In re the MARRIAGE OF Richard S. DOUGALL, Petitioner/Appellant, and Myrna R. Dougall, Respondent/Appellee
No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0056
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2
Dec. 18, 2013
316 P.3d 591
VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge.
¶1 In this domestic-relations case, appellant Richard Dougall appeals from the trial court‘s post-dissolution-decree order for the payment of spousal maintenance arrearages to appellee Myrna Dougall and the denial of his subsequеnt motion for reconsideration challenging that order. The issue presented here is whether
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court‘s rulings. See In re Marriage of Yuro, 192 Ariz. 568, ¶ 3, 968 P.2d 1053, 1055 (App. 1998). The parties’ marriage was dissolved in 2008. The dissolution decree ordered Richard to pay Myrna $750 per month in spousal maintenance. The court also awarded each of the parties one-half interest in two parcels of real property and ordered that Richard obtain appraisals of the properties and pay Myrna her share of the equity. On appeal, this court affirmed the spousal maintenance award and the division of community property and debts. In re Marriage of Dougall, No. 2 CA-CV 2009-0058, 2010 WL 457129 (memorandum decision filed Feb. 10, 2010).
¶3 In 2011, the trial court entered two judgments against Richard for his failure to fulfill his obligations under the decree of dissolution. The first judgment for $5,000 represented the value of Myrna‘s interest in one of the properties. The second judgment was for $4,745 in spousal maintenance arrearages. Effective August 2011, the court also reduced Richard‘s spousal maintenance obligation to $500 per month. This court affirmed the spousal maintеnance modification. In re Marriage of Dougall, No. 2 CA-CV 2011-0182, 2012 WL 1808838 (memorandum decision filed May 17, 2012).
¶4 In August 2012, Myrna filed petitions to enforce the two judgments, claiming Richard “ha[d] made no efforts to pay.” In response, Richard filed a memorandum seeking credits against the judgments for debts he had paid on behalf of Myrna and for a loan and vehicle he had given to her. After a hearing, the trial court enterеd its minute entry order on December 11, 2012, finding Richard in contempt but concluding he could purge himself of the contempt by paying, in addition to the $500 per month in current spousal maintenance, $200 per month toward the judgment for arrearages until paid in full.2 The court entered a separate income-withholding order of $200 per month directed at Richard‘s VA disability benefits and аlso denied his requests for offsets.
¶5 On January 4, 2013, Richard filed a combined “motion for new trial/motion to reconsider/motion for stay.” After a hearing, the court denied the motion by minute entry order entered February 8, 2013. However, at Richard‘s request, the court modified its arrearages order by reducing the $200 payment to $100 per month for three months, then increasing it to $220 per month for fifteen months, and reinstating the $200 amount thereafter. This appeal followed.
I. Appellate Jurisdiction
¶6 According to his notice of appeal, Richard is challenging the trial court‘s December 11, 2012 and February 8, 2013 orders. Although Richard contends we have jurisdiction pursuant to
¶7 Generally, a notice of appeal must be filed no later than thirty days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.
¶8 Here, Richard filed his notice of appeal from both the December 11 and February 8 orders on March 4, 2013. Thus, his notice of appeal as to the December 11 order was filed well beyond the thirty-day requirement of Rule 9(a),
¶9 However, Richard also apрeals from the trial court‘s February 8 order denying his “motion for a new trial/motion for reconsideration/motion for stay,” pursuant to Rule 85(C),
II. Denial of Rule 85(C) Motion
A. Trial Court Did Not Exceed Jurisdiction
¶10 When the trial court modified Richard‘s spousal maintenance obligation in 2011, it stated that pursuant to § 25-530 it did not consider Richard‘s VA disability benefits. But at the December 2012 hearing on Myrna‘s petition for enforcement of spousal maintenance, the court did consider those benefits when it ordered Richard to pay an additional $200 per month toward spousаl maintenance arrearages. The court based its December 11, 2012 order on testimony that Richard‘s total income was $3,918 per month, including $1,245 in social security and $2,673 in VA disability benefits. In setting the $200 amount, the court noted that, after paying the $500 spousal maintenance obligation, Richard “continues to have $3,400 of income available to him.”
¶11 Pursuant to Rule 85(C)(1)(d), Richard argues thе trial court‘s December 11 “order is void, outside the [c]ourt‘s jurisdiction, and must be vacated.”6 He contends that, pursuant to
¶12 Although Rule 85(C)(1)(d) provides an avenue for challenging a void judgment, we disagree with the underlying premise of Richard‘s argument—that a trial court exceeds its jurisdiction and thus renders a void judgment by considering VA disability benefits in violation of § 25-530. The word “void” often is misused, Auman v. Auman, 134 Ariz. 40, 42, 653 P.2d 688, 690 (1982), as is the word “jurisdiction,” Marvin Johnson, P.C. v. Myers, 184 Ariz. 98, 101, 907 P.2d 67, 70 (1995). “A judgment or order is ‘void’ if the court entering it lacked jurisdiction: (1) over the subject matter, (2) over the person involved, or (3) to render the particular judgment or order entered.” Martin v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 11, 15, 893 P.2d 11, 15 (App. 1994). “If a judgment or order is void, the trial court has no discretion but to vacate it.” Id. at 14, 893 P.2d at 14. By contrast, a judgment or order is voidable “when the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction but errs in issuing an order.” State v. Bryant, 219 Ariz. 514, ¶ 14, 200 P.3d 1011, 1015 (App. 2008). A voidable judgment or order has “all the ordinary attributes of a valid judgment [or order] until it is reversed or vacated.” State v. Cramer, 192 Ariz. 150, ¶ 16, 962 P.2d 224, 227 (App. 1998).
¶13 Here, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide issues involving spousal maintenance, including arrearages. See
¶14 In relevant part,
Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the Secretary shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, аnd such payments made to, or on account of, a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.
¶15 In Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 621-22, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the federal statute in considering whether a Tennessee state court had jurisdiction to hold a veteran in contempt for nonpayment of child support when the veteran‘s only means of satisfying the obligation was chapter 38 service-connected disability benefits. The veteran argued that various federal laws, including
¶16 The Court also rejected the veteran‘s argument based on other federal laws and affirmed the contempt finding. Id. at 636. In doing so, the Court stated that, even though a veteran‘s disability benefits may be “exempt from garnishment or attachment while in the hands of the Administrator, we are not persuaded that once these funds are delivered to the veteran a state court cannot require that veteran to use them to satisfy an order of child support.” Id. at 635.
¶17 After Rose, state courts generally have concluded that, although
¶18 We therefore turn to whether § 25-530 precludes a trial court from considering VA disability benefits in ordering the payment of arrearages on a spousal maintenance award. Because this issue requires us to interpret § 25-530, our review is de novo. See Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 401, ¶ 13, 36 P.3d 749, 754 (App. 2001). Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to determine and give effect to the legislature‘s intent. Simpson v. Simpson, 224 Ariz. 224, ¶ 6, 229 P.3d 236, 237 (App. 2010). “The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute,” id., and “we will give terms their ordinаry meanings, unless the legislature has provided a specific definition or the context of the statute indicates a term carries a special meaning.” Kessen v. Stewart, 195 Ariz. 488, ¶ 6, 990 P.2d 689, 692 (App. 1999), quoting Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Tolliver, 183 Ariz. 343, 345, 903 P.2d 1101, 1103 (App. 1995). When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation. Merrill v. Merrill, 230 Ariz. 369, ¶ 27, 284 P.3d 880, 887 (App. 2012).
¶19 According to the plain language of the statute, § 25-530 aрplies when a court is determining “whether to award spousal maintenance” or “the amount of any award of spousal maintenance.” In Downing, this court held the statute also applies to a modification of spousal maintenance. 228 Ariz. 298, ¶¶ 6, 12, 265 P.3d at 1099, 1100. But here, the trial court was not making a determination “whether to award spousal maintenance” or “the amount of any award.” Indeed those determinations already had been made and, as noted above, were affirmed by this court on appeal.11 Nor was the trial court modifying the amount of spousal maintenance. Rather, the current proceedings arose from Richard‘s failure to pay arrearages on spousal maintenance previously awarded. See
¶20 Richard nonetheless argues that the “prohibition [under § 25-530] logically extends to an arrears payment order.” He reasons that § 25-530 coupled with
Conclusion
¶22 For the reasons stated above, we dismiss Richard‘s appeal directly challenging the trial court‘s December 11, 2012 order, vacate the income-withholding order directed at Richard‘s VA disability benefits, but otherwise affirm the trial court‘s orders.