J. JESUS CARRERAS and LOS PRIMOS AUTO SALES, LLC d/b/a LOS PRIMOS AUTO SALES, Appellants, vs. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Appellee.
No. 20–0963
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Submitted February 22, 2022—Filed June 17, 2022
Amended September 6, 2022
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.
Petitioner seeks further review of a court of appeals decision affirming the department of transportation’s decision to rescind his license under
Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Waterman and McDonald, JJ., joined, and in which Oxley and Appel, JJ., joined as to parts II and III.C, and in which McDermott, J., joined as to parts II and III.A–B. Oxley, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Appel, J., joined. McDermott, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Mansfield, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Todd M. Lantz (argued) and Elisabeth A. Archer of the Weinhardt Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Michelle E. Rabe (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
CHRISTENSEN,
This case presents a question of first impression involving the statutory interpretation of
The administrative law judge reversed the license revocation because the structuring conviction was not referencing or concerning the sale of motor vehicles. On appeal, the reviewing officer, district court, and court of appeals each determined that the structuring offense had a sufficient relation or nexus to the sale or other activity relating to motor vehicles and revocation was consistent with the purpose of
For the reasons explained below, we hold this structuring conviction—involving the bank deposits of motor vehicle sales proceeds into different business accounts—has a sufficient relation or nexus to be considered an “indictable offense in connection with selling or other activity relating to motor vehicles.” Id. We determine there is substantial evidence to revoke the motor vehicle dealer license. While Carreras’s revocation started on the date of conviction, the revocation was stayed pending Carreras’s challenge to the revocation order. The revocation period shall be extended by the length of the stay.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Husband and wife Jesus and Martha Carreras owned and operated Los Primos
Jesus admitted to the following as a factual basis for the guilty plea. Los Primos Auto Sales had at least three business accounts. Domestic financial institutions have a legal obligation to report transactions in excess of $10,000. See
made in a manner to evade reporting obligations or “cause the financial institutions to fail to report transactions in excess of $10,000.” The structured deposits combined for an amount of at least $111,835.
On April 2, 2019, the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) officially notified Carreras that it was revoking its Motor Vehicle Dealer License for a period of five years effective April 22 under
On October 31, Carreras filed for judicial review of the license revocation in district court. The next day, Carreras filed a request with the DOT to stay the enforcement of the license revocation during the judicial review. The DOT previously informed Carreras that he would “need to file the request for stay in District Court” because the DOT “no longer ha[d] jurisdiction.” Carreras responded that
The district court later upheld the DOT’s license revocation and determined the DOT had substantial evidence to do so. Carreras filed a notice of appeal on the license revocation. The district court stayed enforcement of the license revocation until the completion of the appeal but tolled the entirety of the five-year revocation period. Carreras filed a separate notice of appeal regarding the tolling period. We consolidated those appeals and transferred the case to the court of appeals,
II. Standard of Review.
“
On appeal, Carreras contends the agency action violated
Carreras also contends the agency’s action violated
III. Analysis.
One of the grounds for license revocation or suspension under
A person who has been convicted of a fraudulent practice, has been convicted of three or more violations of
section 321.92, subsection 2 , orsection 321.99 , has been convicted of three or more violations ofsubsection 16 of this section in the previous three-year period, or has been convicted of any other indictable offense in connection with selling or other activity relating to motor vehicles, in this state or any other state, shall not for a period of five years from the date of conviction be an owner, salesperson, employee, officer of a corporation, or representative of a licensed motor vehicle dealer or represent themselves as an owner, salesperson, employee, officer of a corporation, or representative of a licensed motor vehicle dealer.
Id.
A. “In Connection With.”
Our first question is whether Carreras’s structuring conviction is an “other indictable offense in connection with selling or other activity relating to motor vehicles” under
The ALJ rescinded the DOT’s license revocation, defining the phrase “in connection with” as “in reference to” based on the phrase’s common meaning within the context of
construed”). In doing so, the reviewing officer concluded a “nexus” existed between the structuring offense and motor vehicle transactions at Los Primos to satisfy
On judicial review, the district court agreed with the reviewing officer. The district court explained that “in connection with” only required a “relation and nexus” and noted that “but for” the sale of motor vehicles, the structuring offense would not have occurred. It also concluded this interpretation was consistent with
On appeal, Carreras claims that the ALJ’s interpretation of “in connection with” was correct. Alternatively, Carreras suggests that we interpret “in connection with” to require the underlying offense to “embolden or facilitate” the sale or other activity relating to motor vehicles, analogous to an interpretation of a federal sentencing enhancement where “the [defendant] . . . used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.”
potentially facilitate the felony). The DOT supports the interpretations from the reviewing officer, district court, and the court of appeals.
“The first step in our statutory interpretation analysis is to determine whether the statute is ambiguous.” State v. Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d 573, 581 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Ross, 941 N.W.2d 341, 346 (Iowa 2020)). “Our inquiry ends with the plain language if the statute is unambiguous.” Id. A statute is ambiguous “ ‘if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the statute’ based on the context of the statute.” Id. (quoting Ross, 941 N.W.2d at 346). If a statute is ambiguous, we “rely on principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.” Id. (quoting Ross, 941 N.W.2d at 346). The differing interpretations throughout these proceedings show reasonable minds disagree as to the interpretation of
The legislature did not define “in connection with” in this section. If the legislature has not provided a definition, we may refer “to prior decisions of this court and others, similar statutes, dictionary definitions, and common usage.” Good, 924 N.W.2d at 860 (quoting State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 179 (Iowa 2013)). “[O]ur goal ‘is to ascertain legislative intent in order, if possible, to give it effect.’ ” State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 136 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2008)). “To ascertain legislative intent, we examine ‘the language used, the purpose of the statute, the policies and remedies implicated, and the consequences resulting from different interpretations.’ ”
Albaugh v. The Reserve, 930 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Des Moines Flying Serv., Inc. v. Aerial Servs., Inc., 880 N.W.2d 212, 220 (Iowa 2016)). “It is not our role to ‘change the meaning of a statute.’ ” Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d at 582 (quoting Ross, 941 N.W.2d at 347).
We have generally stated that
“[T]his court [has] noted that ‘in connection with’ is a broad term that conveys a legislative intent to cover a wide range of situations.” Adams v. City of Des Moines, 629 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Iowa 2001); see also Seymour v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 124 N.W.2d 157, 161 (Iowa 1963) (“The words ‘in connection with’ are broad, and have been so construed by the courts.”); Stromberg Hatchery v. Iowa Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 33 N.W.2d 498, 500–02 (Iowa 1948) (interpreting the phrase “in connection with” liberally). A couple of dictionaries define the specific phrase
“in connection with” as “in relation to (something).” In connection with, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in%20connection%20with (last visited June 14, 2022); see also In connection with something, Macmillan Dictionary, https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/in-connection-with-something (last visited June 14, 2022) (“relating to something”). “We note that the legislature did not specify the level of ‘connection’ required by including ‘intrinsically’ or some other modifier.” In re Jean-Guy’s Used Cars & Parts, Inc., 977 A.2d 479, 483 (N.H. 2009); see, e.g.,
These dictionary definitions are consistent with our recent caselaw defining “in connection with” as “related to, linked to, or associated with.” State ex rel. Miller v. Cutty’s Des Moines Camping Club, Inc., 694 N.W.2d 518, 526 (Iowa 2005) (quoting Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Fitchburg Mut. Ins., 793 N.E.2d 1252, 1255 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); see Irving v. Emp. Appeal Bd., 883 N.W.2d 179, 193 (Iowa 2016) (adopting the definition of statutory unemployment benefits outlined in Cutty’s). “[R]elated to, linked to, or associated with” only requires a “relation or nexus.” Cutty’s, 694 N.W.2d 518 at 526; see also Irving, 883 N.W.2d at 193.
This definition is also consistent with other Iowa licensing statutes that authorize a license revocation when the conviction is “related to” the profession or some certain aspect of it. See, e.g.,
revocation of a chiropractor’s license for a “[c]onviction of a felony related to the profession or occupation of the licensee” (emphasis added));3 id.
Carreras also argued that a different definition is required for “relating to” and “in connection with” because they are both used in the same sentence in
To say that Carreras was “convicted of structuring in connection with selling motor vehicles” aligns with our precedents and his actions are precisely
within
Even if we agreed with Carreras that the connection between structuring and the sale of motor vehicles is too attenuated, deposits into a business account constitute “other activity” relating to motor vehicles.
Moreover, our conclusion that a structuring conviction has a sufficient relation or nexus to either motor vehicle sales or deposits into a licensee’s
business account to be considered an “indictable offense in connection with selling or other activity relating to motor vehicles” is consistent with the statute’s purpose. Our decision in Cutty’s provides a comparable illustration. There, we examined whether an unfair practice in connection with the sale of any merchandise under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act included conduct occurring after the sale. Cutty’s, 694 N.W.2d at 525–29 (examining whether an aggressive collection campaign for nonpayment of dues was in connection with the sale of undivided interests of campground property). In the absence of a legislative definition of “in connection with,” we determined that there only needed to be “some relation or nexus between” the unfair practice and the sale of merchandise. Id. at 526. This broad definition aligned with the text and purpose of the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act to bar unfair practices that can occur after the sale. Id. at 525–26.
Similar to the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act’s text and purpose,
a fraudulent practice in connection with selling, bartering, or otherwise dealing in motor vehicles.”
Our interpretation is supported by reading the statute as a whole.
could have limited license revocations to indictable offenses arising from selling or other activity related to motor vehicles but chose not to.
Carreras lastly contends that this interpretation leads to absurd results. “It is universally accepted that where statutory terms are ambiguous, courts should interpret the statute in a reasonable fashion to avoid absurd results.” Brakke v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 897 N.W.2d 522, 534 (Iowa 2017). As explained,
In conclusion, we believe the license revocation is justified. The structuring conviction has a sufficient relation or nexus to motor vehicle sales and the structuring conviction has a sufficient relation or nexus to deposits into motor vehicle business accounts. Either of these nexuses satisfies the requirements of
B. Substantial Evidence.
Next, we address whether the DOT had substantial evidence to revoke Carreras’s motor vehicle dealer license. The district court
C. Revocation Period.
Finally, we must decide on what date the revocation period started and the legal effect of the stay. A person convicted of one of the prohibited acts under
shall not for a period of five years from the date of conviction be an owner, salesperson, employee, officer of a corporation, or representative of a licensed motor vehicle dealer or represent themselves as an owner, salesperson, employee, officer of a corporation, or representative of a licensed motor vehicle dealer.
under
A review of the record shows that DOT granted a stay of the license revocation through the administrative appeal proceedings. Throughout the judicial review proceedings, Carreras successfully moved for stays of the license revocation under
In chapter 322 license revocation proceedings, the DOT only has the power to revoke a license “if, after notice and hearing by the department of inspections and appeals, it finds that the licensee has been guilty of an act which would be a ground for the denial of a license.” Id.
The parties contest whether the revocation period should have been tolled during the pendency of Carreras’s appeal. The parties have misframed the issue. The issue is not whether the revocation period was tolled; instead, it is the legal effect of the stay order. The DOT did not notify Carreras of the revocation until April 2, 2019—over two months after the sentencing of the federal structuring conviction that occurred on January 24. The DOT then placed the license revocation on an “automatic stay order” after Carreras requested a contested case hearing on April 16. In this context, the stay delays the enforcement of the license revocation. Stay, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgement, or the like.”). “A stay order does not affect the merits of the controversy and is to maintain the status quo until a determination can be made on the merits. It is intended only to delay the enforcement of the action stayed, not render it ineffective.” Hanna v. State Liquor Control Comm’n, 179 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Iowa 1970); see Gothard v. Spradling, 586 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (en banc) (“The stay or restraining order did not eliminate the revocation, but merely delayed it.”); Rhoades v. State Real Est. Comm’n, 45 N.W.2d 628, 629 (Neb. 1951) (“[T]he time of the commencement of the period of suspension of the license of appellee would have been automatically advanced until the judgment providing for the suspension became final and enforceable.”). “If the status quo is to be truly preserved, the license holder must be permitted to continue [the] business until the merits . . . have been determined, without depriving the [department] of its right to impose punishment” if the merits are resolved favorably to the department. Hanna, 179 N.W.2d at 376. Otherwise, “[t]he granting of the stay order might allow a violator to escape punishment and the refusal to grant a stay order might subject an innocent party to undeserved punishment.” Id.
We recognized the impact of stays in the context of driver’s license revocations in Shriver v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 430 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1988). “[A]s long as the person has a . . . license . . . under an administrative or judicial stay order, there is no revocation.” Id. at 923. If we accepted Carreras’s position, “it would behoove a person similarly situated to seek stays and continuances through the whole administrative and court review process.” Id. at 924. “Such tactics would result in frustration of the primary purpose” of chapter 322, which is to prevent certain individuals from selling motor vehicles. Id. If the license revocation could only run from the date of conviction while stays were allowed throughout the administrative and judicial review process with the five-year clock still running, it would effectively shorten section 322.3(12)’s revocation period to five years minus the months and years spent challenging the revocation. Id. Indeed, in this case, over three and a half years have already transpired since Carreras’s conviction. The stay merely delayed the enforcement of the judgment.
In conclusion, the five-year revocation period began on the date of conviction: September 6, 2018.4 Under the plain language
IV. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in part the court of appeals opinion.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Waterman and McDonald, JJ., join this opinion, Oxley and Appel, JJ., join this opinion as to parts II and III.C, and McDermott, J., joins this opinion as to parts II and III.A–B. Oxley, J., files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Appel, J., joins. McDermott, J., files an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Mansfield, J., takes no part.
Carreras v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.
#20–0963
OXLEY, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Defining amorphous phrases like “in connection with” is not an easy task, leaving the majority to conclude that “the connection between the sale [of motor vehicles] and the [structuring offense] is plain.” A bit of “we know it when we see it” reasoning. It is not so plain to me. The majority essentially reads “in connection with” as a but-for relationship—but for selling vehicles, Carreras would not have had cash to structure into transactions less than $10,000 and deposit into his business accounts. Our caselaw construing the phrase “in connection with” requires a closer relationship than “but for,” and I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in parts III.A and B, affirming the revocation of Carreras’s license.
I agree with the majority’s construction of
I.
I agree that “in connection with” signals a broad relationship, especially in the context of a regulatory statute that is mandated to be liberally applied. I also agree it is broader than “arising out of” or “arising from.” But there are even broader relationships than “in connection with,” such as the one used in Ohio’s license revocation statute that allows revocation of a dealer’s license for a conviction that “in any way relates to the selling, taxing, licensing, or regulation of sales of motor vehicles.” Geisert v. Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealers Bd., 626 N.E.2d 960, 963 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added) (quoting
The revocation provision in
“In connection with” is not so broad as to be a mere but-for causation standard. See Gavin v. AT&T Corp., 464 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] mere ‘but for’ cause linking a securities transaction (here, the merger of MediaOne into AT & T) to a subsequent injury (concealment of the option to receive the Standard Election without paying any fee) does not make the injury one suffered ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.’ Otherwise [the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998] would apply to a class action by shareholders who suffered paper cuts when they opened the letters informing them of their rights under the merger.” (citing
Miller v. Cutty’s Des Moines Camping Club, Inc. provided multiple definitions for “in connection with.” 694 N.W.2d 518, 525–28 (Iowa 2005). We said the phrase is commonly defined as “related to, linked to, or associated with.” Id. at 526 (quoting Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Fitchburg Mut. Ins., 793 N.E.2d 1252, 1255 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)). Yet we also said “in connection with” means a “substantive connection” or a “causal link.” Id. (quoting Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 930 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act it is “well settled” an act is made “in connection” with commercial activity if there is a “substantive connection” or “causal link” between the two (quoting Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero), 148 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 1998)), overruled on other grounds by Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2014))). This latter definition is consistent with the dictionary definition of “nexus” as “[a] connection or link, often a causal one,” which we also cited in Cutty’s. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Nexus, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)).
We didn’t have to be too specific about the level of connection in Cutty’s because we were only deciding whether “in connection with” had a temporal limit that precluded post-sale activities from being found to be “in connection with” the prior sale. See id. (“[N]othing in the legislature’s use of ‘in connection with’ in the [Iowa Consumer Fraud] Act enunciates a bright-line temporal rule. We will not judicially superinscribe one.”). In Cutty’s, we held the phrase “in connection with the sale of merchandise” included post-sale efforts to require previous purchasers of an undivided 1/3000 interest in property used for camping to pay annual dues as part of the Declaration of Restrictions attached to the purchased interest. Id. at 520–21. Even though we didn’t expressly define it that way, we found a “substantive connection” because the terms of the sale were the basis for the post-sale activity of attempting
We applied a similar standard in Adams v. City of Des Moines, where we said that a firefighter’s directions to move a truck that was touching power lines was made “in connection with an emergency response” because even though the emergency was over, the response was not. 629 N.W.2d 367, 370–71 (Iowa 2001) (quoting
Since Cutty’s, we have been a bit more specific. We cited Cutty’s to define “in connection with” as requiring “a causal connection,” not just any connection or a conceivable connection, between an employee’s misconduct and her disqualification for unemployment benefits in Irving v. Emp. Appeal Bd., 883 N.W.2d 179, 193 (Iowa 2016). Under
In my view, our caselaw establishes that “in connection with” requires a substantive or causal connection, not a mere but-for connection. Thus, Carreras’s license can only be revoked if his structuring conviction has a substantive or causal connection to either selling vehicles or engaging in some other activity relating to vehicles.
II.
Carreras pleaded guilty to structuring financial transactions,
The majority hedges a bit by also relying on “other activity relating to motor vehicles,” which it identifies as depositing the funds into Carreras’s “motor vehicle business accounts.” Here, the connection is even more attenuated, an attenuation implicit in the majority’s conclusion that “[b]ecause depositing funds from the sale of motor vehicles into business accounts constitutes part of the motor vehicle business operations, it qualifies as ‘other activity’ relat[ing] to motor vehicles.” (Emphasis added.) But the “other activity” must be relating to motor vehicles, not to “motor vehicle business operations.” See
The majority’s interpretation of
III.
Carreras was convicted of structuring transactions in connection with splitting large sums of cash into increments less than $10,000 before depositing them into his bank accounts. There is no substantive or causal connection between those actions and selling vehicles or engaging in any other activity relating to motor vehicles. I would reverse Carreras’s license revocation.
Appel, J., joins this concurrence in part and dissent in part.
Carreras v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.
#20–0963
McDERMOTT, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I.
I concur in the court’s opinion that the phrase “in connection with” in
And because I don’t believe that the language of the statute is ambiguous, I wouldn’t place any thumbs on the scale in our interpretive efforts in favor of the State by giving the statute a “liberal construction.” Our duty in construing a statute, “even with the instruction to construe it broadly, requires first that we provide ‘a fair interpretation as opposed to a strict or crabbed one—which is what courts are supposed to provide anyway.’ ” Vroegh v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d 686, 702 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 233 (2012) [hereinafter Scalia & Garner]). A word or phrase is ambiguous only if “two or more quite different but almost equally plausible interpretations” might apply. Scalia & Garner at 31–32, 425; see State v. Mathias, 936 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Iowa 2019). Declaring ambiguity whenever skilled lawyers offer divergent meanings for phrases would unnecessarily launch us into ambiguity-resolving canons in most of our cases. The majority today correctly finds there is only one plausible meaning of the phrase “in connection with” in the context of
Carreras’s structuring conviction was “in connection with” the sale of motor vehicles because sufficient evidence showed that the money that was unlawfully split into multiple deposits was deposited into the business accounts of Carreras’s dealership, Los Primos Auto Sales. I thus concur in
II.
But I must respectfully dissent from part III.C of the court’s opinion and would instead affirm the court of appeals’ holding that the period of revocation was not tolled while the parties litigated this challenge.
The majority concludes that because Carreras requested and was granted a stay to prevent his license from being revoked while he pursued his appeal, we must disregard the plain language of
The statute on this point contains no scrivener’s error or ambiguity. I find nothing unclear about the statutory language—and, apparently, neither does the majority. The majority instead reframes the issue as the “legal effect of the stay” that the district court entered under our judicial review statute, Iowa Code
The majority declares that
A stay is a “postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgment, or the like.” Stay, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In this case, the stay issued under
The majority relies heavily on language in Hanna v. State Liquor Control Commission, 179 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Iowa 1970). But that case involved a court staying its own order—not a statute that set forth a legislatively determined start date—and thus doesn’t address the question this case poses. In Hanna, the Liquor Control Commission entered a court order suspending Hanna’s liquor license “for a period of six months ending August 1, 1968.” Id. at 375. The district court then stayed the Commission’s suspension pending Hanna’s application for a writ of certiorari. Id. After the
More analogous cases have addressed similar questions about whether, for instance, a stay in bankruptcy (to stop collection efforts) triggered by
The simple word “stay” is not appropriate to accomplish what is in fact a suspension or tolling of time. Those apt terms “suspension”, or “tolling” were certainly available to the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code as they were to the drafters of the Bankruptcy Act and the Bankruptcy Rules, and it is instructive that they were not employed in Section 362(a).
The same must be said of sections
And as to regulatory sanctions even more specifically, “[t]he legislature knows how to delay collateral consequences of a conviction pending an appeal.” Maxwell v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 903 N.W.2d 179, 184 (Iowa 2017). For instance, in
The statute at issue in this case pertains both to current owners or employees and also to potential future owners or employees, and thus applies not only when revoking a license but also when granting a license for a prospective licensee. As the court of appeals noted, it’s reasonable to believe that the legislature may have accounted for the time necessary to complete the notice and hearing requirements when it included the “five years from the date of conviction” language in
We are properly bound by the legislature’s explicit policy decision as revealed in the unambiguous text of