STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, vs. CHARLES EDWARD ROSS, Appellant.
No. 19–0939
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Filed April 3, 2020
A defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a tool with the intent to use it in the unlawful removal of a theft detection device, arguing there was not a factual basis to support his guilty plea. SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Dylan J. Thomas, Mason City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Katie Krickbaum, Assistant Attorney General, Carlyle Dalen, County Attorney, and James O‘Hollearn, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether a padlock secured to a steel cable constitutes a “theft detection device” under
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Around 4:00 a.m. on September 24, 2018, Charles Ross and his codefendant, Calvin Lacey, arrived at a Mason City Mills Fleet Farm in a Penske rental truck. Ross used bolt cutters to cut the padlock off of the steel cable that was wrapped around a riding lawn mower on display outside of the store. He then helped Lacey load the lawn mower onto the rental truck without permission to take the lawn mower or the intention to return it to its lawful owner. As they were loading the lawn mower onto the rental truck, a Mills Fleet Farm employee who was arriving for work observed them and called the police. Ross and Lacey fled, but police located them and conducted a traffic stop of their vehicle shortly thereafter. The police searched the vehicle pursuant to a search warrant and discovered bolt cutters, the lawn mower from the Mason City Mills Fleet Farm, a ski mask, and methamphetamine, among other items.
With Ross‘s consent, the district court relied on Ross‘s written plea of guilty and the minutes of testimony to accept his plea to the two misdemeanor charges, including the charge of possession of a tool, instrument, or device with the intent to use it to unlawfully remove a theft detection device in violation of
Ross filed a timely notice of appeal on May 31, 2019, asking us to vacate his conviction for possession of a tool to remove a theft detection device in violation of
II. Standard of Review.
Ross concedes that he failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment in order to preserve error on his challenge to the factual basis of his guilty plea. Consequently, Ross contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the district court to accept his guilty plea without a factual basis supporting his charge of possession of a tool to remove a theft detection device and for failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment after the district court accepted his plea. Ineffective-assistance claims are rooted in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2019). We may decide such claims on direct appeal if the appeal was already pending on July 1, 2019, when Senate File 589
III. Analysis.
Ross claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing him to plead guilty to possession of a “tool, instrument, or device with the intent to use it in the unlawful removal of a theft detection device,” a serious misdemeanor, in violation of
According to Ross, interpreting the definition of “theft detection device” broadly to include the combination at issue would lead to absurdity and render the words “theft” and “detection” meaningless. In contrast, the State believes a “theft detection device” simply has to be something “attached” to any item on display or for sale regardless of whether it will immediately alert the owner to the property theft. Therefore, we must resolve the conflicting theories of “theft detection device” in order to determine whether a factual basis supported Ross‘s guilty plea.
“The first step in our statutory interpretation analysis is to determine whether the statute is ambiguous.” State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Iowa 2018). If the statutory language is unambiguous, our examination of the statute ends with the plain language. Id. But
“if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the statute” based on the context of the statute, the statute is ambiguous and requires us to rely on principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
Id. (quoting State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 889 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Iowa 2017)). As noted above, the legislature‘s definition of “theft detection device” presents at least two differing yet reasonable interpretations: Ross‘s interpretation that the device must clearly detect and indicate that an item has been stolen and the State‘s interpretation that a theft detection device is anything “attached” to an item on display or for sale, regardless of whether it immediately detects theft. Consequently, the statute is ambiguous because both of these interpretations are reasonable, and we must rely on
While we apply the rule of lenity in criminal cases, we still must construe criminal statutes “reasonably and in such a way as to not defeat their plain purpose.” Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 136 (quoting State v. Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Iowa 2013)). Our goal in interpreting criminal statutes “is to ascertain legislative intent in order, if possible, to give it effect.” Id. (quoting State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2008)). In doing so, we examine the legislature‘s chosen statutory language, “not what it should or might have said.” Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Iowa 2004). Moreover, if the statute does not define a word or use it with an established meaning, we give the words their “ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used.” Id. It is not for us to “extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute.” Id. Finally, “[a]lthough the title of a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text, it can be considered in determining legislative intent.” State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004) (quoting T & K Roofing Co. v. Iowa Dep‘t of Educ., 593 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa 1999)).
Here, it‘s clear from the statute‘s plain language and its title—“Theft detection devices—shield or removal prohibited“—that its purpose is to prohibit people from using theft detection shielding devices or removing theft detection devices.
The State emphasizes the word “device” and quotes the online Merriam-Webster definition of it as “a piece of equipment or a mechanism designed to serve a special purpose or perform a special function” to support its argument that the padlock-steel cable combination is a “theft detection device” under
The statute says, “‘Theft detection device’ means any electronic or other device attached to goods, wares, or merchandise on display or for sale by a merchant.”
[t]he legislature is, of course, entitled to act as its own lexicographer, and in this case it did so. However, when the legislative definition of a term itself contains ambiguity, we should hesitate before veering too far from the common meaning of that term.
The dictionary defines “detect” as “to discover or determine the existence, presence, or fact of.” Detect, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (unabr. ed. 2002); see also Jack v. P & A Farms, Ltd., 822 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Iowa 2012) (“If the legislature has not defined words of a statute, we may refer to prior decisions of this court and others, similar statutes, dictionary definitions, and common usage.” (quoting Iowa Dep‘t of Transp. v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 2002))). Here, the padlock-steel cable combination that Ross cut did nothing to detect or determine that Ross was committing theft, as it did not alert anyone to Ross‘s actions in removing the combination or loading the lawn mower into a rental truck to leave with it. A substantial period of time could have gone by before the Mills Fleet Farm even noticed that the lawn mower was missing if the store employee had not witnessed Ross and Lacey loading the lawn mower into their rental truck while he was arriving to work. It was the store employee—not the padlock-steel cable combination—who detected any theft. Ultimately, we agree with Ross that the padlock-steel cable combination around the riding lawn mower was a theft prevention device, not a theft detection device. Nothing in
If the legislature had intended to include devices that only served to prevent—and not detect—theft within the meaning of “theft detection device” in
For these reasons, we agree with Ross that the padlock-steel cable combination he cut with bolt cutters did not constitute a “theft detection device” under
As we have explained before, there are two possible remedies when the record does not contain a factual basis to support a guilty plea. First, “[w]here the record establishes that the defendant was charged with the wrong crime, we have vacated the judgment of conviction and sentence and remanded for dismissal of the charge.” State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 1999). Second, where “it is possible that a factual basis could be shown, it is more appropriate merely to vacate the sentence and remand for further proceedings to give the State an opportunity to establish a factual basis.” Id. In this case, we do not see a possibility of establishing a factual basis on remand. See Nall, 894 N.W.2d at 525. Accordingly, we vacate the guilty plea to
IV. Conclusion.
For these reasons, we vacate the sentence of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.