In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Anthony Blake Swope.
A24-0128
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
October 8, 2025
Gaïtas, J. Concurring, McKeig, Moore, III, Hennesy JJ. Took no part, Procaccini, J.
Court of Appeals
Filed: October 8, 2025
Office of Appellate Courts
Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota, for respondent Scott County.
SYLLABUS
A patient who has been civilly committed as mentally ill under
Reversed.
OPINION
GAÏTAS, Justice.
In this case, we must decide whether a patient who has been civilly committed as mentally ill under
Appellant Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A. (appointed counsel) is a law firm, which the district court appointed to represent civilly committed patient Anthony Blake Swope at the outset of commitment proceedings. After appointed counsel petitioned for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus to enforce Swope‘s right to be admitted to a state-operated treatment program, the county of commitment, respondent Scott County, refused to pay appointed counsel‘s attorney fees. On appointed counsel‘s motion, the district court ordered Scott County to pay attorney fees for the extraordinary writ proceedings. Scott County appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the petition
FACTS
In June 2022, Anthony Blake Swope was arrested and jailed after he allegedly assaulted hospital staff during an assessment. He was charged with two felony offenses. Based on a subsequent psychiatric evaluation, the district court found Swope incompetent to proceed in the criminal case. Scott County filed a petition for commitment on September 2, 2022, moving to civilly commit Swope to a treatment facility because he was “believed to be a person who poses a risk of harm due to mental illness.”
By court order, appointed counsel represented Swope in the civil commitment proceedings. Appointed counsel has had a contractual agreement with Scott County since 2007. Under the agreement, appointed counsel has accepted court appointments to provide representation in certain types of cases, and Scott County has paid appointed counsel for the representation.
Represented by appointed counsel, Swope agreed to be civilly committed. On September 14, 2022, the district court civilly committed Swope for an initial period not to exceed six months. Because Swope was in jail, he qualified for priority admission to a state-operated treatment program under
One month after the district court‘s civil commitment order, Swope remained in the Scott County Jail. On October 13, 2022, appointed counsel petitioned the district court for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus, alleging a violation of the priority admission statute. Initially, appointed counsel filed the petition in the civil commitment case and named the Commissioner of Human Services as a party. After the Office of the Minnesota Attorney General sent appointed counsel a letter stating that the Commissioner could not be made a party to a mental health commitment proceeding, appointed counsel withdrew the initial petition, initiated a separate case, and filed the petition in the separate case. The district court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, reserved
Scott County then refused to pay appointed counsel for representing Swope in the extraordinary writ proceedings. Appointed counsel moved the district court for an order compelling payment of attorney fees. Scott County opposed the motion, claiming that the extraordinary writ proceedings were not “proceeding[s] under” chapter 253B—as referenced in
In January 2023, the district court granted appointed counsel‘s motion for attorney fees, determining that appointed counsel‘s work in the extraordinary writ proceedings had been “directly related” to Swope‘s civil commitment. The district court stated that “[i]t is clear in Chapter 253B that a patient‘s court-appointed attorney is not discharged until the commitment is terminated or until the Court discharges.” Further, the district court stated, “[c]ounsel represents patient in all proceedings under Chapter 253B and must be a ‘vigorous advocate’ for patient. This includes protecting and enforcing patient‘s rights.” The district court found that “[t]he separate habeas corpus petition and petition for writ of mandamus . . . is directly related to proceedings in Chapter 253B” because “[w]ithout the commitment in this file and the continued detention of [Swope] in the Scott County Jail directly as a result of the hold in this file, there would be no separate civil action.” Though the district court acknowledged that “[n]ot all work in a collateral action would mandate payment of fees,” it stated that “[i]t must be a case-by-case determination.” It ordered Scott County to “pay [appointed counsel] in full for representation of [Swope] in this court file and in the related action.”3
Seven months later, Scott County still had not paid appointed counsel for the representation of Swope in either the civil commitment proceedings or the extraordinary writ proceedings. Appointed counsel brought a motion to compel Scott County to pay the outstanding attorney fees or to schedule an order-to-show-cause hearing. In August 2023, the district court issued a second order. The district court found that Scott County‘s failure to pay attorney fees—including fees that Scott County acknowledged it owed to appointed counsel—was “unreasonable.” The district court ordered judgment against Scott County in the amount of $16,251.60 for the unpaid attorney fees. Following the district court‘s second order, Scott County appealed to the court of
Appointed counsel petitioned for review, seeking review of just one issue—whether a petition for an extraordinary writ to enforce the priority admission statute is a proceeding under chapter 253B, for which a patient is entitled to the assistance of the patient‘s appointed counsel and for which appointed counsel should be compensated. We granted appointed counsel‘s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
Swope‘s appointed counsel contends that Swope was entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel in petitioning for extraordinary writs to enforce his right under the priority admission statute to be moved from the Scott County jail to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of his civil commitment. Furthermore, appointed counsel argues that because Swope was entitled to the representation, Scott County must pay for it. Appointed counsel maintains that Swope had a statutory right to be represented in the extraordinary writ proceedings under
Scott County responds that Swope had no right to be represented by appointed counsel in pursuing an extraordinary writ to enforce the priority admission statute. According to Scott County, it therefore has no corresponding obligation to pay appointed counsel for seeking extraordinary relief.
To resolve the issue before us, we first consider Minnesota‘s statutes governing civil commitment and treatment for mental illness, then interpret the statute governing the right to counsel in such proceedings, and finally apply the statute to the circumstances here.
A.
We begin our analysis by identifying the applicable statutes.
Chapter 253B provides a right to counsel, including court-appointed counsel. The scope of that right is addressed in
A patient has the right to be represented by counsel at any proceeding under this chapter. The court shall appoint a qualified attorney to represent the proposed patient if neither the proposed patient nor others provide counsel. The attorney shall be appointed at the time a petition for commitment is filed or when simultaneous competency and civil commitment examinations are ordered under subdivision 2a, whichever is sooner. In all proceedings under this chapter, the attorney shall:
(1) consult with the person prior to any hearing;
(2) be given adequate time and access to records to prepare for all hearings;
(3) continue to represent the person throughout any proceedings under this chapter unless released as counsel by the court; and
(4) be a vigorous advocate on behalf of the person.
(Emphasis added.)
When the district court appoints counsel to represent a patient in a proceeding under chapter 253B,
Here, appointed counsel was appointed to represent Swope in the initial commitment proceedings. Following those proceedings, appointed counsel was not discharged by the court. Thereafter, appointed counsel petitioned for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus to enforce Swope‘s right under chapter 253B to be transferred from jail to a treatment program within 48 hours. Under the priority admission statute, the Commissioner of Human Services must admit certain categories of patients “to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours.”
To vindicate Swope‘s statutory right to priority admission, appointed counsel petitioned for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus. Writs of mandamus and habeas corpus are types of legal proceedings known as “extraordinary writs.” See Extraordinary Writ, Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). An extraordinary writ is “[a] writ issued by a court exercising unusual or discretionary power. Examples are certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition.” Id. A writ of mandamus may be issued “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
A person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of liberty, except persons committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction, or by virtue of an execution issued upon the judgment, may apply for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from imprisonment or restraint.
B.
To determine whether Swope had a statutory right to be represented by his appointed counsel in petitioning for extraordinary writs to enforce the priority admission statute, the precise question we must decide is whether the phrase in the appointed counsel statute “any proceeding under this chapter” includes such proceedings. This requires us to interpret the appointed counsel statute. See
We must apply our rules of statutory interpretation to decide this question. In interpreting statutes, we apply de novo review, considering the meaning of the statutes without deference to the lower courts. In re Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711, 715 (Minn. 2024). “The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
“We interpret statutes so as to give effect to each word and phrase, and we may consult dictionary definitions to determine a word‘s plain meaning.” Mittelstaedt v. Henney, 969 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. 2022) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a word has more than one meaning, it is not necessarily ambiguous. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994). “The sense of a word depends on how it is being used; only if more than one meaning applies within that context does ambiguity arise.” Id.
1.
With these rules in mind, we consider the statutory language “any proceeding under this chapter,” as used in the appointed counsel statute to define the scope of the right to appointed counsel under chapter 253B. Both parties assert that the plain meaning of the phrase is clear and unambiguous. However, both parties offer different interpretations of the language.
Appointed counsel urges us to interpret “proceeding” as “an inclusive and encompassing term” that may include an underlying
On the other hand, Scott County contends that the phrase “any proceeding under this chapter” only includes proceedings that are “outlined under” chapter 253B. Stated otherwise, Scott County‘s argument is that appointed counsel can represent patients only in the type of proceedings that chapter 253B specifically names. Scott County points out that chapter 253B does not reference petitions for writs of mandamus. Moreover, Scott County notes that chapter 253B only mentions habeas corpus to clarify that chapter 253B “does not prohibit anyone from seeking habeas corpus.” See
Mindful of the parties’ arguments, we now consider the language of the appointed counsel statute and the phrase “any proceeding under this chapter” as used in
i.
Initially, we turn to the words “any proceeding.” We determine that the Legislature‘s use of these words together and within the context of the appointed counsel statute clearly evince an intent to include a wide range of legal filings, hearings, and events.
As appointed counsel notes, Black‘s Law Dictionary provides an expansive definition of the word “proceeding,” which encompasses all manner of business that comes before a court. Proceedings can include “acts and events” that make up a lawsuit, the “procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency,” “[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action,” or the business conducted by a court or other official body. Proceeding, Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The Legislature‘s use of the broad term “proceedings” is significant. If the Legislature had intended to restrict “proceedings” to specific types of proceedings, we presume that the Legislature would have done so by including limiting language in the statute. See Lykins ex rel. Duranske v. Anderson Contracting, Inc., 20 N.W.3d 880, 891 (Minn. 2025) (stating that if the Legislature had intended to restrict the language in a statute, it would have done so).
Additionally, we observe that the appointed counsel statute, considered as a whole, uses the term “proceeding” broadly. See State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. 2021) (stating that we read a “statute as a whole“). Proceedings referenced in other subdivisions of
Furthermore, the Legislature‘s use of the word “any” in conjunction with “proceeding” manifests the Legislature‘s intent to expand rather than limit a patient‘s right to representation under chapter 253B. See In re PERA Police & Fire Plan Line of Duty Disability Benefits of Brittain, 724 N.W.2d 512, 519 (Minn. 2006) (stating that the Legislature‘s use of the word “any” as a modifier demonstrates “the intent to be inclusive, not restrictive“). The term “any proceeding” in the appointed counsel statute is therefore more expansive than a “proceeding” without such a modifier. See In re Application of Moratzka, 988 N.W.2d 42, 47-48 (Minn. 2023) (stating that the Legislature‘s use of the modifier “any” with the word “instrument” resulted in an “extremely expansive” term).
Given the breadth of the words “any proceeding,” we conclude that petitions for habeas corpus and mandamus, and legal proceedings associated with these extraordinary writs, constitute “any proceeding” for the purpose of the appointed counsel statute. This, however, does not end our inquiry. Although we determine that the Legislature plainly intended to afford a broad right to appointed counsel by extending that right to “any proceeding,” the Legislature also manifested its intent to restrict the right by including the phrase “under this chapter.” We turn to the meaning of that phrase next.
ii.
We now consider the meaning of the phrase “under this chapter” as used in the appointed counsel statute.
Although we need not and do not decide the meaning of “under this chapter” for all intents and purposes, we are convinced that a proceeding to enforce a patient‘s enumerated right under the chapter to be timely transferred from jail and admitted to a state-operated treatment program is a proceeding “under” chapter 253B. The priority admission statute under chapter 253B specifically provides patients who have been found incompetent to proceed in a criminal case and have been civilly committed with a right to be moved from jail to a state-operated treatment program.
We note that this interpretation of the phrase “proceedings under this chapter” is consistent with our decision in Latourell v. Dempsey, 518 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 1994). There, we interpreted similar language under a different chapter, the Minnesota Parentage Act,
Analogously, chapter 253B provides a jailed patient who has been civilly committed with a right to priority admission to a state-operated treatment program. Because this is a substantive right provided within chapter 253B, a proceeding brought to enforce that right is a proceeding “under” chapter 253B.
C.
Having determined that a petition for an extraordinary writ to enforce the priority admission statute is a proceeding under chapter 253B, we apply this determination to the circumstances in this case.
The court of appeals ruled that appointed counsel‘s petition for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus to enforce Swope‘s right to priority admission, and the ensuing proceedings in connection with the filing, did not constitute “any proceeding under [chapter 253B].” Swope, 13 N.W.3d at 56-57. Thus, the court of appeals reversed the district court‘s determination that Swope was entitled to the assistance of his appointed counsel to pursue these proceedings and that appointed counsel
We have concluded that a petition for an extraordinary writ to enforce the priority admission statute is a proceeding under chapter 253B. Because “[a] patient has the right to be represented by counsel at any proceeding under this chapter,”
As a final matter, we recognize that our decision in this case may impact counties throughout the State of Minnesota. We also acknowledge that, although most counties contend with significant budget constraints, our decision may have an outsized impact on counties outside of the metropolitan area and in greater Minnesota. Similar concerns were raised in Latourell, where we concluded that a county was responsible for representing a parent under the Parentage Act. See Latourell, 518 N.W.2d at 566. We are sympathetic to these concerns. But, as we noted in Latourell, “[w]e will not infer a legislative intent contrary to that expressed by the unambiguous language of a statute.” Id.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
Reversed.
PROCACCINI, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
CONCURRENCE
MCKEIG, Justice (concurring).
I agree with the court‘s conclusion that a petition for an extraordinary writ to enforce the priority admission statute constitutes a proceeding under
I write separately to emphasize the burden this decision could place on counties
I agree with the court that the statute as written requires counties to pay for court-appointed counsel under these circumstances. But I am concerned that raising costs for rural counties will further stretch their limited budgets, cause cuts to other important legal services, and, consequently, discourage attorneys from remaining in rural areas with even less funding for necessary legal work.
I encourage the Legislature to examine this issue and consider whether the State instead should fund court-appointed counsel for these types of proceedings where county budgets are already limited. Part of the rationale for assigning general financial responsibility to the county of residence for the expenses of commitment, including attorney fees, centers on the localized nature of civil commitment proceedings, which involve counties in the pre-petition screening process, the filing of commitment petitions, and the provision of case management services to patients. See
But that rationale does not apply in the same way when the priority admission statute is involved, where the counties of our State have little say regarding how that law is implemented by the State of Minnesota. As the statute now operates following its amendment, civilly committed patients will be admitted from a jail to a state-operated treatment program “within 48 hours of the Office of Executive Medical Director . . or a designee determining that a medically appropriate bed is available.”
An example of how this issue could be addressed is found in the law creating the Supreme Court Judicial Appeal Panel. Attorney fees incurred for proceedings before the Supreme Court Appeal Panel are paid by the Minnesota Direct Care and Treatment executive board, as specified in
MOORE, III, Justice (concurring).
I join in the majority and join in the concurrence of Justice McKeig.
HENNESY, Justice (concurring).
I join in the majority and join in the concurrence of Justice McKeig.
Notes
The court of appeals cited In re Navratil, 799 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. App. 2011), to support its conclusion that a proceeding resolving a dispute over a patient‘s right to treatment is not a proceeding specifically mentioned in the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act and is therefore not a proceeding “under” the Act. Swope, 13 N.W.3d at 57. Navratil involved an individual challenging his indeterminate civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person, arguing that “ordering his indeterminate commitment without regard to the availability of treatment amounts to a deprivation of due process.” 799 N.W.2d at 650. In Navratil, the court of appeals concluded that although a committed individual has a statutory and constitutional right to treatment, “the commitment process is not the proper avenue for asserting a right-to-treatment argument,” and that “[t]he treatment of committed individuals is the province of the commissioner of human services, not the district court.” Id. at 650-51.
Unlike the committed individual in Navratil, Swope does not argue that he has a statutory right to treatment under