Tokvan Ly, Respondent, vs. Jodi Harpstead, Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services, Appellant.
A22-1826
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
June 12, 2024
Moore, III, J.
Took no part, Procaccini, Hennesy, JJ. Office of Appellate Courts.
James P. Conway, Kevin J. Wetherille, Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A., Shakopee, Minnesota, for respondent.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Brandon Boese, Scott H. Ikeda, Assistant Attorneys General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
SYLLABUS
- An appeal is not moot where there remains a live controversy as to a part of the order on appeal or, alternatively, where a favorable decision on the merits of the appeal may afford some relief to the appellant.
- The independent, extra-statutory basis for appeal of an order issuing a peremptory writ of mandamus before entry of final judgment as a final order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, which was first recognized in State ex rel. Matthews v. Webber, 17 N.W. 339 (Minn. 1883), has been extinguished by amendment to
Rule 103.03(g) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure ; an order issuing a peremptory writ of mandamus is also not appealable underRule 103.03(a) of those rules as an “irregular judgment,” and our prior reliance on such a legal fiction, beginning in State ex rel. Mortenson v. Copeland, 77 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1898), is disclaimed and overruled. - Under the supreme court‘s inherent authority and
Rule 102 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure , the supreme court has the authority to suspend the final judgment requirement underRule 103.03(a) of those rules, exercise jurisdiction over an otherwise defective appeal, and remand to the court of appeals to consider the merits of the appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
OPINION
MOORE, III, Justice.
This case requires us to determine whether a district court‘s order issuing a peremptory writ of mandamus is immediately appealable, even though the district court reserved the issue of mandamus damages for later determination at trial. The respondent, Tokvan Ly, suffers from severe mental illness and was incarcerated in the Scott County Jail. The district court found Ly incompetent to face criminal proceedings and ordered him committed to the care of the appellant, Jodi Harpstead, in her official capacity as Commissioner of Human Services. The Legislature has directed that persons who are in Ly‘s position be prioritized for admission to state-operated treatment programs operated by the Commissioner and be admitted “within 48 hours.” See
Ly was not admitted within 48 hours of his commitment. Instead, 15 days after his commitment, Ly remained in jail and was not receiving the specialized treatment needed to address his severe mental illness. Accordingly, he filed a petition for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus in Scott County District Court alleging, among other things, that the Commissioner was failing to comply with a mandatory duty to admit him to treatment within 48 hours under the Priority Admission statute and seeking damages resulting from his delayed admission to treatment. After expedited proceedings and over numerous and vehement objections from the Commissioner, the district court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus that determined the Commissioner‘s liability solely on the facts as alleged in Ly‘s petition, and set the issue of mandamus damages for a fact trial. In ordering that the writ issue, the district court commanded the Commissioner to admit Ly to a state-operated treatment program and it sua sponte imposed a monthly statewide reporting requirement upon the Commissioner related to all persons awaiting admission to state-operated treatment programs under the Priority Admission statute.
The Commissioner appealed the district court‘s order, contending that State ex rel. Matthews v. Webber, 17 N.W. 339 (Minn. 1883), permitted her to immediately appeal the order under
FACTS
Ly suffers from schizoaffective disorder and has a history of serious mental health episodes requiring specialized psychiatric care. Previous episodes have resulted in psychiatric hospitalizations, residential psychiatric care placements, and at least eleven civil commitments by a judicial officer since the year 2000. Although the appeal currently before us concerns questions of a purely procedural nature, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the heart
On September 27, 2022, Ly was declared incompetent to proceed in three criminal cases against him by reason of mental illness under
Two weeks later, on November 5, 2022, Ly filed a petition seeking writs of mandamus and habeas corpus in Scott County District Court. Ly‘s petition alleged that the Commissioner failed to carry out a duty under the Priority Admission statute‘s 48-hour rule and that Ly remained incarcerated in the Scott County Jail. He further alleged that he was receiving inadequate medical care for his schizoaffective disorder and his symptoms were worsening while in jail. As relevant here, Ly sought: (1) relief in the form of a writ of mandamus compelling the Commissioner to immediately admit him to a state-operated treatment program; (2) damages pursuant to
Apparently based on the allegations in the petition, but without reciting any facts, the district court issued an alternative writ of mandamus on November 9, 2022.2 The alternative writ read, in relevant part:
1. YOU ARE COMMANDED to immediately admit the Petitioner to a treatment facility or a state-operated treatment program as required under
M.S.A. § 253B.10, subd. 1 , and until doing so, immediately provide Tokvan Ly with proper care and treatment, best adapted, according to contemporary professional standards, to rendering further supervisionunnecessary, including providing him appropriate antipsychotic medication, under the care of a psychiatrist or other suitable medical professional, and providing him such other care and treatment made
necessary by his condition and is in keeping with professional standards for such care.
2. OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE YOU ARE COMMANDED to:
- Make a return of this writ by filing either an answer to show cause why Petitioner has not been admitted to a treatment facility or a state-operated treatment program as required under
M.S.A. § 253B.10, subd. 1 , and provided treatment as required byM.S.A. § 253B.03, subd. 7 , or file a demurrer, at least 24 hours before the return hearing. If Defendant answers rather than filing a demurrer, the Court will set a jury trial on contested facts at a time and date to be determined, provided that the parties may waive a jury trial.
The alternative writ indicated that the situation was “emergent and urgent” and set a hearing “to review compliance with this Order and to address the remaining issues raised and relief sought by the Petitioner.” The alternative writ further directed that counsel “be prepared to address the merits of this action and immediate actions which may be taken to transfer Petitioner to a treatment facility and provide him treatment required by law.”
On November 16, 2022, the Commissioner filed a “Motion to Dismiss/Demurrer” seeking dismissal of the alternative writ and denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.3 As relevant to this appeal, the Commissioner contended first that the alternative writ “fail[ed] to state any facts showing the obligation of the Commissioner to perform any act, nor does it allege any facts showing the Commissioner‘s failure to act,” meaning that the Commissioner lacked notice of the claim against her and the alternative writ did not
comply with the requirements of
Before the hearing, Ly filed responses in opposition to both of the Commissioner‘s
At the hearing on November 30, 2022, the district court required the Commissioner to argue both of her motions, over her objections that the motions had not yet been fully briefed and that she had received no notice that she would be required to argue them at what had been noticed as a “Review Hearing.” The district court denied the venue change and took the motion to dismiss under advisement, providing the Commissioner 48 hours in which to file a reply brief after the hearing. The Commissioner duly filed her reply. On December 5, 2022, Ly filed proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order to deny the motion to dismiss, order a peremptory writ of mandamus, and enter judgment for Ly. Therein, Ly advanced new arguments, including that a peremptory writ of mandamus should issue on the merits of the petition because the Commissioner had not filed an answer.
On December 21, 2022, the district court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order denying the Commissioner‘s motion to dismiss and ordering a peremptory writ of mandamus.4 It determined the writ should issue based on the facts alleged in Ly‘s petition, which it viewed as uncontested because the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss rather than an answer. The district court‘s order read, in relevant part:
2. This Order shall operate as a Peremptory Writ of Mandamus to Jodi Harpstead, Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services as follows;
YOU ARE COMMANDED to immediately admit the Petitioner, Tokvan Ly, to a treatment facility or a state-operated treatment program as required under
M.S.A. § 253B.10, subd. 1 , and to thereafter immediately provide Tokvan Ly with proper care and treatment, as required underM.S.A. § 253B.10, Subd. 1(c) , which is best adapted, according to contemporary professional standards, to rendering further supervision unnecessary, including providing him appropriate antipsychotic medication, under the care of a psychiatrist
or other suitable medical professional, and providing him such other care and treatment made necessary by his condition and is in keeping with professional standards for such care, as required by
M.S.A. § 253B.03, subd. 7 .YOU ARE COMMANDED to provide the Court with 30-day reports concerning all cases in the State of Minnesota to which the 48-hour rule applies, identifying the originating County and the time and date that the 48-hour period would have expired for each patient. These reports must include affidavits or other documents or evidence demonstrating the resources utilized with regard to these cases. In addition, the reports must include updated
capacity issues of all relevant treatment centers. The first such report shall be due by close of business on January 15, 2023.
(Emphasis omitted.) We refer to these two forms of mandamus relief ordered by the district court as the “admission requirement” and the “reporting requirement,” respectively. The district court imposed the reporting requirement sua sponte and without citation to any legal authority.5
In addition to a finding of liability on the petition for writ of mandamus, the district court set a fact trial regarding the specific damages incurred by Ly on account of the finding that the Commissioner had failed to comply with the Priority Admission statute‘s 48-hour rule; reserved decision on the petition for writ of habeas corpus; set a hearing for January 3, 2023, to review the Commissioner‘s compliance with the peremptory writ; and directed the parties to participate in alternative dispute resolution.
On December 23, 2022, Ly was admitted to treatment in the care of the Commissioner at Anoka-Metro Regional Treatment Center. The Commissioner filed
sworn declarations from two executive medical staff members, which reflect that Ly‘s admission was based on his position on the priority admission waiting list.
On December 27, 2022, the Commissioner promptly appealed the order issuing the peremptory writ to the court of appeals.6 The court of appeals questioned its jurisdiction and directed the filing of memoranda on the issue, which both parties timely filed. The court of appeals subsequently entered an order dismissing the appeal as premature. Ly v. Harpstead, No. A22-1826, Order Op. (Minn. App. filed Feb. 7, 2023). In its order, the court of appeals found that the order issuing the writ was not immediately appealable under
ANALYSIS
In proceeding with our inquiry, we first address whether this appeal has become moot. Second, we consider whether appeal may be taken directly from an order issuing a
peremptory writ of mandamus, rather than from judgment entered upon the writ. Third, we address our own authority to suspend the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, exercise jurisdiction over the Commissioner‘s appeal, and remand to the court of appeals to consider the merits of the appeal.
Before reaching the principal issue presented by this case, we must address whether this case is moot. Ly raised the issue of mootness in his responsive brief before this court, noting that he has already been transferred to a treatment facility, treated, and subsequently discharged from the care of the Commissioner. The Commissioner does not dispute that her appeal of the admission requirement has been mooted in part by Ly‘s transfer, treatment, and discharge, but she contends this appeal is not moot because of the outstanding issue of mandamus damages and the ongoing reporting requirement.
It is an axiomatic legal principle that courts in Minnesota may only hear actual cases and controversies. See In re Application of the Senate, 10 Minn. 78, 81 (1865). Our court will decline to hear cases that have become moot “because courts do ‘not issue advisory opinions or decide cases merely to make precedents.‘” Winkowksi v. Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d 302, 308 n.7 (Minn. 2023) (quoting Sinn v. City of St. Cloud, 203 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1972)). When faced with an appeal where “a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible,” we will dismiss it as moot. Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015). “A moot case is nonjusticiable.” Snell v. Walz, 985 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Minn. 2023). “Justiciability is an issue of law that we review de novo.” Id.
Ly‘s suggestion of mootness need not detain us long. Although he contends that this appeal is moot because the Commissioner has transferred, treated, and discharged him, he also acknowledges that the order on appeal obligates the Commissioner to provide monthly reports concerning all individuals statewide awaiting admission to a treatment facility under the Priority Admission statute.
Ly cites no authority compelling us to dismiss an appeal as moot notwithstanding the existence of a live controversy as to the reporting requirement. Indeed, that very notion is in considerable tension with the idea of mootness as safeguarding that “Minnesota courts may only hear actual cases and controversies.” See Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d at 308 n.7; see also Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (“As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (per curiam) (“[E]ven the availability of a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent a case from being moot.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 8-9 (dismissing case as moot where “no live case or controversy regarding the claims that appellants actually pleaded” existed and declining to address live constitutional claim on account of forfeiture).
Furthermore, even if the reporting requirement did not exist, this appeal would not be moot because a decision in the Commissioner‘s favor still provides an opportunity for meaningful relief notwithstanding Ly‘s transfer, treatment, and discharge. The district court‘s peremptory writ determined the Commissioner‘s liability but reserved the issue of damages for decision at a fact trial. If the Commissioner succeeds on the present appeal, she would be allowed to proceed with her merits appeal of the peremptory writ order before the court of appeals. A decision in favor of the Commissioner on the merits appeal could reverse the district court‘s liability determination and allow the Commissioner
II.
The heart of this appeal is whether an order issuing a peremptory writ of mandamus may be immediately appealed as of right when a district court has reserved decision on the issue of damages sought upon the writ. Because the existence of appellate jurisdiction is a question of law, we review this question de novo. See In re Polaris, Inc., 967 N.W.2d 397, 405 (Minn. 2021). We note that the “Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure shall apply in all proceedings on the writ” of mandamus.
As this case undeniably demonstrates, “[h]istorically, there has been little uniformity in the manner in which an aggrieved party has sought review by an appellate court in mandamus proceedings.” Schiltz v. City of Duluth, 449 N.W.2d 439, 440 (Minn. 1990) (collecting cases); see also State ex rel. Bd. of Comm‘rs v. McKellar, 99 N.W. 807, 808 (Minn. 1904) (“It must be admitted that there is considerable uncertainty as to the correct procedure to be observed in bringing mandamus cases to this court for review.“). Much of this confusion has centered around whether an appeal may be taken from the writ itself, or whether appeal must be taken from judgment entered upon the writ. See, e.g., Ullrich, 648 N.W.2d at 743. We therefore address the threshold question of whether the Commissioner may properly appeal from the district court‘s order issuing the peremptory writ rather than from judgment entered upon the writ.
Without question, the mandamus statute permits an appeal from judgment. See
However, older decisional law of our court recognized that appeal in mandamus may lie “[i]ndependent of [the appeal] provision of [the mandamus] statute” because “an order of a district court allowing a peremptory mandamus is appealable . . . as ‘a final order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding.‘” Matthews, 17 N.W. at 339 (quoting
Further complicating the matter, our decisions in the decades following Matthews also developed the alternate rationale that appeal under Matthews was disfavored but permissible because an order issuing the writ was an “irregular” judgment. Copeland, 77 N.W. at 222; Boldt, 273 N.W. at 605; City of White Bear Lake, 292 N.W. at 778–79, 782. Notably, since the promulgation of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure in 1967, this court has yet to address the viability of appeal from an order issuing a peremptory writ under Matthews or under the “irregular judgment” rationale followed in Copeland.
Against this convoluted legal backdrop, the Commissioner contends that appeal may lie from the district court‘s order issuing the peremptory writ: (A) pursuant to
A.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals “except as otherwise provided by statute, from a final order, decision or judgment affecting a substantial right made in an administrative or other special proceeding.”
Since at least 1863, the mandamus statute has provided for appeal “as in civil actions.”
In Matthews, we found that appeal in mandamus may lie “[i]ndependent of [the appeal] provision of [the mandamus] statute” because “an order of a district court allowing a peremptory mandamus is appealable . . . as ‘a final order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding.‘” Matthews, 17 N.W. at 339 (quoting
Over the next 60 years, our decisions followed Matthews to allow appeal from orders issuing a peremptory writ rather than from a judgment. See Copeland, 77 N.W. at 222; McKellar, 99 N.W. at 808; Boldt, 273 N.W. at 605; City of White Bear Lake, 292 N.W. at 778. While noting that the practice of appeal from the writ, rather than from judgment entered upon the writ, was disfavored, we repeatedly permitted such appeals on the basis that an order directing the issuance of the writ was itself a form of “irregular” judgment. Copeland, 77 N.W. at 222; Boldt, 273 N.W. at 605; City of White Bear Lake, 292 N.W. at 778–79, 782.
At the time of the Matthews decision, the bases for appellate jurisdiction were set by statute, rather than by rule. The statutory basis for appellate jurisdiction relied on by
Matthews was recodified several times without relevant substantive amendment until 1963. In 1963, the Legislature amended the statute, then codified at
In considering Matthews’ continued viability, three aspects of the decision are noteworthy. First, the basis for appeal in Matthews was “independent” of the basis
appeal set forth in the mandamus statute. Second, the Matthews court understood the statutory basis for appeal to authorize appeals only from a final judgment. Third, the “independent” or extra-statutory basis for appeal recognized for the first time in Matthews was under a statutory provision allowing appeal from “a final order affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding.”
When Matthews was decided, the mandamus statute provided for the appeal of mandamus “as in civil actions.”
The 1963 amendment that inserted the phrase “except as otherwise provided by statute” to the predecessor of today‘s
Putting this all together, Matthews and the decisions of our court following it were decided before the 1963 amendment to the predecessor of
B.
The Commissioner alternatively argues that a different subpart of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure,
That an order issuing the writ might be considered an irregular judgment emerged from our 1898 decision in Copeland. There, we observed that “the old practice,” or Matthews basis of appeal, was inconsistent with the mandamus statute‘s appeal provision. Copeland, 77 N.W. at 222. Nevertheless, faced with an appeal taken from an order issuing a peremptory writ of mandamus, which the trial court “evidently intended” to operate as final judgment on the writ, we held the trial court‘s order “to be the judgment of the court, although an irregular one, and, consequently, that an appeal will lie from it.” Id.12
Six years later, Copeland‘s treatment of an order issuing a peremptory writ of mandamus as a form of irregular judgment came under direct criticism in McKellar, where we observed that:
[In Copeland], attention was called to the fact that the statute . . . expressly provided for the entry of judgment in such cases from which an appeal would lie. It was accordingly held in that case that an order directing that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue was a judgment, though an irregular one; hence it was appealable as a judgment. Judged by the practical working of the rule thus laid down, it would now seem that it would have been better to have held that the order was simply one for a judgment, and therefore not appealable.
Although McKellar clearly articulated that Copeland‘s irregular judgment rationale was incorrect, it did not conclusively disclaim the practice. Instead, McKellar simply held that the “approved and correct procedure” was to appeal from judgment entered upon the writ, and that an appeal from an order directing issuance of the writ was “irregular practice, which should not be encouraged.” Id.
Although McKellar sought to end the practice of treating orders issuing the writ as a form of irregular judgment, we subsequently relied on this legal fiction to allow an appeal to proceed on two other occasions. In 1937, our decision in Boldt glossed over McKellar‘s discussion of the doctrinal flaws in treating orders issuing the writ as irregular judgments and instead cited McKellar‘s recital of the Copeland holding as if it were the operative statement of law. See Boldt, 273 N.W. at 605. On that basis, the Boldt court permitted an appeal to lie from an order issuing the peremptory writ as from an irregular judgment. Id. Three years later, we cited to Boldt to allow for appeal from another order issuing the writ. See City of White Bear Lake, 292 N.W. at 778–79, 782.
As this history reflects, the irregular judgment rationale that the Commissioner asks us to endorse in permitting her appeal to proceed under
Under the modern Rules-based practice, we do not think the final judgment rule is so easily sidestepped. To the extent that our decisions in Copeland, Boldt, and City of White Bear Lake endorsed the legal fiction that an order issuing a peremptory writ of mandamus is appealable as an irregular judgment, we overrule them and disclaim the practice.
In any event, even if we were to conclude that an order issuing a peremptory writ of mandamus is, as a general matter, an appealable judgment under
Because the district court‘s order directing issuance of the peremptory writ reserves determination on the issue of damages, it is not final and thus would not be appealable even if we were to carry forward our prior practice of treating orders issuing peremptory writs as “irregular” judgments. Accordingly, the district court‘s order is neither a judgment nor final, and it is therefore not appealable under
With the clarification we provide today, the court of appeals’ ultimate conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over this appeal under the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure was entirely correct. But we do not conclude our analysis there. Although always constrained by the jurisdictional limits of the Minnesota and federal constitutions, we have inherent and extraordinary authority to suspend the limits upon appellate jurisdiction imposed by
We seldom resort to that authority, and rightly so. Nonetheless, “in a limited number of other cases we have recognized our inherent authority to take an appeal in the interests of justice even when the filing or service requirements set forth in a rule or statute have not been met.” In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2003). This authority to make an exception to the requirements to hear an appeal lies uniquely with our court, as it is rooted in the Minnesota Constitution vesting us with “appellate jurisdiction in all cases.” See State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. 2011) (quoting
The Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure also provide that “[i]n the interest of expediting decision upon any matter before it, or for other good cause shown, the Supreme Court . . . may suspend the requirements or provisions of these rules . . . on its own motion. . . .”
We have previously explained that we will use our suspension authority under Rule 102 to take jurisdiction over a defective appeal “where the facts and circumstances contributing to the defect persuade us that [an] appellant was not inexcusably dilatory and that justice would be better served by reaching the merits of the case.” LeRoy v. Marquette Nat‘l Bank of Minneapolis, 277 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Minn. 1979). We have invoked Rule 102 where a case‘s “particular circumstances” convinced us that an “appellant‘s defective appeal arose from a genuine misconstruction of
We have occasionally observed such rare circumstances and acted sua sponte to suspend
This case presents several circumstances that persuade us of the appropriateness of invoking our inherent authority and our authority under
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals, exercise appellate jurisdiction over the Commissioner‘s appeal, and remand to the court of appeals to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
PROCACCINI, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
HENNESY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MOORE, III
Justice
Notes
605.09 Appealable judgments and orders. An appeal may be taken to the supreme court by the aggrieved party in the following cases:
. . . .
(g) Except as otherwise provided by statute, from a the final order, or judgment affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding, provided that the appeal must be taken within the time limited for appeal from an order; or upon a summary application in an action after judgment.
1963 Minn. Laws 1416-17.