*1 478 deeds, not dealing § a statute
Reliance on P.S. transfers, is misplaced. mortgages impermanent and other as notice to the to serve world Allowing improper indexing § 9853 conflicts with that 16 P.S. and the conclusion illogical, fact, majority’s meaning is erroneous. plain § 357’s § 9853 renders 16 P.S. actually abridged reading alone the world gives If recordation meaningless. proper there is no need then mortgage, constructive notice of must indexing at all—recordation without mortgages index this absurd did intend Surely legislature suffice. result. reasons, hold that First I would Citizens foregoing
For the mort- notice of this National Bank did not have constructive my and offer firm dissent. gage, in the decision participate LAMB did not Former Justice this case. dissenting opinion. joins this
Justice SAYLOR 879A.2d Pennsylvania, Appellee, COMMONWEALTH
v. SHIFFLER, Appellant. Albert S. Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of 30, 2004. Argued Nov. July Decided *2 Karl, for Albert S. Esq., Glick, James Jude Esq., Mary Jean Shiffler. Associa- for Defender Philadelphia, Esq., Rosalsky,
Peter Philadelphia. tion of Sekula, for Com- Esq., Totaro, M. Esq., Kelly
Donald R. Pennsylvania. monwealth CAPPY, C.J.,
BEFORE: CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, BAER, SAYLOR and JJ.
OPINION Justice CASTILLE.
This Court granted
review
the order of the Superior
vacating
Court
appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand
ing the case for
whether,
resentencing,
consider
under the
Sentencing
law,”
Code’s “three strikes
appellant should have
been considered a second-time violent crime offender and
sentenced
a mandatory minimum term of ten years of
imprisonment; or considered a third-time violent crime of
fender and sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of twen
ty-five years
imprisonment.
See
Pa.C.S.
9714. The
more
question
narrow
upon
granted
which we
here
review
*3
one left unanswered by our decision in Commonwealth v.
141,
Bradley,
(2003):
575 Pa.
On December at approximately a.m., 1:45 appellant unlawfully entered home of Robert and Carolyn Wegner in Ephrata Borough, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, while the couple was asleep. Wegners The were awakened to find appel- bedroom, lant in their walking around their bed. When appellant house, exited the the Wegners called emergency services, and Officer Christopher McKim of the Ephrata Bor- ough Police Department was dispatched to the scene of the crime. After arriving at the Wegners’ residence, Officer McKim appellant found hiding on the Wegners’ porch and ordered him to put his hands up, which point appellant fled. arrest- eventually chase and subdued and gave Officer McKim arrest, abrasions to During the caused appellant. appellant ed calf and bit the officer’s right eye McKim’s and left Officer the Wegners’ While in finger, resulting puncture wound. home, in cash and a approximately stole appellant $76.00 brassiere. woman’s assault,2 aggravated charged burglary,1 with
Appellant 2002, arrest,4 25, an theft,3 on entered resisting June accepted The trial court guilty charges. to all open plea date, that same the Commonwealth plea, and on appellant’s Mandatory Sentencing. On its Notice of Intent to Seek filed 9, for the Appropriate filed a “Motion September appellant Determination of Prior Offenses.” Applicable hear trial held a
On October court that on introduced evidence ing, where Commonwealth 12, 1997, criminal case separate in a May appellant pled guilty charges burglary.5 to three Commonwealth separate as a third-time be sentenced argued appellant should 9714(a)(2). that his urged Appellant offender under Section “totally concurrent” sentences for those convictions were that, therefore, as one the offenses “should be considered only that he was purposes conviction” for Section 9714 and (a)(1) of the offender, to subsection pursuant a second-time and, in addi agreed statute. The trial court found tion, sentence because it appellant’s further reduced “high dangerous risk presumption that he had rebutted sentence of Accordingly, imposed ness.” the court five concurrent burglary charge; for the years imprisonment ten *4 for years imprisonment aggravated to four sentence two 3502(a). § 1. 18 Pa.C.S. 2702(a)(3). §
2. 18 Pa.C.S. 3921(a). §
3. 18 Pa.C.S. §
4. 18 Pa.C.S. 5104. charges burglary on October stemmed from a committed 5. One 1996, 5, separate remaining charges from two and the two stemmed 16, February Appellant pleaded burglaries 1997. both committed on charge day terms guilty on the same and was sentenced to three to each imprisonment, twenty-three months of to run of eleven and one half to concurrently. years probation a sentence two charge; assault consecutive in the amount charge; arrest and restitution resisting for a notice of $12.00.6,7 timely appeal The filed Commonwealth Superior to the Court. panel majority Superior
In a
a
published opinion,
remanded, holding
and
vacated
sentence
appellant’s
Court
third-
treated
as a
appellant
that the trial court should have
twenty-five
him a
time
and should have sentenced
offender
(a)(2). The
minimum term under subsection
year mandatory
although appellant
pleaded
had
panel acknowledged
day
on the same
and
prior burglaries
to the three
guilty
offenses,
for those
the offenses
received concurrent sentences
9714.
purposes
“strikes” for
of Section
separate
constituted
(Pa.Su-
1128,
v.
833 A.2d
Shiffler,
Commonwealth
(“[T]he
treats each
convic-
statutory language
prior
per.2003)
offense,
though
plea
was consoli-
separate
tion as
even
dated.”).
argument
the Commonwealth’s
panel accepted
rejected
ambiguity,
appellant’s
that the statute is free from
“[bjecause
that,
held
argument
[ap-
and
philosophy
enumerated violent
prior
of at least two
pellant]
guilty
occupied
residences on two
crimes—namely, burglaries
pur-
has at least
convictions for
separate days—he
two
1131.
of the ‘three strikes’ law.” Id. at
poses
Judge
In
President
concurring
dissenting opinion,
his
appellant
the trial court that
agreed
Emeritus McEwen
should be sentenced as a second-time offender under Section
9714(a)(1).
that,
purpose
P.J.E. McEwen stated
“[t]he
remand,
opinion,
requested
stating
it
In its
the trial court
ten-year mandatory
minimum
should have sentenced
offenders,
sentence,
9714(a)(1).
applicable to
under Section
second-time
acknowledged,
explana
doing,
apparently
albeit without
so
the court
tion,
"high
dangerousness" presumption,
applying
its error in
risk
it,
longer
allowing appellant
when the statute no
calls for
to rebut
rather,
rebuttal,
simply
presumption
but
mandates a ten-
such
4;
9714(a)(1),
year
Slip op.
also 42 Pa.C.S.
as
term. See
see
2;
20,
811,
113,
No.
Common
amended
Act
Dec.
P.L.
see also
Butler,
(2000) (presumption of
wealth v.
563 Pa.
483 penalty a further impose ... is to legislation criminal habitual been have incorrigible criminals who hardened and upon those 1132 Shiffler, 833 A.2d punishment.” by prior unaffected P.J.E., dissenting) (citing Common (McEwen, concurring and Dickerson, 249, 766, 771 590 A.2d Pa.Super. v. 404 wealth (1993)). (1991), Pa. A.2d 990 P.J.E. McEw aff'd, his that sentence was appellant’s en because concluded justice system” the criminal only prior contact with “first net of that will widely incorrigibility he “so cast the not ” years.... Shiffler, for 25 pull into appellant penitentiary at 1132. 833 A.2d Court, challenges panel appellant appeal
On that he arguing majority’s interpretation Section read suggests we Appellant but a two-strike offender. consistently it interpret the statute as whole and Assem sentencing, which General philosophy that, in He that such reveals bly reading intended. submits third-time under to be sentenced as a offender order statute, convictions must have predicate the defendant’s two Moreover, “sequentially.”8 appellant argues occurred sequential necessary to be “is requiring prior convictions on the impose penalty the statute’s aim—to a stiffer serve by prior punish criminal who has been unaffected incorrigible coun ments.” Brief at 13. Commonwealth Appellant’s remanding correct in Superior ters that the Court was meaning on the resentencing plain matter for based as a statutory appellant text which dictates that be sentenced offender. allocatur to consider granted third-time We wheth interpre er the recidivist influences or controls the philosophy the three tation of strikes law. Throughout argument, repeatedly his to what he calls refers "sequentiality requirement.” Essentially, he that a the statute’s submits may 42 Pa.C.S. defendant sentenced as three-strike offender under 9714(a)(2) only following chronology preceded his where the criminal crime; present sentencing: first a first for the commission of conviction crime; crime; of a second service of sentence for the first commission crime; crime; for the conviction for the second service of sentence that, Dickerson, (suggesting A.2d at 992 second crime. Cf. 9714, chronology drafting legislature consider of crimi- did not case). at issue in that nal record matter, preliminary
As a note that this appeal we does *6 a to discretionary aspects involve the of challenge appellant’s sentence, jurisdiction. lack over which Court would See 9781(f) (“No 42 § Pa.C.S. the appeal discretionary aspects of permitted beyond of the sentence be the court appellate shall that jurisdiction has initial for such see Brad appeals.”); also Rather, 834 ley, Bradley, A.2d at 1131. as the case in claim appellant’s present raises a of con question statutory struction, a pure which, which is law and the question of under circumstances, the of implicates legality appellant’s sentence. because, in year This is so the absence of the twenty-five mandatory minimum sentence for provided 9714(a)(2), appellant exposed would have been to a maximum twenty years sentence of of only imprisonment burgla for the ry Bradley, conviction.9 See 834 A.2d 1131. If the three provision strikes were deemed sen inapplicable, appellant’s maximum, hence, tence the would exceed lawful and be deemed illegal. Accordingly, may raise the instant claim as a of right, jurisdiction matter and this Court has to (“The 9781(a) § review it. 42 Pa.C.S. defendant or the Com may appeal monwealth as of the of sen right legality the tence.”); Bradley, see also 834 1131. A.2d at the present
Because claim an issue raises of statuto ry construction, this Court’s standard of plenary. review is Bd., See Zoning Hazleton Area School Dist. v. 566 Hearing 180, 1205, (2001). Pa. 778 1210 task guided A.2d Our is principles sound and settled set forth Con Statutory Act, struction including primary object maxim that the of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative 1921(a); § intent. 1 Pa.C.S. see also Commonwealth v. Mac Pherson, 571, (2000). 561 Pa. 752 A.2d 391 In pursuing end, that we are mindful that of words a statute “[w]hen are clear from all and free the letter of it not to ambiguity, is be disregarded under the pretext pursuing spirit.” of its 1921(b). Indeed, § general rule, Pa.C.S. the best “[a]s Appellant pleaded guilty burglary felony degree, as first statutory twenty years impris- carries a maximum sentence 3502(c)(1); 1103(1). § § onment. 18 Pa.C.S. of a language the plain intent legislative indication Common (citing A.2d at 1132 Bradley, 834 statute.” See Co., 143, 822 A.2d 573 Pa. Mfg. v. wealth Gilmour (2003)). phrases language, reading plain “[w]ords and accord grammar according rules shall be construed any words usage,” while approved to their common and ing mean appropriate acquired “peculiar phrases have meaning. Pa.C.S. according to must be construed ing” 1903(a). statutory However, non-explicit interpreting when variety from a text, may gleaned intent legislative necessity occasion and factors, inter alia: including, remedied; to be statute; object the mischief to be attained; interpretation; of a consequences particular 1921(c). 1 Pa.C.S. legislative history. the contemporaneous *7 lib Moreover, be construed generally statutes should while 1 strictly, to be construed always statutes are erally, penal 1928(b)(1), penal in a statute any ambiguity § Pa.C.S. See, e.g., in favor of the defendant. interpreted should be Driscoll, 316 485 Pa. 401 A.2d v. Commonwealth (1979). doctrine plain meaning the
Notwithstanding primacy intent, the rules of con- legislative of representative as best For important qualifying precepts. offer struction several that, instance, Statutory the Construction Act also states alia, intent, may apply, courts inter ascertaining legislative that does following presumptions: legislature execution, absurd, or impossible intend a result unreasonable; intends the entire legislature and that 1922(1),(2). § and certain. Pa.C.S. statute be effective clear that Assembly has made importantly, Most General they applied are not to be where the rules of construction the manifest result in a construction inconsistent with § 1901. Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. intent of the General mandatory minimum sets forth the The three strikes law offenders as upon repeat certain imposed sentences be follows: subsequent offenses.
§ for second and 9714. Sentences (a) Mandatory sentence.—
(1) Any person any who is convicted court of this shall, of a crime of if at the time Commonwealth violence of the commission of the current the person offense had violence, previously been convicted of a crime of to a minimum years sentenced sentence at least ten confinement, total notwithstanding any provision other title or other contrary. Upon this statute to the a second violence, conviction for a crime of give court shall oral and notice of the person penalties written under this section for a third for a crime of conviction violence. Failure to provide such notice shall not render the offend- (2). ineligible er to be sentenced under paragraph (2) at the person Where had time of the commission of the current previously offense been convicted of two or more such crimes of crimi- arising separate violence from transactions, nal mini- person shall be sentenced to a confinement, mum sentence of at least 25 of total years other title other notwithstanding any provision statute to the Proof that the offender contrary. received notice of or otherwise knew or should have known of the penalties paragraph under this shall not be required. Upon for a third or subsequent conviction crime of vio- lence the court if it may, years determines of total confinement is insufficient to protect public safety, sentence the imprisonment offender to life without parole. 9714(a). only Pa.C.S. “Crimes of violence” include those *8 crimes that statutorily are enumerated in subsection (g), of a structure “burglary adapted overnight for accommodation in which at the time of the any person present” offense is is 9714(d) one such 9714(g).10 crime. then Pa.C.S. Notably, burglary the Crimes Code of definition does not mirror that 9714(g). burglary, found in Section The Crimes Code defines in rele- part, person guilty burglary vant as follows: "A is if he enters a therein, building occupied or structure intent to commit a crime premises open public unless the are at the time to the or the actor is 3502(a) added). privileged (emphasis licensed or to enter.” 18 Pa.C.S. structure, "occupied ”[a]ny place An structure” is defined as vehicle or adapted overnight persons, carrying for accommodation of or for on therein, person actually present.” business whether or not a is added). (emphasis Burglary felony degree, Pa.C.S. 3501 a the is first applicability the proving manner for the provides provision sentence, a rather remarkable including mandatory the if one of sentence mandatory of a allowing for vacation is vacated: “strikes” predicate or acquittal and an conviction vacated previous a
Should of sentence imposition to subsequent entered discharge final right section, shall have the offender this under of sentence for reconsideration sentencing court petition for except applicable not have been if section would was vacated. which conviction 9714(d).
42 Pa.C.S. has this Court years, of the last fifteen In the course of a satisfies the definition what question examined statute—ie., conviction previous a crime under predicate decisions, pro- which notable crime of violence—in two for a here. context for our consideration helpful vide Dickerson, interpret pre asked this Court was statute, convic “previous defined 1995 version enumerated of a list of any “crimes of as tions” for violence” of the date years had “occurred -within seven they offenses if Dickerson, 621 offense.” of the instant of the commission 9714(b)).11 There, the former 42 (quoting at 991 Pa.C.S. A.2d (1) building, structure or present: "the two facts are unless each of accommodation”; (2) adapted overnight for portion entered is not entry,” in which case it is present at the time of is "no individual 3502(c). Under Section degree felony. 18 Pa.C.S. reduced to a second 3502, therefore, burglary for as properly can be convicted a defendant present, there will not was degree felony even where no one first Notwithstanding procedur- finding necessarily as to that fact. be a "burglary aof structure law classifies reality, the three strikes al time of the overnight in which at the adapted accommodation result, As a any present” as a "crime of violence.” person is offense present qualification of a potentially exposed to the and/or defendant violence” even degree felony burglary a "crime of predicate as first present necessarily person find that a though the factfinder did challenge the Appellant here does not the offense. at the time of qualifying "crimes present prior burglaries as characterization of his thus, violence;” concerning disconnect in presented no issue is definitions. qualifying predi- limit of Section 9714 does not present version 11. The seven-year occurring window. those within crimes of violence to cate *9 women, defendant raped two at 9:45 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. 31, respectively, on December 1986. The two attacks resulted separate two prosecutions. criminal 11, 1988, On February alia, jury inter of, convicted the defendant rape and involun (IDSI) tary deviate sexual intercourse arising from the first 13, 1988, attack. September On the defendant was sentenced for those crimes to serve an aggregate term of imprisonment of seven and one-half to fifteen years.12 4, 1989, April On defendant IDSI, entered a guilty plea to rape, and possessing crime, an instrument of each arising from the second attack. 10, 1989, On April the trial court sentenced the defendant the second set of crimes to an aggregate term of ten to twenty years imprisonment. However, following defendant’s motion modify sentence, his the trial court re-sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven and one half to fifteen years of imprisonment, to run consecutively to his aggregate term for the first set of convictions. sentence, fashioning the trial court applied five-year mandatory minimum sentence 9714(a) set forth in the version of Section inwas force at the time. appeal Court,
On to the Superior claimed, the defendant alia, inter that his prior counsel was ineffective for failing object to the trial court’s imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under Section 9714. The court arguable found merit in Dickerson’s claim that Section 9714 did not apply in his case because “a conviction cannot be a previous conviction for 9714(b) purposes of unless the conviction for the first offense to the commission of the second offense.” Dick- occurs erson, 590 A.2d at (emphasis in original). Thus, the court vacated the judgment sentence and remanded for an evi- dentiary hearing on counsel ineffectiveness. 2000, § 9714(a),(g), 20, 811,
See 42 Pa.C.S. by as amended Dec. P.L. 113, § No. 2. pre-1995 12. version distinguish of the statute did not between offenders, rather, second- and third-time but mandatory set forth a prison years minimum sentence of five repeat for all offenders. See 9714(a), 1995, § Pa.C.S. as amended Oct. P.L. No. 21 1), (Spec.Sess. No. *10 Court, challenging to this the appealed The Commonwealth affirmed, of the statute. Superior interpretation Court’s We statute, consistent explaining reading our which was the as position, defendant’s follows: ... the to mean seven language We understand “within the to the date the commission of instant years prior it means argues offense.” Commonwealth “within years seven the date of the commission before after instant offense.” The the dispute legislature arises because not consider the apparently anomaly posed appellee’s did recidivism, expect criminal cases of behavior. we offense, conviction, following sequence events: first first offense, conviction, first second sentencing, second second situation, sentencing. provided In such a the legislature mandatory imposed that the minimum sentence would be if the sentencing the second first conviction occurred within If years seven before second offense. the first convic- years tion occurred more than seven before the second offense, legislature did not consider the criminal suffi- ciently blameworthy to merit the minimum sen- enhanced case, however, sequence tence. The events in this was: offense, offense, conviction, first second first first sentenc- conviction, that, ing, second second hold in sentencing. We sequence, mandatory minimum statute sentencing does not because the not occur apply first conviction did years prior within seven the commission of the second offense.
Dickerson,
It not intended that the for penalty prescribed heavier the commission of a second upon offense should descend one, anyone, incorrigible after re- except being who proved, “still hardeneth his neck.” If the penalty heavier prescribed upon the second violation ... is visited one who has not had the benefit of the of a first reproof conviction, purpose then the of the statute is lost. 771). Furthermore, Dickerson, A.2d at (quoting
Id. enhancement that, of sentence point “[t]he commented Court in persevered have offenders who severely more punish disci- penal the theoretical effects despite activity criminal Id., at 992. 621 A.2d pline.” the current to review further occasion
This had Court There, the defendant was in Bradley. the statute version of alia, in 1997. At his of, assault aggravated inter convicted evidence presented hearing, Commonwealth robbery for armed convictions the defendant’s two the defendant February on Specifically, outside of a restaurant a man co-defendants robbed two *11 The three men then drove p.m. at around 8:13 Harrisburg of a outside robbed a second victim 3 miles and approximately The defendant p.m. at around 8:41 different restaurant offenses, only a but received of both eventually convicted court at 1134. The trial Id. imprisonment.” term of “single sepa- constituted two the robberies concluded that two defendant, and sentenced crimes of violence predicate rate minimum term of offender, mandatory ato as a third-time af- The Court Superior years' imprisonment. twenty-five Court, argued the defendant to this appeal firmed. On transaction,” criminal “single arose from a the 1991 robberies by required transactions” as criminal “separate rather than three strikes law. analysis statutory interpretation conducted a This Court found “transaction.” We of the word meaning on the focusing appropriate” and “peculiar acquired the word had in usage its context and examined in the meaning Guidelines, as as the well Sentencing of the various sections compulsory in the episode” “criminal usage phrase at Id. 110 of the Crimes Code. rule set forth joinder 110). rejected Ultimately, we 18 Pa.C.S. (citing 1133-34 not robberies were that his 1991 armed argument defendant’s and as follows: explained transactions criminal separate relationship between logical and Looking temporal convictions, criminal separate ... two robbery two crimes not committed were involved. transactions were “temporal- the crimes constitute time.” Nor did single “at a episode, of the same part actions that are continuous ly Rather, discrete the robberies were incident.” event or in differ- at different times and occurring incidents criminal involving two apart three miles and ent locations over robbery one another. Neither no connection to victims with the other. commission of the successful was essential his confeder- appellant fact that and Nor does mere upon of crime the two victims type the same ates committed “ ... as contin- crimes occurred 4[s]pree’ [that] them render behavior.” separated abiding not in time law uous actions not, outside for rob first victim example, did Appellant a second immediately then rob restaurant] [first Instead, his the same victim at location. robbery, proceeds the first completed split accomplices to a The trio then drove left the scene this crime. away. apparent location miles another different three second the three then robbed their opportunity, crime of offenses Although victim outside [second restaurant]. another, to one relatively proximity committed short were criminal train of part single, of a continuous they were we activity. Accordingly, no break in criminal events with to be the courts deemed them properly hold that below of the three purposes criminal transactions” “separate provision. strikes
Id. at 1134. “transac- meaning to the the term challenging addition
tion,” in raise some Bradley attempted the defendant also to philosophy argument by appellant form of the recidivist raised the herein, subject single sentencing he had to a for since been However, that the Bradley crimes. the Court noted time of argument had not that at the specific defendant raised motions, Pa. his in his or in his sentencing, post-sentence R.A.P.1925(b) Thus, argument statement. was waived. in in the case Bradley squarely joined What waived is now sub judice. at issue by that narrow text begin acknowledging
We
9714(a)(2)
here—i.e.,
to
subjects
language
in
which
minimum
mandatory
sentences those defendants
“at
who
time of the commission of’ their current offense had been
“previously
or
crimes of
convicted”
two more
violence—
to
no
apply
appellant’s
seems
There
circumstances.
that,
the time
dispute
at
committed the current
burglary offense on December
he had been previous
two,
three,
ly
of not
qualifying
“convicted”
but
crimes
violence—i.e.,
Furthermore,
the 1997 trio of
none
burglaries.13
“commission,”
of the triggering terms—specifically,
“previ
ous,”
peculiar
acquired
“conviction”—have
and appropri
context,
rather,
ate
in
meaning
but
have been
interpreted only according to their common and approved
1127; Dickerson,
usage.
Bradley,
See
First, this Court is mindful requirement construe statutes penal narrowly and we are to assume reading plain 13. Our text is not controlled our decision Bradley, ambiguity where we found in the word it "transaction” as appears question in Section 9714. The sole that case was under multiple part what to consider circumstances crimes of the same purposes penalty Bradley, "transaction” for enhancers. See Here, appellant challenges fundamentally A.2d at 1134. distinct aspect argue previous statute does not that his crimes three *13 of violence arose from same criminal transaction. result to not intend an absurd Assembly does that the General argu- of any Appellant’s the construction statute. from flow or unreasonable- absurdity highlights potential ment for his sentencing At the time of his concurrent ness here. not, fact, in in was burglaries appellant three prior Indeed, he because a second-time offender. sentenced as before he convicted burglaries prior committed all them, been of he could not have any or sentenced for in holding of our light a second-time offender in sentenced as Dickerson, must occur at 992 conviction (previous 621 A.2d offense). anomaly The subsequent to commission of been—nor he not ever situation is thus: while has appellant’s offender, a he been—sentenced as a second-strike could have 9714(a)(2) subject him of subsection application reflexive offender. The unreasonable- sentencing as a third-strike considering more apparent ness of that result is made when his upon the sentence received disparity between justice system—an contact the criminal sentencing first lijé in a to 23 months of aggregate imprisonment term county Superior panel that which the Court facility—and this, his required upon second majority statutorily deemed minimum term of sentencing system—a contact with do not such result years imprisonment. We believe that gradu- in Assembly adopting was intended the General by in ated scheme of is reflected intending sequential Our construction of the statute as Concurring approach supported by Opinion learned J., (Saylor, at 1136 Saylor Bradley, Mr. Justice A.2d concurring). Concurring Opinion recognized The that Brad- analysis on available to ley’s “presentation” appeal limited the by authored this Justice. Majority Opinion, which was simply dismissing, cautioned Concurring Opinion against cases, in favor of a broader appropriate arguments future statute, not raised Brad- understanding which were of the recidi- potential inter alia: relevance ley, including, lenity. (Saylor, and the rule of Id. 1136-37 philosophy vist salient here. Both considerations have value concurring). J. *14 Pennsylvania this and other philosophy, As to that, recognized point courts appellate repeatedly have “[t]he punish severely of sentence enhancement is to more offenders despite activity in criminal the theoreti- persevered who have Dickerson, cally penal discipline,” beneficial effects of added) cases). (collecting Particularly A.2d at 992 (emphasis link implicit punishment salient here is the between enhanced reform, and behavioral and the notion that the former should along foregone increase defendant’s correspondingly other opportunities Any conception for the latter. i.e., ignore underlying philosophy, the rationale the recidivist “one, culpable being the most defendant who after ” Id. Just as the second- ‘still hardeneth his neck.’ reproved, (a)(1) time offender enhancement under subsection is meant to punish severely defendant more when defendant has an to opportunity offended before and has been afforded reform, so too is the third-time offender enhancement under (a)(2), to punishment subsection which increases the minimum to more twenty-five years, obviously punish meant defendant he has to severely already foregone opportunities when two reform himself. The of such generally recognized purpose graduated sentencing punish severely laws is to offenses more unwillingness the defendant has exhibited an to reform when his miscreant and to conform his life to the ways according law. As notes: prevalent is that enhanced cannot be punishment view all of the
imposed prior pre- unless defendant’s convictions offense, and each principal ceded commission of offense and in chronological sequence. conviction occurred Thus, offense, first, each must been following have committed after the defendant’s conviction of the immedi- ately preceding adopting offense. Courts view have are intended reasoned that habitual offender statutes potential career criminal of the consequences warn an persistent activity, give criminal the offender to reform to the opportunity through exposure restraining before the more punishment influences of conviction and an habitual is im- punishment severe offender statute incorrigible much not so deemed The offender is posed. once, but be- more than she has sinned he or because demonstrated, through persistent has the offender cause susceptible to the behavior, that he or she is criminal process. reforming the conviction influence of Chronological procedural (citing Brief at 30 Appellant’s enhancement affecting as of former convictions sequence statutes, 7 A.L.R.5th habitual offender under penalty added). carefully in the 2a) nothing (1992), We see (emphasis that the Gener- suggest 9714 to structure of Section graduated *15 to sentencing simply court to require intended Assembly al “call him out” to proceed second strike and a defendant’s skip three strikes. by applying noted lenity the rule of is consistent with holding today
Our the statute A construction of Bradley. in Saylor Justice by under third-time offender treat as a appellant that would (a)(2) in of his light harsh particularly would be subsection reform. sentencing single opportunity and single previous (a)(2) that subsection agreement In of our light convictions regarding predicate silent whether ambiguously is ambiguity construe that are to sequential, obliged must be we subject only him to second- favor find appellant’s Driscoll, (citing 401 A.2d at enhancement. See offender Pa.C.S.1928(b)). may of Section interpretation for our support
Further to 2000 amendment Sec- Assembly’s in the General be found former sub- there deleted Assembly The tion 9714. General (b) legislature deleted entirety. doing, in its so section “previous conviction”: phrase following qualification previous conviction shall purposes of this section For judgment of conviction, not any include whether is con- imposed pending or litigation has been sentence that conviction. cerning 11, P.L. 9714(b)(2), Dec. by § as amended
42 Pa.C.S. added). language, The deleted 165, § 9 (emphasis No. non-contingent sentencing made enhanced expressly sentencing—i.e., for reform—is opportunities upon prior evidence Assembly previously that the General had intended different than understanding of this statute is directed by existing by today. our language holding decision final aspect supports holding.
One statute also our 9714(d) the extent extraordinary is that it author- petition izes an offender to court for reconsid- if, eration of mandatory his sentence after one sentencing, strikes) (i.e., previous his has convictions since been vacated and the present mandatory depended sentence that upon conviction. 42 Pa.C.S. 9714. This provision clearly reflects Indeed, approach. recidivist that an philosophy offender may by very vindicated court sentenced him— apparently by any unrestricted time bar or other procedural bar—is further proof Assembly General did intend this in an operate unduly statute harsh manner. To vacation contrary, the clause indicates the General Assem- bly’s intent to be realistic its assessment of the status of the offender, ensuring violent-crime that his enhanced punishment is consistent with his actual level of repeat culpability.
Finally, admonition, this Court mindful of the offered very author, that: a valid philosophy, policy, while is not the *16 only sentencing valid nor a policy, is it constitutional princi- ple or “the legislature reject mandate: is therefore free to or replace enacting it sentencing legislation. when recidivist If the legislature enacts a statute a clearly expresses which different application, philosophy’ possesses ‘recidivist no authority clearly statutory which would override contrary language.”
Bradley,
Accordingly, we reverse sentencing matter to the trial court for and remand this 9714(a)(1). relinquished. consistent Section Jurisdiction EAKIN did not in the consideration participate Justice decision this case. dissenting opinion.
Justice files a NEWMAN NEWMAN, dissenting. Justice
I from the of the I respectfully Opinion Majority. dissent lan- myself by unambiguous find constrained the clear and of 42 9714. to the issue is the guage Pa.C.S. Central language legislature chosen in enacting Section 9714, The plain language legislature which language chose not to include consistent with a recidivist philosophy, Although may binds me. it for the wise legislature topic, place to revisit it is not the of this Court interject philosophy way our into a statute where it in no Pennsylvania violates the Constitution or conflicts with other laws of this Commonwealth. Majority quotes Opinion Court’s Commonwealth 141, (2003),
v. Pa. Bradley, 575 A.2d 1127 reads: which philosophy, The recidivist not the policy, while valid is only valid nor it a sentencing policy, princi- is constitutional ple legislature reject or mandate: “the is therefore free to or replace it when enacting legislation. recidivist If legislature enacts a statute clearly expresses different application, the ‘recidivist no philosophy’ possesses authority clearly contrary statutory which would override language.” Williams, at 1135 (quoting
Id. Commonwealth v. 539 Pa. (1994)). However, despite A.2d acknowledging this basic concerning power legislature, tenet Majority goes impose on to none philosophy where in the legislature’s writing. infra,, evident As discussed statute, beyond even when read plain language *17 in may clause further a or be a question goal, proper mixture of both recidivist and punitive philosophies. person provides,
The exact at issue language “[w]here of the current offense had at the time of the commission or more such crimes been convicted two previously transactions, the per from criminal arising separate violence minimum sentence of at least son shall be sentenced to a 9714(a)(2). As 42 Pa.C.S. years of total confinement[.]” and, is clear by Majority, language “[t]here noted this that, committed the current [A]ppellant no at the time dispute 2001, 26, previous offense on December he had been burglary three, two, crimes of qualifying of not but ly ‘convicted’ addition, Majority at 13.1 In Majority Op. violence.” ‘com terms—specifically, “none of the triggering notes that mission,’ acquired peculiar ‘previous,’ ‘conviction’—have context, in but rath meaning sentencing appropriate er, to their common and interpreted only according been have 1127; A.2d at usage. Bradley, See Common approved (1993).” Dickerson, 533 Pa. 621 A.2d wealth v. modified). (citations that, there is no question Id. Because offense, current Appellant the time of the commission of the convictions, that, three I conclude as mandated had statute, of the the trial court should have plain language sentence. imposed mandatory 9714(a)(2), Despite recognizing language clear beyond plain meaning to look Majority attempts approved usage the common and interpreting statute argu- of this “previous” support terms and “convictions.” ment, Dickerson, this Court Appellant supra, cites a require- another of the statute to contain interpreted part Al- sequential. ment that the convictions events, sequence forth the normal though this Court set offense, conviction, first second namely, sentencing, first first offense, conviction, did not sentencing, second second we may dispute whether the two crimes committed 1. There be some over 2, 1997, February within one and one-half hours of each other on However, Bradley, separate would count as two convictions. separate these two crimes would count as lead one to believe transactions, Moreover, making even if Appellant’s fourth strike. February previous crimes to be one we were to consider the two transaction, clearly separate Appellant the 1996 criminal event is would be on his third strike. *18 Instead, Dickerson may the scenario. present address occurred the that the second offense on basis differentiated plain language Read the to the first conviction. within prior the the of the commission of second time of Section offense, offense. prior had not been convicted for Dickerson on the case, rape committed a In that Dickerson had second this Court stated day Accordingly, as the first rape. same for purposes “a cannot be a previous conviction conviction 9714(b) first unless conviction for the offense of the [Section] of the second offense.” Dick- occurs to the commission Thus, erson, in original). clearly, at 770 (emphasis A.2d offender not be sentenced as second-strike Dickerson could statute, not to and because plain language the pursuant that the requirement Court either an additional imposed the philoso-. sequential and sentences be a recidivist convictions phy. chain of likely
It the most scenario that a events certainly offense, conviction, sentencing, first first unfold as: first would conviction, offense, sentencing, third second second second conviction, Nevertheless, offense, the third sentencing. third situations, other such as this surely could foresee legislature one. the dicta in attempt the to stretch
Appellant Majority and Dickerson, behind a general philosophy discusses the statute, meaning destroy to literal three-strikes (a)(2). However, 1921 of the words within subsection Section Act, binds us 1 Pa.C.S. to Statutory Construction clear “When the words of a statute are the statute. words free all the letter of it is to be ambiguity, from its Id. The disregarded pretext pursuing spirit.” under plain lan- holding Majority contravenes adopted 9417(a)(2). However, Majority incor- if the guage legislature, as to the intent of the rectly speculated desire, fact as the statute language did in legislature indicates, the three- trigger the current circumstances to for sentence, legislature mandatory minimum strikes into the repetitive language unnecessary need insert statute; whereas, clarity. language paragon the current is a
My position legislature allows the the statute to modify intent, if, avers, as reflect its true the Majority plain does not do so. language currently Moreover, considering even when it philosophy, is far from certain that had Appellant not received his two and chances warnings general at reform consistent recidi- Appellant vist three-strikes policy. was sentenced three criminal previous offenses one proceeding. Appellant re- *19 relatively a ceived lenient sentence at that time because the imposed sentences were concurrent. It is more than conceiva- situation, ble that such a in the legislature, minds of the does not deserve to lessen count of prior the convictions for a Majority future offense. The notes that has not Appellant foregone opportunities two to reform Majority himself. atOp. 16. In the part, reasons that Majority the concurrent nature in prior sentences resulted a single opportunity for However, reform. by position the set forth by unanswered the Majority is the that question must be answered. If had been Appellant sentenced it is if consecutively, asked in single prison stretch counts as two to opportunities reform. I that the believe distinction between is the two irrelevant in both Appellant because scenarios has received multiple warnings opportunities to reform. Presently, the concur- rent nature of the sentences for multiple offenses was a benefit and upon kindness Appellant bestowed he could such, not it expected. have As is illogical to allow the concur- rent of nature his to convictions override the plain language the statute.
Further, one that solely statute is not is in recidivist Rather, nature. one may interpret the three-strikes to be law thus, partially in punitive nature to act as a deterrent. Such deterrence is effective only punishment when the future convictions is Presently, clear. had reason Appellant know that conviction subsequent to his three expose him to the mandatory three-strikes law minimum Moreover, sentence. it is possible interpret statute as nature, purely punitive creating harsher not in penalty offender, of a but because interests of rehabilitation of criminal acts.2 commissions repeated defendant’s adopted by to be proper policy dispute A over and not to this legislature left to the should be Commonwealth clear, nature, language Although Court. me to persuade by Majority sections cited do the other to the clearly contrary purpose as language override that the statute. 9714 and language
I
the clear
am bound
the time of
because
“had
Appellant
conclude that
been
current offense
convicted
previously
commission of the
arising
separate
from
or more such crimes
violence
two
9714(a)(2),
transactions,”
Superior
criminal
Pa.C.S.
to a
should be sentenced
properly
Appellant
Court
held
minimum sentence.
mandatory
twenty-five year
*20
judice
penalty is
secondary problem
2. A
with the case sub
is that the
year mandatory
seemingly
facially
twenty-five
minimum for a
harsh. A
burglary
is extreme. How
$76.00
minor offense of
ever,
and a brassiere
concerning
constitutionality
challenge
no
is before us
11,
1179,
Ewing California,
punishment.
v.
538 U.S.
123 S.Ct.
See
decision,
(2003) (holding,
twenty-
in a five to four
that a
L.Ed.2d 108
year
stealing
golf
pursuant to
five
minimum sentence for
three
clubs
Amendment,
Eighth
law did not violate the
California’s three-strikes
any
properly
and that
criticism for the statute is
directed at
Estelle,
263,
1133,
legislature) (citing
100 S.Ct.
Rummel v.
445 U.S.
(1980),
given
was
for a three-time
L.Ed.2d 382
in which
life sentence
underlying
obtaining $120.75
false
felon where the
offense
However,
precedent
finding
Eighth
an
pretenses).
there is
Amend
for
imposed pursuant
unduly
penalty
to a
ment violation for an
harsh
State,
(Del.2003) (holding
Crosby
See
v.