In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Anthony Blake Swope.
A24-0128
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed September 16, 2024
Ross, Judge; Concurring specially, Cleary, Judge
Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for appellant Scott County)
Mallory K. Stoll, Blahnik, Prchal & Stoll, PLLC, Prior Lake, Minnesota (for respondent Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A.)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Cleary, Judge.
SYLLABUS
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court оf Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
OPINION
ROSS, Judge
The district court appointed a law firm to represent Anthony Swope in his civil-commitment
FACTS
Anthony Swope in June 2022 experienced a mental-health crisis and assaulted staff mеmbers at a hospital. The district court found Swope incompetent to stand trial for criminal charges and appellant Scott County petitioned for judicial commitment. The district court appointed respondent law firm, Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille P.A. (JMW), to represent Swope during the civil-commitment proceeding. The district court ordered Swope‘s commitment, and Swope was taken to Sсott County jail on September 14, 2022.
Swope remained in jail on October 13, 2022, so JMW petitioned the district court for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus, contending that Scott County had violated
JMW filed a motion in the court file covering the commitment proceeding asking the district court to order the county to pay the attorney fees for its representation of Swope in both the civil-commitment proceeding and the mandamus and habeas corpus proceeding. The county opposed the motion, emphasizing that the mandamus and habeas corpus petition was collateral to Swope‘s civil commitment as a separate proceeding. Based on that distinction, it argued that the mandamus and habeas corpus proceeding was not a proceeding under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act,
Scott County refused to pay and instead filed this appeal.
ISSUES
- Did the district court err by ordering Scott County to pay JMW the attorney fees it generated in Swope‘s mandamus and habeas corpus proceeding?
- Did the district court abuse its discretion in approving the amount of fees to be paid to JMW for Swope‘s commitment proceeding?
ANALYSIS
Scott County argues that the district court erroneously ordered it to pay JMW‘s legal fees for representing Swope in the mandamus and habeas action. The county also argues that the district court abused its discretion in calculating the amount of fees due. We addrеss each argument in turn.
I
We first consider the county‘s argument that the district court erroneously ordered it to pay JMW‘s legal fees for representing Swope in the mandamus and habeas action. No statute directly obligates a county to pay the legal fees a party incurs when seeking relief in a mandamus action or an action for habeas corpus. The district court ordered the county to pay JMW‘s legal fees in full for all its work on Swope‘s behalf based on the statute authorizing court appointment of legal counsel in civil-commitment proceedings:
A patient has the right to be represented by counsel at any proceeding under this chapter. The court shall appoint a qualified attorney to represent the proposed patient if neither the proposed patient nor others provide counsel. The attorney shall be appointed at the time a petition for commitment is filed or when simultaneous competency and civil commitment examinations are ordered under subdivision 2a, whichever is sooner. In all proceedings under this chapter, the attorney shall:
(1) consult with the person prior to any hearing;
(2) be given adequate time and access to records to prepare for all hearings;
(3) continue to represent the person throughout any proceedings under this chapter unless released as counsel by the court; and
(4) be a vigorous advocate on behalf of the person.
The issue before us is whether a separate mandamus and habeas corpus action,
We have no difficulty determining what is meant by “this chapter” in the repeated phrases in the statutory provisions. The legislature introduces
By contrast, a proceeding resolving a dispute over a patient‘s right to treatment is not a proceeding specifically mentioned in the treatment act, and it is therefore not a proceeding “under” the act. This plain-reading conclusion finds support in In re Civil Commitment of Navratil, 799 N.W.2d 643, 651 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. June 13, 2011). In Navratil, we held that even though a civilly committed individual has the right to be treated, the civil-commitment process of the treatment act “is not the proper avenue for asserting a right-to-treatment argument.” 799 N.W.2d at 650-51. We recognized other avenues outside of the commitment process to assert the right to treatment, including a petition for habeas corpus. Id. at 651. Similarly, in Moen, we held that a motion brought under
We are not persuaded to a different conclusion by the treatment act‘s reference to a habеas corpus proceeding. While
The parties have argued that our opinions might be construed as somewhat conflicting. We clarify our prior caselaw to the extent any discrеpancy appears between our holdings in Hefler and Navratil or Travis. As we held in Navratil and discussed in Travis, a patient‘s right to treatment cannot be enforced in a civil-commitment proceeding and must instead be enforced through a separate action, offering in dicta that filing a habeas corpus petition and appearing before the special review board are avenues for right-to-treatment relief. 799 N.W.2d at 651; In re Civ. Commitment of Travis, 767 N.W.2d 52, 58-59 (Minn. App. 2009). In Moen, we reiterated our Hefler holding that a committed рerson has a statutory right to counsel for a hearing before the special review board. 837 N.W.2d at 50-51 (citing In re Hefler, 378 N.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Minn. App. 1985)); see also
JMW offers various pоlicy arguments against our holding today. It emphasizes that the treatment act guarantees a person subject to civil commitment the right to counsel at all stages of civil-commitment proceedings. JMW reminds us of its ethical obligation to Swope to vindicate his right to treatment conferred by the commitment act. And it contends that, because no specifically outlined proceeding in the treatment act provides a mechanism to vindicate that right, the appointed attorney‘s work still ought to be a covered fee. Should we expect attorneys to accept a court-appointed role to represent civil-commitment patients when some of the work will be unfunded? JMW argues reasonably, “Without counsel, other persons like Mr. Swope will be forced to languish in jail or prison awaiting treatment while their mental health continues to deteriorate and their condition worsens. This Court should be deeply troubled by such worrying implications for one of our State‘s most vulnerable populations.”
JMW‘s policy arguments are well founded and raise genuine practical concerns. But it is not our prerogative to add language to a statute to advance what might appear to bе sound policy—including policy that the legislature perhaps only inadvertently failed to account for. This deferential, separation-of-powers approach is grounded in the longstanding admonition restraining us from adding words when construing a statute, even words that the legislature may have unconsciously omitted. Martinco v. Hastings, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (Minn. 1963) (“[C]ourts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overloоks.“). Although the treatment act has been amended after the circumstances involved in this case, the amendment does not directly expand the scope of coverable legal services. The amended statute now includes a subdivision stating, “Patients . . . must be admitted to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours of the Office of Medical Director, under section 246.018, or a designee detеrmining that a medically appropriate bed is available,” and it provides that the new language “expires on June 30, 2025.”
Wе also cannot affirm the district court‘s order based on the parties’ contract. Although the district court stated in its 26th and final conclusion of law that “Scott County has an obligation to pay JMW‘s fees pursuant to
II
Scott County argues that the district court abused its discretion by finding the fees charged for multiple JMW attorneys working on Swope‘s civil-commitment action to be reasonable, because the district court had only appointed one attorney to the matter and because it approved fees that Scott County argued were unrelated to the proceeding. And the parties argue over whether the district сourt‘s failure to use a lodestar method to calculate the reasonableness of the attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. We review a district court‘s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion and its factual findings for clear error. County of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 711 (Minn. 2013). The district court determined the fee award based on JMW‘s submitted invoice, which did not distinguish between JMW‘s work on the civil-commitment proceeding аnd its work on the petition for mandamus and habeas corpus. We are in no position to opine as to the reasonableness of the fee award or reach the question of methodology both because the district court‘s fee award included the work outside the scope of the commitment
DECISION
We affirm the district court‘s order for Scott County to pay JMW for the attorney fees incurred while representing Swope during his civil-commitment proceeding. We reverse the district court‘s decision, which it based on
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
CLEARY, Judge (concurring specially)
While I concur with the majority opinion based on the current statutory framework, I write separately to urge the legislature to follow through and give meaning to thе mandates provided in
These statutory provisions address some of the most vulnerable among us—the seriously mentally-ill who have been civilly committed. Many have been left to languish in local law enforcement holding facilities while they are denied the treatment that they so desperаtely need, the provision of which is mandatory under