Matson v. Margiotti

rulе burden of ruling long our established pres- is it to sustain the possible proof legitimacy, and the In of our decisions prior claim. the light ent therein for years, announced salutary principles incomprehensible. claim is of this allowance dissenting joins Musmanno Mr. Justice opinion. Margiotti. Appellant,

Matson, March 1952. Before Argued Drew, C. J., Bell JJ. Stearne, Jones, Chidsey, Hanson Marjorie Matson, in propria appellant, persona.

Robert L. Kunzig, Deputy Attorney with General, E. him Robert Woodside, Attorney General & Margiotti Gasey, for appellee.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Bell, May 1952: complaint Plaintiff filed a the basis of her libel, letter action written being Margiotti Charles J. Attorney General the Commonwealth Pennsyl- to William S. vania, District Rahauser, letter written upon This County. Allegheny of Penn- of the Attorney General stationery “Common- said letter on heading being, sylvania, Attorney General, Office of the of Pennsylvania, wealth The letter Harrisburg.” follows:

“January 5, Esquire, Rahauser, S. “William County, Allegheny District Pennsylvania. Pittsburgh, Bill:

Dear conducted investigation of an As a result fol- I have ascertained Police, State Pennsylvania an Matson, Hanson regard Marjory lowing facts on staff: your assistant district attorney Univer- at Matson was a student 1. While Mrs. reputation had the she Pittsburgh School, of Law sity tend- Communistic her fellow-students having among school I am informed that attended reliably she encies. was one League Communist and that she at the Young Mac- demonstrators against of the principal to deliver Pittsburgh Arthur when he came to Pittsburgh University at the commencement address in 1932. is Execu I that Mrs. Matson

2. am informed on and was one Friendship Board of American-Soviet tive Party, of the Citizens organizers Progressive of the you and which as is Progressive Party, which now to which undertook recall organization was may of Public Education force Board of the City to it to use school auditorium Pittsburgh permit a high in for its This matter was meeting. litigated in United States District Court its Pittsburgh, Court Party stated that opinion Progressive a Communist Organisation.* was

* throughout, Italics ours. undertook Mrs. Matson no doubt that There is County Court in the act for Bernard Salis as Counsel appeal for violation of Salis on an from a conviction forbidding passing out McKeesport of a ordinance permit. literature which literature without a signed by distributing Communist Salis was Party Pennsylvania. Matson Western Mrs. requested by you. She claims from the case to withdraw representing she was Liberties Union the American Civil appearing on behalf of Salis. 4. I am in the also Matson sat informed that Mrs. defending courtroom with who was Nathan counsel, Highland Alberts in the Park Biot Case. Alberts Secretary Pittsburgh Branch of the Communist Party inciting and was convicted of riot; recently Superior his conviction was sustained My Judge Court. Montgomery information is that spoke you to this reference conduct of Mrs. requested Matson and she was then court- leave the room. August

In5. the Post Gazette of the fol- 6, 1948, lowing appears: Pittsburgh Chapter

‘The Civil American Liberties Union, a letter to has President Truman, protested prosecution leading of 12 Communists “for holding opinions committing beliefs and rather than period overt acts.” near-hysteria, “Even admittedly this placed upon no is, restrictions should be competition market-place public of idеas in the opinion,” Marjorie Mrs. Hanson Matson wrote the representative President. Mrs. local ACLU Matson, an attorney, assistant point district was careful out organization that her bars Communists, Bundists and supporters dictatorships other serving from in its high offices! follow- associated has been Matson

6. Mrs. activities: ing Friendship

American-Soviet Citizens Party- Progressive Executive Board in Grant ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‍Speaker Principal Organizer Women’s Bally Street Light Strike

Duquesne Dr.& Havde Bryngold associated with Closely Hathaway. Marion to Mrs. regards other information with

We have activities. communistic Matson’s brought been already have of these matters Some and head of As your attention. Penn- Commonwealth of Justice of the Department that Mrs. I letter to demand sylvania am writing Assistant as position dismissed her Matson be appears it Allegheny County, District render her obvious that her Communistic associations ob- unfit to hold this Her future retention position. justice security structs and becomes to the dangerous our people Pennsylvania.

I informa- am this demand on the basis of making Pennsylvania tion me Police. furnished State Sincerely yours, Charles J. (signed) Margiotti, General.” complaint averred the statements were made by false and were the defendant wickedly and that the libelous communication maliciously; Plaintiff newspapers. released to also claimed spe- cial damages. objections in filed the nature preliminary

Defendant in which he claimed immunity of a demurrer absolute fact reason of the letter an act of the a matter did not jurisdiction, consequently constitute

193 also averred that аctionable libel. Defendant statements set libelous per forth the letter were not se. Plaintiff from the of the Court of appealed Order Common defend- County sustaining Pleas of Allegheny objections. ant’s preliminary contention

We shall first of defendant’s dispose per se. the statements were not libelous question Courts notice have at last taken long judicial fact that Communism movement political is a dedicated to the government overthrow force each United States and incidentally state, A. v. 85 and violence: Com. 369 Pa. 72, 91, Truitt, 81, Inc., 2d Milasinovich v. Serbian Progressive Club, 425; 389 Pa. 84 A. 2d Dennis v. United States, 571; U. opin- S. 494. We are therefore unanimously ion contained in the statements General’s letter Mrs. Matson’s communistic regarding activities and organ- her a communist membership hold which he rendеred her unfit ization, alleged her position as District Assistant and dan- Attorney, gerous to the security people Pennsylvania, are libelous se. per

The defendant would nevertheless possible have two defenses: Truth Co. v. (a) (Press 119 Pa. Stewart, 14 A. Oles 51; v. 2 Pa. Pittsburg Ct. Times, Superior Kilian 130; & Doubleday Co., Inc., 367 Pa.

A. 2d and 657) He (b) Privilege. plead did not counsel “truth”, stated at the bar of the Court that a committee of the Allegheny Bar Associa County tion had cleared Mrs. Matson of of Com any charge munism. has been divided into

Privilege two (1) kinds, absolute or unlimited, (2) conditional or limited.

Defendant contends he is entitled to “absolute privilege” hence absolute immunity civil Absolute suit. privilege, as its name is un- implies, high public exempts official from all limited, defamatory arising damages false out of civil for suits or moti and even from statements actions statements provided or the statements are made vated malice, duties actions are talcen in the course the official’s of powers authority, it and within the his or as jurisdiction: Spaulding expressed, his sometimes Kennedy, v. v. 40; Jones 121 F. 2d Vilas, 161 U.S. 483; Margarine Co. v. Standard Nut 72 F. Mellon, 557; 2d App. v. 24 v. DeArnaud D.C. Farr Ainsworth, 167; App. v. 38 C. Yaselli 12 2d Valentine, 413; Goff, D. F. 18 Mellon v. Aff. Per Curiam 275 U.S. 396, ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‍503; Brewer, Springfield (C.C.D.C.) 2d F. 2d v. F. Carter, 168 175 ; (C.C.A. 8); Reynolds, v. 914 Gibson 172 95 F. 2d (C.C.A. 8); Corp., Adams v. Home Owners’Loan 107 F. Phelps (C.C.A. 8); 2d 139 v. 97 F. 2d 339 Dawson, (C.C.A. 8); Corp., Adams v. Home Owners’Loan 107 F. Gregoire F. v. Biddle et 177 2d v. 579; Glass al., Ickes, p. F. 117 2d 273; Restatement, Torts, §591, 238; pages C.J.S. Libel and 100 and Slander, §§99, 157, Spaulding leading In U.S. Vilas, case maliciously plaintiff for sued a Postmaster General causing representing plaintiff as a common swindler, him to lose several thousand clients otherwise disgracing thousand him. Plaintiff secured several attorney Postmasters and from United States alleged in Con that he to be a bill caused introduced gress payment Post certain for claims; passage master after endeavored General, bill, destroy legislation by Congress plaintiff’s to obtain employment; General, contracts of that the Postmaster plaintiff in order to further and with malicious harass payment plaintiff’s with the checks to intent, sent, attorney’s stating a letter no were clients, services necessary pay- any power attorney and that to collect plaintiff was The null and void. for them was ments financially damaged seriously undoubtedly both Supreme respect reputation. Court cause valid did not state a held that declaration Postmaster of action the United States because privilege, if and even entitled to absolute maliciously falsely he was statements made, were exempt must demurrer and his nevertheless from suit page opinion 498: be sustained. The Court its said, opinion general are considerations “We that the same public policy for which demand convenience judges superior jurisdiction immunity from of courts of damages arising them civil suits from acts done judicial performance in the course of the of their func- apply large to a extent to official tions, communications by Departments engaged made heads of Executive when imposed discharge upon by in the of law. duties them people require protection The interests of the due respect be accorded to them their of official acts. As judicial recоgnize the case of a we distinc- officer, Department by tion between action taken the head of a manifestly palpably reference to matters which are or beyond authority, having legitimate his and actions [a proper] general or connection with the com- matters by supervision. mitted law to his control In ... exercising the functions of his an the head of office, Department, keeping Executive within the limits authority, apprehension Ms should not be under an the motives that may, any control his official conduct at subject inquiry time, become the in a civil suit damages. seriously cripple It proper would and public effective administration affairs as entrusted to government, executive branch of the sub- if he were jected such restraint.” privilegе applied

This absolute only originally to (1) three proceedings legislative classes (2) bodies, military (3) judicial proceedings, communications page 164; section 102, and naval officers: 53 C.J.S., 506. section 3rd ed., Slander and Libel, Newell, Spalding 161 U.S. Commencing v. Yilas, in 1895with gradually extended been absolute has this President to the official statements and acts high and other cabinet the United States and his State, aof federal as officials as well Governor necessarily to his cabinet. appellant that the concedes, There is no doubt, officially, acting when General, pro privilege, scope authority, absolute his has respect liability immunity civil tection and But acts. Ms communications and official privi plaintiff correctly that his so, contends, may lege un and that it beсomes be abused and lost, (or other if available when juris high public official) outside acts matters beyond powers or duties: diction or of his Cooper Spalding v. v. O’Connor, Vilas, 483; U.S. (C.A.D.C.); Re 99 P. 126; 2d 135 Section C.J.S., p. statement, Torts, §591, specifically

Plaintiff under further contends that facts is entitled disclosed defendant record, only privilege. a difficult conditional This raises very important A in a libel suit issue. defendant upon privilege relies conditional has who the defense of proving the burden communication was that published proper conditionally privileged oc on a or proper proper manner from a in a casion, motive, Morgan upon probable cause: was based reasonable Briggs v. Bulletin A. 369 Pa. 85 2d Co., 353, 369; 349, v. 111 2 v. Phila. Pa. A. O’Donnell Garrett, 513; 404, Hartman v. Record 51 A. 2d Co., 775; 356 Pa. 307, Hyman & A. Bausewine 287 Pa. Liеberman, 78, 486; v. Norristown 351 Pa. 41 A. 2d 736. Herald, 634, 645, appli its is not with the but with difficulty law, in case. The particular plain cation to the facts each author tiff that since the General argues Attorney ized District supersede Court to had matter* he Allegheny County only special no or to interfere the District right power super matter in been which the latter had not hence no to be dismissed seded; right demand she to from her no position; consequently write the In other libelous letter January 5, Attorney General was outside words, acting jurisdiction as author well as of his beyond ity. poses This the basic in this case. question

We are all unanimously opinion Attorney General discharge has no right power or to or to compel a district attorney discharge an assis tant district attorney her official or frоm position matters or duties, cases outside of the or case matter which the superseded the district has attorney: Cf. Matson v. 368 Pa. 83 A. 2d Jackson, 283, 134; Constitution of Art. Com. Pennsylvania, §4; VI, ex rel. v. 267 Pa. Likeley, 110 A. Com. ex rel. 167; Kelley 329 Pa. McBride, A. 2d Com. ex rel. 41, 196 80; Smith v. Glark, Pa. 200 A. 41. However, this is not a complete answer to the question of whether the Attorney General right has a in his duty, official capacity notify a district of Penn attorney sylvania that one of the latter’s assistants accord was, ing reports from the State Police, member of a communist organization and engaged communistic and that activities, her retention in an position was dangerous to the security the people of Pennsyl vania. In other words, might have no right discharge plaintiff, but might have

* Margiotti Appeal, See 865 Pa. 75 A. 2d 465. notify duty right the District a a and had discharge. In justified her facts which he believed face although on its letter shows the connection, probable upon cause— reasonable and that it was based pre public although an official act of and performed with in accordance been sumed have proper for good i.e., motive, and faith and with law protect public good purpose promoting pages ing public Sec. C.J.S., interest: 31 Fleming 518; 182 A. 321 Pa. 28, v. Adamson, 804-806; Glesenkamp Hill 2d v. A. 884; 338 Pa. Alexander, 26, 11 alleged plaintiff Pittsburgh, v. 320 Pa. 181 A. 763— maliciously charges only false but were were not absolute entitled made. If privilege, personal political immater are motives presence of reasonable ial as is the of malice or want probable Spalding With 161 U.S. Vilas, cause: exactly exists, as here reference to the same situation Supreme page acts, “But if he 499: Court said, having authority, be made cannot conduct damages, personally against for foundation of a him suit impelled that him to do . . . The motive plaintiff wholly complains immaterial. is, therefore, If admitted, we were to hold that the demurrer purposes mali acted of the the defendant trial, ciously, change This illus that could not the law.” well danger principle extending absolute trates plaintiff privilege. contends, On the other hand, if, merely en be she would conditional, prove defeat which would titled to actual malice privilege; and hence defendant’s claim of conditional it this reason be For demurrer could not be sustained. pertinent important to review some comes together and duties of an ana have been limitations thereon which some of the lyzed recent cases. several discussed

199 the is General of Pennsylvania The chief the and as law Commonwealth, of officer enforcement the duty over-all of that charged seeing such is with the Cf. enforced. law the Commonwealth is throughout Com. ex 188 A. rel. Minerd v. 325 Pa. Margiotti, 17, rel. Com. ex 368 Pa. 81 A. 524; Margiotti Orsini, 259, 2d Margiotti He has both 891; Appeal, supra. Pa., “ power ‘(a) investigate any and To viola- duty of the laws of the Common- tions, alleged violations, wealth come to To may notice; (b) which [his] [and] take such and such be steps, adopt may rea- means, of sonably necessary to enforce the laws the Common- wealth.”’ of Article 904, Administra- IX, [Section tive Code of P.L. Matson v. 177]; 1929, Jackson, Pa. 83 A. 2d 134. 283, 288,

In Mr. very comprehensive able and opinion, Justice) Justice Chief (later speaking Schaffer, Com. ex rel. this Court in Minerd v. 325 Pa. Margiotti, 188 A. 17, 524, reviewed the 30, 31, powers of the in General both England and from the earliest and days said: “We had Pennsylvania, quite recently occasion to consider the of prerogatives the Attorney Com. v. 309 Pa. Lehman, where 486, objected defendant to the superseding the district prosecutor attorney by special appointed by Attorney General. Speaking Mr. through Justice Linn, we ‘Prior to the observed: Act of May L. 3, P. 16 P.S. ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‍sec. general attorney repre- was sented in county each his deputy who conducted criminal prosecutions; statute the office district attorney was created and that officer was charged performance of the duties theretofore performed by deputy attorney general. Thereafter prosecutor elected instead hut appointed, power general supervision vested in the attorney general performance over a district attorney’s not taken that power away; county duties information that general it is matter remained, from to time time when had been exercised the power . . necessary. cases the review of decided conclude

“We Gen other authorities historical clothed with the Pennsylvania eral of at com enveloped Attorneys attributes criminal investigate the right including mon law,* counties several proceedings institute acts, appear to sign to indictments, Commonwealth, the appear to and submit grand jury testimony, the before criminal the Common in to cases on try and court to in and all these activities and, wealth’s behalf, in and set district attorney aside when supersede such Attorney judgment General’s action may be necessary.” fur- of the powers Attorney vast General were

These Dauphin in in opinions County recognized ther our No. 332 2 Jury Proceedings 1, Grand Pa. A. 289, 298, Dauphin County Jury 2d in Grand Proceedings 783; Pa. 2 A. 2d No. 332 382, 809; Margiotti rel. Margiotti and Com. ex 365 v. Pa., supra, Appeal, in each of which supra, we reiterated Orsini, Pa., * Compare Fay, Atty., Miller, also 2d U. S. 183 F. Appeals said, page authority where the Court of 988: “The Attorney request United make the [to States to disconnect tele phone allegedly gambling] challenged. used aid is Nor not do challenge made, we think successful be could United States Attorney public protect is vested with broad discretion to crime, being statutory grant discretion such derived both from and authority of the General at common In law. discharge duty Columbia, of his citizens of the District of it proper Maryland Company is for him to call to the attention of the being the fact he has evidence that its instruments are used District of violate Columbia laws.” super- supplement may and that the jury may proper grand vise a under circumstances and supersede conjunction attorney; with a district or act in duty . . and it is his to do if and then said: so he government to be hindered believes the lawful security, of its the detriment of conduct affairs to peace good order of the .” and State. . powers

It therefore that the is obvious and duties Attorney General chief of an law enforcemеnt officer they derived as are from both Commonwealth, are common wide and law, statute vast. How- pointed out in as Mr. Justice Stern Matson v. ever, supra, these do not Jackson, Pa., include right general qualifications “to examine into the competence duly of a views elected district attorney supplant- his or one of assistants as a basis for ing conducting thenceforth him and the office quotation deputies.” This own one case are important grounds upon if not the most main, plaintiff her contention bases that the beyond jurisdiction, may General acted so it be well exactly what was decided review case. attempted in that case to conduct hearing “alleged public leanings, into the communistic sympathies and utterances” of an аssistant district at- hearing torney, Attorney the General would be judge jury. prosecutor, Pointing and the out that no charged, Attorney this Court crime was held that power had no either General such under the Administra- authority. under other tive Code or However, quoted excerpt nor neither the case itself therefrom supports plaintiff’s position objection in this case. goes general in this qualifications, case not her views competence, whether but she a or was member aof organization engaged or communist in communistic ac- organization, major tivities in an one of whose behalf of and sabotage destroy to undermine, purposes and to uphold she sworn laws was government whose this enforcement officer of the chief law protect. As be- it was the and we Commonwealth, privilege right, to the at- call duty lieve or of any District facts county tention district that one of assistant which disclose charges a criminal dangerous for attorneys example, was, ac- communistic allegedly engaged in this was case, or her or demand his dismissal. and request tivities therefore, no doubt, We have right had a to write Attorney General, qua General, to the District January 5, 1951, letter dated Mrs. County concerning assistant, Allegheny him Attor- information which the and to on; give Mats Pennsylvania obtained from the had State ney supposed Matson’s Mrs. communistic as to Police this letter, hold that official specifically We activities. and public written course being powers, “absolutely privi- if allegations and that even were leged”; erroneous maliсiously were made, and false, constituted a complete absolute and defense action libel. Mrs. Matson’s fair to only It answer several seems further argu- of the plaintiff. ments maliciously

Mrs. she has been Matson, believing charges very the false of a public libeled official, him to for the naturally pay wants suffering he has caused her. There is much damage to be said her contentions. However, myriad of cases have every lawyer nearly out pointed what every layman, reflection, after some neither freedom knows, viz., freedom speech protect nor one’s property of which reputation is guaranteed the Cons —each they is obvious and it titution* —is unlimited, conflicting. The competing and be must sometimes high public practice slander officiаls recent of some vilify people or no chance little innocent have who reputation has shocked their to defend or themselves respectable every nearly citizen would our nation and unjustifiable mud-slinging character like to see for by public candidates assassination officials sympathies public stopped or abolished. One’s office person invariably is, who are on the side of the almost falsely justification, accused. often with little or no universally herein- Yet the hold, authorities almost public high or above statements acts stated, officials which are made in the course of and within give their com or duties them plete legal immunity though from redress. Even may irreparable damage, it innocent sometimes suffer public has been found to be interest and there public policy fore “immunize” sounder and wiser public permit or officials, or slander, libel, prosecution charges malicious where official’s suits, turn out to be would be to deter all but the most false, courageous judgment-proof public or the most officials performing their official duties and would thus justice many often hinder or obstruct and allow crim go unpunished. inals to point given grave

One other has us Was concern: delivery press by the immediate to the copy prior General of delivery, of his to its letter, regrettable practice pursued the District —a by high ranking officials whose victims first learn their press fate radio or to and hence entitled —incidental to the same absolute as the letter, was it * Pennsylvania, I, §§i, 7; Constitution of Art. Cf. United Stales Constitution, Amendment-1. official

outside the of the General’s scope to only duties or therefore entitled powers and com- have we conditional Here once privilege? again protected the to be peting right of individual rights: in her of right and and property reputation,' of actions public to be the official kept informed of on their cases public only officials. have found two We this in point unexplored field. virtually Supreme

In v. U. Spalding Vilas, S. Court to sustained the a Postmaster General right of write a notice to their attention all claimants calling to his provisions an giving Act of Congress own resulted interpretation even it though thereof, serious damage plaintiff, plain- to the even though tiff it held alleged maliciously made. The Court that the suits principle of from сivil immunity absolute should “. . extent (page 498) . to a apply large official Executive communications made heads Departments duties when engaged discharge imposed upon them by law.”

An even closer Secretary case is Glass Ickes, the Interior, 117 F. In brought 2d 273. that case Glass an action of defamation that against alleging Ickes, Ickes had defamatory issued a false and maliciously press memorandum or release in which he said plaintiff had been barred De- from the practice partment of the Interior, operators that all oil should look into the matter in to they “before kicked the plaintiff’s proposed one-man The Court lobby.” held the press release was an com- absolutely privileged munication and malice consequently motive or the of defendant immaterial. Justice now Vinson, Chief Justice of Supreme Court of the United States, said in a footnote on page 278: “The practice of cabinet (cid:127) officers to issue public statements respect n activity their departments known to is too- well such announcements serve Indeed, comment. require a useful if not essential role in the functioning processes democratic of government.” We believe it is an public permit interest Attorney General keep public advised in the where acts conduct such actions are course of and within the official duties powers. We therefore hold under in this the facts case the delivery to the of the of public press letter Attorney General to the District Attorney of Allegheny County dated January 1951, protec- within the of tion the absolute privilege accorded this case to the Attorney General. affirmed.

Judgment Dissenting Opinion Mr. Justice Jones: members court who heard this are appeal unanimous letter January defendant’s of 1951, to of William S. District Kahauser, Allegheny libelous concerning County, plaintiff, per se. We are privi- also as to the unanimous law of lege which the majority defendant pleads. As the opinion states .“. . the it, when Attorney General, acting and within the officially, scope authority, of his has absolute privilege, protection and immunity civil respect ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‍his liability official communica- tions and official acts. . . . this . . . [privilege] becomes if unavailable and when the Attorney . . . acts in matters jurisdiction outside his or beyond the scope of his рowers or duties.” The which the cases, majority cite and analyze support the above-quoted legal are not proposition, open to question. My difference with the lies majority alone in their conclusion that, under the facts of this case, defendant entitled to absolute as a defense libel. is my his It

206. post- writing opinion that the General, January ing “out- acted his letter of 5th to Bahauser, jurisdiction beyond side consequently, no he is entitled to duties” and that, privilege. more than conditional publication days libelous after Just twelve January Gen letter of the defendant 5th, public hearing court in a eral undertook conduct Allegheny Pleas of the Court Common room of sym County leanings, alleged communistic “into the Marjorie pathies Mat- Mrs. Hanson utterances Attorney Allegheny County.” Assistant District son, day hearing, On the fixed for General’s Allegheny upon County, Court of Common Pleas of complaint preliminary issued a Mrs. Matson, enjoining deputies, injunction the Attor whom conducting ney acting, from General was then appeal, hearing. Matson On we affirmed: scheduled 368Pa. 83 A. 2d Jackson, alleged inquiry “com Matson’s That into Mrs. by sympathies leanings, means utterances” munistic scope proposed hearing the of not within the was unmistakably powers Attorney or we General’s duties, up supra. Matson we v. Jackson, First, confirmed County jurisdiction the Allegheny of the court’s held pro injunction Attorney been the General Had suit. only ceeding his of official duties, County Dauphin Common Pleas of would have Court of against deputies: jurisdiction Act suit his had May in a P.L. 191. well-considered Second, 26, 1931, opinion held the merits Mr. Justice we on Stern, conducting hearing such was not within “any or duties of the General under s provision the-Administrative or under Code”- implicit in conclusion is common-law.- This -latter ) (p. argument- being made our to the then answer to hold such power but a to a exercise hearing preliminary possible was of his the District power supersede Attorney, Ap this court had theretofore held power (Margiotti 365 Pa. 75 A. 2d peal, 465) be derived the common law. With reference to the power super- session Mr. Justice Steen pertinently said, “Certainly — it was the broadest never, by stretch of imagination, regarded right of the including to examine into general qualifications, views competence of a elected duly District or one Attorney, of his as a basis for assistаnts, him supplanting thenceforth conducting office deputies.”1 own

The majority’s conclusion in the instant case that the Attorney General’s letter of Dis- January 5th to trict Rahauser was within his official powers ignores duties the necessary implications and effect our decision Matson v. Jackson, supra. If the Attorney General was without power, as we there de- to hold a on hearing cided, alleged “communistic sympathies and leanings, utterances” of Mrs. Matson, was no equally part of his it powers or duties the letter write containing charges concerning which he to hold proposed the hearing.

The letter of January 5, 1951, here was involved, no more an exercise or discharge a poAver or duty in the reposed Attorney General by than law attempted hearing which Matson v. Jackson enjoined. In the Attorney General’s letter succeeding to District handed, Jackson, supra, Matson v. down June not, therefore, The learned court below did have the benefit of that when, May 29, 1951, decision on it pre- sustained the defendant’s objections liminary plaintiff’s complaint to in the instant case. majority concurring opinions Both the in the court below drew requisite “powers” Attorney all-embraeive of the General from power supersession, proposition flatly rejected which we —a in Matson v. Jackson. announcing Bahauser on

Attorney January he had “The which he said hearing scheduled, this is to the issues purpose hearing clarify behind been to letter presented you previously have [see develop and to evidencе any January 5, 1951] further this directly on We subject” (Emphasis supplied). that “The case proposed however, hearing held, or legal power without on the wholly authority part was Since the General.” Attorney Attorney of the to power or wholly legal authority” without “was his letter of 5th clarify charges January or regard fortiori, “further evidence” develop thereto, acting jurisdiction he not and duties he made the had a charges. He, right, when course, to inform the attorney like other district citizen, he concerning knew anything former’s assistants or office that he deemed harmful to the public service. he not so because of doing, acting But, any of- him. duty devolving upon ficial the letter of charges 5th Moreover, January as the letter for the itself purpose, reveals, were made General’s “demand that supporting from her position Matson be dismissed as Assistant Mrs. in Allegheny power County,” District —a possess. majority opinion he did not frankly are all that “We unanimously concedes opinion General has no or right power compel a district attorney or discharge discharge from her district attorney position an assistant matters or cases outside of the case duties, superseded in which has or matter Matson citing v. Jackson and attorney,” the district authority. Admittedly, exception other noted in this case. Since the purpose of present not to bring 5th was about Mrs. Matson’s January letter since district attorney as an assistant dismissal 209 the Attorney General had no effect such legal power to it result, was likewise no part powers his оfficial or duties to make the charges substantiation “demand” he did not to legal have authority make.

Nor can the letter be otherwise an justified as official act. It more was no in aid of an execution the laws of the Commonwealth than was the proposed hearing. plain purpose January letter of 5th being, already stated, compel Mrs. Matson’s dismissal as an assistant district the reason attorney, for the General’s effort to that end becomes relevant. He did not charge that she had violated nor law; did he purport be investigating viola- tions of the law. He gave as his reason for demanding Mrs. Matson’s dismissal that “it appears that obvious her Communistic associations render her hold unfit to position.” This reason is referable alone views competence” “'qualifications, of the assistant district field not attorney, open to the Attorney —-a General even a case where he has superseded the attorney: district see Matson v. at Jackson, p. supra, Furthermore, Attorney General be cannot been thought have acting within the scope powers and duties when he published the independently libel contained in his letter of January 5th he before it in had due course of put transmission for the accomp- lishment of any legitimate purpose. If that be not so, then the doctrine of absolute privilege will be extended far conscionable beyond any limits and become an aid to in the persecution hands of the unscrupulous. I well where a recognize public that, within the officer, acting scope his lawful libels authority, the fact another, he acts does not deprive him maliciously of abso- lute v. privilege: Spalding see, e.g., 161 U.S. Vilas, 2d F. Ickes, and Glass 499; acts an officer In other when words,

(C.A.D.C.). motive duties, of his consideration. But, a material not does become deliberately can that a public not mean does absolute privilege then obtain libel and publish in the same an official act subjoining subsequently the cases such as The difference between connection. and is that present the supra, and Glass Spalding cases, in of officer acted performance in former the the first incidental libel was an alleged and the duty his official acts libels and then he In the latter, concomitant. first asserts is official. he in of what respect 5th letter January that thе Notwithstanding prior of our cases any (especially the basis on cannot, the to be an act of be found Matson Jackson), content appear majority the General, Attorney the effect that powers dicta to reiterate and are “wide vast” on General Attorney and, that the libelous hold generality, of this broad basis in the Attorney “written [by letter was General] I readily of his powers.” course within duties of the powers that agree many important. merely are de- But, adjectives be expansive should not them scribing an official act out of conduct to make which, availed should be found not to be decisions, under our of the Attorney General. or duties powers General’s powers that the are “wide say To limitation no whatsoever on them. is It puts аnd vast” they that are That saying limitless. tantamount the current decision of this court extant, with being so, mere appointive (a officer) will absolute enjoy and all henceforth as he his official so uses long stationery writings descriptive designation with of his himself signs Governor, libel Ms appointor, He can even office. further said Mr. Justice Steen What with impunity. (at 288) apposite v. Jackson p. here,— Matson the proposed out already pointed “. . . have we an aid to the execution be as justified cannot hearing Indeed contrary the laws. view or enforcement of Gen- the Attorney to holding be equivalent would conduct hearings power eral is vested every economic and social views of to the political, in the Commonwealth entrusted with the public offiсer the Governor himself down execution of laws, even those important officials, including to the least to ascertain order whether, duly elected, their competent perform are fit and they opinion, enforcing proposition duties laws, respective —a ab- illustrates its inherent statement the very court decision overextending by The vice surdity.” enough General would be bad harm confined to of that if were acts possible the majority opinion the now construes but what officer, be to a relative powers will, degree, to be within the every the officer in prosecuting among the territorial confines of Commonwealth It to disturbing, say is to con- jurisdiction. least, evils. potential template is disquieting facility more still the evident

But, majority virtually the well- repudiatе with which for the full opinion unanimous membership considered in Matson Jackson, little court a supra, of this That case and ago. a year present than are less in so far principle as the distinguishable not General’s duties is concerned. of the official majority opinion attempt does serious Nor of the When con- two cases. read in differentiation in Matson v. the decision Jackson, junction in the instant in places case this court majority opinion holding the anomalous position in- to into and inquire lacks official power he had an say now majority what vestigate charge. duty General’s right

It was, course, the District he Attorney anything communicate to knew; or the conduct of in relation to his assistants his office inimical be thought might It every interest. equally right to the public every official and of private other public citizen, do in likewise. so such But, that matter, acting, only the Attorney General) enjoy persons (including as a defense to their incidental privilege conditional it Once the libel is established prima libels. facie, duty person therewith charged becomes that the “publication ‍‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‍allege prove upon [was made] from a proper occasion, proper motive, proper upon based reasonable or manner probable [was] Bausewine v. Norristown Herald, cause”: see Inc., 2dA. cases Pa. there cited. The libelous being se and question per letter the defend- conditional enjoying only ant the circum- for the court it was error below to sustain stances, objections and dismiss the preliminary complaint. procedendo. I reverse with a would Chidsey joins Mr. Justice this dissent. Storage Appellant, v. Murdoch &

Anderson, Company, Inc. Transfer

Case Details

Case Name: Matson v. Margiotti

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: May 27, 1952

Citation: 88 A.2d 892

Docket Number: Appeal, 6

Court Abbreviation: Pa.