Xenia Rural Water District v. VegorsXenia Rural Water District v. Vegors
An еmployer claims it is not responsible for injuries sustained when a worker got hit by a truck driven by a fellow employee. The district court reversed the industrial commissioner’s award of worker compensation benefits based on Iowa Code section 85.16(3) (2003), an affirmative defense for willful injury. We reverse the district
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Norman Vegors worked as a machine inspector for Xеnia Rural Water District, a company that installs rural water lines. Vegors was injured at work after a coworker, Casey Byrd, hit him with a pickup truck. Vegors had his hands full and “wiggled [his] butt” at Byrd. Vegors testified that he did so to acknowledge or say hi to Byrd. Vegors then leaned over the bed of his own truck. After this, Byrd attempted to bump Vegors with the mirror of his truck but instead hit Vegors with the truck bed.
Vegors testified that he and Byrd commonly acknowledged each other even when their hands were full, including, for example, waving the boom of the track hoe at the other. Xenia employees testifiеd that Vegors had been involved in a prior incident for which he was disciplined and that he admitted to his supervisor that he and Byrd had just been goofing around.
Vegors sought workers’ compensation benefits, and Xenia contested benefits, arguing Vegors was barred from recovering because he engaged in horseplay and asserting the affirmative defense of willful injury. The deputy commissioner held that Xenia, as the employer, had the burden to prove the defense of horseplay. The deputy commissioner found Vegors intended to shake his hind end as a means of communication and not to initiate, instigate, or participate in the horseplay which led to the injury, and, therefore, recovery of workers’ compensation benefits was not barred. The commissioner affirmed the decision to award benefits and, although the deputy had not discussed it, separately addressed the affirmative defense found in section 85.16(3) barring compensation when injury is caused by the “willful act of a third party directed against the employee for reasons personal to such employee.” The commissioner hеld the defense did not apply because a coworker is not a third party.
Xenia sought judicial review. The district court addressed the question of whether “the agency erred in finding that petitioners did not meet their burden of proof that the claimant’s alleged injury was the result of horseplay, and that the petitioners did not prove an affirmative defense pursuant to
II. Scope of Review.
An appeal of a workers’ compensation decision is reviеwed under standards described in chapter 17A.19(10).
Under chapter 17A, when the legislature has “clearly ... vested” an agency with authority to interpret a statute, this court will only reverse а decision of statutory construction which is irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.
The workers’ compensation commissioner is generally charged by the legislature with the duty to “[a]dopt and enforce rules necessary to implement” workers’ compensation laws.
Although the legislature has not provided an explicit written statement regarding the workers’ compensation commissioner’s authority, we must determine whether the legislature clearly vested the agency with authority to interpret the statutes at issue.
III. Merits.
A. Burden to Establish Horseplay or Lack Thereof. Xenia, Vegors’s employer, argued Vegors cannot be compensated beсause he engaged in horseplay. The deputy commissioner held that Xenia had the burden to demonstrate horseplay because it is a defense. The deputy commissioner then determined Vegors had not engaged in horseplay. The commissioner affirmed the deputy commissioner but did not address the proper burden. Upon judicial review, the district court reversed the agency and held the claimant bears the burden to demonstrate that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment and therefore, to demonstrate the injury was nоt the result of horseplay. It appears the district court did not reach an ultimate conclusion on the merits of whether Vegors’s alleged horseplay bars recovery because the court went on to hold Vegors’s recovery was barred under a separate affirmative defense, which we will address below.
Employers are required to compensate employees for “personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of the employment.”
Prior cases of this court suggest the injured employee must show he or she was not engaged in horseplay as part of the burden to demonstrate the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.
See Ford v. Barcus,
These opinions are consistent with treatment of the horseplay issue in other jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions bar compensation for certain types of horseplay based on the “arising out of employment” language.
See Lincoln v. Whirlpool Corp.,
Vegors argues that placing the burden upon the claimant to demonstrate that the injury was not the result of horseplay is inconsistent with general legal principles because it requires the claimant to prove a negative. Vegors points to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.904(3)(e) which states, “[ojrdinarily, the burden of proof on an issue is upon the party who would suffer the loss if the issue were not established.” Vegors contends that if horseplay is not established, the employer will suffer the loss and therefore should bear the burden.
We disagree. The horseplay exception stems from the requirement that the injury arise out of and in the course of employment, and Vegors will bear the lоss here if he cannot meet this requirement. Employers may raise any number of arguments to contest an employee’s assertion that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment. For example, in
Quaker Oats,
the employee was injured in a traffic accident after being paged to the plant on a Sunday to fix a mechanical problem.
Quaker Oats,
Similarly, Vegors retains the burden to show his injury arose out of and in the course of employment. His employer, Xenia, argues that he has not met that burden because the injury was the result of horseplay. This argument does not shift the burden to Xenia.
B. Application of Horseplay Doctrine to Vegors. Vegors argues that еven if the commissioner improperly held Xenia, the employer, had the burden to establish horseplay, the district court should have remanded for the commissioner to apply the facts to the proper burden.
The deputy commissioner held that Xenia did not meet its burden to demonstrate horseplay and credited Vegors’s explanation of the injury. On review within the agency, the commissioner noted that the deputy commissioner “believed claimant when he testified that his act of shaking his butt was intended as a means of communication and not to initiate, instigate or participate with a co-workers’ horseplay that lead [sic] to the injury.” The commissioner affirmed the award of benefits, explaining that although his review is de novo, he gave deference to the deputy commissioner’s credibility determination and that “[generally, non-participating victims of horseplay will be compensated.” The district court held the agency applied the incorrect burden, but did not remand the case to the commissioner because the court separately determined Xenia had establishеd its willful-injury defense under
Vegors argues it cannot be determined as a matter of law that Vegors engaged in horseplay that would bar compensation and therefore, remand is appropriate to allow the commissioner to consider the issue under the proper burden.
See McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co.,
This court has held that horseplay which an employee “voluntarily instigates and aggressively participates in does not arise out of and in the course of his employment.”
Ford,
Innocent employees who are injured as the result of another’s horseplay may recover. It is “clearly established that the non-participating victim of horseplay may recover compensation.” 2
Larson’s
§ 23.02, at 23-2;
see also Coleman v. Armour Swift-Eckrich,
For those employees who have initiated or are participating in horseplay, courts and commentators have suggested fоur considerations for determining whether the horseplay is a deviation from the course of employment that bars recovery:
“(1) the extent and seriousness of the deviation, (2) the completeness of the deviation (i.e., whether it was commingled with the performance of duty or involved an abandonment of duty), (3) the extent to which the practice of horseplay had become an accepted part of the employment, and (4) the extent to which the nature of the employment may be expected to include some such hоrseplay.”
Phillips v. John Morrell & Co.,
The inquiry should focus on the actions of the claimant.
The substantial character of a horseplay deviation should not be judged by the seriousness of its consequences in the light of hindsight, but by the extent of the work-departure in itself. This is not always easy to do, especially when a trifling incident escalates or explodes into a major tragedy.
2 Larson’s § 23.07[3], at 23-23. The character of Vegors’s action of shaking his rear end — and not the serious injury resulting from being hit with a truck — must be analyzed to determine whether it is a deviation sufficient to bar recovery.
It cannot be determined as a matter of law that Vegors voluntarily instigated or aggressively participated in horseplay to an extent that prevents compensation. There is evidence in the record that the horseplay was initiated only by Byrd or that any action by Vegors was an insubstantial deviation from his employment. Vegors testified thаt he acknowledged Byrd with his hind end and that he did not intend to dare Byrd to hit him with a truck, otherwise he would not have turned around and focused his attention on his work prior to being hit. The commissioner made a determination that Vegors
Because we reverse the agency determination regarding the proper allocation of the burden of proof, we remand to the agency to allow the agency to apply the proper burden to the evidence. Cf. Kohlhaas v. Hog Slat, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 387, 393 (Iowa 2009) (“Although it could be argued there is substantial evidence in the record that Kohlhaas’s current condition does not warrant an increase in compensation, it is fair to conclude the commissioner’s determination may have been influеnced by the language in Acuity we have just disavowed. In that we have clarified the requirements for a review-reopening petition, we reverse and remand....”). The commissioner should evaluate whether Vegors’s action was a substantial deviation from his work based on the four factors identified above and applying the proper burden.
C. Interpretation of Iowa Code
We apply the workers’ compensation statute broadly and liberally in keeping with its humanitarian objective: the benefit of the worker and the worker’s dependents. Id. The statute’s “beneficent purpose is not to be defeated by reading something into it which is not there, or by a narrow and strained construction.” Id. We are, however, bound by the requirements of the statute. Id.
The potential application of
With regard to the first issue, Vegors suggests the phrase “third party” cannot include coworkers because elsewhere in the workers’ compensation statute these terms are referred to separately. In section 85.22, the statute explains that when an injury creates a legal liability against “some person, other than the employee’s employer or any employee of such employer,” the injured employee “may also maintain an action against such third party for damages.” Vegors points to this use of the phrase “third party” as evidence that the term third party was not meant to include coworkers. We do not find this example instructive. The phrase “third party” in section 85.22 is preceded by “such,” which refers the reader to the earlier definition of “person”, which specifically excluded coworkers. Additionally, the language of
The second issue concerns the proper definition of “willful.” The district court held the term willful required only that the third party intend to do the act, not that the third party intend to injure the claimant. This court has recognized that willful is susceptible to two definitions. One possible definition of willful is “ ‘an act which is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.’ ”
Iowa Beta Chapter of Phi Delta Theta Fraternity v. State,
Many state statutes comparable to
With regard to the third issue, we find that Byrd’s action of hitting Vegors with a truck was not done for “reasons personal to the employee.” Courts have explained that incidents which arise between employees are often “part and parcel” of the working environment and will not bar compensation unless an employee’s action is caused by “influences originating entirely outside the working relation and no[t] substantially magnified by it.”
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo,
The category of injuries barred from compensation by
Whatever men and boys will do, when gathered together in such surroundings, at all events if it is something reasonably to be expected, was one of the perils of his service. We think with Kalisch, J., in Hulley v. Moosbrugger, ... “[f|or workmen of that age or even of maturer years to indulge in a moment’s diversion from work to joke with or play a prank upon a fellow workman, is a matter of common knowledge to every one who employs labor.”
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills,
IV. Conclusion.
Claimant has the burden to establish his injuries arose out of and in the course of employment. A claimant cannot recover
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED.
Notes
. We note that Xenia raised two additional issues on judicial review that were not addressed by the district court: (1) whether the deputy commissioner erred in finding that the respondent was entitled to a permanent total disability award and (2) whether the deputy commissioner erred in finding that the claimant’s left knee injury was causally related to the June 2, 2005 incident. Because we remand to the district court for remand to the commissioner on the issue of entitlement to compensation, these issues need not be addressed by the district court until Vegors's entitlement to benefits is determined.