision and, again, a merely rational relationship between the classification and the policy justification.” Id. at 879 (citations omitted). Sentencing is a legislative function. We afford broad deference to the legislature in setting the penalties for criminal conduct and in determining when the penalties are to go into effect. See State v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa 2000) (“Substantial deference is afforded the legislature in setting the pеnalty for crimes.“); State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1973); State v. Stanley, 344 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). There is a strong policy justification for making ameliorative sentencing provisions prospective only. Beyond the administrative and financial burden of resentencing offenders, the State has a strong policy interest both in maintaining the integrity of sentences that were valid when imposed аnd in promoting the finality of sentences. See
Our conclusion there is no equal protection violation here is reinforcеd by persuasive authority. Our sister states conclude equal protection principles do not require ameliorative sentencing provisions to be applied retrospectively. See, e.g., Ex parte Zimmerman, 838 So. 2d 408, 410–11 (Ala. 2002) (“[A] reduction of sentences only prospectively from the date a new sentencing statute takes еffect is not a denial of equal protection” (citing 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 777 (1985))); People v. Morales, 371 P.3d 592, 597 (Cal. 2016) (“[A]mici curiae argue that principles of equal protection mandate treating those resentenced under [amended law] the same as those originally sentenced under [old law]. We disagree. The two situations are different. . . . The purpose behind [the old law] is irrelevant here. Accordingly, persons resentenced under [the amended law] are not situated similarly to those sentenced under [the old law]. . . . Sentencing changes ameliorating punishment need not be given retroactive effect.“); Carter v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Ind. 1987) (holding a defendant sentenced before an amendment goes into effect is not denied equal protection by being sentenced under the statute in place prior to the amendment); Bowen v. Recorder‘s Court Judge, 179 N.W.2d 377, 378 (Mich. 1970) (same); Burch, 994 S.W.2d at 139 (same).
Clayton appears to recognize the lаw has a rational basis but argues application of the law retrospectively would better advance the purposes of the law when compared to prospective application only. Specifically, he contends the law was intended to reduce prison overcrowding and to reduce the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans and extending the law to persons whose convictions were final prior to enactment of the law would better advance these purposes. We reject the claim for three reasons.
First, Clayton‘s claim is merely an assertion unsupported by evidence regarding the purpose of the law or evidence regarding race and incarceration rates for those convicted of robbery in the first or second degree. Second, even assuming there was evidence of a racially disproportiоnate impact, a law that lacks a “racially discriminatory purpose” does not become unconstitutional “solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Here, there was no evidence the legislature acted with discriminatory purpose in choosing to not make this relief available retroactively. The law applies equally to defendants of all races convicted before the effective date of the act. In addition, to the extent Clayton argues the legislature engaged in discrimination in choosing to make the law only prospective,
[t]his theory of discrimination also makes little sense. Is it really possible that the same [legislature] that was deeply concerned about racial justice when looking at future sentences suddenly became racist when contemplating past sentences? That is a heavy lift. A more basic explanation еxists for what [the legislature] did, and for what it failed to do . . . . The government has a powerful interest in avoiding the disruption of final sentences. [The legislature] did nothing extraordinary or for that matter discriminatory when it respected this interest. It was merely sticking to . . . the ordinary practice in . . . sentencing, withholding [a] change from defendants already sentenced.
United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2013). Third, the mere fact that the legislature might not have extended as much relief as possible does not mean the failure to extend such relief makes the law irrational and in violation of the right to equal protection. Legislation is the progeny of the perfect policy and the politically possible. We will not hold legislation unconstitutional merely because it was not perfect. See State v. Mitchell, 757 N.W.2d 431, 438 (Iowa 2008) (“As long as the classificatory scheme chosen by [the legislature] rationally advances a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective, we must disregard the existence of other methods of allocation that we, as individuals, perhaps would have preferred.“).
WRIT ANNULLED.