John Doe v. Franklin Co. Sheriff's Office, Aplt.
120 MAP 2016
| Pa. | Nov 22, 2017Background
- Four individuals filed a class-action complaint alleging Franklin County and its Sheriff’s Office (and Sheriff Dane Anthony) violated 18 Pa.C.S. §6111(i) by mailing unsealed postcards that disclosed LTCF (license to carry a firearm) application/status information.
- Section 6111(i) makes confidential LTCF applicant information and creates civil liability for "any person, licensed dealer, State or local governmental agency or department" that violates the confidentiality rule.
- Plaintiffs sued County, Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Anthony (Count III alleging supervisory/management-directed disclosures), and unnamed employees; trial court sustained preliminary objections and dismissed the entire complaint, finding Sheriff Anthony immune as a high public official.
- The Commonwealth Court reversed in part, holding Section 6111(i) created a statutory cause of action that implicitly abrogated high public official immunity as to sheriffs (treating sheriffs as "local government agencies" or "persons").
- The Supreme Court granted review limited to whether the General Assembly intended to abrogate high public official immunity by enacting §6111(i), and reversed the Commonwealth Court, holding there was no specific, express waiver of that immunity in §6111(i).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §6111(i) abrogated high public official immunity for sheriffs | §6111(i)’s language ("any person" and "local governmental agency") reaches sheriffs and thus permits suit | Abrogation must be express; §6111(i) contains no clear, specific waiver of high public official immunity for sheriffs | No — the statute does not specifically and intentionally abrogate high public official immunity for sheriffs |
| Whether high public official immunity applies beyond defamation to official acts | Immunity is limited or abolished and does not bar statutory torts like §6111(i) | Immunity is broad, absolute for high public officials, and applies to actions as well as speech | Immunity applies to official acts; it was not abrogated by §6111(i) |
| Whether the term "local governmental agency" in §6111(i) includes sheriffs | Title 2 definition and constitutional designation of sheriffs as county officers mean sheriffs fall within that term | Title 2 definitions are limited to that title; UFA defines "sheriff" separately and §6111(i) omits the term — omission significant | "Local governmental agency" in §6111(i) does not clearly include sheriffs; omission of the defined term "sheriff" is dispositive |
| Whether Gardner/Hidden Creek support implicit waiver | Gardner and similar decisions show sheriffs can be treated as agencies for UFA purposes | Those cases are inapposite or rely on definitions limited to other statutes; implicit waiver is disfavored | Gardner/Hidden Creek do not justify finding an implicit abrogation here; waiver must be explicit |
Key Cases Cited
- Dorsey v. Redman, 96 A.3d 332 (Pa. 2014) (legislature controls waivers of governmental immunity; statutory intent governs).
- Lindner v. Mollan, 677 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 1996) (absolute privilege for high public officials remains; immunity not abrogated by Tort Claims Act).
- Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68 (Pa. 2005) (high public official immunity applies to actions and statements within official duties).
- Matson v. Margiotti, 88 A.2d 892 (Pa. 1952) (historical articulation of absolute immunity for high public officials).
- Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 140 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1958) (high public official status depends on office importance and policymaking functions).
- Zauflik v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 104 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2014) (discusses governmental immunity principles and legislative role).
- Hidden Creek, L.P. v. Lower Salford Township Authority, 129 A.3d 602 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (statutory, explicit waiver of immunity in Municipal Authorities Act; used to illustrate need for clear language).
- Gardner v. Jenkins, 541 A.2d 406 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (fact-specific use of Title 2 definitions in LTCF mandamus context; not controlling for statutory waiver here).