John Russell v. Allison Lundergan-Grimes
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6977
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Plaintiff John Russell (and his business) placed and displayed political signs on business property ~150 feet from a Cold Spring, KY polling place; deputies removed signs on prior Election Days under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 117.235(3).
- § 117.235(3) creates a 300-foot no-electioneering buffer from any entrance to a building housing voting machines; the State Board of Elections has a narrow administrative exception for temporary bumper stickers.
- Russell sued state election officials and the Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the statute violates the First Amendment (facial and as-applied).
- The district court denied motions to dismiss, held a bench trial, found the statute unconstitutional, and entered a permanent injunction; this Court granted expedited appeal and a partial stay for the 2014 election.
- The Sixth Circuit considered threshold jurisdictional issues (Eleventh Amendment and Article III standing) and the merits under the Supreme Court’s Burson framework and this Court’s prior Anderson decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Eleventh Amendment bars suit against state officials | Russell: Ex parte Young allows injunctive relief; officials have enforcement connection | Defendants: Sovereign immunity shields official-capacity suits | Held: Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit; Ex parte Young applies to AG, Secretary of State, and State Board officials |
| Article III standing for pre-enforcement challenge | Russell: credible, imminent threat of prosecution based on past removals and AG authority | Defendants: no concrete threat; jurisdiction lacking | Held: Russell has Article III standing (fear of prosecution reasonably founded; past enforcement supports threat) |
| Whether §117.235(3) satisfies First Amendment strict scrutiny (narrow tailoring) | Russell: 300-ft zone is overbroad and not narrowly tailored; bans speech on private and public property | State: compelling interest in preventing fraud/intimidation justifies buffer; deference to election regulation | Held: Statute fails Burson/Anderson narrow-tailoring requirement; State offered no adequate justification for zone larger than Burson’s 100-ft safe harbor |
| Whether statute is facially invalid / overbroad | Russell: statute chills substantial protected political speech across area and on private property | State: statute is a permissible, viewpoint-neutral election regulation | Held: Statute is facially invalid as overbroad (prohibits substantially more speech than necessary and fails private-property exemption requirement) |
Key Cases Cited
- Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding 100-foot polling-place buffer as balancing free speech and preventing voter intimidation)
- Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004) (invalidating a 500-foot Kentucky buffer and requiring private-property exemption)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permits injunctive suits against state officials for prospective relief to stop ongoing constitutional violations)
- Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (official-capacity suits are suits against the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes)
- Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (pre-enforcement First Amendment challenges permitted where threat of prosecution is credible)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) (past enforcement supports a credible threat of future enforcement for standing)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (political speech restrictions subject to strict scrutiny)
- Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (recognizing burdens on voting may be permissible when not severe and when protecting election integrity)
