JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, JOHN DOE 3 AND JANE DOE 1, Aрpellees v. FRANKLIN COUNTY, FRANKLIN COUNTY SHERIFF‘S OFFICE, FRANKLIN COUNTY SHERIFF DANE ANTHONY AND EMPLOYEE JOHN/JANE DOES, Appellants
No. 120 MAP 2016
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
November 22, 2017
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ. ARGUED: May 10, 2017
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY DECIDED: November 22, 2017
We granted discretionary review to determine whether the General Assembly abrogated high public official immunity when it enacted Section 6111(i) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act (UFA),
Before explaining the factual background of this matter, we set forth the relevant statutory framework. Section 6111 of the UFA governs the sale or transfer of firearms generally, and subsection (i) of the statute relates specifically to the confidentiality of information provided by a potential purchaser or transferee who seeks to purchase, receive, or apply to carry a firearm. Section 6111(i) provides:
(i) Confidentiality. — All information provided by the potential purchaser, transferee or applicant, including, but not limited to, the potential purchaser, transferee or applicant‘s name or identity, furnished by a potential purchaser or transferee under this section
or any applicant for a license to carry a firearm as provided by section 6109 shall be confidential and not subject to public disclosure. In addition to any other sanction or penalty imposed by this chapter, any person, licensed dealer, State or local governmental agency or department that violates this subsection shall be liable in civil damages in the amount of $1,000 per occurrence or three times the actual damages incurred as a result of the violation, whichever is greater, as well as reasonable attorney fees.
Appellees John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3 and Jane Doe 1 are adult individuals residing in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, who each applied for a license to carry a firearm (LTCF) by submitting an application to the Franklin Cоunty Sheriff‘s Department. Subsequently, appellees filed the underlying eight-count class action complaint against Franklin County (the County), the Franklin County Sheriff‘s Office (the Sheriff‘s Office), Sheriff Dane Anthony (Sheriff Anthony) (collectively, appellants), claiming, inter alia, violations of the confidentiality provision of Section 6111(i) and seeking damages.3 Appellees alleged they
Central to this appeal is Count III of the Complaint, in which appellees specifically alleged Sheriff Anthony, in his management and leadership of the Sheriff‘s Office, “instituted and directed the disclosure of confidential LTCF application information to the public, employees of the County and Sheriff‘s Office not authorized under the UFA, [USPS] employees and other third parties at the same address who use the same mailbox as the LTCF applicant in violation of
The trial court sustained most of the preliminary objections and dismissed the entire complaint.6 Relevant to this appeal,
In reaching its conclusion, the trial court considered whether the language in Section 6111(i) of the UFA somehow annulled the application of high public official immunity. Appellees argued Section 6111(i) permits a cause of action against any “person,” and the sheriff, who is responsible for issuing LTCF licenses under the UFA, is a “person” and thus not immune from liability. However, the court held it was “not prepared to deny Sheriff Anthony the absolute immunity the common law of Pennsylvania affords to high public officials.” Trial Court Op. at 7. The trial court further opined that had the legislature intended to eliminate high public official immunity in Section 6111(i), it could have done so “in language that was clear, specific and unequivocal.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court sustained the demurrer to Count III against Sheriff Anthony, ruling he was shielded from liability by high public official immunity.
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the matter fоr further proceedings. Doe v. Franklin Cty, 139 A.3d 296, 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Relevant to this appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court‘s dismissal of Count III of the complaint against Sheriff
The Commonwealth Court next provided a background of high public official immunity, acknowledging it applies not only to statements by protected individuals but also to their actions. Id. at 313-14, citing Lindner v. Mollan, 677 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 1996) (immunity applied as defense to claims of slander and libel); Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68, 69 (Pa. 2005) (“[i]t has long been held that high public officials are immune from suits seeking damages for actions taken or statements made in the course of their official duties.“); Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall, 877 A.2d 560, 567 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (acknowledging doctrine of high public official immunity applies to actions by public officials, not just statements). The court then observed that although high public officials may ordinarily enjoy immunity, the Pennsylvania Constitution at Article I, Section 11, permits the General Assembly to establish a cause of action otherwise barred at common law. Id. at 314, quoting
The Commonwealth Court then engaged in a statutory construction analysis of Section 6111(i) to determine whether the General Assembly intended high public officials to be immune from liability arising from violations of it. Examining the language of Section 6111(i), specifically its provision that “any person, licensed dealer, State or local governmental agency or department that violates this subsection shall be liable in civil damages,” the court found the General Assembly “explicitly provided for limited liability for a violation of” Section 6111(i). Id. The Commonwealth Court concluded the term “local government agency” as used in the statute to describe those who might be held liable for violating the UFA includes county sheriffs as defined
Appellants filed a petition for allowance of appeal and we granted review, limited to the discrete issue of “[w]hether the General Assembly intended to abrogate high public official immunity when it enacted
In seeking reversal of the Commonwealth Court‘s decision and arguing Sheriff Anthony is protected from suit by high public official immunity, appellants note the Commonwealth Court acted contrary to precedent in creating an exception to the absolute immunity historically applied to high public officials. Appellants claim the Commonwealth Court‘s denial of immunity is the equivalent of a punishment аgainst sheriffs who are acting in good faith in their official duties, and will consequently expose sheriffs across the Commonwealth to liability for actions taken in good faith.
Appellants specifically argue high public official immunity applies equally to actions and speech of public officials, and thus is not limited to defamation claims, despite appellees’ assertions to the contrary. Appellants further argue high public official immunity is unlimited, acting to exempt a high public official from all civil suits for damages arising out of official business, and thus precludes liability under Section 6111(i). Appellants’ Brief at 17, quoting Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1195 (“Absolute immunity ‘exempts a high public official from all suits for damages,’ even for ‘statements or actions motivated by malice.‘“). Appellants further submit it is undisputed that Sheriff Anthony qualifies as a high public official and, as such, the immunity should protect him from appellees’ allegations that he violated Section 6111(i) of thе
Appellants further argue this Court has reinforced high public official immunity, holding the General Assembly did not abrogate it by enacting the Tort Claims Act, and an employee of a local government agency can be held liable pursuant to the Torts Claim Act only in cases of willful misconduct, or when that employee does not qualify as a high рublic official. See Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1197 (noting employees of local governmental agencies are subject to liability only when they do not qualify as “high public officials” or in cases of willful misconduct). Appellants submit the immunity may not be waived by implication and yet this is precisely how the Commonwealth Court found waiver in Section 6111(i).
Appellants further reject the general proposition advanced by appellees that immunity has been abolished since the 1970s, and explain that when this Court purported to abolish immunity in case law, the General Assembly acted affirmatively to reinstate it legislatively. See generally Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 878-881 (Pa. 1973), superseded by statute as recognized by Dorsey, 96 A.3d 332; Mayle v. Pa. Dep‘t of Highways, 388 A.2d 709, 720 (Pa. 1978), superseded by statute as recognized by Kapil v. Assoc. of Pa. State College & Univ. Faculties, 470 A.2d 482 (Pa. 1983). The Commonwealth, as amicus in support of appellants, observes high public official immunity was rooted in the common law, but also has a statutory basis, and remains in place except where the General Assembly expressly waives it. Commonwealth‘s Amicus Brief at 4, citing
Appellants further note legislative history regarding the enactment of Section 6111(i) indicates the General Assembly never discussed the civil liability portion of the statute, and accordingly, there is nothing in that history to support a finding that the General Assembly intended to abrogate high public official immunity. Appellants’ Briеf at 22. Thus, appellants argue a determination that Section 6111(i) abrogated immunity is essentially a holding the General Assembly did so sub silentio, which is contrary to this Court‘s precedent as well as statutory law. Id. at 22-23, citing Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1196 (noting this Court “has never called into question, much less overruled” high public official
Finally, appellants question the Commonwealth Court‘s reliance on Gardner, which predated by nearly a decade the enactment of Section 6111(i), and сhallenge the court‘s reliance on Hidden Creek, noting that case did not address the UFA, but rather considered whether the Tort Claims Act bars statutory actions under the Municipality Authorities Act; the Hidden Creek court did not decide whether any statutory cause of action abrogates absolute immunity otherwise provided to high public officials. Appellants’ Brief at 24.
The Pennsylvania Sheriffs’ Association (the Association) also filed an amicus brief in support of appellants. The Association echoes appellants’ argument our courts have long recognized and upheld the absolute nature of high public official immunity. Association‘s Amicus Brief at 5-7. The Association observes that when the General Assembly intends to waive immunity, such waiver must be specifically authorized by statute. See id. at 8, citing Yakowicz v. McDermott, 548 A.2d 1330, 1333 (Pa. Cmwlth 1988), citing
Appellees respond first by insisting that high public official immunity was completely abolished in the 1970s. Appellees’ Brief at 2-4, citing Ayala; Mayle. Appellees then claim the Commonwealth Court correctly held high public official immunity is inapplicable to actions brought under Section 6111(i) because: (1) the immunity only applies to cases involving defamation, and should not be extended to the tort created by the statute; and (2) Section 6111(i) provides a right to sue a sheriff as a “person” or “local government agency” who discloses confidential LTCF information. Appellees note, in the event high public official immunity applies to matters beyond defamation, the immunity is limited to situations where the official is “acting in furtherance of some interest of social importance.” id. at 6-7, quoting Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 140 A.2d 100, 102 (Pa. 1958) (emphasis omitted). Appellees argue the alleged violations of Section 6111(i) involved here did not take place in furtherance of any important social purpose, and instead were actually injurious to the public, as demonstrated by
Appellees also claim that even if Sheriff Anthony was acting in furtherance of some matter of social import, high public official immunity was specifically abrogated by the General Assembly when it included the words “any person” and “local governmental agency” as entities that could be held liable for violations of Section 6111(i). Id. at 8-9. Appellees echo the reasoning of the Commonwealth Court and argue the Sheriff should be considered a “local governmental agency” as defined in
Finally, appellees argue
We consider the parties’ arguments in light of our scope and standard of review in this appeal from the Commonwealth Court‘s decision reversing the trial court‘s order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. The issue presents pure questions of law over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 241 (Pa. 2017); Dorsey 96 A.3d at 337. A court may sustain preliminary objections only when it is clear and free from doubt the plaintiff will be unable to establish a right to relief, even when the court accepts as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every inference that is fairly deducible from those facts. Mazur v. Trinity Area School Dist., 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008).
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that appellees could not establish a claim for liability under Section 6111(i) against Sheriff Anthony — even if the allegations that he improperly sent confidential
Specifically, “absolute immunity from civil liability for high public officials is the only legitimate ‘means of removing any inhibition which might deprive the public of the best service of its officers and agencies.‘” Id. at 1196, quoting Montgomery, 140 A.2d at 103. Thus, the principle of high public official immunity, while serving a unique role in protecting public officials while acting in their official capacity on behalf of the public, is grounded in the same genеral, overarching principle of immunity for the public good, as derived from the English concept of sovereign immunity. Cf. Zauflik v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 104 A.3d 1096, 1110 (Pa. 2014). The scope of common law immunity, including high public official immunity, is very broad:
Absolute privilege, as its name implies, is unlimited and exempts a high public official from all civil suits for damages arising out of false defamatory statements and even from statements or actions motivated by malice, provided the statements are made or the actions are taken in the course of the official‘s duties or powers and within the scope of his authority, or as it is sometimes expressed, within his jurisdiction . . .
Durham, 772 A.2d at 69, quoting Matson, 88 A.2d at 895 (emphasis in original). “This Court has never called into question, much less overruled, the common law doctrine of absolute privilege for high public officials.” Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1196. In fact, the privilege of immunity has consistently been upheld and was specifically found not to have been abrogated by the legislature. Durham, 772 A.2d at 69, citing Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1196 (noting doctrine of tort immunity existed prior to the enactment of the Tort Claims Act, which did not abrogate the immunity).
Further, with respect to high public official immunity specifically, in Lindner, supra, this Court unequivocally dismissed a similar argument that the absolute privilege of high public official immunity was abrogated by the terms and definitions in the Tort Claims Act, noting such interpretation would result in an “irrational disparity . . . in the immunities for Commonwealth and local agency employees.” Lindner, 677 A.2d at 1196. In fact, “[t]his Court has never called into question, much less overruled, the common law doctrine of absolute privilege for high public officials.” Id. In addition, the General Assembly expressed its intent to preserve official immunity for local agency employees when it enacted
With respect to appellee‘s second challenge to the application of high public official immunity, the immunity is an absolute privilege broadly applied to actions as well as speech “exempt[ing] a high public official from all civil suits for damages arising
Further, we have also consistently held that where the General Assembly intends to provide exceptions to immunity, such exceptions must be specifically and explicitly expressed. Cf. Zauflik, 104 A.3d at 1127, citing
Questions pertaining to statutory waivers of common law immunity are “legislative in nature,” and as we consider the ramifications of Section 6111(i), we note “the objective of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” Dorsey, 96 A.3d at 340, citing
Section 6111(i) of the UFA creates civil liability for breaches of confidentiality by “any person, licensed dealer, State or local governmental agency or department.” However, Section 6111(i) does not specifically include in this list of potential defendants the term “sheriff.” Notably, the UFA does not define the terms “person” or “State or local government agency,” but the UFA does define “sheriff.”
Appellees assert Sheriff Anthony‘s immunity from liability under Sectiоn 6111(i) was abrogated by the General Assembly because he qualifies either as a “person” or a “local governmental agency.” In addition, the Commonwealth Court concluded Sheriff Anthony could be held liable under the statute as a “local government agency.” However, our careful review of Section 6111(i) along with the UFA‘s definitions and UFA as a whole does not support a finding that the General Assembly specifically intended to abrogate the high public official immunity of sheriffs when it stated that “persons” and “local governmental agencies” generally may be held liable for violations of Section 6111(i).
As stated, although the UFA does not define “person,” the term “person” is used throughout Section 6111, and when viewed in that context, the term refers to, inter alia, individuals who are not licensed dealers, manufacturers or importers engaging in the sale or transfer of firearms. See, e.g.,
Moreover, even the Commonwealth Court correctly acknowledged that Section 6111(i) does not explicitly include the term “sheriff” in the list of potential defendants, before ultimately concluding sheriffs are implicitly encompassed in the term “local government agencies.” Doe, 139 A.3d at 314. The court noted sheriffs are county officers as provided in Article IX, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but then stated it had determined in Gardner the term “government agency” includes sheriffs. Id., at 314-15, citing Gardner, 541 A.2d at 408.
A careful reading of Gardner — which involved an earlier version of the UFA that predated Section 6111(i) — reveals the
We reject the Commonwealth Court‘s expansion of its reasoning in Gardner to determine the General Assembly implicitly abrogated Sheriff Anthony‘s immunity as a high public official by including “local governmеnt agencies” as potential defendants in civil suits arising out of violations of Section 6111(i). First, as stated, the definition of “government agency” relied on by the Commonwealth Court is found in Title 2, and such definitions are expressly limited to application within Title 2.
Furthermore, in interpreting section 6111(i), we are mindful that we may find immunity waived only where waiver is expressly stated, and we must construe еxceptions to immunity strictly. Cf. Zauflik, 72 A.3d at 797 (noting “governmental immunity is an absolute defense” not subject to any exception “beyond th[os]e exceptions granted by the legislature“); Dean, 751 A.2d at 1132 (exceptions to immunity are strictly construed). For example, in Hidden Creek, the defendant municipal authority sought immunity under the Tort Claims Act from a complaint asserting excessive sewer tapping fees. 129 A.3d at 610. The Commonwealth Court correctly determined the General Assembly expressly waived immunity for lawsuits arising out of improper tapping fees by
The statute included clear and unequivocal language waiving governmental immunity and providing an explicit statutory basis for suit specifically against the authority.
The General Assembly did not providе such a clear and unequivocal basis for suit specifically against the sheriff when it enacted Section 6111(i) of the UFA. As the General Assembly defined “sheriff” in the UFA, it could have used that specific term in the statute to target sheriffs for liability if the intention was to abrogate their otherwise applicable immunity. This is particularly so where the UFA specifies that the sheriff is the official in charge of processing LTCF applications.
We therefore hold the General Assembly did not specifically and intentionally abrogate high public official immunity such that Sheriff Anthony may be held liable pursuant to Section 6111(i). We further hold the Commonwealth Court erred in its decision to the contrary, which necessarily involved a finding of implicit abrogation that is not supported in the law. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court and remand for reinstatement of the trial court‘s order sustaining the preliminary objection dismissing Count III of the Complaint against Sheriff Anthony.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Baer, Todd, Donohue, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.