History
  • No items yet
midpage
Tom Brakke and Rhonda Brakke D/B/A/ Pine Ridge Hunting Lodge, and McBra, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources and Iowa Natural Resource Commission
897 N.W.2d 522
Iowa
2017
Check Treatment

*1 theory that Blessum not deal her did the law- honestly he

her reinitiated relationship false

yer-client upon the based a will

representation she needed prop- children inherit her

assure her would basis, too, substan-

erty. I conclude On this Bles- supported finding that

tial evidence thereby dishonesty and engaged

sum fiduciary duty his to Stender.

violated find juror a reasonable could

Because acquired he used information

that Blessum rela- scope lawyer-client

within the during disadvantage

tionship to Stender’s dishonestly and that Blessum

the assault lawyer-client relationship as

reinitiated the relation- pretext beginning a sexual theory liability

ship, based fiduciary duty should

breach jury. submitted

been

III. Conclusion. I I find expressed,

For the reasons have appeal. reverse I would

merit Stender’s negligence

the directed verdict both for a fiduciary-duty issues and remand

new trial. JJ., join this

Wiggins Appel, dissent. Brakke

Tom BRAKKE Rhonda Lodge, Ridge Hunting Pine

d/b/a/ McBra, Inc., Appellees, NATURAL DEPARTMENT OF

IOWA Re Natural

RESOURCES Commission, Appellants.

source

No. 15-0328 of Iowa.

Supreme Court

Filed June *4 Miller, General, Attorney

Thomas J. Dorff, Attorney L. Assistant David Gener- al, appellants. Douglas A. Brommel E.

Rebecca Graves, Brown, Winick, Gross, Gross Schoenebaum, P.L.C., Des Baskerville Moines, appellees. appealed, the landowners

APPEL, The DNR Justice. expressed For cross-appealed. the reasons presents challenge by land- This case below, DNR lacked statu- we conclude the an order issued emergency owners emergency order tory authority issue an Department Re- of Natural Iowa quarantine on land used as imposed (DNR) the landowners sources order also deer-hunting We preserve. a whitetail formerly as a white- quarantine land used the action of the DNR did after whi- conclude years for five tail deer test- property on the impermissible deer harvested amount tetail disease, or wasting for chronic positive ed Consti- under United States property CWD, order re- light or the tution Constitution. main- repair quired landowners chal- rulings, we the DNR’s these conclude an electric fence around tain failure to re- lenge the district court’s period. for the evi- open the record receive additional the DNR challenged affirm The landowners is moot. therefore dence We ap- emergency order an administrative court. judgment district Proce- Iowa Administrative peal under 17A.19(10) Act, Iowa section dures Code Back- I. and Procedural Factual *5 judge An issued administrative law ground. decision, finding proposed

a the DNR statutory authority to issue the the lacked A. Introduction: Positive CWD Test emergency imposing quarantine order Ridge Pine from Deer Harvested at the Upon by the Iowa Natural the land. review 1990s, Hunting Lodge. Tom In the and (NRC), NRC Commission the Resources Brakkes) (the Brakke established Rhonda finding the instead that ruling, reversed in deer-breeding Clear a whitetail farm statutory authority the DNR had sufficient Lake, bought they Iowa. Pine ap- the support to order. The landowners (Pine Hunting Ridge) in Ridge Lodge pealed. Iowa, $575,000.1 County, Davis the The district court NRC. reversed the hunt- purpose purchasing Brakkes’ emergency the or- The court held DNR’s lodge provide an market” ing was “end irrational, wholly un- illogical, der was and they Clear Lake for the deer raised the justifiable under Code section purchase, After the the property. Brakkes 17A.19(10)(0 acting the DNR was because improve $200,000 an spent additional legislature’s authority. grant the outside constructing a cabin and property by court, however, rejected the landown- including investing fencing, additional argument that DNR’s ers’ separate and south- fence the northern compensable order amounted prevent- of the property, halves ern under the United States and Iowa Consti- entering from from deer the north side ed Upon entering judgment, tutions. and south vice side record to reopen court also refused to versa. to present the DNR additional evi- allow property licensed as whitetail was that the certain dence landowners received deer-hunting Iowa Code preserve under indemnity payments from the United (USDA). majority 484C. The of the deer the Department Agriculture chapter States pur- property. For purchased half the south half of the 1. The north McBra, by through purposes appeal, owners will 1031 ex- chased Inc. change, personally be referred to as while Tom Rhonda Brakkes. and from placed Ridge September at Pine came 2012 Agreement. Brakkes B. On breeding their Clear Lake farm. September DNR Brakkes signed “Agreement an for Chronic Wast- susceptible deer are CWD. Whitetail ing Recovery Plan Ridge Disease at Pine type spongiform CWD transmissible Lodge” (Agreement). Hunting Under prion encephalopathy, also known as dis- Agreement, the Brakkes were allowed prevent The DNR seeks to ease. carry planned Ridge out hunts at through voluntary agree- Pine spread CWD breeding statutory September 8, 2012, ments with between farms and scheduled regulation deer-hunting pre- Brakkes, however, whitetail December 2012. The serves. See Iowa Code 484C.12. were install required jointly with DNR electronic fence inside the perim- Originally, participated in a Brakkes existing eter of surrounding fence Pine voluntary program CWD at their Clear Ridge, split evenly with the costs between breeding they Lake farm so could trans- Ridge. the DNR Pine After construc- port and sell their deer to others. With fence, tion of the electric the Brakkes were hunting operations success their at Pine solely responsible for fence repair in 2012 enroll- Ridge, the Brakkes ceased DNR maintenance. staff was to conduct breeding ment of the Clear farm in Lake weekly perimeter and inspections, fence voluntary program they CWD because repairs all identified longer selling no staff were the business Brakkes, be submitted operations. writing deer to other Brakkes however, samples completed by the twenty- continued to Brakkes within submit from all testing deer Pine four harvested hours. Ridge required section by Iowa Code Further, Agreement provided 484C.12. *6 Ridge completely Pine be depopulated 16, the notifica- On June DNR received all elk no January deer and later than testing tion from a that a deer CWD lab 2013. All animals for were be tested for Ridge positive from Pine tested CWD. disposed of in CWD and accordance with CWD-positive originally The deer came applicable regulations at the cost. Brakkes’ breeding from Brakkes’ in Clear the farm depopulation Once the was Ridge Pine confirming diagnosis, After the Lake. the Brakkes, complete, expense, the at their July DNR notified the on 19. Brakkes agreed facility to clean and disinfect the case, captive Prior to this no or wild deer compliance Finally, with DNR the rules. positive for had tested Iowa. ever CWD parties to a future agreed operational plan law, Department Iowa the Under Iowa developed conjunction to “be the with Stewardship of Agriculture and Land depopulation complete.” after (IDALS) regulates whitetail deer deer Agreement The term "of the the was from farms, regulates while the DNR deer until January date execution deer-hunting preserves.

whitetail One deer Pine additional harvested at 170.1A(2); 484C.2(2). § On Au- Code id. Ridge positive in December tested gust permission IDALS received hunts, CWD. After the conclusion of the Brakkes to kill the and some test deer In Ridge depopulated Pine all its deer. the Lake at the Clear farm. One deer April 2013, all feeders were farm disinfected positive Clear Lake tested CWD. bleach, buried, point, At with excess feed was and some notice of IDALS issued a Agreement all ful- quarantine for the the terms Brakkes were Clear farm. exception—the parties Lake filled one did with Hearing agreement oper- on a “future E.The an Administrative and not reach the Natural Resource Commis- plan” depopulation after the ani- ational Appeal. sion mals. appealed Introduction. The Brakkes April On April 2013 Letter. C. In emergency order on June 25. a letter DNR. wrote

the Brakkes initiating appeal, letter the Brakkes stated, letter, you “As emergency order violated their claimed know, Ridge Pine the area utilized and United States Iowa constitutional hunting Hunting Lodge preserve is as a rights property rights other and because (5) quarantine.” five subject year to a (1) jurisdiction over the DNR lacked Pine “com- Brakkes letter noted that the had Ridge longer hunting no once was plied requirements Septem- all (2) preserve; the terms agreement.” The letter an- ber emergency compensa- order without if response no were received nounced taking; tion an were unconstitutional DNR, regard Brakkes from the would arbitrary, actions ca- DNR’s were requirements Agreement as sat- all pricious, and an abuse discretion. further isfied. Brakkes announced why cited six Brakkes reasons operating no they longer Pine would arbitrary capri- DNR’s actions were deer-hunting pre- Ridge as a whitetail First, they only cious. claimed limited serve. species may of deer contract number CWD limit meaningfully and CWD does By June the DNR discovered Second, growth species. Brakkes gates Ridge standing open at Pine were highly that CWD is not asserted infectious portions of the fence were dam- reservoir of there CWD the aged had been removed. Third, be fully wild that cannot eliminated. claimed more Brakkes there are harm- Emergency Order. On June D. ful deer for diseases affect which the issued the DNR order not impose DNR does such drastic meas- stop their decon- require Brakkes Fourth, ures. asserted Brakkes surrounding Pine struction fence materially emergency order would not af- immediately por- Ridge and restore the *7 Fifth, spread fect the CWD. the Brak- The damaged. tions of the fence that were previously kes the told claimed DNR them Brak- emergency required order also the removing no issues it had with the keep to close and all of the kes closed alleged Finally, fence. the Brakkes gates the DNR to authorize to access and Ridge separated Pine into was two sec- Ridge for duration in Pine a limited order property tions half of the and about was present on any may kill be the deer that exposed never CWD. Finally, emergency re- property. order hearing. 2. ease A Contested contested agree quired Brakkes submit and hearing beginning case was held No- plan designed to execute a ensure vember 18. Dale Garner DNR testi- within, not quarantined be and CWD fied he understood that the USDA indem- beyond, Ridge. spread Pine nification plan compensating owners of gates June the Brakkes closed the On positive deer as a killed result CWD Ridge repaired the On at Pine and fence. longer tests no available. was Neither Iowa 11, however, seen general deer in June wild were nor DNR or the IDALS had plan. an indemnification inside the fence. that, power as presented granting impose

The DNR evidence them the five- quarantine, result of the market year quarantine preserve value on “the all and as Ridge property remaining Pine real had de- animals in- located within the $165,000. irrational, by appraiser clined The DNR’s preserve” illogical, was fected wholly unjustifiable testified that she not had calculated the because the inter- extended, lost business in not pretation enlarged, the Brakkes’ changed value being to operate legislature’s able intent. as hunting preserve. Appeal NRC. February On presented from

The Brakkes evidence appealed proposed DNR decision. experience finance with in On expert hunting April parties submitted a sec- operating joint- leases that the ond stipulation regarding income Pine the submis- Ridge any year quar- for the without sion of parties additional evidence. The. restrictions, “disagree[d] antine or been they would have noted about relevan- $157,537. operated cy finding,” If Brakkes had but “[a] wild har- deer thp Pine a farm Ridge hunting as instead in County, early vested Allamakee preserve $22,021. they would have lost positive The December 2013 for Chronic tested - expert five-year Wasting finance parties calculated-the to- Disease.” The submitted NRC, hunting tal Pine briefs Ridge income of as a an unrecorded preserve $917,309, five-year hearing May while held on Ridge total of Pine farma would income as On May- upheld the NRC the DNR’s $100,465.If negative oper- the Brakkes order. commission found free-range Ridge hunting Pine as a ated not their burden had met no operation, fencing captive ani- demonstrating that Iowa Administrative mals, five-year income would be 571—115.10, authorizing Code rule cross-examination, $143,307. the fi- On five-year quarantine preserve “on the not expert nance he was a certi- admitted all remaining animals located within the public ap- fied or a accountant licensed preserve,” infected was not authorized praiser, analysis he conducted chapter 484C. commission admitted was not a valuation. business that chapter explicitly does not state 484C January hearing quaran- After final land is to be tined, the Brakkes and but it to because the entered a did need stipulation duty gave to submit the DNR the additional evidence. statute also stipulation prevent spread stated that December commis- CWD. held, common the Brakkes had all the re- sion a matter of sense killed evidence, maining Ridge quaran- Pine given deer at and the DNR and the scientific prevent tine on samples required all adult collected land spread any deer. CWD was CWD. detected *8 samples. of NRC Action. F. Review Judicial judicial'

On The for review February petitioned law Brakkes administrative (ÁLJ) 27. On judge proposed her of the decision on June issued decision. NRC’s jurisdic- for to The DNR lacked DNR moved leave ÁLJ ruled December tion to the NRC. to order. The evidence present issue additional had volun- chapter alleged ALJ 484C The the Brakkes determined Iowa DNR Code at the Clear only quarantine tarily depopulated to deer authorized DNR their whitetail,” 2014 and August not the were preserve “diseased land. Lake farm in Thus, by the $917,100 interpretation paid 484C.12 indemnification DNR’s as court.” Renda motion. same results the district Brakkes The resisted

USDA. Comm’n, Rights motion Iowa Civil N.W.2d court denied the v. The district (Iowa 2010). 18, stating anticipate may court it did not The district December any agency evidence grant for additional if the action properly the need relief to the issues. rights for it address prejudiced order substantial action agency and if the' falls petitioner ruling court issued The district criteria in section one listed within commis- reversing the February (n). 17A.19(10)(a)through ac- additionally ruling the DNR’s sion the United taking under tions were agency’s interpre defer to “We court

States or Iowa Constitutions. legislature in- of law has tation when the vested with the DNR had been found interpretation in the authority clearly the DNR’s vested that terpretive and thus only Kay-Decker, discretion.” interpretation agency’s law would “irrational, 222; Renda, 11; or illogical, it reversed if was 784 N.W.2d at N.W.2d court, however, 17A.19(11)(c). unjustifiable.” § wholly also We see Iowa Code irrational, wholly illogical, and was interpretation agency’s found will overturn inter- for the DNR to have unjustifiable if the only agen it has law when discretion authority preted it the give “irrational, illogical, cy’s interpretation hunting preserve quarantine unjustifiable.” wholly Iowa Code specified authority only chapter 17A.19(10)(/,);Renda, 484C § N.W.2d at 11. white- preserve quarantine “diseased 484C.12(1). tail.” Code While See Iowa The standard of review consti prevent legislature intended claims, including respect tutional with CWD, clearly spread of did legislature City takings, is de novo. Harms v. Sib give not intend to the DNR unfettered 2005); (Iowa ley, Blu 702 N.W.2d quarantine any land that came authority City Inv. v. West Des menthal Trusts The court into contact infected deer. 2001). (Iowa Moines, 636 N.W.2d actions were not held that the DNR’s also Brak- because invasion Authority Statutory III. specifi- both property temporary,

kes’ Quarantine Land Where Whi- cally taking per and also as a se Positive tetail Deer Test fac- taking involving the Penn Central2 CWD. tors. parties A. con Introduction. appealed court’s The DNR the district scope “quarantine” of DNR au decision, test cross-appealed. thority section under Iowa Code 484C.12. II. Standard Review. point quarantine Brakkes out the au thority only preserve agency deci extends whitetail “Judicial review deer, suggests the power section while the DNR governed sions is Iowa Code deer nec Bd. whitetail Kay-Decker 17A.19.” State (Iowa Review, essarily power includes the to exclude deer Tax 2014). from reserve where CWD has “apply the standards of section We 17A.19(10) if discovered. to determine we reach the been *9 York, Transp. City L.Ed.2d 631 Co. v. New Penn Cent. 98 S.Ct. 438 U.S. 104. 124. Statutory B. lation. plan Framework. The designed shall be reduce and then eliminate the reportable provisions Relevant the Iowa Ad- disease, prevent spread and to appeal ministrative Procedures Act. This plan disease to other animals. The must brought Iowa under the Administrative developed signed within sixty Procedures Act. Iowa Under Code section days pre- after a determination that the 17A.23(3), only shall agency “[a]n serve population whitetail is affected authority delegated or discretion or con- with plan the disease. The must address upon by ferred law agency and shall population management and adhere expand authority or its enlarge or adopted rules by the department. The beyond delegated discretion powers plan must be as a or formalized memoran- upon agency.” conferred agreement dum of executed the land- 2. Statutory authority NRC and owner landowner’s veterinarian and chapter DNR. Iowa Code 484C generally the epidemiologist. plan The must be grants authority regulate pre- approved by department. 484C.2(2). § serve whitetail. Code Iowa The statute “preserve 484C.12(2). § defines whitetail” as Id. kept hunting preserve.” a “whitetail on a quarantine 3.Rules arising related to 484C.1(8). §

Id. statute defines a has promulgated CWD. The DNR hunting preserve as “land where land- rule power impose quar- related keeps preserve owner part whitetail as antine as a result of an outbreak of CWD. business, if purpose business’s provides, The rule provide persons opportunity with the A positive for wasting test result chronic hunt preserve whitetail.” Id. disease in a will result minimum of a 484C.1(6). § five-year quarantine preserve Iowa Code section 484C.12 concerns remaining all animals located within the 484C.12(1) testing for pro- CWD. Section preserve. No animal infected movement vides, in or preserve out shall occur purchased, Preserve whitetail are during quarantine period. confined, released, propagated, or sold Iowa Admin. Code r. 571—115.10. by a hunting preserve shall be free language of the rule is different reportable diseases for considered wild- than .that Iowa Code under section ... department may provide life. 484C.12(1). 484C.12(1) section Iowa Code quarantine for preserve of diseased provides may provide for the DNR whitetail that the health of threaten ani- “diseased, preserve white- populations. mal tail,” for provides five-year while the rule 484C.12(1). 484C.12(2) § Section re- “quarantine on and all preserve re- plans lates to eradication diseases. It maining within animals located the infect- provides, Compare preserve.” ed Iowa Code landowner, or the landowner’s 484.12(1), Admin. r. Code veterinarian, epidemiologist des- 571—115.10. ignated by department develop shall plan eradicating reportable C. dis- Positions Parties. The among argues ease whitetail DNR3 popu- the district court erred collectively parties 3. Both the DNR will and the NRC were named refer to both as the convenience, parties litigation. For we *10 argument response to the Brakkes’ irra- In that the DNR was it concluded when meaning of Iowa sec- plain Code that the to tional, wholly unjustifiable illogical, and DNR clearly deprives tion 484C.12 as section 484C.12 interpret Iowa Code case, argues jurisdiction in this the DNR authority quarantine to granting the DNR a whole. the statute as we must view Ridge. Pine “hunting context, legislature’s use “quaran- that the argues DNR word The not “preserve whitetail” do preserve” and 484C.12(1)must section in Iowa Code tine” respect intent legislature’s with reveal to the only applying as understood See id. The “quarantine.” the term originally Pine that were whitetail deer restricting access DNR asserts physical property to the Ridge, also but “quarantine.” is inherent the term space Ac- itself, present. no deer are when even evi- to the points also scientific The DNR DNR, that cause prions cording to the continuing showing it dence introduced environ- persist in the are known CWD The prion-contaminated areas. virulence infected time even after all for some ment disputing the Brakkes’ DNR concludes or the removed deer have been of CWD a disease characterization hunting pre- operating as has ceased populations on deer impact low killing all The asserts that serve. DNR industry. hunting disinfecting the cleaning and deer and then agency Brakkes state when an only part fully effective are premises juris- authority, it acts without exceeds of CWD. response to outbreak diction, therefore such acts are void. provide order to DNR maintains Here, argue that under CWD, wild deer effective containment 484C.12, language of Iowa Code section premises for an kept out must be only “pre- jurisdiction over has DNR pre- of time order period extended “hunting preserves,” serve whitetail” becoming them from infected. vent id. defines. See which 484C.1(6), (8). § Brakkes assert otherwise, Interpreting power only impose DNR has asserts, irrational, illogical, is itself preserve “quarantine of diseased whitetail” unjustifiable ignores wholly it because popula- health animal threaten legislature intent of the express 484C.12(1). § tions. Id. particular threat combat due CWD animal poses to the of Iowa’s health dispute the DNR’s focus The Brakkes populations. populations, including the wild The Brakkes “quarantine.” on the word particular out no other points The DNR cannot be the word suggest the focus but chapter 484C disease is mentioned “quarantine instead “quarantine” but CWD, special indicating disease section whitetail” under diseased legislature. Code concern to the See Iowa 4840.12(1). as of Brakkes note that DNR, it would According 484C.12. to the date of the June legislature so con- make no sense order, any “diseased they did regu- deny Ridge, CWD to the state Pine cerned with preserve whitetail” hunting preserve. latory ability protect longer authorities the itself was no Brakkes, lose path- agencies population primary According from a whitetail disease, licenses when license jurisdiction name- over way for transmission of the being ends, only exception with the ly exposure prion-contaminated land. age. singular suggests us- DNR unless context

533 legislature provides expressly required the for con- date rule by a is to show clear tinuing jurisdiction. convincing evidence that the rulemak- ing beyond was the agency’s statutory au dispute signifi- The Brakkes the also thority. Davenport Cmty. Sch. v. Dist. of the cance on of Iowa’s CWD health- Rights Comm’n, Iowa Civil 277 N.W.2d According of population whitetail deer. (Iowa 907, 1979) 910 (suggesting the stan Brakkes, already a low the exists at CWD dard is the same as “substantial evi in the population, level deer no wild dence”); Dep’t Schmitt v. Iowa Soc. showing ag- negative scientific evidence of Servs., (Iowa 739, 1978) N.W.2d 744 263 gregate effect of on popula- CWD deer (analyzing agency’s whether administrative argue any tions. The Brakkes also “beyond rule authority delegated the was mitigated by be harm CWD causes can it”); Bonfield, Arthur Earl Iowa ordinary, disease-management animal Administrative Procedure Act: Back techniques—a five-year quarantine is not Construction, ground, Applicability, Pub scientifically justified. Law, lic to Agency Access the Rulemaking that, The Brakkes stress before Process, 60 Iowa L. Rev. 908-09 order, is- DNR had never (1975). quarantine any nor instructions sued indicating quar- there was a grant While deference to we agree- property. antine Under the agency’s interpretation of the statute when parties signed, permit- ment the deer were legislature has clearly vested that in Ridge, thereby enter Pine ted and leave terpretation in agency, ultimately suggesting quarantine place. not in interpretation and of construction a statute argue The Brakkes also that because the is an issue for the court to decide. Office of ability it not DNR believed did have the Bd., Consumer Advocate v. Utils. Iowa 744 gates it Ridge close the at Pine once (Iowa 2008); N.W.2d 643 accord gates open, learned were did Schmitt, 263 In interpret at N.W.2d quarantine Ridge had believe Pine ing authority of grant statutory jurisdiction or to take action on own its beyond agency, we “will not look the ex against Ridge. Pine DNR’s claim if press terms the text of statute existed a matter of law plain meaning statute clear.” prior' to the surrénder their Brakkes’ Inc., Holdings, Neal Annett v. 814 N.W.2d is, Brakkes, according license belied (Iowa 2012). plain 519 A is not by the facts. or “if clear reasonable minds differ could D. Framework Assess meaning or be as to uncertain Validity ment the Substantive Hill, Carolan v. 553 statute.” N.W.2d Agency agency “pre Rule. An rule is 1996). (Iowa provisions “The plain the party challenging sumed valid unless by statute cannot altered administrative proves rule “rational agency” ‘a could Schmitt, rule.” 263 N.W.2d not conclude the rule was within its dele ” gated authority.’ agency possesses Ad An com Outdoor no Meredith vert., Dep’t Transp., Inc. v. Iowa 648 mon or powers. inherent law Branderhorst (Iowa 2002) Comm’n, Milh State (quoting Highway N.W.2d v. Iowa 1972). Vorhies, (Iowa power olin N.W.2d N.W.2d (Iowa 1982)); power granted see Iowa agency also Med. Soc. v. limited to the 40; Nursing, Bd. also Holland v. N.W.2d statute. see (Iowa 2013). State, 161, 163- party seeking to invali- 253 Iowa Likewise, ‘unreason- may ignore produce construction would court or ‘un- impose or ‘absurd’ or language a statute and able’ ‘unworkable’ clear guise ‘unlikely’ clearly of con- inconsis- through just’ result

its own ideas *12 struction, way to if it best purposes policies even is the tent (footnotes achieve a de- 115-19 promote public question.” welfare and act in Id. at omitted). Holland, at 164. sirable result. is to It at the outset important E. Discussion. distinguish interpreting ambigu between interpretation Straightforward statutes to results ous absurd avoid straightforward A language. legislative to declining terms of a enforce literal language of Code sec- reading of the universally absurdity. to avoid It is statute supports posi- tion 484C.12 the Brakkes’ statutory accepted that terms are where “quarantine” cannot be tion. The term interpret ambiguous, courts should statutory language from the

wrenched in a fashion to reasonable avoid statute term is modi- “quarantine” it. The follows 46:7, (“All § results. at 279 absurd See id. phrase “of by fied diseased a agree finding courts apparently 484C.12(1). § It See Iowa Code whitetail.” ambiguity opens statutory construction allow for of nondi- does not familiar, interpretive range the full that are not seased whitetail whitetail tools.”). preserve whitetail. in absurdity The true doctrine argues logical The DNR the natural and a Under the ab volves different scenario. reading produce would results. The absurd doctrine, surdity court declines follow question absurdity doc- arises whether the the literal terms of the statute avoid support trine should be invoked here to 45:12, § at 115. As absurd results. See id. DNR’s administrative rule and the Sutherland, by noted a different upon it is order question proceed upon from courts how based. finding ambiguity. Id. is where the Here absurdi- 2. Overview doctrine absurdity doctrine becomes controversial. good ty. absurdity has a The doctrine may To what extent a court evade or pedigree. Statutory Construc- Sutherland ignore the literal terms statute to instance, tion, ordinarily, for notes that poor pub simply avoid a result that is not statutory ambiguous language should be but is it policy, lic so unreasonable that in a produces construed fashion that the legis could have been intended Singer 2A result. J. & reasonable Norman limit of lature reflects the inherent Statutory Singer, Shambie Statutes & process various legislative appli to foresee (7th 45:12, 104-06 ed. Construction cations of a statute? 2014) Statutory Con- [hereinafter rev. jurisdictions 3.Caselaw other goes But further. struction]. Sutherland applying absurdity doctrine. The cases of Sutherland, According may courts use Supreme the United Court States a “variant of the ‘reasonableness’ rule approach between a oscillated textual ambiguity even absent ... when an act’s legislative parsing hews a close texts clear, plain, meaning produces literal approach a more purposeful unintended, absurd Id. at 115. result.” construction statutes. Sutherland instructs that courts find it goes for departure Support absurdity “fundamental” from liter- doctrine justified al as far as In construction “when such a back United States Kirby, hiring Court had occasion the rector. Id. at absurdity ponder the doctrine. U.S. 7 S.Ct. at 514. The Court’s to apply refusal L.Ed. 278 Wall. particu was transaction “ case, a crime ‘know- statute made striking larly as the statute contained a ing[ly] wil[l]fully’ obstruct or retard “actors, specific exception artists, lec mail.” passage of the Id. at 485. The turers, singers, and domestic but servants” question enforcement whether law clergy did include exception. officer a mail who arrested carrier 458-59, S.Ct. at 512. The rec Court murder Id. at violated statute. 487. ognized linguistic argument “great had *13 Kirby The said no. It cited the Court Id. force,” yet stated that cannot think “we Puffendorf, Enlightenment philosopher congress to hiring intended denounce” the who a stating concluded that law “whoever 459, of a religious rector. Id. 12 at at S.Ct. pun- in drew blood the streets should be Court 512. The of purpose declared the severity” ished with utmost did prevent statute was of “cheap, influx apply surgeon trying to a who was unskilled labor.” Id. at at S.Ct. 513. perform per- therapeutic bloodletting on a Further, the Court pur declared that a Id.; son who fell the street in a fit. down pose against religion imputed could not be Sollors, see M. Error: David The onWar 465, legislation. Id. at 12 S.Ct. at The Scrivener’s Error Doctrine Tex- 514. tual Confronting Criticism: Errors Supreme The Court revisited ab Texts, Literary Statutes and 49 Santa surdity v. doctrine Public Citizen Unit 459, (2009) (noting Clara L. Rev. 463 n.19 Justice, Department ed States 491 U.S. Kirby referencing Court was work of 440, 2558, S.Ct. 109 105 L.Ed.2d 377 jurist of the Samuel von Pufen- German (1989). question in dorf). that case was The Court also an cited Edwardian Advisory whether the Federal Committee example prisoner of guilty that a is not escape prisoner justice department’s of Act applied when the breaks out a Kirby, of prison Kirby on fire. 74 at solicitation U.S. 487. views committees it examples and the cites Bar on various stand the American Association proposition broadly ap- 443, a judicial ivorded and nominees. Id. at 109 S.Ct. at parently nar- unqualified may statute The literal of the statute terms would, rowly construed avoid absurd results scope any have drawn within notwithstanding the literal terms or group persons more who two advised statute. branch. Id. President executive 452, Brennan, at 109 at 2566. S.Ct. Justice Supreme Court another considered Court, this result writing for declared departure a stat- from the literal terms of Congress intention it was not the Trinity in Holy ute Church v. United prevent political actors from the would States, 457, 12 143 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed. U.S. Id. at to conduct their affairs. freedom Holy 226 Trinity, In In escaping 109 at 2566. the literal S.Ct. that on Court whether statute considered statute, Brennan words of the Justice cited foreign- prohibited importation its face Hand, wrote, who once “[I]t ers into Learned perform States “to United surest one of the indexes of any labor or to a mature applied service kind” developed jurisprudence not to make a English who Id. at church hired rector. statutory lan- Id. at dictionary.” 12 fortress out S.Ct. guage Yet, (quoting 109 at 2567 Cabell v. Mark unqualified. Id. the Su- S.Ct. (2d Cir.), ham, preme aff'd, F.2d 326 apply Court held statute did not narrowly 166 of construed—the a statute were L.Ed. S.Ct. U.S. meaning seemingly ex- (1945)). statute was beyond meaning panded its literal save opinion, Kenne concurring Justice See id. the statute self-destruction. dy version presented narrower compelling gist King is stat- 470-71, 109 Id. absurdity S.Ct. doctrine. King not commit suicide. thus utes do J., concurring). (Kennedy, Accord at 2575 recognition although to a amounted ing Kennedy, plain words Justice interpretation of plain language “the if the liter only could be avoided statute presumption enjoys a robust in its “patently interpretation lead to al would favor, legislative it is also true [a consequences” under circumstances absurd instance, cannot, body] every be counted quite impossible Congress “it where or to on to said it meant have what result ... have intended the could Abramson, FBI meant v. what said.” alleged absurdity is so clear as where 615, 638, U.S. S.Ct. (quoting most anyone.” be obvious (O’Connor, J., dissent- L.Ed.2d 18, 27, Brown, United States 333 U.S. (footnote omitted). ing) (1948)); see L.Ed. 442 S.Ct. *14 Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 Glen pulsating through A factor 1001, (2006) 1047 [hereinafter L.J. Ind. absurdity some cases is the federal desire Staszewski], Holy to avoid constitutional conflict. Trini ty application although implies as the ab at least that the Finally, labeled doctrine, hiring Supreme ap Court of the surdity the statute rector issues, King might First plied concepts similar to it in v. raise Amendment see 465, 514, Burwell, U.S. -, 2480, 192 143 135 S.Ct. U.S. at 12 S.Ct. at 576 Care majority 483 In the Affordable Public Citizen discusses need L.Ed.2d engage Ex meaning phrase “an of the executive mean Act, the branch free change by ingful political under [42 established the State communications disclosure, 453, am at particularly public see 491 U.S. 109 18031]” U.S.C. was not at -, opinion). on at As biguous, (majority at least face. 2566 Id. S.Ct. noted 2482, court, -, “by by one appellate at 2489. The term statute’s 135 S.Ct. absurd, by meaning perhaps is plain seem to include un State” does -, constitutional, “the Government.” Id. at resort extrinsic materials Federal by appropriate. 2490. As Jus is v. 135 Chief United States Romero- S.Ct. noted Bustamente, 1104, (9th Roberts, arguments 1109 337 F.3d Cir. tice “Petitioners’ 2003). meaning tendency supported This plain by about is [the section] at -, strong.” legislative 2495. notion if the branch Id. 135 S.Ct. at wishes are Yet, rights sepa Justice concluded the Chief Roberts trench constitutional phrase powers, only ration so specific read must do should be narrow ap un the clearest of intentions. Such an broadly any exchange more include Act, proach tends to confrontational including der those established use less at -, tool statutory construction as by the Federal Government. Id. strengthen underenforced, 135 Chief Justice noted constitutional at 2496. S.Ct. Staszewski, 81 Ind. Affordable Care See L.J. purpose norms. insurance improve Act was health

markets, destroy not to them. although in commentary, appli- As noted Trinity, absurdity principle King—unlike Holy cation contest- Kirby, courts, terms even those who the broad ed federal advo- and Public Citizen where

537 approaches textual or cate literal endorse avoidance results is a con unreasonable contexts; in at least See principle some strategy. interpretive ventional But this is Dougherty, Absurdity M. Veronica not always true. As the Hawaii noted Limits Defining Literalism: the Absurd Court, “departure from literal Interpreta Result Principie Statutory justified construction when such con tion, 127, 44 L. Am. U. Rev. 128 & n.6 struction produce would absurd and (1994) Dougherty]. in For [hereinafter result,” unjust clearly inconsistent with the stance, in v. Laundry Green Bock Ma v, purposes of the statute. Pac. Ins. Or. Go., chine staunch textualist Scalia Justice Ins., Auto. 53 Haw. 490 P.2d 901 rejected interpretation of literal Federal (1971). There many áre state court cases 609(a)(1) Rule of Evidence because it utilizing absurdity doctrine whén the produce would absurd 490 U.S. results. plain meaning language does not 504, 527, 1981, 1994, 109 S.Ct. 104 L.Ed.2d ambiguous, seem some of quite which are (1989) (Scalia, J., see concurring); See, e.g., State, remarkable. Maddox v. Dougherty, 44 Am. U. L. at 153-58. Rev. (Fla. 2006) So.2d (holding Similarly, Judge Easterbrook has written introduction of prohibiting traffic that the language may of a statute be bent “in any trial” any citations limited to trial only produces when the text absurd re dealing directly with offense); the traffic Inc., Honeywell v. sults. Neal 33 F.3d Mass, Wallace, Commonwealth (7th 1994), abrogated by Cir. Graham 730 N.E.2d (interpreting Cty. Soil & Conservation Dist. v. Water Wilson, phrase States ex rel. “trial United merits” to U.S. include the. S.Ct. judgment); L.Ed.2d default Spencer, State v. *15 (2005); see 44 Dougherty, Am. L.U. Rev. 535, (find 765, (1970) N.C. 173 S.E.2d 774 Posner, by 128 As Judge n.6. noted even ing “standing” in obstructing the' street' interpretive literalists in realize that “the walking street); traffic includes in the (we terpreter is compelled) free say would re Brewing Narragansett Co. re: Falstaff in depart the direction of sense” where Fire, 1047, (R.I. Brewery A.2d 1050 637 interpretation yield strict would re absurd statute, 1994) (holding authorizing release States, sults. Cent. S.E. Pen & Areas S.W. of juvenile of also “name address” Foods, Inc., Lady sion Fund v. Baltimore record). of underlying authorizes release (7th 1992). 960 F.2d Cir. If anything, absurdity case for the in many There is caselaw states may stronger doctrine be in state well. supports absurdity form of some than in legisla- courts federal courts. State See, Townsell, e.g., doctrine. Brock v. 309 part-time generally tures meet basis. 179, (Ark. 2009); 186 S.W.3d Collec Prof'l They generally employ do mecha- Lauron, Cal.App.5th tion Consultants v. 8 public hearings, of nisms extensive mar- 419, 958, (2017); 214 Cal.Rptr.3d Peo 433 kups, staff that have charac- review (Ill. Johnson, 615, ple v. 77 N.E.3d 619-20 congressional past. action in terized 2017); Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. v. 210 Further, large legislation of volumes state Mini, 382, 75, 55 Ill.2d 304 N.E.2d 78 passed waning are in often hours of a (1973); Peterson, v. Commonwealth session, legislative flurry of with a last 1166, (2017); Mass. 65 N.E.3d amendments, increasing minute thus Z.C., State ex rel. P.3d 2007). (Utah may passed cases, doubt, legislation of Many possibility no really ambiguity linguistic vetting. are full cases the without just other have done regarding absurdity. many as state courts Iowa caselaw over the decades. absurdity of our invoke cases Some statutory primarily a tool principle straightforward descrip A more Estate, Real interpretation. Mall See absurdity present tion of the doctrine was City Hamburg, 818 N.W.2d L.L.C. v. Olson, declared, in we ed v. where Case (Iowa 2012). interpre The use of give should The court effect a number tools determine tive letter, spirit law than the rather court textually plausible options the especially so where adherence really application of choose is not should or absurdity, injus letter result would doctrine, represents absurdity but contradiction, tice, or would lead to approach endorsed even conventional plain purpose would defeat opponents absurdity doc textualist act, provision or where inserted Manning, Absurdity trine. See John P. through inadvertence. Doctrine, 116 2419-20 Harv. L. Rev. 234 Iowa survey A Drake nn.122-23. recent & (1944). Holy Trinity, and Kirby, Public demonstrates that members Law Review has Citizen utilize what one scholar called beyond court look frequently of this Jellum, absurdity.” D. “specific See Linda interpretation in the text of statute Why Specific Absurdity Tex Undermines Wallace, Does Past statutes. Karen L. L. tualism, Brook. Rev. Empirical Analy Predict the Future?: An Specific absurdity is terms when the literal Recent sis Court Use a broadly framed statute have been History as a into Legislative Window spe absurd result avoid narrowed Iowa, Statutory Construction in Drake cific Id. at instances. (“The L. 266-67 court has Rev. absurdity engaged specific We have a willingness to consider a wide exhibited analysis For on a number of occasions. help range might of sources that it inter instance, in we Hoyman, State invoked statute pret legislative consistent with scope absurdity doctrine to narrow intent.”). that criminalized fraudulent practices public in the context of records. apparent response suggestions As an *16 (Iowa 2015). 1, 863 14 statuto- N.W.2d cannot tools of construction to we use ry any criminalize language seemed to text, depart legislative clear we have knowingly regardless incorrect of entry, a circular work-around sometimes utilized significance the maker in- and whether we if in which declare that the statute Id. to deceive. at 8. We concluded tended results, must produces “am- absurd be scope of literally, read when See v. biguous.” Co. Sherwin-Williams breathtakingly broad.” statute “would Revenue, 417, Dep’t Iowa 789 N.W.2d of Id. at thus the term interpreted 13. We (Iowa 2010). n.8 But it is 427 & doubtful “false” in the statute to mean really clear into that a text is transformed entry with was made intent deceive. Id. ambiguous solely con- an- one based absurdity at 15. doctrine We thus used the sequences of In application. cases where scope of criminal statute. narrow the employ ambiguity, we circular we are real- doctrine, ly applying absurdity Bearinger Depart true Similarly, v. Iowa namely, overriding Transportation, the text ment we considered result, just an prescrip avoid intolerable as the could invoke a whether driver tion-drug in Kir- United States Court did defense before administrative Citizen, seeking to driver’s li- by, Holy Trinity, and Public tribunal revoke her

539 (2014). 844 N.W.2d the state frequency cense. We occurs with less than a matters, legisla narrowing noted that in criminal construction. expressly provided prescription-

ture for a recognized We also seem have Yet, at drug defense. Id. 107-08. a similar statutes should not contain the seeds of provided was not for in the defense admin instance, their own For destruction. we process istrative to license revoca related have stated that “when a interpreta literal tion. Id. at 109. Under the driver’s license tion of a statute results in absurd conse statute, revocation revocation could occur quences that undermine clear purpose “any amount controlled sub statute, an ambiguity arises.” Sher present person.” is in the Id. at stance 107 win-Williams, n.8; 789 N.W.2d at 427 see 321J.2(1)(e) (quoting (empha Iowa Code Hopkins, also State v. 465 N.W.2d added)). In order to sis avoid absurd re (Iowa 1991) (noting we strive arrive at a sults, scope we narrowed the the term construction that will best effectuate its “any amount” to exclude amounts it); purpose than defeat Crow rather v. body duly prescribed a result (Iowa 1972). Shaeffer, 199 N.W.2d ingested prescription drugs. Id. at 110. vein, In a similar our cases older recognized some what have called the com Finally, in Iowa Institute Insurance v. “spirit” mon equity law of the statute. Group Iowa Association Jus- Core Case, at at 234 Iowa N.W.2d tice, “all we construed term informa- spirit Our invocation of the statute product, attorney tion” to exclude work usually conjunction finding product, attorney-client, and work other ambiguous. statute is id. See privileged materials. 867 N.W.2d N.W.2d (2015). The literal terms the statute did any qualification. not have at 69. We recognized con- We have also narrow “all information” ambigu- declared to be problems. struction to avoid constitutional ous, language but plain enough. McGuire, 200 State v. Id. at narrowed statute to 73. We avoid (Iowa 1972); Falls, Cedar City Carroll results. Id. at 76. untoward 283-84, N.W. 655- possible A unconstitutional re- case, however, In we are asked tip might statutory sult is a factor that statute, scope narrow the but to from literal interpretation away reading expand plain beyond the scope mean of the statute. ing. presented This is in King, the scenario U.S. -, have, 135 S.Ct. 2480. We end, teaching find Sher- we occasion, expanded meaning of a stat win-Williams consistent with vast through interpretation in order ute majority of state and federal law and has *17 avoid an result. Hutchison absurd See vitality today. In Sherwin- continued Shull, (Iowa 2016) 878 N.W.2d Williams, noted that “the re- we absurd (favoring expansive interpretation of the sparingly sults should be used doctrine “meeting” promote underlying term judicia- because it entails the risk that the statute); Estate, of goals Mall Real ry displace legislative policy will the (applying expansive legislature N.W.2d at 199 inter speculation basis of that the of term pretation unmistakably the “material” achieve could not meant what it Nonetheless, statutory consistency). 2A (quoting it said.” at 427 Stat- 789 N.W.2d (7th 45:12, § say avoiding utory fair to literal terms at 105-07 seems Construction Sherwin-Williams, 2007)). Yet, in power in order to ed. we of statute extend the of better, thorough, as a more case views approval with what also cited Hawaii comprehensive states, more result. and am- In- statutory absurdity in not here. But we do see [E]ven absence deed, legisla- it is not uncommon that the departure from construc- biguity, literal Fur- process results in half measures. tive justified tion is construction when such statute, ther, plain meaning of the unjust re- produce an would absurd only to namely quarantine that applies in sult and the construction literal whitetail,” not is ab- preserve “diseased clearly action inconsistent particular is quar- The DNR itself admits surd. act. purposes of the policies step animals is one antine diseased (alteration (quoting in Pac. original) program in a control CWD. 901). Ins., 490 P.2d in this record case CWD established the ab The bottom line is great game-hunting concern in is of in Iowa surdity is established doctrine well community, but to be no clear there seems elsewhere, clearly always not though efficacy about various consensus utilized, in rare It articulated. can be reviewing efforts. After eradication cases, meaning of plain to overcome case, emerge in this one record does doctrine, how of a statute. The the words thinking, my can’t be!” gosh, "Oh only in ever, sparingly be used must considering plain legislative lan- confident the court is circumstances when guage. result legislature did not intend linguistic focus Iowa of the statu required by application literal on the animals than the land rather tory terms. regimes. in other regulatory CWD found absurdi- applying Discussion example, For law authorizes a Illinois light of these ty doctrine in this case. In until quarantine herd CWD-infected cases, considering now turn to we depopulated herd either the has been meaning of Iowa Code section 484C.12. It been no there has evidence CWD engage DNR expressly authorizes the for five from the date years the herd white- quarantine of “diseased case, that have the last and all animals tail.” Code There does Iowa 484C.12. died, slaugh- been euthanized or been ambiguity to be a lot here. The seem during period in the tered herd require- applies only if quarantine three were examined CWD. diseased, present: preserve, and ments are 85.120(e)(2) 8, § Ill. Admin. Code tit. blue-is-red-type Id. It whitetail. would (Westlaw through Reg. current Ill. vol. interpretation that the statute claim 21). provision quaran- There is no issue And, applies nondiseased whitetail. depopulated. after the herd tine has been whitetail, applies not to land. quarantine further note that at the time We could, enacted, plain perhaps, escape chapter there We Code 484C was applica meaning through legislative other that distin- words were models of animals absurdity principle. guished quarantine tion of the That between example, fighting seeks land. For issue case. through expressly to broaden Carolina statute author- absurdity doctrine North *18 quarantine exposed of It akin to izes of animals coverage. inclusion is then the at -, premises at 2496. the state. N.C. King, 576 U.S. affected within S.Ct. (West, § cur- The DNR from the 106-401 Westlaw seeks to release itself Gen. Stat. Reg. through chains of to rent S.L. of the 2017 verbal the statute achieve 2017-17 (en (a) Sess.). banc); of the D., Section statute authorizes In re Matthew 368 Wis.2d “quarantine any the to state veterinarian (2016). Indeed, 880 N.W.2d or exposed animal to a conta- affected might while more need to in be done 106-401(a). § gious Id. Under disease.” case, specific legislature may well have provision, quarantine this in remains 484C.12(2), relied on Iowa Code section any sick or effect diseased animal “until requires landowner, which or the land- of disposed has been properly veterinarian, epide- owner’s and DNR premises properly been cleaned have and miologist to develop plan for eradicating (b) authorizes disinfected.” Id. Section among preserve the disease whitetail veterinarian, in state consultation with the provision This population. suggests a reli- agriculture ap- commissioner of and with agreement ance on mutual a case-by- proval of to quarantine “ar- governor, remedies, for further case basis rather 106-401(b); § eas within the State.” see expansive government quarantine than the Nelson, High Andrew H. Stakes: Defend- authority suggested by the DNR. to ing Response North Carolina’s Conta- Diseases, gious 83 N.C. L. Rev. Animal also observe We some the features (2004), Further, a survey 263-71 may support application to tend regulations related administrative to CWD absurdity doctrine are not this present do not ex- cervids shows that some case. We note that the asks us to quarantines, some au- pressly authorize retract, government than expand, rather herds, quarantines only thorize but While we have occasion done power. so quarantines some authorize of both herds past doctrine, under absurdity See, premises. e.g., Ariz. Admin. Code argument we think it is a more difficult (Westlaw § through R3-2-405 current Ariz. when, a make than If statute is narrowed. (7)) Reg. (providing vol. issue .Admin. legislature regula- assert new wants -exposed for depopulation of animals powers. landowners, tory private over quarantine); CWD but no mention Further, expressly. so should do 9r3-17(a) (Westlaw Regs; Kan. Admin. cur- extent are issues at there constitutional 27, 2017) through Apr. rent No. Vol. here, they cut against stake a broad inter- (authorizing quarantine”); a “herd 2-4 Vt. pretation light (Westlaw § Code R. 316:XI current property interests deer farmers. 2017) through May (providing quar- for a premises). antine of decline herd We F. We therefore conclude Conclusion. passage quarantine write a related to that Iowa Code section 484C.12 should be law, into premises the Iowa ordinary meaning. according read only authorizes animals. consequence interpretation See Iowa Code 484C.12. agency statutory lacked the au- thority promulgate the administrative might The fact more have expanding scope quarantines rule grant been done does make five-year of lands for a fencing include authority legislature gave limited when all diseased period wildlife to interpret the DNR absurd. Our task is result, eradicated. As a statute, been improve Far it. See Wells Ct., agency authority issue the go Bank v. was without Super. 53 Cal.3d If Cal.Rptr. legis- this casé.4 the P.2d order court, interpretation 4. Like the we in the of the statute district decline to consid defererice Renda, er whether DNR or Even if NRC entitled to under 11-14. *19 542 regulatory taking under the United expand quarantine powers wishes

lature rule, is, by the DNR it of that suggested as Iowa Constitutions entitled States and course, so. just free to do compensation. them to B. Provisions. Constitutional Taking Under Due Process IV. Takings of the Fifth Amendment Clause or Clauses United States provides Constitution United States Constitutions. Iowa “private shall not taken be property A. Introduction. Under both use, just compensation.” public for without Constitutions, and Iowa United States Const, I, Article section 18 U.S. amend. V. just government required pay provides Iowa Constitution private compensation when “takes” “[p]rivate not be property shall taken public use. property U.S. Const. just first public compensation use without V; I, § Const. art. 18. The amend. made, being or to be secured made to Takings overarching purpose Clause thereof, damages owner as the as soon Constitution is “to bar the United States by jury.” be shall assessed Iowa Const. forcing people some Government I, § art. which, public in all alone to bear burdens not assert that stan- Brakkes do justice, should borne fairness and the Iowa takings dard under Constitu- a whole.” v. public Yancey as United tion is than that under the feder- different 1534, (Fed. States, 1539 Cir. 915 F.2d takings counterpart. al constitutional We 1990) Armstrong (quoting v. United apply therefore the established federal 40, 49, 1569, States, 80 S.Ct. 364 U.S. takings, but regarding standards reserve (1960)). L.Ed.2d right apply these in a standards Supreme has The United States Court than fashion different the federal courts. types takings. two different recognized Kooima, State 833 N.W.2d type direct government first involves (Iowa 2013); Racing Ass’n Cent. Iowa v. to “a property seizure of amounts (Iowa 2004). Fitzgerald, practical posses- [the ouster owner’s] U.S.A., Inc., 544 Lingle sion.” v. Chevron of the Parties. C. Positions Cit 528, 537, U.S. S.Ct. caselaw, point ing federal out (alteration (2005) original) L.Ed.2d regulatory takings occur when the v. S. (quoting Lucas Carolina Coastal (1) owner government requires the to suf Council, 505 U.S. 112 S.Ct. invasion, permanent physical no mat fer 2886, 2892, (1992)). 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (2) minor; completely deprives how ter Court, however, recognized has economically owner all beneficial use of second kind which occurs as jus property; her without sufficient regulation government result of be- requires tification owner dedicate a sufficiently comes onerous “its effect exchange portion of for a appropriation tantamount to direct or building permit. Lingle, See U.S. ouster.” (describing 125 S.Ct. at 2081 the first case, cross-appeal types takings “per regulatory se their two Tigard, takings”); City Dolan v. Brakkes assert the district court erred emergency finding U.S. S.Ct. order amounted afforded, we deference were nonethe- issue the order in this case. would authority less rule the DNR without

543 (1994) (involving permit rary con Laundry Kimball Co. L.Ed.2d nature. v. Unit- owner). States, 1, 7, A tak imposed property ditions ed U.S. S.Ct. (1949); ing may balancing also occur the L.Ed. 1765 United States Co., Transportation Petty 375-76, v. Motor factors Penn Central 327 U.S. 596, 598-99, (1946). City taking York indicate Co. New S.Ct. L.Ed. 729 104, 124, case, has U.S. cite a occurred. 438 98 S.Ct. Brakkes recent Arkansas (1978). L.Ed.2d 631 Fish Game & Commission v. United States, to familiar suggests government- factors be balanced under the which that (1) flooding may compensable. Penn Central test are the economic induced claimant, impact 519-20, regulation of the the U.S. 133 S.Ct. (2) (2012). in regulation the extent to the which L.Ed.2d 417 terfered with distinct investment-backed Brakkes also argue the emer expectations, the character gency regulatory taking order is a because government action. equivalent is the functional of ousting argue order emergency property

The Brakkes the the Brakkes their for a five- per regulatory taking se the year period, long because at least as the required Brakkes to maintain emergency place. According order the order Brakkes, gates both the fence and the at Pine emergency order hollows Ridge. In support argument, right their to “possess, out its use dispose” Loretto, v. Teleprompter property. Brakkes cite Loretto of their 458 U.S. 419, 102 435, 102 Corp., Manhattan CATV 458 U.S. S.Ct. at repeat 3176. The Brakkes Lor- emergency 73 L.Ed.2d 868 In S.Ct. that the order forces them to etto, fence, cable precludes forced maintain the landlord was allow them from conducting to install con company hunting property, television cable and on the 421- property. requires boxes on her Id. at an operational nection submit them 22, 102 plan effectively permit S.Ct. The United at 3168-69. that will DNR Supreme permanent all during Court found to control times States all activities occupation property quarantine. real physical five-year According to the Brakkes, taking. they amounted to Id. at compensable property cannot sell their to the DNR escape addition because S.Ct. at tentacles requirement away to maintain the fence and po restrictions will scare DNR emergency buyers. or gate, the Brakkes note the tential in physically authorized the DNR to der Next, argue kill property their wild Fur vade deer. strips as a qualifies order because it ther, any future the Brakkes observe economically property all beneficial operational plan necessarily prohibit would Lucas, in point Brakkes which use. The excluding person the Brakkes from Court that a property stated invasions, physical These property. nel upon owner “to sacrifice all econom- called Brakkes, according takings are ically uses in name of the beneficial just compensation. them to entitle is, good, property common leave his idle, recognize phys- economically DNR’s ... a tak- Brakkes has suffered permanent. ing.” U.S. at 112 S.Ct. at 2895. ical invasions are Nonethe- Brakkes, less, According point to two the record Brakkes World War government’s era con- there is no other II cases where case demonstrates premises hunting other than as a company demnation amounted use the land tempo- prohibits. order compensable takings despite preserve, the DNR theory, action de government must Finally, because it satisfies test, prive “all economi Penn the Brakkes assert owner Central *21 319, 122 emergency the order 535 U.S. impact cally of beneficial use.” economic extensive, in- has regulation been the 152 L.Ed.2d has S.Ct. Tahoe-Sierra, ex- Supreme their investment-based In terfered with the Court held product of pectations, the order was a of development and a moratorium that political considerations and not the- law. thirty-two for not property months did 2659. at See 438 at S.Ct. per taking. U.S. create a se at Brakkes, According the the district DNR Ta argues that S.Ct. declining taking to find a erred court that less recognizes anything hoe-Sierra Penn under Central. complete than elimination of value or a analyzed total loss be Penn must under response DNR focuses per and be Central cannot as se treated taking question compensable of a whether takings. See id. at at 1478. S.Ct. regu- se respect per With occurred. according The DNR that to the notes latory asserts the takings, the DNR record Court, Supreme such a United find States in- permanent physical not did establish a economically that ing use[ “all beneficial ]” deprive the Brakkes of vasion did govern a has been eliminated as result of all economic benefit. Lucas, “relatively action ment rare.” permanent physical of question On 1018, 112 at 2894. U.S. at S.Ct. invasion, emphasizes parade the DNR a argues The DNR that the Brakkes fail physical that stress inva federal caselaw of “all tempo deprivation economically show must permanent, be sions First, for beneficial use” two reasons. rary, compensable to be under the per se taking notes that a temporary DNR particular, In Takings Clause. the DNR addition, points Loretto, insufficient. the DNR that *22 takings government theories. The classic of no case in a “aware court has compensation taking is a requiring direct taking found a where in diminution value physical appropriation property, of “or the percent”). 50 was less than To the extent practical of ‘a equivalent functional ouster profits Brakkes claimed lost was the Lucas, of possession.’” [the 505 owner’s] proper of impact, measure economic (alteration 1014, U.S. at 2892 S.Ct. 112 at standing proposi- DNR cases for the cited original) (quoting Transp. Co. v. Chica tion consequential damages are not 642, (1878)). go, 635, 99 25 L.Ed. 336 U.S. takings recoverable in cases and thus taking, hand, on regulatory A the other should not for determining standard occurs regulation when becomes so a bur See, if taking e.g., a occurred. Kurth v. densome that its effect is “tantamount to a Dep’t Transp., 628 N.W.2d 6-7 of Lingle, direct or appropriation ouster.” 544 (Iowa 2001). 2081; U.S. at 125 S.Ct. Penn. Coal at Mahon, 393, 415, factor, Co. Under the v. 260 second Penn Central U.S. 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, (1922) 322 suggests (recognizing DNR 67 that investment-backed L.Ed. time); expectations takings not weigh regulatory do in favor of the first see a Estates, also taking. argues The DNR v. Easter Lake Inc. Polk (Iowa 1989) hunting County, 75 subject knew reserves were N.W.2d (“[Government notes, regulation. substantially action that for DNR purposes deprives considering person property, of a of the use of investment-backed expectation, test or may compensable is not a whole be a spe- part, whether government taking.”). solely cific regulation regu existed at This focuses on case investment, gs. latory of ques- time but critical “[t]he takin tion existing is whether extension of law positions As of can be seen reasonably possible.” could be foreseen types regulatory parties, there are three of States, Cienega Gardens v. United (1) takings per taking a play: arising se (Fed. 2007) (quot- F.3d 1288-89 Cir. -permanent from physical a invasion of ing States, Edison Co. v. Commw. United (2) per taking arising a se property, (Fed. 2001) (en 271 F.3d Cir. regulation all eco that denies the owner banc)). (3) nomically ownership, beneficial a factor,

On regulatory taking balancing the last Penn Central based DNR argues that the character of of three Penn Bor Central factors. government weigh action not Supervisors, does favor Bd. mann of (Iowa 1998); of taking. points The DNR out Craig that the see A. Peter son, possession ‘Takings’ Brakkes Regulatory maintained their Land Use Re right pos- Ap and maintained the visited: The New Court sess, lease, or sell property. Hastings proaches, L.J. 336-39 points purpose (sketching to the beneficent development however, council, prohib- takings at 2889. A coastal regulatory caselaw since Court’s Central). any improve- ited construction habitable Penn property. ments on the Id. The land devel- takings se per Merits of arguing the oper sought compensation, claim, invasions involving “physical regulation, though pursuant enacted or “all property” deprivation economi law, taking ” valid because denied use land. cally productive or beneficial economically produc- him all beneficial takings law begin with We review tive of the land. S.Ct. use by government involving physical invasions at 2890. Loretto, keyA 458 U.S. regulation. case Loretto, the owner 102 S.Ct. 3164. that a com- recognized Lucas Court building City apartment of a New York regulation occurs pensable requiring law challenged a York New economically of all viable “denies owner with the installation landlords interfere use of land.” Id. at S.Ct. at his prem cable facilities television them Tiburon, Agins v. (quoting City ises, payments from tenants demand 2138, 2141, *23 S.Ct. 447 U.S. television, permitting for cable (1980), other abrogated L.Ed.2d a cable payment from television demand 545, Lingle, 544 at grounds by U.S. in of an amount set company excess 2087). position justified, This S.Ct. at 423, Id. 102 S.Ct. at 3169. regulation. at explained, Court from a landown because that courts The Loretto Court noted lower view, being point totally deprived of er’s legitimate pub a had found the law served all of use of land is the the beneficial purpose, lic but that when there a held equivalent physical appropriation. Id. physical occupation authorized “permanent gov at at 2894. S.Ct. While taking action is by government,” the a proper be affect ernment must allowed to public or not it inter whether serves ty compensa by regulation values without 425-26, at at est. Id. S.Ct. 3170-71. tion, recognized takings Court ques Loretto Court turned relatively could “the rare situ occur under permanent a tion whether there was government deprived ations where the had physical invasion the facts present under economically a of all beneficial landowner 438, 102 Id. at S.Ct. at 3177. The Court ed. 1018, 112 uses.” Id. at at 2894. S.Ct. permanent a noted that landlords suffered Court Supreme considered the physical occupation in the form of the taking a question temporary of whether boxes, wires, plates, and bolts that affix deprived period that for a time installment to the roof the cable television be owner of all economic could a benefit building. in permanent a Id. Such Evangeli per taking. English se In First was, property stallation the landlord’s cal v. Coun Lutheran Church Glendale therefore, at taking. Id. at S.Ct. ty Angeles, Los Court held 3178. time that a the first landowner could concept regulation de that a damages period recover for the temporary prived a “of all property owner economi during regulation was which land-use cally productive beneficial or use” amount effective. 482 U.S. 107 S.Ct. per taking to a explored ed se was 96 L.Ed.2d Lucas, 1015, 112 505 U.S. at S.Ct. at 2893. Lucas, purchased English, appellant In church’s developer In land First buildings campground property intending develop coastal sin was flooded and 1008, 112 at at destroyed. Id. at 482 U.S. S.Ct. gle-family residences. S.Ct. flood, county response (“Nothing Compensation Just adopted suggests Clause prohib ‘takings’ an interim ordinance that must per- irrevocable.”). manent and ited the construction reconstruction any building protection in an interim flood English The First emphasized Court area, which included campground. that its was decision limited ordinances at at 107 S.Ct. 2381-82. There is no that deny property owner all use of opinion indication in the stated dura their and not delays “normal ordinance,” tion obtaining building permits, of the “interim if the changes ordi in zon- ordinances, ing variances, nance in fact Id. at included duration. the like which are before us.” U.S. at S.Ct. at 2382. at Additionally, S.Ct. the Court brought church claim California explained, once a determination has been court, state arguing the ordinance occurred, a taking made that gov- has camp- denied the church all use of the ernment retains ability choose to asking for ground just compensation. regulation, amend the regu- withdraw the Id. at Califor- 107 S.Ct. 2382. The lation, or exercise eminent domain. Id. But nia courts rejected the claim under Cali- government already when the has taken all precedent, fornia which established the use of property, duty provide has a only remedy for an that de- ordinance compensation period during prived a landowner the total of their use effective. Id. declaratory lands was relief or mandamus. English First While seems stand for

Id. at Califor- 2382. This S.Ct. govern proposition temporary *24 nia precedent compensation held was ment actions that eliminate all economical only sought if a available landowner had ly subject use of are property viable relief, declaratory the ordinance was held per taking analysis, a Fifth Amendment se excessive, government persisted and significantly the Court narrowed hold Tahoe-Sierra, enforcing regulation. English church ing Id. The First 535 328-29, at 122 at 1482. In Ta U.S. S.Ct. appealed Supreme United States hoe-Sierra, Supreme Court considered Court, arguing temporary regulatory group’s challenge to a two- landowners just takings require compensation under year, eight-month moratorium on new de 310, the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 107 S.Ct. 306, at velopment around Lake Tahoe. Id. at 2383. 122 at moratoria S.Ct. 1470. These were analysis prece a lengthy prior After planners land-use could enacted so dent, Court found that where develop plan the lake while takings deny all proper landowners use of 310-11, development. Id. at allowing new ty, there is no real difference between 122 at 1472-73. The landowners S.Ct. temporary takings permanent takings. and per both se claimed the moratoria were 318, (“ ‘[Temp takings takings Id. at at multifac- 2388 under S.Ct. 314-15, Id. at which, approach. Penn Central here, tored takings deny a land orar at 1474-75. S.Ct. property, owner all use of his are not permanent takings, different in from kind concluded the court had The district clearly requires which the Constitution met, not Penn factors but Central were compensation.”); see Diego 304, 107 also Gas & San U.S. English, First under 1003, Lucas, Elec. v. City Diego, Co. San 450 U.S. 505 U.S. S.Ct. the landowners entitled to S.Ct. 67 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. were (Brennan, J., months of dissenting) compensation thirty-two for the un- analyzed are instead tempo- se violations but they were the moratoria because Penn test. the multifactor Central economically der viable of all rarily deprived therefore at We Tahoe-Sierra, at S.Ct. 1478. 535 U.S. at of their land. use per takings se claim reject the Brakkes’ 316-17, at When 147-5-76. S.Ct. Brak- to consider whether the proceed cross-appealed, appealed parties the Penn takings claim under kes have a Penn Cen- appeal did landowners Central test. at at 122 S.Ct. tral issue. Id. rejected a cate- Court The Tahoe-Sierra takings claim 3. Merits of depri- temporary gorical, per se rule Central bal Penn under a multifactored of all economic uses

vations viable Central ancing test. Penn involved takings necessarily gives rise to a land City’s landmark application York New 321, 122 In- Id. at S.Ct. at claim. Central preservation law Grand stead, temporary depriva- stated the Court at at 98 S.Ct. Terminal. 438 U.S. analyzed must be tions use of law, of a piece the owner 2654. Under the fact-specific Penn Central under was property designated as a landmark The Tahoe-Sierra Court framework. Id. in a building maintain required to English by emphasiz- distinguished First prevented repair good state and was English in First ing that the issue was building altering the exterior occurred, only taking had but whether a approval the Landmarks absent required be- compensation was whether 111-12, Id. at Preservation Commission. taking temporary. Id. at cause 98 S.Ct. at 2653. 1482; English, see First S.Ct. Court, in summariz The Penn Central (“We at 2389 107 S.Ct. U.S. jurisprudence, ing its Fifth Amendment government’s merely that where the hold is no formula” emphasized “set there a tak- already worked activities “justice determining concerns result, ing....”). As a the Tahoe-Sierra require private property owner fairness” English stand stated First did not Court injuries for economic compensated to be oc- that a had for the proposition public action. Id. at caused *25 328, at 122 curred. 535 U.S. at S.Ct. Hemp v. (quoting at 2659 Goldblatt S.Ct. emphasized that Lucas did also Court 590, 987, 990, stead, 594, 369 U.S. 82 S.Ct. the support petitioners not the because (1962)). empha The Court 8 L.Ed.2d 130 eliminating all value of in Lucas government is re whether the sized that perma- “unconditional and the land was just compensation depends quired pay nent,” 122 temporary. not Id. at S.Ct. [in “upon particular the circumstances Lucas, 505 (quoting at 1483 U.S. at (alteration original) in case.” Id. that] 2891). 112 S.Ct. at v. Eureka (quoting States Cent. United authorities, con- on the above we Based 155, 168, Co., S.Ct. Mining 357 U.S. have to establish clude failed (1958)). Accord L.Ed.2d taking regulatory based either per a se Court, is ad hoc and inquiry the ing the theory or all eco- physical-invasion an Id. specific. fact theory. While the World nomic-benefit Nevertheless, Cen the Penn eases, First vintage by II buttressed War of several factors tral Court identified per or English, might imply suggest that significance.” Id. “particular temporary arise from tak- se can regulation of impact the The economic ings, more case Tahoe-Sierra the recent and, particularly, the claimant per the temporary takings holds that are We, however, regulation has inter- generally extent which have considered fered with distinct investment-backed the Penn two-part Central test be a course, are, of relevant con- expectations test, merging the first two de- factors So, too, is siderations. character in scribed Kaiser Aetna— A government “taking” may “ action. (1) regu- ‘[t]he economic impact readily more the interfer- found when and, lation particularly, on the claimant with property ence can be characterized regulation extent has a physical by government, as invasion interfered with distinct investment- arises from than interference some ” backed expectations[,]’ “the public program adjusting the benefits government ‘character of the action’— promote life to and burdens economic for instance it whether amounts to good. common physical invasion af- merely instead omitted); (citations Fitzgarrald accord through fects interests ‘some City City, 492 N.W.2d public program adjusting the benefits (Iowa 1992); & Elec. Iowa-Ill. Gas Co. v. promote burdens of economic life Comm’n, Iowa State Commerce ” good.’ the common (Iowa 1987). Even when a Harms, (alteration at 98 702 N.W.2d public regulation important poli furthers original) Lingle, 544 U.S. at (quoting cies, may “so it nevertheless frustrate dis 2082). 125 S.Ct. at expectations tinct as to investment-backed Cent., to a taking.”

amount Penn 438 U.S. apply We now turn to the Penn Central 2661; Coal., at see S.Ct. at Penn. test no before us. There case at at 160. A taking U.S. 43 S.Ct. doubt impact there has been economic if may regulation destroys be found order this case. But expectation” “primary owners land, the value of testified Cent., parcel. investors Penn 16.4%, expert, only DNR’s has declined 2665; see 438 U.S. S.Ct. also generally weigh enough heavily Health, Bd. Kasparek Cty. v. Johnson support taking. As finding See CCA 1980) (Iowa (empha 288 N.W.2d socs., Although 667 F.3d at the land Central). sizing element of Perm hunting cannot preserve, be used as States, In Kaiser Aetna v. United prior had value and other uses to becom Court the Penn Central fac summarized ing hunting preserve and has value and “the economic impact regula tors as during quarantine period. other uses tion, its in interference with reasonable there is little doubt While expectations, vestment backed and the may profits, Brakkes lost yard government action.” 444 character *26 in takings ordinarily stick a case is lost 164, 175, 100 62 U.S. S.Ct. of Acre value See property taken. Rose (1979); Connolly L.Ed.2d 332 accord v. Farms, States, Inc. F.3d v. United 559 211, Corp., Pension Guar. 475 U.S. Benefit 1260, (Fed. 2009). held 1268 We have Cir. 224-25, 1026, 1018, 106 89 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d consequential damages are not recov (1986). progeny 166 Aetna and Kaiser .its Kurth, in takings erable 628 cases. given N.W.2d descriptions rise to of have Penn at 6-7. further stated that “the We have involving three-part balancing as a Central uncertain, profits of are too Pomeroy, a business test. See Adam R. Penn Central many contingencies to Balancing depend upon 35 A Part too Years: Three After Rule?, any safely accepted be of the or a 22 evidence Test One Strike Fed. Cir. . (2013) property upon of B.J. usable value 677 550 in determining in on.” Iowa be considered is carried Wilson v. whether

the business Comm’n, expectations are reason 249 Iowa vestment-backed Highway State (Iowa 1958). We 201 P.3d able.” Mont. profits may lost that claims of “appellants conclude court concluded Kafka determining a in only as factor reasonably anticipated that considered should have alleg- of the land which has the lost value industry might be phased Farm the Game Acre, Rose 559 F.3d edly See been taken. safety-related con out due to health and at 1272. 32; Id. at see also Buh cerns over CWD.” State, v. mann 348 Mont. P.3d evidence, on the we find the eco- Based (2008) of (noting dangers CWD to deer not in simply weigh does favor nomic harm population “publicly and elk known were of Penn The Penn taking a Central. under very among many mem controversial designed give gov- is approach Central generally see Ronald public”); bers fairly ernment authorities wide berth Wasting Opsahl, Disease W. Chronic public in the See regulation interest. Action, Elk, Deer and A National Call 144-45, 98 S.Ct. at 2669-70. U.S. (provid Envtl. 1061-62 L. support applicable easelaw does including ing history of CWD endemic assertion the economic Brakkes’ Colorado, south presence in northeastern impact regulation of the Wyoming, eastern and western Nebraska finding taking. cuts in favor states). other presence in a number of turn to the question nowWe action whether DNR’s interfered result, As do not we conclude expectations. distinct investment-backed expectations been investment-backed expectations is investment-backed test dramatically upset here. One the down- Gardens, Cienega objective one. field entering regulated sides of in the F.3d at 1346. The Brakkes were regulation, particularly more intense operating hunting preserve. business involved, may be threatening diseases are A investor would reasonable be aware in- offing. diseases threaten When subject reg hunting preserves are to state dustries, expect reasonable ulation, regulation including related government may be awakened from its 484C; ch. CWD. Code see also See Iowa regulatory slumber. Promotions, v. Commodity Inc. Hawkeye (8th 2007) Vilsack, F.3d Cir. consider, as Penn Finally, we expecta (holding that investment-backed directs, govern the character of Central weigh in favor tions did importance purpose ment action. gambling heavily regulated industry). government are un action relevant factor. See Rose der Penn Central Further, a reasonable investor would Acre, Here, purpose at 1283. F.3d presence of in a understand the CWD government to protect action was give aggres- could hunting preserve rise to potentially wildlife in from a conta government sive action curtail imposing quarantine on gious disease spread Notably, the disease. Kafka Fish, Department Wildlife, land where diseased deer been Montana had *27 Parks, no the present. and There is doubt Brakkes the Court of Montana government’s action. considering felt brunt of the that investment- noted sug in the record to nothing in the Yet there expectations backed context claim, arbitrarily regulated gest singled takings specula- “the were and special out treatment. particular industry tive nature of a should Further, testimony hearing designed “shall be to reduce- then and by action taken the govern reportable disease, indicated the eliminate and to substantially propor prevent ment was not out of the spread of the disease to other to purpose importance 484C.12(2). tion behind and animals.” Iowa Code Both regime. Any regulatory physical inva together. subsections need to be read of all light sion the land was minimal. If read we subsection as limiting circumstances, govern the facts and authority DNR’s strictly the diseased “regulatory has not taken actions ment themselves, deer we cannot account for are functionally equivalent that to the clas gives which subsection DNR broad government directly sic in which authority er over imple a “landowner” to private property or appropriates outs ment plan “eliminate reportable Lingle, 544 U.S. his domain.” owner prevent spread “to disease” other S.Ct. at 2082. statute, interpret animals.” When a- we we try parts, to harmonize its Iowa Individu VI. Conclusion. al Health Reins. State Ass’n Benefit reasons, For the we affirm the above Iowa, (Iowa Univ. N.W.2d judgment district court. 2016). here, Doing so I would that conclude “quarantine” gives authori term DNR AFFIRMED. ty regard to do what medical science would as a in response reasonable justices except All concur Mansfield disease, may the outbreak which include Waterman, JJ., part concur in who that affect measures the land as well as part. dissent the animals. MANSFIELD, (concurring in Justice majority’s hypertechnieal interpre- part). part dissenting too proves tation of the statute much. Note respectfully I respect dissent says “quarantine that dis- opinion. III of I Part the court’s believe whitetail,” preserve not “quarantine eased overly the court is view taking an technical exposed been may whitetail have statutory pro- of the underlying authority Thus, the majority’s disease.” under Department vided of Natural Iowa view, only DNR could take action with (DNR). Resources respect currently to deer have the disease, I not majority’s do share the on the view not other farm deer unambiguous. exposed the statute is clear and We have disease. That is been view, majority’s read statutes See In re Estate as a whole. all. Under the DNR (Iowa Gantner, require the landowner to disin- could 2017). 4840.12(1) Code section fect the farm the diseased where areas Furthermore, says provide quar- “may recently. deer have been antine diseased whitetail once the deer died and their diseased removed, populations.” threaten health animal have been DNR would carcasses subsection, 4840.12(2), If authority altogether. Yet next be without the ma- states landowner, or the veter- jority right, authority landowner’s “[t]he DNR’s would be inarian, epidemiologist designated strictly animals them- limited the sick develop plan,” nothing [DNR] shall selves and else.5 else, nothing majority’s Under the view diseased do that Iowa Code late the animals and only section 484C.12 authorizes DNR to iso *28 simply moving to the animals them-

Although I not think we need diseased do light selves. in doctrine reach absurd-results of section 484C.12 taken ambiguity of the pub- in Additionally, operates this law whole, of the majority’s reading as historically lic health area where State hospital is has absurd. If indeed authority “Unquestion- has to act. broad patient, to does authority “quarantine” a ably, police of a state power inherent of the keep people out mean can’t to quarantines allows establish to a state patient room is patient’s control Johansson v. disease animals.” disease Any there? infectious Health, F.Supp. Bd. Animal place to to have connection has some 1985). (D. 1021 Minn. been, not has an infected individual

where Farms, Gosch, In Inc. v. we Shinrone just to that individual.6 interpret were asked an Iowa Code Furthermore, regula- DNR has issued a relating to control. See section brucellosis empowers to do clearly DNR tion (Iowa 1982). At time N.W.2d positive It “A test it did. provides, what provided, Code section relevant re- wasting for chronic will result disease county Whenever the. balance of [the five-year quaran- in a sult minimum becomes brucellosis fund remaining eradication] all on the tine dollars, twenty-five less than hundred pre- the infected animals located within county notify auditor shall de- r. Code 571-115.10. serve.” Iowa Admin. partment agriculture] writing [of gen- Iowa section 484C.3 is a While Code fact, expense no be in- such shall rather grant rulemaking authority,7 eral on such account excess interpretive curred specific grant of au- than a cash such fund. available it is thority, “quaran- to characterize fair language” “a “specialized sub- tine” as § Iowa 164.27 Code special expertise term stantive within Sac brucellosis fund County eradication agency.” Renda v. Civil See Iowa indemnify lacked sufficient funds Shin- Comm’n, 13-14 Rights rone for a control in full brucellosis claim. 2010). (Iowa Hence, I would defer Following the Id. at farm’s commence- 300. interpretation it is unless “irration- DNR’s litigation, county ment of the farm al, unjustifiable.” illogical, wholly or Iowa whereby into a settlement levies entered 17A.19(10)(Z). Both in this sides Code for the in the benefit fund maximum appeal agree this deferential standard years continue in future amount would appropriate here. of review payments fund would make Shin- “irrational, illogical, years, I in- it is rone in until Shinrone’s do think future wholly unjustifiable” interpret paid attor- demnity section off. Id. The claim however, general, opinion authority ney to re- giving 484C.12 as issued prevent could quire county not commit reasonable actions “the fund, upon spread years, payment where disease successive based previously were in addition to claim.” Id. animals question provides, "The I could even Code 484C.3 whether DNR direct section adopt landowner animals. department pursuant to kill the shall rules necessary chapter 17A administer agree spatial component I "A DNR: chapter.” quaran- implicit definition of therefore in the tine.” *29 binding We the settlement was found HASKENHOFF, Appellee, Tina notwithstanding enforceable provi- other Code section 164.27 and Code observed, chapter

sions. “Because We first SOLUTIONS, HOMELAND ENERGY regulation 164 is a health within the state’s LLC, Appellant. police con- power, liberally is to be No. 15-0574 Id. strued.” then held that We 164.27, section “if interpreted foster of Iowa. Court public objectives of chapter health Filed June permits the settlement entered into in this view, case.” In our the section

only prohibited payments current cash $2500, not

once the fund fell below balance

binding agreements payments to make Id. at 304-05. years.

future regulatory

Courts must sensitive agencies should

overreach. Government

not issue a quarantine order affects legitimate

landowner’s livelihood without doing

medical scientific so. basis

Although.the parties strongly disagree as here,

to the need for the measures ordered conflicting pre- evidence scientific commission, "upheld

sented order,

DNR’s order. district court’s opinion, today’s solely

like is based legal authority lack of due alleged

DNR’s reading I’m not a statute. crabbed science,

qualified to evaluate the but on the colleagues. I disagree my

law reasons, foregoing

For the I re- would judicial

verse court’s review district decision of the

order and reinstate the

Natural Commission. Resource

Waterman, J., joins concurrence in

part part. and dissent notes United States basis, temporary that even on out expressly distinguished be Court Brakkes have not been deprived all permanent temporary invasions tween interests, the property economic as can per present held taking se was species, fishing, still be used for only noneervid permanent. when an was invasion harvest, crops, hay ground, 432-35, row timber U.S. at at 3174-75. S.Ct. breakfast, pasture, or II bed and cattle recognizes DNR World War among points other The DNR also Petty Motor uses. cases of Kimball and era appraisal, which indicated the value compensation temporary tak allow property the Brakkes’ suggests later due DNR’s ings, but the DNR $1,056,000 regulatory fell to be a effort caselaw clarified that in has order $891,000. doctrine, per taking se current under Loretto, taking permanent. must be Having argued failed U.S. at S.Ct. per taking, the to show a se DNR turns to question question emergency The DNR next addresses the whether emergency taking to a un- regulatory whether the order amounted order amounted taking deprived it per se because der Penn The DNR asserts that Central. factor, hunt productive Brakkes all under the first use Penn Central ing preserve. Citing Preser im- Tahoe-Sierra Brakkes show economic failed Council, Regional weighed pact vation Inc. v. Tahoe order Planning taking. stress- Agency, finding the DNR favor The DNR asserts in the per relatively order be se under es the diminution small regulation, namely, prevent value fact the spread in value will diminution the end of Finally, argues abate CWD. period quarantine approaches. Accord- duration of the relatively was DNR, ing to the for the order economic brief in the property diminution and.the weigh in impact to of a taking, favor value was modest. great- diminution in has to much value D. er, Discussion. by fifty at least percent more. See States, CCA United Assocs. 667 F.3d 1. Overview regulatory 2011) (Fed. (stating Cir.

Case Details

Case Name: Tom Brakke and Rhonda Brakke D/B/A/ Pine Ridge Hunting Lodge, and McBra, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources and Iowa Natural Resource Commission
Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date Published: Jun 16, 2017
Citation: 897 N.W.2d 522
Docket Number: 15–0328
Court Abbreviation: Iowa
Read the detailed case summary
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In