In re PAUL MURRAY on Habeas Corpus.
A161687
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
April 19, 2021
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; Alаmeda County Super. Ct. No. 150811
In 2008, petitioner
In 2008, petitioner was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole (LWOP) for a first degree special circumstаnce murder he committed when he was 22 years old.1 In 2010, we affirmed his judgment of conviction. (People v. Murray, supra, A121746.)
On March 16, 2020, petitioner filed a motion for a Franklin hearing,2 contending he was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under
Meanwhile, on December 30, 2020, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting an equal protection violation. The alleged violation is based on
Youth Offender Parole Hearings
The origin and evolution of
“The Legislature first enacted
section 3051 in 2013 in response to a series of decisions concerning Eighth Amendment limitations on juvenile sentencing. (See Graham[ v. Florida] 560 U.S. [48,] 74 [juvenile who commits nonhomicide offense cannot be sentenced to LWOP]; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 465 [juvenile who commits homicide offense cannot be sentenced automatically to LWOP]; People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268 [juvenile cannot be sentenced to functional equivalent of LWOP for a nonhomicide offense].) These deсisions rested in part on ‘science and social science’ (Miller, at p. 471), and noted that ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds’ and in the ‘parts of the brain involved in behavior control’ (Graham, at p. 68; see Caballero, at p. 266).“‘[T]he Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 260 [(2013-2014 Reg. Sess.)] explicitly to bring juvenile sentencing into conformity with Graham, Miller, and Caballero.’ (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 277.) In enacting
section 3051 , the Legislature explained that ‘youthfulness both lessens a juvenile‘s moral culpability and enhances the prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs, these individuals can become contributing members of society.’ (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.) The bill‘s stated purpose was ‘to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in accordance with the decision of the California Supreme Court in [Caballero] and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in [Graham and Miller].’ (Ibid.)“As originally enacted,
section 3051 only afforded a youth parole eligibility hearing to juvenile offenders, not to young adults. (In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 981 & fn. 6.) It also excluded juveniles who were sentenced to LWOP, since they were already eligible for resentencing undersection 1170 . (Former § 3051, subd. (h) [‘This section shall not apply to cases. in which an individual is sentenced to’ LWOP], as enacted by Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) In the years that followed, however, the Legislature expandedsection 3051 ‘s provisions on who is eligible for a youth offender parole hearing, ‘recogniz[ing] that the maturity process does not end at 18 and in many cases extends to at least 25 years of age.’ (In re Jones (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 477, 484 (conc. opn. of Pollak, J.) (Jones).)
“In 2015, the Legislature expanded
section 3051 to apply to offenders who committed crimes at the age of 23 or younger. (Former § 3051, subd. (a)(1), added by Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1.) The amendment‘s author cited ‘[r]ecent scientific еvidence on adolescent and young adult development and neuroscience show[ing] that certain areas of the brain—particularly those affecting judgment and decision-making—do not fully develop until the early-to mid-20s.’ (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 261 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 28, 2015, p. 3.)“In 2017, the Legislature twice amended
section 3051 . First, the Legislaturе further increased the age from 23 to 25, such that offenders serving a determinate or life sentence for crimes committed when they were 25 or younger are now eligible for a youth offender parole hearing. (§ 3051, subd. (b); Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1.) The amendment‘s author cited research that the prefrontal сortex, which is responsible for decisionmaking and impulse control, ‘doesn‘t have nearly the functional capacity at age 18 as it does at 25.’ (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1308 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), as amended Mar. 30, 2017, Apr. 25, 2017, p. 2.)“That same year, the Legislature also amended
section 3051 to allow youth offender parole hearings for juveniles—but not young аdults—sentenced to LWOP. (§ 3051, subd. (b)(4); Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.) This amendment was designed to bring California into compliance with the constitutional requirements of Miller and Montgomery [v. Louisiana] (2016) 577 U.S. 190,’ which held that Miller‘s prohibition on mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders was retroactive. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 394 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 21, 2017, p. 4.) The bill sought ‘to remedy the now unсonstitutional juvenile sentences of life without the possibility of parole,’ without the need for ‘a resentencing hearing, which is time-consuming, expensive, and subject to extended appeals.’ (Id. at p. 3.)
“Thus, in its current form, section 3051 ‘permit[s] the reevaluation of the fitness to return to society of persons who committed serious offenses prior to reaching full cognitive and emotional maturity,’ unless the person was between 18 and 25 years of age when they committed their offense [and] sentenced to life without possibility of parole.’ (Jones, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 485 (conc. opn. of Pollak, J.).) It therefore ‘distinguishes both between those who committed their offenses under 18 years of age and those between 18 and 25 years of age, and between offenders 18 to 25 years of age sentenced to prison terms with the possibility of parole and those in the same age group who have been sentenced to life without the рossibility of parole.’ (Id. at p. 483 (conc. opn. of Pollak, J.).)” (Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 775-777, footnotes omitted.)
Equal Protection Principles
“The
The principles by which we evaluate a claimed equal protection violation are well established, as summarized, for example, by our Supreme Court in People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277: “In order to decide whether a statutory distinction is so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection, we typically ask two questions. We first ask whether the state adopted a classification affecting two or more groups that are similarly situated in an unequal manner. (People v. McKee [(2010)] 47 Cal.4th [1172,] 1202.) If we deem the groups at issue similarly situated in all material respects, we consider whether the challenged classification ultimately bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. (Johnson [v. Department of Justice (2015)] 60 Cal.4th [871,] 881.) A classification in a statute is presumed rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable. (See ibid.; Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1118, 1140 [holding that ’ “a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification‘” ‘].) The underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been ’ “ever аctually articulated” ’ by lawmakers, and it does not need to ’ “be empirically substantiated.” ’ (Johnson, at p. 881.) Nor does the logic behind a potential justification need to be persuasive or sensible—rather than simply rational. (See ibid.)” (People v. Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 289; accord, Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 196–198; Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 777–778.)
The ‘rational basis’ scrutiny is exceedingly deferential: A law will be upheld as long as a court can ‘speculat[e]’ any rational reason for the resulting differential treatment, regardless of whether the ‘speculation has “a foundation in the record,” ’ regardless of whether it can be ‘empirically substantiated,’ and regardless of whether the Legislature ever ‘articulated’ that reason when enacting the law.” (People v. Love, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 287, quoting People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74.)
Petitioner Has Not Demonstrated an Equal Protection Violation
As noted, petitioner asserts that
In deciding the eligibility of LWOP offenders for a
We recognize the concerns expressed by others before us, inсluding Justice Liu and several of our colleagues on the Court of Appeal, whose thoughtful observations recognize the tension between
We, too, share the concerns and recognize the tension. That said, it does not amount to an equal protection violation, and it is not our role to “second-guess the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law.” (People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 74.) But we join the others in encouraging the
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Richman, Acting P.J.
We concur:
Stewart, J.
Miller, J.
In re Paul Murray on Habeas Corpus (A161687)
Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Honorable Morris Jacobson
Attorney for Petitioner, Pаul Murray: Under Appointment of the Court of Appeal, Law Offices of John F. Schuck, John F. Schuck
Attorneys for Respondent, The People of the State of California: Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rene A. Chacon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General.