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Board of Regents v. Royal Insurance Co. of America
517 N.W.2d 888
Minn.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 REGENTS OF the BOARD OF UNI- MINNESOTA, et

VERSITY OF Petitioners, Appellants,

al.,

ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF

AMERICA, American Insurance Great

Company, River Insurance North Com- al., Respondents.

pany, et C1-93-24,

No. C8-93-36 C5-93-186.

Supreme Court Minnesota. 17, 1994.

June *2 Jones, Seiben, Harvey N. Mi-

Michael R. LaVerdiere, Storm, Seiben, Polk, R. chael Hawn, P.A., Hastings and & Edward Jones Westbrook, Riley, Annetta J. Anderson J. Loadholt, III, Ness, Berly Motley, Richard- Poole, P.A., Charleston, SC, appel- for son & lants. Mansfield,

Stephen Foley, Foley Min- J. & neapolis, Ins. for Great American Co. Horstman, Robins, Kaplan, Miller Andrew Ciresi, Minneapolis, for North River Ins. & Co., et al. Ditzler, Royal Minneapolis, D. for

Austin America. Ins. Co. of MeHeffey, North River Ins. Laurence M. Co., Morristown, NJ, North Ins. for River Co. Berens, PA, Berens, Kelley

Michael & Brunner, Minneapolis and Thomas W. Laura Barthel, Washington, Foggan, A. A. Carol DC, for amicus curiae Ins. Environmental Litigation Assoc.

OPINION SIMONETT, Justice. “pollution exclusion” in the defen-

Does the cov- carriers’ insurance exclude dant conclude in erage for asbestos claims? We it not for the this case does for the excess policies but part. part and affirm in We reverse early University 1972 the From 1969 to asbestos-containing fire- installed Minnesota materials, by Asbes- proofing manufactured buildings. tospray Corporation, in some of its Regents of the Univer- In the Board of (hereinafter sity and of Minnesota the State sued, others, among Regents”) called “the interest, H Asbestospray and its successor (formerly Corporation A& Construction damages for the cost of re- Spraycraft), for buildings. from the moving the asbestos Asbestospray insurers When coverage, A denied and H & Construction agreement insureds entered into an the two Shugart, 316 N.W.2d pursuant to Miller (Minn.1982), confessing judgment in fa- million, Regents ing vor of the and as- broad for all sums $1.6 the insured against signing legally obligated their claims their pay damages insurers Regents. personal injury “caused by an occurrence.”3 then commenced this action *3 against Royal Compa- defendants Insurance primary policies The contain the standard ny, Company, North River Insurance U.S. exclusion, 1973 Form which ex- Company, Fire Insurance and Great Ameri- cludes Company. can Insurance trial The court bodily injury property damage arising or granted Regents’ summary motion for discharge, dispersal, out of the reléase or judgment, finding Miller-Shugart settle- smoke, soot, fumes, acids, escape vapors, of policies, ment reasonable and the insurers’ alkalis, chemicals, liquids, gases, toxic excess, provide both and cover- irritants, waste materials or other contami- age.1 Royal, North River and Fire U.S. land, pollutants upon nants or into or (hereinafter “respondent compa- atmosphere, any body water course or nies”) appealed appeals to the court of on water; apply this exclusion does not multiple appeals issues.2 The court of af- discharge, dispersal, if such release or es- except pivotal firmed the trial court on the cape is sudden and accidental. coverage, finding issue of insurance that cov- erage “pollution was excluded exclu- glance, provision At first seems clear Regents sion” in the Board v. enough. appear would that if an insured America, Royal Ins. Co. 503 N.W.2d 486 deposits toxic place waste a contained and (Minn.App.1993). pollu- Because it found the escapes, by seeping it such as into the sur- question dispositive, tion clause the court of rounding water, underground soil or the ex- appeals did not address the pre- other issues applies; policy clusion thus the would afford sented to it. 503 N.W.2d 489. coverage no for the classic case of a waste disposal gradually site pollutes which Regents petitioned The for further review hand, appears area. On the other it that if exclusion issue. This is the explosion an sends chemical fumes over us, only respondent issue as the before insur- residential, area, or an oil truck overturns ers did not file a notice of review. The spills marsh, and oil into a these would be primary policies exclusion clause in the reads happenings sudden and accidental differently from the exclusion clause in the exception come within pollu- clause of the policies. Consequently, we will dis- tion so that the exclusion would first, primary policy cuss the and apply and there would be insurance cov- policy then the excess exclusion. erage. I. when, happens case, But what as in this Respondents’ primary policies are fireproofing Com- insured’s material installed in a Policies, prehensive Liability General afford- releases pol- asbestos fibers? Is the Royal 1. The trial court judgment. found Insurance the entire amount of the settlement Company craft, Asbestospray, Spray- covered and then Regents This became a non-issue when the 1-year property damage for five terms with agreed appeals in the court of $100,000. limits of North River Insurance Com- limited to the stated limits. Great Ameri- pany Spraycraft 1-year covered for one can, therefore, party is not a at this level. $100,000. property damage with limits of And Company Great American Insurance Spraycraft covered primary policies 3.The define an “occurrence” as $100,000 1-year for three terms including repeated "an accident continuous or property damage limits. conditions, exposure bodily which results in coverage U.S. Fire afforded excess for two 1- injury property damage expected neither nor year aggregate property damage terms with lim- standpoint intended from the of the insured.” million, $5 its of and North River afforded excess 1-year for three terms with the same Regents' The trial court ruled that the claim limits. was caused an "occur- 2. appealed only Great American rence.” The court issue, the trial court's did not reach that holding jointly severally that it was liable for and it is not an issue before us. is, If home.” 432 at 499. The N.W.2d reasonable germane? lution exclusion expectations Creamery exception test of Atwater accidental” so Co. “sudden and Mutual Insurance inapplicable? And if the Western National that the exclusion is (Minn.1985),however, apply, is N.W.2d no exception the exclu- 366 has clause here, ruling inapplicable place contrary itself because and the Grin- sion nevertheless course, Atwater, parties, of dif- In we held that language? of its nell overruled. major questions. “where are hidden in the fer on each of these exclusions section, definitions the insured should be relevancy 1. The exclu- knowledge held reasonable sion. literal terms conditions.” 366 N.W.2d at general liability In comprehensive 278.4 (standing in shoes *4 case, pollution the policy in this involved insureds) argue prod the that is a first such; designated plainly exclusion is con- case, pollution ucts not a This case. wording sequently, of the exclusion the case, simply they argue, the in is a where construed, if of ambiguity should be a claim product has a has sured sold defective which raised, in is with the usual rules accordance damage. argument This property caused interpretation governing insurance con- long. not us for need detain expectation tracts. The test reasonable property damages speaks The to exclusion ignore pollution not a license the exclusion to discharge “arising the out of’ release in this case nor to rewrite the exclusion say “arising pollutants. not out of a solely to to a result insured conform negligently prod- unfit or made defective or prefer.5 might words, uct.” In the exclusion defines other by characterizing activity the itself excep- 2. The and accidental” “sudden pollutant, activity pol- not the insured tion. See, Indus., e.g., luter. Park-Ohio Inc. v. 1215, (6th Co., Home 975 F.2d 1223 Indem. pollution “if The exclusion Cir.1992) law). (applying Ohio discharge, dispersal, escape release or such sudden accidental.” however, rely, Regents also on Regents argue gradual re- opinion, that court Grinnell Mutual Wasmuth, into the interior v. 432 lease asbestos fibers Reinsurance Co. N.W.2d buildings period (Minn.App.1988), pet. space of its over some 495 rev. denied for “sudden,” and, therefore, (Minn., 10,1989), years 20 was with a simi Feb. somewhat applies. to exclusion exception lar fact situation. There the insured’s insula indeed, And, respectable material, home, Regents cite in a tion when installed emit authority that ap proposition for the “sudden” formaldehyde ted fumes. The court of “unexpected,” point coverage, means and then out that peals holding that found insurance fibers was reasonably the release of the asbestos unex- expect insured would have See, Reclamation, pected. e.g., v. Land general liability policy Just comprehensive ed its Ltd., 737, 507, “unexpected damage 155 157 Wis.2d 456 to exclude Wis.2d Int’l, 570, (1990); Morton Inc. v. in a N.W.2d 573 due to installation of materials Creamery unique policy. at 276-78. The presented a tion of Id. Iowa 4. Atwater situation. definition, Court, note, policy interesting there Supreme Under the was no “bur- has it is premises, though glary" on the insured’s even expecta- application reasonable limited the of its admittedly burglary occurred had and even egregious tions situations similar doctrine though policy Open was a “Merchantile (Mut.) Steffen, v. that in See AID Ins. Atwater. Policy.” Burglary 366 N.W.2d 274-75. Stock at 189, (Iowa 1988). 423 N.W.2d 192 burglary, For there to be a required definition burglar who there be a left visible respondents’ trial in this case found 5. The court If, entry or exit. marks of a forcible as was exclusions, in both the Atwater, burglar enough case in is skillful adopting policies, inapplicable by Grin marks, "burglary.” no there is no This leave expectation approach. Conse nell’s reasonable Atwater, qualification, we “visible said in marks” quently, decided the further the trial court never really or masked im- a "hidden” appeals. the court of issues here and discussed disguised permissibly within the definition sec- 892 America, irritants, pol- 629 3. “Other Accident Ins. Co. contaminants General ” (N.J.1993). lutants. 881, equally Other re

A.2d authority spectable holds that “sudden” has Moving the text of connotation, something temporal and means itself, argue exclusion first See, chemicals, abruptly. e.g., smoke, happens Lumber toxic and the other Indus., waste materials described in the Casualty v. Belleville mens Mut. Co. by-product exclusion are the of industrial (1990). 675, 568, 407 Mass. 555 N.E.2d fibers, out, pollution. they point Asbestos also, note, panels that two of our court of mineral, naturally occurring are a not a Compare on the issue. appeals have differed material, waste and hence are not contem Grinnell, (construing 432 N.W.2d plated But the exclusion. “unexpected” to mean or “unin “sudden” irritants, goes on to include “other tended”) Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. contaminants, pollutants.” We would be 368, Great Cent. Ins. 480 N.W.2d 375-76 doing English language if disservice to the (“sudden” “abrupt”), (Minn.App.) pet. means fibers, say we were to that asbestos 1992). (Minn., Mar. rev. denied are a health hazard because of their irritant body, effects on the human were not an a word has than one Because more irritant. *5 meaning ambiguous. it is does not mean The depends being sense of a word on how it is land, upon atmosphere, 4. “Into or or used; only meaning applies if more than one any body watercourse or water.” of ambiguity within that context does arise. argue The further that as Here “sudden and accidental” modifies “dis bestos fibers are not released into the “atmo charge, place It refers not to the [etc.].” sphere” but into the air inside the build particular place in a but ment of waste to the ings, pollution and therefore the exclusion discharge escape of or the waste from that apply. does not The court of disa place. The word “sudden” is used in tandem greed, stating distinguish that to air between “accidental,” and building arbitrary the word “accidental” inside and outside a is an distinction. parlance in means unex unintended, pected Casualty or Bituminous (in “Atmosphere” ordinarily its understood Bartlett, 72, 76-77, Corp. v. Minn. 307 240 sense) physical “air,” is another name for 310, (1976), part 312-13 overruled in N.W.2d important but —and is this what is is air —it grounds, Rupp thought being particular place. on other Prahm v. Constr. of as in a We 389, (Minn.1979); say atmosphere would not a room 277 391 N.W.2d thus stuffy, stuffy. is but rather that the air is “unexpected” to mean construe “sudden” atmosphere think of We as the air surround- redundancy. is to a incon create seems ing planet, spoke our as when Hamlet of too, gruous, leakage seepage to think of a or (Act canopy, “this most excellent the air.” many years happening that occurs over ii.) II, it speak scene So is that of we suddenly. releasing atmosphere a balloon into the but difficulty concluding, We have no in the letting the air problem out of a tire. Our used, “atmosphere” context here that the term “sudden” is here how the term should be pollution understood when used in a exclu- opposite gradual. used to indicate the of sion. Consequently, we hold that the “sudden and exception pollution accidental” to the exclu- pollution This much is clear. The exclu- apply sion asbestos fibers re- initially sion is directed —at least it was —at gradually

leased over time from the insured’s involving pollution claims of the natural product. environment.6 Thus the exclusion is worded 6. hap- Concerns about the of natural wastes that had been allowed to accumulate prominent hazardly, period many years. environment became in the 1960s often over a See Rosenkranz, Note, happening spills. major with the oil This led E. Joshua Ex- Pollution Glass, growing Through Looking to a awareness that our natural re- clusion Clause (1986), being endangered by good sources were for a hazardous Geo.L.J. 1237 account of the (Ill.1991), concluded that when the the natural resources broadly encompass namely, setting, “atmosphere” part read as of the planet in natural this their word (ie., land, land, upon of water. atmosphere, bodies clause “into or whole clear, however, body the exclu- atmosphere, any less whether or water course or It is of water”), meant include contamination readily apparent pollu “it is sion setting. their damage resources outside natural applies property these tion exclusion arising discharge from the into Significantly, environment, part or onto the external some generic rather term “water” but not use thereof, rather than the release asbestos “any body or of wa- phrase watercourse building.” a fibers within ter,” description indicative of water streams, ponds or lakes. use “land,” “property,” instead of whether term II. personal, appears or likewise directed

real turn now excess Re- We to the And, land as natural resource. within U.S. contain spondent Fire’s think, context, “atmosphere,” we following exclusion: air. refers to ambient * * * This shall not to lia- saying are not here air inside bility or contamination outside, building differs from the air or land, water, personal proper- air or real intermingle. air do not the inside outside injuries damages resulting ty any Rather, within the context by an occurrence. therefrom caused air is not in the distinction happens the air to be. itself where Respondent policy has North River’s excess be- supply the air within When similarly exclusion.7 worded contaminated, is harmful to the comes *6 coverage Here is excluded for the building; of that controlled environment water, “land, or of air pollution contamination in of the air is the contamination personal property.” language or real or This surrounding harmful to the natural envi- not primary policies’ in the differs from used ronment, escapes until it into least not attempt No is made in the excess exclusion. personal to that environment so as cause identify particular pollu policies’ exclusion to injury not or claim —a or contaminants. No reference is made tants conclude, therefore, here. We that the made dispersal of to the or release a substance “atmosphere” pollution in the exclusion term But, impor place. most from contained primary under does not exclude the being polluted, the tantly, defining in what is pollution the or of policies for contamination language descriptive does not use exclusion building. air within only. natural environment Not of the level, may At one the make distinction we pollution personal land but the of real and are to draw a fine line. But words seem property is mentioned. Instead of “water deliberately policies in to chosen water,” body simply there course or is distinctions, we think construc make and the to And instead of atmo reference water. given “atmosphere” have the word tion we generic sphere, the uses the exclusion functionally contextually sound and here is “air.” arrived pertinent. Some other courts have conclude, therefore, the Thus Illinois unlike at the same conclusion. the We Fidelity policies, policy in the Supreme Court in States & the United policies 144 ex- Guaranty Co. v. Insulation excess includes —and therefore Wilkin 280, 287, policy coverage N.E.2d from contamina- Ill.2d Ill.Dec. cludes —the agreed policy apply litigation polluters sought shall to not ensued land, clean-up pollution the costs of and reme- transfer massive or contamination insurers, insurers, water, the dial action their and personal any property or or air real or through exclusionary provisions, sought to define injuries damages resulting or therefrom caused exposures. policy their and limit by an occurrence. reads: 7. North River's exclusion by Regents pollution

tion or asbestos fibers of air claim the installation of the building. fireproofing within a material not or “continuous

repeated” single place because it took on a remains, however, occasion, There one further and as to the release of the asbes- that, argue any event, fibers, issue. The tos the release was accidental. We claim the exclusion does to their think this is a tortuous miseharacterization fibers from happened. because the release asbestos dealing what We are not with the material “occur fireproofing the is not an dumping storing or of hazardous wastes at rence,” term is used in the as that disposal subsequent site and or discharge argument, exclusion. To understand this we escape surrounding into wastes interplay need to between what consider Here area. we have the manufacture policy excess covers and what it excludes. fireproofing containing asbestos, material product installation the manufactured ain policies provide coverage for losses building, subsequent and the release of the “caused an An “occurrence” occurrence.” view, asbestos fibers. The common sense we happening is defined as an accident “either think, causing is that the “occurrence” during policy period or a continuous pollution damage is the re- continuous or repeated exposure conditions which unex- peated exposure building’s interior to unintentionally injury pectedly and causes gradual release of the asbestos fibers. persons property during poli- tangible Indeed, Regents’ complaint alleges the cy period.”8 fireproofing “continuously material admitted building” asbestos fibers into the [sic] by an phrase, The same “caused occur- damage “property that the has rence,” been and is appears exclusion. Complaint, continuous.” Plaintiffs Count But “a here “occurrence” is defined as con- repeated XII. This exposure continuous or repeated exposure tinuous or to conditions precisely what the exclusion ex- unexpectedly unintentionally coverage. from cludes injury persons tangible property causes period.” during Significantly, hold, therefore, ex- word is omitted. “accident” The deletion precludes clusion of the policies excess cover- the word “accident” from the definition of age under the Re- “occurrence” in the exclusion makes gents’ claims. pollution damage clear that caused *7 in part Reversed part. and affirmed in “accident” is remain covered under the to coverage but occurrence-based PAGE, J., part took in no by damage repeated caused continuous or consideration decision of this case. exposure to be is not covered. GARDEBRING, (dissenting). Justice words, purposes pollu- In for other of the distinguished tion the insurer has are asked in this case to decide wheth- by between an and an occurrence accident er the in exclusions the carriers’ by exposure, gradual policies occurrence thus indicat- coverage exclude for ing the term restoration of “accident” to its based on claims release of asbestos inside meaning single, buildings. as a fortuitous event.9 We The majority concludes that the disagree do not understand to asbestos claims are excluded under the ex- Rather, that this policies distinction has been made. cess but included under the they argue inapplicable. is still the exclusion The critical distinction between the compare 8. by See to footnote 3 the definition of to "caused losses an occur coverage provision "occurrence” in purpose insuring rence.” The new of this clause primary policies. clarify towas that "an accident” could be either single event time fixed in or a continuous 1966, comprehensive general 9. Prior to lia- Abraham, happening. Kenneth S. Environmen bility policy covered losses "caused accident.” (1991); Liability tal Insurance Law 92-93 Rosen litigation phrase Because of over what this kranz, 6, supra note at 1241-42. meant, industry in 1966 the insurance switched ap- “hermetically sealed.” As the court of to be the use of said two doors, noted, primary policies, “[b]uildings as con- have win- “atmosphere” peals in the dows, poli- vents, in (par- to the “air” the excess and are not vacuum sealed trasted word majority ticularly university exclusions. with cies’ a state thousands Regents’ assertion as- in agrees university personnel going students into the “at- daily).” fibers were not released buildings bestos and out of the mosphere,” into the air inside the in nothing I can Because find the word buildings, and therefore concludes “atmosphere” meaning its limits primary policies air, respectfully outdoor I dissent. apply. majority’s rationale that while the TOMLJANOVICH, (dissenting). Justice is harm- pollution of the air inside of that ful to the controlled environment I concur with dissent Justice Gar- building, “the the air in a contamination of debring. surrounding building is not harmful environment, at least not until natural as to

escapes into that environment so cause injury

personal claim—a However, nothing

not made here.” case requires language

law or limited ah’ exclusion be building.

outside dictionary always

While definitions are determination, they

helpful making legal Shakespearean may useful be least as as In re Access to Law Enforcement Records ease, look, might In quotations. one Relating Daniel Arrest Peter example, to Third New Interna- Webster’s QUINN 10, 1992. on November (1971), Dictionary one tional where defi- C5-92-2526, C0-92-2529, Nos. C4-93- given atmosphere is air of a nition of “the and C8-93-134. C6-93-133 locality esp. as affected place [sic] * * An example characteristic particular of Minnesota. Supreme Court atmosphere given is “the close of the school- that, room,” indicating plainly rather at least 17, 1994. June Webster, according may “atmosphere” indoor, air. Fur- mean as well outdoor

ther, meaning beyond within contained dictionary, nothing in the there is com- understanding

mon sense of the word atmo- *8 any sense it to

sphere which in limits outdoor

air. agree

I with the court of that to

distinguish the air and the air between inside building arbitrary

outside a distinction. majority “may admits distinction to draw fine line.” It is indeed fine

seem

line, passes freely. through one which air majority would have us believe air properties changes its as moves

somehow building air

into or out of a or that the within from completely separate building. This is not the ease.

air outside the contained,

Buildings completely are not

Case Details

Case Name: Board of Regents v. Royal Insurance Co. of America
Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date Published: Jun 17, 1994
Citation: 517 N.W.2d 888
Docket Number: C1-93-24, C8-93-36 and C5-93-186
Court Abbreviation: Minn.
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