STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, vs. JAMES L. MATHIAS, Appellant.
No. 18–1119
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
December 6, 2019
A defendant appeals his conviction for carrying a firearm on the grounds of a school in violation of
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender (until withdrawal), and Ashley Stewart, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Walton, County Attorney, and Caleb J. Copley, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
A defendant appeals his conviction for carrying a firearm on the grounds of a school in violation of
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On September 22, 2017, Davenport North High School and Davenport Central High School played a football game in the stadium at the Brady Street Athletic Complex (the Complex) in Davenport. The Davenport Community School District owns and operates the Complex. Davenport Central‘s outdoor facilities are all located at the Complex, and it uses the Complex for various school athletic events, including football, baseball, soccer, and track. Private schools, such as Davenport Assumption High School and St. Ambrose University, and nonschool entities also use the Complex.
The Complex is located on the southeast corner of East 36th Street and North Brady Street in Davenport. Brady Street runs north/south, and 36th Street runs east/west. Although no traditional schoolhouse buildings are located at the Complex, the Davenport School District Athletic Director and a Davenport police officer, who is the police liaison to the Davenport public school system, testified that the Complex was
On the southwest corner of the Complex, right off of Brady Street, is a digital sign surrounded by a brick structure. Above the digital sign are the words “Brady Street Athletic Complex,” and below the digital sign are the words “Davenport Community Schools.” The stadium itself has multiple signs that say “Davenport Community Schools,” at least some of which are visible from the parking lots.
There are two parking lots adjacent to the stadium and accessible from Brady Street: one immediately west of the stadium and east of Brady Street and one to the south of the stadium. People attending events at the stadium use both parking lots. On the evening of September 22, the south parking lot was full of cars.
That evening, Davenport Police Captain Jamie Brown was in uniform but working security in an off-duty capacity at the football game. Around 9:00 p.m., an unidentified person informed him that a man was placing flyers on cars in the parking lot. Brown located James Mathias in the south parking lot, close to Brady Street, placing flyers on cars.
Brown asked Mathias what he was doing, to which Mathias responded, “[F]reedom of speech.” Brown noted that Mathias “[s]eemed to be kind of agitated or annoyed that [he] was there,” so he then asked to see Mathias‘s identification. As Mathias was reaching back to retrieve his I.D. from his pocket, his shirt rose up and Brown saw a bulge on the side of Mathias‘s waist. He asked Mathias if he had a firearm. Mathias answered yes but said he had a permit, which he handed to Brown along with his I.D. Brown again asked Mathias why he was there, and Mathias repeated, “[F]reedom of speech.”
In the following weeks, Brown spoke with the Scott County Attorney‘s Office about the incident. On February 19, 2018, the State charged Mathias with carrying a firearm on the grounds of a school in violation of
Mathias pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the State‘s case and again at the close of all the evidence, Mathias moved for judgment of acquittal. He argued there was insufficient evidence that the parking lot was the grounds of a school. The court denied the motion.
Before closing arguments, Mathias objected to Jury Instruction No. 18, which provided, “The phrase ‘grounds of a school’ may include recreational facilities, cultural facilities, or school buildings at which instruction is given.” He objected to the definitional instruction “because there is no case law on it or there is no definition of that phrase provided in the statute.” The court overruled the objection.
The jury found Mathias guilty, and he appealed. We retained the appeal.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law. State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). We will uphold the verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id.; see State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2004).
“We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law.” State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 157 (Iowa 2019). We evaluate whether the instruction at issue “accurately states the law and whether substantial evidence supports it.” Id. Even when the instruction is erroneous, we will not reverse unless prejudice resulted. State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Iowa 2018). “Prejudice results when jury instructions mislead the jury or materially misstate the law.” Id. at 241–42.
III. Issues.
The issues we must address on appeal are (1) whether the district court erred in denying Mathias‘s motion for judgment of acquittal and (2) whether the district court properly instructed the jury that the grounds of a school may include recreational and cultural facilities.
IV. Whether the District Court Erred in Denying Mathias‘s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.
The Iowa Code provides in pertinent part,
A person who goes armed with, carries, or transports a firearm of any kind, whether concealed or not, on the grounds of a school commits a class “D” felony. For the purposes of this section, ”school” means a public or nonpublic school as defined in section 280.2.
Under the State‘s interpretation, the grounds of a school include property owned and used by a public or nonpublic school for school athletics and events. Under Mathias‘s interpretation, the grounds of a school include only the classroom building and immediate surrounding land and do not include football stadiums and parking lots built on land that is not contiguous with the classroom building. Thus, we must determine if a school district-owned sports complex that is not contiguous to classroom buildings qualifies as grounds of a school under
“When interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain the legislature‘s intent.” State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 898 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Iowa 2017), overruled on other grounds by TSB Holdings, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 913 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa 2018)). We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have said. Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C., 878 N.W.2d 759, 770 (Iowa 2016). We cannot allow legislative intent to change the meaning of a statute if the words used by the legislature will not allow for such a meaning. See Schadendorf v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 757 N.W.2d 330, 337 (Iowa 2008).
We begin with the text of the statute. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d at 116. If the legislature chooses to define the term in a statute, that definition ordinarily binds us. State v. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Iowa 2017). When the legislature does not define the term, we look to the context in which the term appears and give it its ordinary and common meaning. Id. at 16; accord
Then we determine if the statute is ambiguous. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d at 116. Ambiguity occurs “if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain
Here, the legislature chose not to define whether “grounds of a school” requires the grounds to be contiguous with the classroom building.
Putting all of that together reveals that “grounds of a school” could have multiple reasonable meanings. That phrase could reasonably mean the land of any school directly supported by taxation or accredited pursuant to section 256.11. See Ground, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary. It could reasonably mean “an area appropriated to or used for a particular purpose” of any school directly supported by taxation or accredited pursuant to section 256.11. Id. Or it could reasonably mean “the gardens, lawn, or planted areas immediately surrounding and belonging to a . . . building” of any school directly funded by taxation or accredited pursuant to section 256.11. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the phrase is ambiguous, see Bainbridge, 749 N.W.2d at 248, and we must resort to our tools of statutory construction, see Lopez, 907 N.W.2d at 117; see also
In determining the legislative intent of an ambiguous statute, we may consider matters such as the statute‘s object and legislative history, the circumstances surrounding its enactment, “former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects,” and “[t]he consequences of a particular construction.”
The Iowa General Assembly enacted
A new section is also added to chapter 724 making it a class “D” felony for going armed with, carrying, or transporting a firearm on the grounds of a public or nonpublic school. Exemptions are provided for peace and corrections officers, military personnel, persons transporting firearms in closed and locked containers or inside the cargo or luggage compartments of motor vehicles, law enforcement personnel from other states, and persons specifically authorized by the school to have a firearm on the grounds of the school, including for instructional purposes.
H.F. 528, 76th G.A., 1st Sess., explanation (as introduced Mar. 22, 1995) (emphasis added); see
The exemption for persons authorized to have a firearm on school grounds for instructional purposes implies the grounds of a school may extend beyond classroom buildings. See, e.g., Students at North Butler and Clarksville Schools Can Take Firearms Course in Spring, RadioIowa (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.radioiowa.com/2018/12/13/students-at-north-butler-and-clarksville-schools-can-take-firearms-course-in-spring/ [https://perma.cc/BL8P-3E58] (reporting that two rural Iowa schools adopted a firearms safety course, which would involve inoperable firearms with replica ammunition, as part of their physical education classes); see also
The exemption for persons transporting firearms in closed and locked containers or inside the cargo or luggage compartments of motor vehicles also implies that the grounds of a school extend beyond classroom buildings. Motor vehicles do not enter classroom buildings. Factually,
The fiscal note for H.F. 528 characterizes the new language in two ways. In the heading, it says, “POSSESSION OF FIREARM ON SCHOOL PREMISES.” H.F. 528, 76th G.A., 1st Sess., fiscal note (filed Mar. 27, 1995) (emphasis added). But in the text under that heading, it says, “The bill establishes a Class ‘D’ felony for going armed with, carrying, or transporting a firearm on the grounds of a public or nonpublic school. The bill provides for specified exemptions.” Id. (emphasis added). By doing this, the fiscal note suggests that “grounds” as used in
Several other provisions of the session law also address firearms and schools. Two provisions address possession of firearms “on school premises” in violation of state law. 1995 Iowa Acts ch. 191, §§ 21, 22 (codified at
A third provision addresses firearms brought to or knowingly possessed at “a school.” Id. § 23 (codified at
Reading these various session law provisions together reveals a lack of consistency in how the legislature refers to the geographical scope of a school. This inconsistency, like the fiscal note to H.F. 528, suggests the legislature intended the terms “school premises” and “grounds of a school” to be coextensive or at least synonymous.
Also instructive to our analysis is the history of
The legislature enacted
Further,
Peterson was decided in 1992.
A broader interpretation of “grounds of a school” as used in
Such a holding also requires a cabined notion of education. Education is not limited to only that which occurs in the traditional classroom setting. Many schools offer classes that are not in such a setting but still take place on school-owned property—e.g., marching band, weightlifting and conditioning, and shop. The location of these classes is sometimes not in the same building or location as the classroom buildings. See 2019 Marching Blue Devils, Davenport Central Instrumental Music (July 17, 2019), http://nebula.wsimg.com/23d2809ee6b463f9b28a88c515e2d95b?AccessKeyId=B0B15BF32692D84C6C14&disposition=0&alloworigin=1 [https://perma.cc/B7LR-K5AE] (Davenport Central marching band‘s fall 2019 schedule indicating attendance at certain events at Brady Street stadium is required); cf. State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Iowa 2012) (noting the weight room where Mark Becker shot and killed his former football coach was a temporary weight room that was set up in the bus barn after the Aplington-
Moreover, the State of Iowa considers participation in an organized and supervised athletic program as part of the mandatory requirement for graduation. The legislature requires a student in high school to participate in physical education activities to graduate. See
Finally, in the area of law dealing with tax exemptions for school property, a Wisconsin court found the location of a property does not determine whether the property is subject to taxation or exempt from taxation. Trs. of Ind. Univ. v. Town of Rhine, 488 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). Rather the use of the property determines its taxable status. Id. Thus, the court concluded, “Non-adjoining property may constitute ‘grounds’ of a college or university.” Id. The court went on to give specific examples. It stated,
We can envision numerous scenarios in which a college or university might, for a particular activity or course of study, own property which does not adjoin the main campus but which nonetheless might be considered, given the proper use,
as part of its grounds—an arboretum, for example, or agricultural land and its buildings, or an athletic field or stadium.
In Iowa, we have applied a similar analysis to property of a college run by a church. Trs. of Griswold Coll. v. State, 46 Iowa 275, 281–82 (1877). There, the school owned parcels of land separated by a street. Id. at 277. The residences for the bishop and a professor were located on a parcel across the street from the college building. Id. In determining whether the residences were exempt, the court held the residences were “proper and appropriate to effectuate the objects of the institutions.” Id. at 282. We reaffirmed Griswold College in St. Ambrose University v. Board of Review, 503 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Iowa 1993) (en banc). There we characterized the test as whether there is a “sufficient nexus between the purposes of the University and a child care facility.” Id. at 407.
In situations like the instant case, there is a sufficient nexus between the purpose of the school and the stadium complex. That purpose is to further the education of athletes, band members, cheerleaders, and students attending school-related events. Just because the stadium is not contiguous to the classroom building does not mean its purpose is lessened.
Consideration of these factors of construction persuades us that “grounds of a school” as used in
B. Whether Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding that the Brady Street Athletic Complex Qualifies as the Grounds of a School.
Having concluded that “grounds of a school” as used in
Evidence in the record reveals the Davenport Community School District owns the Complex. Additionally, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, reveals the parking lot where Captain Brown encountered Mathias is part of the Complex. We also find the signage at the Complex and its parking lots identified the Complex and the lots as owned by the Davenport School District. Finally, the evidence reveals that the Complex‘s facilities were being used for school-sponsored activities at the time. Thus, there is substantial evidence that the Brady Street Athletic Complex, including the south parking lot, qualifies as grounds of a school.
The district court did not err in denying Mathias‘s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Mathias contends Jury Instruction No. 18 was incorrect because it (1) was not needed and (2) included a definition for the term “school” that does not comport with the statutory definition of “school” from section 280.2—i.e., as contemplated in
A judge in a criminal case is required to give jury instructions on the applicable law as to all the material issues in the case. Becker, 818 N.W.2d at 141. When the Code does not define a term in a criminal statute, the district court must engage in statutory construction and define that term for the jury. See State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996).
Here, the Code did not define “grounds of a school” in the statute. The district court engaged in its own statutory construction and determined “grounds of a school” includes recreational facilities such as this Complex. We come to the same conclusion as the district court in this opinion. Accordingly, the district court did not commit error when it instructed the jury.
VI. Disposition.
For all the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
Appel, Waterman, and Christensen, JJ., join this opinion. McDonald, J., files a concurring opinion in which Waterman and Christensen, JJ., join. Mansfield, J., files a dissenting opinion.
McDONALD, Justice (concurring specially).
The majority and the dissent disagree on whether the statute at issue limits the “grounds of a school” to those grounds contiguous to the classroom building. I write separately because it seems to me neither opinion addresses the first step in the analysis: what comprises a school within the meaning of the statute.
This court has adopted a broad definition of the word school. We have said “[a]n accepted definition of school is ‘a place for instruction in any branch or branches of knowledge.’ ” Livingston v. Davis, 243 Iowa 21, 26–27, 50 N.W.2d 592, 596 (1951) (quoting Alexander v. Phillips, 254 P. 1056, 1058 (Ariz. 1927), abrogated on other grounds by Morgan v. Bd. of Supervisors, 192 P.2d 236, 240 (Ariz. 1948)). In the same case, we stated a school “is ‘a place where instruction is imparted to the young.’ ” Id. at 27, 50 N.W.2d at 596 (quoting People v. Levisen, 90 N.E.2d 213, 215 (Ill. 1950)). A school is not limited to a single type of structure or even a single structure:
The word “school” is a generic term with many definitions, as may be a statutory term, and generally denotes an institution or place for instruction or education, or the collective body of instructors and pupils in any such place or institution. A “school” is a place where instruction is given or imparted to the young, or place for systematic instruction in any branch or branches of knowledge given by methods common to schools and institutions of learning. . . .
. . . A school is single and entire notwithstanding it is held and conducted in two or more buildings. The number of persons being taught does not determine whether the place is a school.
78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 1, at 25–26 (2018) (footnotes omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion (1) that physical education is one of the branches of knowledge legally imparted in the Phoenix union high school; (2) that competitive athletic games and sports in both intra and inter mural games are legal and laudable methods of imparting such knowledge; and (3) that a structure whose chief purpose is to provide for the better giving of such competitive athletic games and sports as aforesaid is reasonably a schoolhouse within the true spirit and meaning of [the statute].
254 P. at 1059. In Montague v. City of Cedar Rapids, 449 N.W.2d 91, 94-95 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989), the court of appeals held that a gymnasium was a “school” within the meaning of a zoning ordinance prohibiting an adult bookstore from being operated within a certain distance of a school. The court explained that “the use of the building, not the type of the building, is determinative” in whether a building should be considered a school. Id. at 93. The gymnasium at issue in that case “provided physical education and gymnastics training” and “had approximately 100 child and adult students.” Id. at 94. This was sufficient for the court to conclude the building was a “school” within the meaning of the ordinance. See id. at 94-95.
A number of courts have similarly held that a gymnasium, stadium, or athletic complex is a school or a school building. See, e.g., JH2K I LLC v. Ariz. Dep‘t of Health Servs., 438 P.3d 676, 680 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (“Moreover, Arizona courts have long interpreted the word “school” to refer
I respectfully disagree with my colleagues that a school, within the meaning of the statute, is limited to the single building housing classrooms. In State v. Green, the court held that a “school grounds” includes the physical plant comprising the school and the grounds contiguous thereto. 567 S.E.2d 505, 509 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002). Notably,
I would thus hold the “grounds of a school” includes those parts of the physical plant of a school, including all grounds contiguous thereto, where programming or instruction is delivered to students. See Green, 567 S.E.2d at 509.
With that understanding, I agree there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant‘s conviction, and I agree the jury instruction was
Waterman and Christensen, JJ., joins this special concurrence.
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
This case involves the following criminal statute:
A person who goes armed with, carries, or transports a firearm of any kind, whether concealed or not, on the grounds of a school commits a class “D” felony. For the purposes of this section, ”school” means a public or nonpublic school as defined in section 280.2.
My view finds support in Webster‘s Dictionary. One definition of “grounds” is “the gardens, lawn, and planted areas immediately surrounding and belonging to a house or other building.” Grounds, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (unabr. ed. 2002). Another definition is “an area appropriated to or used for a particular purpose.” Id. The majority cites both definitions, but I think the first definition—which focuses on geography—is more apt than the second definition—which focuses on purpose. We are interpreting the phrase, “grounds of a school.” Normally, one would not use the preposition “of” to denote the purpose of something. So the geographic emphasis rings more true to me.
South Carolina makes it a separate offense to engage in drug trafficking “in, on, or within a one-half mile radius of the grounds of a public or private elementary, middle, or secondary school.” State v. Green, 567 S.E.2d 505, 509 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
There is a further point to be made. Criminal statutes ought to give fair notice to the public of the conduct that is prohibited; we enforce that concept through the rule of lenity. See State v. Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Iowa 2013). There is good reason to believe that this statute did not give fair notice. For one thing, the defendant himself believed his conduct was lawful. When asked, “Do you have a firearm on you?” the defendant replied, “Yes, but I have a permit.” He then showed the police officer his permit. More importantly, the police officer was unsure. It should be noted that this officer was a twenty-three-year veteran of the Davenport Police Department. He was working off-duty for the school district that night, something he had done for more than the last ten years. And yet—despite all that experience—he did not know whether the defendant‘s possession of a firearm in that location was illegal. The officer testified,
Q. Now, in my reading of this case, and correct me if I‘m wrong, I think charges weren‘t filed until a couple weeks after this event took place. Can you kind of walk us through that process. A. Yes. So when I was dealing with him there, I made the determination based on where we were and people coming and going as a risk factor for me out there, for him, for those coming and going, that I was just going to get him on his way. I wanted to make sure that since the applicable law said “school,” that Brady Street Stadium applied, so I felt that I needed to make sure that I was confident in the applicable law before I took him into custody if that was the case. So I allowed him to go. And then after that, I met with the County Attorney‘s Office in the weeks after, spoke with
them about the case that I had, presented what I had seen and what I had done up there, and then that‘s when the charges were filed thereafter.
We have invoked the rule of lenity numerous times in our recent decisions. See, e.g., In re Prop. Seized from Bo Li, 911 N.W.2d 423, 429 (Iowa 2018) (“The State‘s statutory interpretation . . . would violate ‘the rule of lenity, which guides us to resolve ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused.’ ” (quoting State v. Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 140, 146 (Iowa 2013))); State v. Nall, 894 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Iowa 2017) (“[U]nder the rule of lenity, we take a narrow approach to construing ambiguous criminal laws.“); State v. Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Iowa 2015) (“[T]he principle that we construe criminal statutes narrowly, otherwise known as the rule of lenity, should be taken into account.“).
In my view, this is a case where “reasonable doubt persists after the traditional canons of interpretation have been considered.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 197 (2012) [hereinafter Scalia & Garner]. Accordingly, I would apply the rule of lenity here. It favors a narrow construction of the term, “grounds of a school,” as referring only to a school and its surrounding real estate. Cf. State v. Shelley, 15 A.3d 818, 819, 823-24 (N.J. 2011) (vacating the defendant‘s conviction for distributing cocaine within a school zone after holding that a daycare center with one full-day kindergarten program staffed by a state-certified teacher did not constitute an “elementary school“).
Concerning the majority‘s reasoning, I have the following observations. First, the majority says, “When interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain the legislature‘s intent“—quoting State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018). I agree Lopez and other cases say that. But they‘re wrong. Statutory interpretation is not a quest for legislative intent.
Second, the majority places considerable weight on a textual difference between
I think the majority reads too much into too little. The general assembly‘s passage of
I pause to add a few words on the special concurrence. The special concurrence takes the position that a stadium is a school itself. In my view, this bolsters my dissent. If my distinguished colleagues cannot agree on the meaning of “grounds of a school,” how is a citizen who wants to comply with the law supposed to know what the term means? The special concurrence also makes much of the prominent notice indicating that the stadium is property of the Davenport School District. The notice, however, refers to the site as an “athletic complex“—i.e., not a school. And notwithstanding this supposedly clear notice, a law enforcement officer who had worked this site for the past decade was uncertain himself whether firearms were forbidden.
For all these reasons, I remain unconvinced that “grounds of a school” as used in this criminal statute includes the parking lot of a football stadium separated by over a mile from the school itself. I would therefore reverse the defendant‘s conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence.