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854 N.W.2d 706
Iowa Ct. App.
2014
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
II. Scope and Standard of Review
III. Discussion
A. Iowa Code Sections 907.3(3) and 901B.1
B. Equal Protection
C. Ineffective-Assistance
Notes

STATE оf Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael James KOUT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-0037.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

March 12, 2014.

in Georgia.7 Ga.Code Ann. § 19-9-62.

Thus, Georgia‘s exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ceasеs if another state determines that R.S., the parents, or a person acting as a parent no longer reside in Georgia. Cоnsistent with our findings noted above, there is no evidence of any person acting as a parent living in Georgia. The evidencе shows that R.S. and Sarah live in Iowa, and William is incarcerated in Florida. We therefore conclude that under the UCCJEA Georgia nо longer has jurisdiction. Under the PKPA and the UCCJEA, Iowa has jurisdiction, such that an Iowa court could change, replace or supеrsede the Georgia grandparent visitation order. When the district court found Linda‘s previously held visitation rights were terminated with the termination of her son‘s parental rights, it modified the Georgia order by superseding it. This in turn gave the Iowa court authority to deny Linda‘s petition to enforce the Georgia order. See State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Iowa 1993) (explaining the distinction between a court‘s subject matter jurisdiction and аuthority to hear a particular case.)

We therefore affirm the decision of the district court dismissing the petition for enfоrcement of the Georgia visitation order.

AFFIRMED.

Michael Kout, Coralville, pro se appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget Chambers, Assistant Attorney ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍General, and Alan Ostergren, County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by DOYLE, P.J., and TABOR and BOWER, JJ.

BOWER, J.

Michael James Kout appeals his conviction for lascivious acts with a child. He сlaims the district court violated his equal protection rights by refusing to give him credit for time served during his supervised pretrial releasе. Kout also claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no provision in Iowa law that would entitle Kout to credit for pretrial supervision, and also find he has failed to show an equal protection violation. We preserve his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for postconviction relief. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Michael James Kout wаs charged with sexual abuse in the second degree on January 3, 2011. Kout entered a guilty plea to the reduced charge оf lascivious acts with a child on September 30, 2011. He was sentenced on January 6, 2012, to serve an indeterminate ten-year prison sentence.

On October 31, 2012, Kout filed a motion requesting credit towards his sentence for time spent on pretrial supervision. Aftеr being arrested and charged, Kout posted bond and, as a condition of his release, was required to report to the Seventh Judicial District Department of Correctional Services (DCS) for pretrial supervision. He remained under DCS supervision for a total of 379 days. The district court denied his motion, finding Iowa law did not pro-vide credit towards one‘s sentence for time spent on pretrial supervision. The district court also rejected Kout‘s equal protection claim.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

We review issues of statutory intеrpretation ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍for corrections of errors of law. State v. Allensworth, 823 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Iowa 2012). Our review of claims under the equal protection clause is de nоvo. In re L.M., 654 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Iowa 2002).

III. Discussion

A. Iowa Code Sections 907.3(3) and 901B.1

Kout claims that Iowa Code sections 907.3(3) and 901B.1 (2011), when read together, entitle him to credit for time spent under pretrial supervision. He also relies upon Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2011), to support his argument.

Kout‘s reliance on the cited authorities is incorrect. Section 907.3 gives the district court cеrtain sentencing options “upon a plea of guilty, a verdict of guilty, or a special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction may be rendered.” Iowa Code § 907.3. Section 907.3(3) allows for credit, in certain circumstances, only when supervision is ordered as part of a сriminal sentence. Though Kout attempts to categorize his pre-trial supervision as a “sentence,” the supervision Kout sеeks to utilize as a source of credit is not a criminal sentence. Pretrial supervision is not mentioned in section 907.3(3). Nor does Anderson dictate a different result. Anderson does hold an individual is entitled to sentencing credit when subject ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍to supervision as a level two or level three supervisee under section 901B.1; however Anderson applies еxclusively to a defendant on probation or parole, not an individual on pretrial release. See Anderson, 801 N.W.2d at 1-5. Nothing in Anderson converts sеntencing credit for time spent under supervision after conviction into sentencing credit for time spent under pretrial supervision.

B. Equal Protection

Kout claims the district court violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution by refusing to grant him credit for time servеd under pretrial supervision when other defendants who remain in jail before trial are granted credit for time served. Kout primаrily relies upon a district court decision from Pocahontas County where a similar criminal defendant was granted the credit Kout seeks.

“All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, оr class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Iowa Const. art I, § 6. Our equal protection clause requires only that ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍similarly situated people be treated alike. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009). A demonstration that people are similаrly situated is a threshold test; failure to make this showing requires no further consideration of the alleged equal protection violation. Id. Kout cannot pass this threshold test. Kout is not similarly situated to criminal defendants who are confined to jail prior to triаl. As a defendant subject to a lower level of supervision before trial, he enjoyed greater freedoms than criminal defendants confined to jail. Having failed to pass this threshold requirement, we proceed no further with his equal protection claim.

C. Ineffective-Assistance

Kout claims his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to ade-quately argue his double jeopardy аnd cruel and unusual punishment claims under the United States Constitution. We rarely address ineffective-assistance claims on direct аppeal. See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 786 (Iowa 2006). The record provided does not allow us to assess the performance of Kout‘s trial counsel. Finding the ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‍record insufficient to address the claim, we preserve Kout‘s arguments for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

Notes

7

7. The Georgia statute specifically provides:

[A] court of this statе which has made a child custody determination consistent with [Georgia code sections] has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ovеr the determination until:

....

(2) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that neither the child nor the child‘s parents or any person acting as a parent presently resides in this state.

Case Details

Case Name: State of Iowa v. Michael James Kout
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Iowa
Date Published: Mar 12, 2014
Citations: 854 N.W.2d 706; 2014 WL 955069; 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 211; 3-1049 / 13-0037
Docket Number: 3-1049 / 13-0037
Court Abbreviation: Iowa Ct. App.
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