John RUSSELL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Alison LUNDERGAN-GRIMES, Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 14-6262
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: March 3, 2015. Decided and Filed: April 28, 2015.
784 F.3d 1037
Before: BATCHELDER, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.
This case requires the balancing of First Amendment rights with the right to cast a ballot that is both tabulated and undiluted. Those voting rights are achieved by safeguarding the integrity of the ballot box against fraud, intimidation, and other degradations of the electoral process. Plaintiffs John Russell and Campbell County Auto Body, Inc. (collectively “Russell“) brought suit under
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Kentucky statute challenged here provides in relevant part, and with various qualifying provisions not relevant here:
No person shall electioneer at the polling place on the day of any election, as established in
KRS 118.025 , within a distance of three hundred (300) feet of any entrance to a building in which a voting machine is located. . . . Electioneering shall include the displaying of signs, the distribution of campaign literature, cards, or handbills, the soliciting of signatures to any petition, or the solicitation of votes for or against any bona fide candidate or ballot question in a manner which expressly advocates the passage or defeat of the ballot question, but shall not include exit polling or other exceptions established by the State Board of Elections through the promulgation of administrative regulations.
John Russell is president and an owner of Campbell County Auto Body, Inc. Auto Body‘s property is approximately 150 feet from a polling location in Cold Spring,
Russell brought this action under
Russell filed his original complaint on June 16, 2014, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The state defendants filed two motions to dismiss, one for Conway under
Kentucky brought an emergency appeal to this court. Consistent with the Supreme Court‘s clear instruction, we have held that “last-minute injunctions changing election procedures are strongly disfavored.” Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir.2012) (per curiam). Accordingly, on October 17, 2014, we partially stayed the district court‘s order, thus ensuring that Kentucky would have some buffer-zone law in place
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a motion to dismiss invoking
III. ANALYSIS
We must address four constitutional issues in this case, two pertaining to our ability to hear the case, one on the merits of the free-speech claim, and one on the scope of injunctive relief.
A.
All of the defendants who bring this appeal are statewide officials, and all argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against them. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the Eleventh Amendment bars on jurisdictional grounds this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against any of them, and if so, whether we have Article III authority to decide this case. The State squarely raises this issue as a jurisdictional defect that is the State‘s first line of defense, so we must decide it. If any one officer is shielded by the Eleventh Amendment, that individual defendant must be dismissed from the case. If all Defendants are protected by the Eleventh Amendment here, then while Russell‘s judicially cognizable injury is fairly traceable to Defendants, we would nonetheless lack the power to remedy the injury through a favorable ruling, in which event we would be required to order the district court to dismiss the entire suit for want of jurisdiction.
The circuits are split on whether the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar. See Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 473-77 (6th Cir.2006). While the Eleventh Amendment‘s language is “strikingly simi-
1.
The Eleventh Amendment provides, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official‘s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep‘t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). It is a suit against the State itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985). The Eleventh Amendment bars many such suits. Will, 491 U.S. at 66. However, there is an exception to States’ sovereign immunity under the doctrine announced in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), whereby “a suit challenging the constitu-
The clearest answer is for Attorney General Conway, who has “jurisdiction, concurrent with that of county and Commonwealth attorneys, to investigate and prosecute violations of the election laws.”
It is a closer question for the remaining statewide defendants, but the answer remains the same. Young does not reach state officials who lack a “special relation to the particular statute” and “[are] not expressly directed to see to its enforcement.” Id. at 157. And it requires more than a bare connection to administering a statute. “Holding that a state official‘s obligation to execute the laws is a sufficient connection to the enforcement of a challenged statute would extend Young beyond what the Supreme Court has intended and held.” Children‘s Healthcare, 92 F.3d at 1416.
This case is unlike Children‘s Healthcare, where we specifically noted that:
this action also does not fall within the Young exception, because the plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional statute. Instead, the plaintiffs in effect pray that the federal courts permit a broader enforcement of certain statutes by striking down those provisions of the statutes which prevent their enforcement with respect to persons against whom the plaintiffs believe enforcement is proper. This would turn Young inside out.
Id. Here, we have the opposite situation—a much more common situation—of a plaintiff seeking to enjoin enforcement of a statute that he claims violates the First Amendment. While the challengers in
“General authority to enforce the laws of the state is not sufficient to make government officials the proper parties to litigation challenging the law.” 1st Westco Corp. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 6 F.3d 108, 113 (3rd Cir.1993). “Consistent with the Young requirement of action on the part of the state official, we note that the phrase ‘some connection with the enforcement of the act’ does not diminish the requirement that the official threaten and be about to commence proceedings.” Children‘s Healthcare, 92 F.3d at 1416. These precedents do not foreclose injunctive relief here. Enjoining a statewide official under Young based on his obligation to enforce a law is appropriate when there is a realistic possibility the official will take legal or administrative actions against the plaintiff‘s interests. Cf. id.; 1st Westco, 6 F.3d at 114.
That is the case here. The Secretary of State and members of the State Board of Elections are empowered with expansive authority to “administer the election laws of the state . . . [and] may adopt administrative regulations necessary to properly carry out its duties.”
KSBE—of which Secretary Grimes is the Chair—is busily engaged in administering Kentucky‘s election laws, including
”Young‘s applicability has been tailored to conform as precisely as possible to those specific situations in which it is necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to the supreme authority of the United States.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is such a situation. Kentucky‘s Attorney General, Secretary of State, and State Board members are all subject to suit here under Ex parte Young‘s exception to Kentucky‘s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
2.
Denying Defendants’ claims of Eleventh Amendment immunity also confirms our jurisdiction to adjudicate this case. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution. . . .”
The Kentucky Attorney General has concurrent jurisdiction with county prosecutors to prosecute violations of
Russell satisfies Article III‘s requirements with regards to Conway. Russell cites Conway‘s role in enforcing election laws, and that he fears prosecution. This “fear of prosecution” is sufficient to confer standing when it is “reasonably founded in fact.” Planned Parenthood Ass‘n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1395 (6th Cir.1987). Furthermore, “past enforcement [of a statute] against the same conduct is good evidence that the threat of enforcement is not chimerical,” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2345 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), especially where the agency tasked with enforcing the statute receives complaints on a relatively frequent basis. Given Defendants’ historical conduct, there is certainly a credible threat that Russell could be prosecuted under the statute. After the bench tri-
B.
We turn now to the merits. Two cases control our analysis here: the Supreme Court‘s decision upholding a 100-foot buffer zone in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), and our subsequent decision invalidating a Kentucky statute creating a 500-foot buffer zone in Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir.2004). The Kentucky statute before us today, mandating a 300-foot buffer zone, was enacted as the successor to the one we invalidated in 2004.
The First Amendment commands, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”
In Anderson we held that Burson imposed a “modified burden of proof” on the State, which is “an important component of the Burson analysis, for it stands as the Supreme Court‘s recognition of the deference due to the states in our federal system of government.” Anderson, 356 F.3d at 656. The Constitution entrusts to the States the primary role in carrying out elections. See
The states’ ability to conduct elections—particularly for state officers—should not be usurped or interfered with by the federal courts absent a clear violation of the United States Constitution. By modifying the burden, the Burson Court recognized that states are uniquely equipped to manage their own elections. . . .
Anderson, 356 F.3d at 656. When we apply strict scrutiny in this context, we therefore will hold that a state law satisfies strict scrutiny‘s narrow-tailoring prong “provided that the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights.” Burson, 504 U.S. at 209 (plurality opinion) (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1.
There is no question that the State has compelling interests here. The Supreme Court held that “some restricted zone [for political speech] is necessary in order to serve the States’ compelling interests in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud.” Id. at 206. “The real question then is how large a restricted zone is permissible or sufficiently tailored.” Id. at 208. In Burson, a fractured Court cautiously upheld a 100-foot radius buffer-zone after balancing the need to respect free speech with the need to prevent voter fraud and intimidation. Justice Blackmun‘s plurality opinion recounted various problems that have plagued the balloting process over time, especially in the early years of the Republic, leading to the secret-ballot process with voter privacy that prevails today. See id. at 200–02. The Court sought to protect free speech on one hand, while preventing speech from being used as a means to effectuate fraud or intimidation. “Given the conflict between these [competing priorities], we hold that requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling places does not constitute an unconstitutional compromise.” Id. at 211.
In Anderson we faced a functionally identical buffer zone, except that the radius was 500 feet. Anderson, 356 F.3d at 651. We explicitly recognized that Burson had held that such statutes balance the tension between the two compelling interests of facilitating the franchise while preserving ballot-box integrity. Id. at 656–57. We invalidated Kentucky‘s statute because (1) “the statute is overbroad in that it prohibits speech over too much geography,” and (2) “absent a narrowing construction it prohibits more speech than is necessary to meet the State‘s protected interest.” Id. at 666. Noting that Burson was silent on whether buffer zones could forbid political speech on a citizen‘s private property, we held that the First Amendment requires that private property must be exempted from the no-speech zone. Id. at 662. The parties agree that no narrowing construction is possible for this statute, so if
The First Amendment is “[p]remised on mistrust of government power.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. Concerning speech, “a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Political speech “concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). In the context of elections, “it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361. Indeed, “the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). The right against voter intimidation is the right to cast a ballot free from threats or coercion; it is not the right to cast a vote free from distraction or opposing voices.
Burson created a 100-foot-radius safe harbor, one that we held in
Buffer zones arise from States’ attempting to minimize the interference voters face in exercising the franchise. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 210. Our holding in Anderson invalidating oversized buffer zones is further buttressed—and the State‘s task in justifying large no-speech zones is made more difficult—by the Supreme Court‘s subsequent decisions that suggest citizens should be expected to overcome minimal obstacles when voting. Prior to Burson, the Court recognized as a countervailing compelling interest that a State “indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.” Eu, 489 U.S. at 231. In 2008, the Court again recognized this interest, upholding voter-identification requirements as a permissible burden that does not violate voting rights. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (plurality opinion). The Court‘s approach in Crawford—consistent with prior cases—recognizes that the fundamental right of a citizen voter to cast a ballot is accompanied by a concomitant right for each voter not to have his vote sullied by illegal activity. This explains why the Court has repeatedly “upheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n. 9 (1983). Crawford reasoned that the Constitution is not offended by a voter-ID law that “imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights,” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 (plurality opinion), suggesting that citizens cannot demand as a constitutional entitlement an environment in which fulfilling this civic duty is effortless. The right against election fraud—or similar degradations of the integrity of the electoral process—carries the implication that the State may adopt appropriate measures to prevent such fraud, buffer zones being among those measures.
When applying strict scrutiny outside the context of conducting elections, courts generally require a “strong basis in evidence” to support the State‘s theory. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2423 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (examining the use of racial prefer-
[e]lections vary from year to year, and place to place. It is therefore difficult to make specific findings about the effects of a voting regulation. . . . Thus, requiring proof that [a certain radius] is perfectly tailored . . . “would necessitate that a State‘s political system sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take corrective action.”
Burson, 504 U.S. at 209 (quoting Munro, 479 U.S. at 195). So while the highest level of scrutiny is still applicable, the State‘s evidentiary burden is relaxed, and is limited to evidence demonstrating that the strictures of the law are “reasonable” and do not “significantly impinge” on First Amendment rights. Id.
2.
We cannot find that the State carried even this relaxed burden in its effort to demonstrate that the 300-foot buffer zone withstands strict scrutiny. There are compelling interests at stake in safeguarding the integrity of the polling booth, and the Supreme Court has held that a 100-foot radius is constitutionally permissible to achieve the State‘s compelling interests. But Kentucky presented no persuasive argument as to why Burson‘s safe harbor is insufficient, and instead a 300-foot radius is required to prevent fraud and intimidation. Kentucky did not present any evidence—or even a non-evidentiary policy argument—to the district court justifying a no-speech zone nine times larger than the one previously authorized by the Supreme Court, and offers no well-reasoned argument to our court, either. Indeed, we note that the 300-foot radius of
The trial court invalidated
C.
Finally, we must decide whether to invalidate
But the First Amendment rule is different under the overbreadth doctrine. That doctrine gives rise to “a type of facial challenge in the First Amendment context under which a law may be overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute‘s plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n. 6 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts invalidate such statutes in their entirety to prevent a “chilling effect,” whereby speakers self-censor protected speech to avoid the danger of possible prosecution. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19 (2003) (discussing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)). Consequently, because it impairs a substantial amount of speech beyond what is required to achieve acceptable objectives, “a statute which chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial invalidity has been demonstrated.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336.
We have held that
This statute is now overbroad in at least two respects. First, Anderson held that it is requisite that a buffer-zone law exempts speech occurring on private property, Anderson, 356 F.3d at 662—which Kentucky‘s former 500-foot statute did, id., but this statute curiously does not—and thus prohibits political speech in a greater physical area than the First Amendment allows. And second, on public property that would otherwise be some species of public forum,
IV. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar this suit against Defendants here, so we have Article III jurisdiction to decide this case.
