*1 MANSELL MANSELL Argued January May No. 87-201. 1989 Decided *2 n Court, J., Rehnquist, opinion the in which Marshall, delivered the Kennedy, JJ., J., White, Stevens, Scalia, and Brennan, C. J., J., Blackmun, opinion, in dissenting which O’Connor, joined. filed joined, post, p. 595. appellant. argued
Douglas cause With B. for Cone T. Elia. him on the briefs was Jim argued the cause and filed a brief for Dennis A. Cornell appellee.* urging curiae reversal were filed for the United States *Briefs of amici Bolton, Fried, Dep- Attorney
by Assistant General General Solicitor Merrill; Association and for the Retired Officers uty General Solicitor Horbaly. et al. Jan Inuzuka, Aimer, Sally filed a I. F. Judith June Kazuko Goldfarb urging curiae Equity League et al. as amici the Women’s Action brief for affirmance. opinion delivered the of the Court.
Justice Marshall appeal, state courts, In decide whether consistent we Spouses’ Former with Services Pro- the federal Uniformed (1982 V) (For- Supp. ed. and tection S. C. Act, U. Act), may mer Act or treat as Protection upon pay waived divisible divorce veterans’ benefits. We retiree order to receive they may not. hold that
I A specified Armed Forces who serve for a Members of the *3 period, years, may generally 20 retire retired at least with (1982 V) §3911 pay. Supp. seq. et ed. 10 U. S. C. V) (1982 § (Army); Supp. (Navy seq. et ed. and and Ma- 6321 (1982 V) (Air Force). Supp. §8911 Corps); seq. ed. and rine et pay eligible a veteran is to receive amount of retirement years according is number of calculated to the served §§3926 §§6325-6327 (Army); the rank achieved. and 3991 (Air Force). § Corps); (Navy 8929 Veterans who and Marine military eligible for became as a result of service are disabled (wartime disability); §310 disability benefits. U. S. C. disability § disability). (peacetime bene- The amount of according eligible to fits a to receive is calculated veteran disability degree which the of the and the to the seriousness §§314 impaired. ability living been to earn a has veteran’s and 355. military dipping, prevent a retiree
In double order to only disability the extent that he waives receive benefits military corresponding his retirement a amount of §3105.1 disability exempt fed benefits are Because 3101(a), military eral, taxation, retirees who state, and local pay disability in- in favor of benefits waive their retirement $1500 a month retire example, eligible For if a retiree is for benefits, disability $500 he must waive pay ment a month $500 pay any he can benefits. retirement before receive surprisingly, after-tax income. crease their Not waivers of pay retirement are common. like several other
California, States, treats ac marriage quired during community property. as When a couple community property divorces, state court divides equally spouses spouse between while each retains full any ownership separate property. See Cal. Civ. Code 4800(a)(West 1989). Supp. Ann. military 1983and California treats community property
retirement
as
to the
they
performed during
extent
derive from
service
marriage.
g.,
Thompson,
e.
See,
Casas v.
42 Cal. 3d
131, 139,
720 P. 2d
denied,
cert.
In
In direct enacted the For- mer Act, Protection which authorizes state courts to “disposable pay” community prop- treat retired or retainer as 1408(c)(1).2 erty. § “‘Disposable 10 U. S. C. retired or language community of the Act property covers both equita States, ble distribution as today. does our decision Because this case con State, cerns a simplicity for the sake of we refer to 1408(e)(1) § authorizing as “disposable state courts to treat retired or re pay” community property. tainer monthly pay’”
retainer is defined “the total retired military pay entitled,” a minus retainer to which member is V). 1408(a)(4) (1982 § Supp. certain ed. and deductions. required Among to be deducted from total the amounts any are amounts waived order to receive bene- 1408(a)(4)(B).3 § fits. payments
The Act a which also creates mechanism under payments the Federal will make direct to a for- Government spouse Secretary presents, mer who to the of the relevant military granting portion a state-court order her a service, military disposable pay. retiree’s retired or retainer ways. This is direct mechanism limited two 1408(d). § only spouse a a First, former who was married to period years during “for a of 10 or more member performed years which the member least 10 of service determining eligibility the member’s for retired creditable 1408(d)(2), eligible pay,” or retainer receive direct community property payments. Second, the Federal Gov- community property payments that ernment will not make percent exceed 50 retired or retainer 1408(e)(1).
B
Appellant
appellee Gaye
E. Mansell and
M. Mansell
Gerald
years
parents
six chil-
were married for 23
and are the
marriage
in 1979with a divorce decree
dren. Their
ended
County,
Superior
At
California,
from the Merced
Court.
Major
received both Air
time,
Mansell
Force
pursuant
portion
pay,
and,
to a waiver of
dis-
ability
Major
Mansell entered
benefits. Mrs. Mansell
(a)
3 Also deducted from total
are amounts:
(b)
States;
required by
owed
member to the United
law to
taxes,
pay,
employment
including
be deducted from total
and fines and for
(c)
courts-martial;
federal, state,
properly
feitures
deducted for
ordered
(d)
taxes;
pursuant
provisions
and local income
withheld
to other
under the
(e)
Code;
equal
Internal Revenue
to the amount of retired
of a member
(f)
annuity
physical disability;
retired
deducted to create an
for the
for
*5
V).
1408(a)(4)(A)-(F) (1982
§§
spouse.
Supp.
former
10 U. S. C.
ed. and
provided,
part,
property
which
that
into a
settlement
percent
Major
Mrs.
Mansell would
Mansell 50
of his total
pay, including
portion
that
of retirement
Major
disability
waived so that
Mansell could receive
1979).
(May
Major
In
29,
1983,
benefits. Civ. No.
modify
Superior
Mansell
the
Court to
the divorce
asked
de-
by removing
provision
required him
cree
the
that
to share his
Superior
The
total retirement
with Mrs. Mansell.
Court
opinion.
Major
request
denied
Mansell’s
without
Major
appealed
Appeal,
Court
Mansell
to the California
of
Appellate
arguing
Fifth
District,
that both the Former
Spouses’
Act
Protection
and the anti-attachment clause that
protects
receipt
disability
a
benefits,
veteran’s
of
38 U. S. C.
3101(a) (1982
Supp. IV),4 precluded
Superior
ed. and
the
treating
Court from
that had been
community property.
waived to receive
benefits as
Relying
Supreme
on
of
the decision the
Court California in
Thompson, supra,
Appeal rejected
Casas v.
Court
portion Major
argument
that
Mansell’s
based on the For-
(Jan.
Spouses’
mer
Act.
Protection
5 Civ. No. F002872
1987).5
passage
Casas
that after
held
the Former
longer pre-empted
Act,
Protection
federal law no
provides
That
clause
veterans’
not
assignable
benefits “shall
be
law,
except
specifically
by
to the extent
authorized
and . . . shall be ex
creditors,
empt
attachment,
from the claim[s] of
and shall not be liable to
levy,
any legal
whatever,
or
equitable process
seizure
or under
either
3101(a) (1982
receipt
before or
after
C.
[veteran].”
38 U. S.
ed.
V).
Supp.
brief,
In
supplemental
argues
Mrs. Mansell
doctrine of res
judicata
prevented
pre-McCarty
should have
settlement
being reopened. McCarty McCarty,
587
military
applies
community property
retire-
as it
law
state
not
pay.
that the Act did
reasoned
The
court
ment
Casas
ability
retirement
to treat total
court’s
limit a state
spouse’s
community property
former
and to enforce a
pay-
through
rights
than direct
remedies other
to such
143-
3d,
42
Cal.
the Federal Government.
ments from
Appeal did not dis-
The
2d,
720
at 928-933.
Court
151,
P.
3101(a).6
clause, 38 U. S. C.
the anti-attachment
cuss
Supreme
Major
petition
Mansell’s
denied
of California
Court
for review.
(1988),
jurisdiction,
probable
We noted now reverse.
II preeminently matters are relations Because domestic Congress, consistently recognized that state have law, we displace rarely legislation, passes general intends to when it g., 481 Rose, Rose v. See, e. in this area. state Hisquierdo, (1987); Hisquierdo U. S. 439 v. U. 628 S. (1979). find will not held that we Thus we have 572, 581 required “‘positively pre-emption it evidence that absent (quoting supra, Hisquierdo, by at 581 enactment.’” direct (1904)). The instant 77 Markoe, 196 U. S. v. Wetmore presents where rare instances one of those however, case, legislated directly specifically in the area of Congress has relations. domestic language the Former from both
It is clear 1408(c)(1), legislative § g., his- and its e. Act, see, Protection (1982); p. Rep. 165 tory, g., 97-749, No. R. e. H. Conf. see, (1982), sought pp. 1-3, 16 No. McCarty landscape legal deci- change created precludes Act Spouses’ Protection the Former decide that Because we to re pay waived treating as States anti- benefits, whether decide we need not veterans’ ceive g., See, e. 3101(a), protects such clause, independently attachment Wissner, (1987); Rose, v. 338 U. S. Wissver Rose 481 U. S. pre-existing law, sion.7 Because federal as construed pre-empted completely application Court, of state community property pay, law to Con gress McCarty only by enacting overcome the could decision grant authority giving power an affirmative the States the community property. to treat Cf. Jersey Dept. Nat. Bank Midlantic v. New Environmental *7 (1986). 474 Protection, 494, U. S. 501 appellant appellee sharply scope The on differ the of- Congress’ McCarty. modificationof Mansell Mrs. views the Spouses’ complete congressional Former Protection Act as a rejection McCarty's holding pre-empted; that state law is restoring pre-McCarty she reads the Act as to state courts all authority. Major supported by Mansell, the States, United argues Spouses’ only par- that the Former Protection Act is rejection McCarty pre-empts tial of the rule that federal law regarding military pay.8 state law question statutory Where, here, as the is one of construc- begin language g., tion, we with the of the statute. e. See, (1984); Blum Stenson, 465 886, U. S. Prod- Consumer Safety Sylvania, uct Comm’n v. Inc., GTE U. S. argument Mrs. Mansell’s faces a formidable ob- language stacle in the of the Former Protection Act. 1408(c)(1) affirmatively grants Section of the Act state courts power pay, yet language the to divide its precise provides is both and limited. It that “a court prop- treat retired or retainer . . . either as erty solely of the member or as of the member and spouse jurisdiction his in accordance with the law of the 7Congress also demonstrated its McCarty focus on when it chose June 25, 1981, day McCarty decided, the before applicable was the date for provisions. 1408(c)(1); § some of the Act’s 10 U. S. C. see also note follow 1006(b) (transition § ing 97-252, § Pub. L. provisions). 8Although the United Major States has filed an amicus supporting brief Mansell, brief, its initial amiciis filed before the jurisdiction, Court noted supported Mrs. Mansell. 1408(c)(1). § definitional section The Act’s court.” such “disposable or retainer retired specifically the term defines waived pay” exclude, alia, inter 1408(a) § disability payments. veterans’ order to receive (4)(B).9 language, precise plain and under the Act’s Thus, authority dispos granted to treat have been state courts they community property; not been have pay as able retired retired granted to treat total property. limiting language attempts to overcome Mansell
Mrs. 1408(a)(4)(B),by reading definition, in the contained solely designed out the garnishment to set statute Act as a pursuant order, court to a which, under circumstances payments a former make direct will Federal Government 1408(a)(4)(B) According defines spouse. view, only payments pay” because “[disposable or retainer retired limited to are mechanism direct under the federal by that term. amounts defined heavily argument sav- on the Act’s garnishment relies *8 provides:
ing That clause clause. a “Nothing to relieve be construed in section shall alimony, payment liability child of for the of member by required payments order on a court support, or other payments re- grounds made out have been made this section under or retainer tired [the permitted direct under amount maximum in the obligation Any mechanism]. such unsatisfied payments part: pertinent in provides 9 The statute “ monthly retired or the total pay’ means ‘Disposable retired or retainer which— . . . less amounts member is entitled pay to which a retainer the retired or “(B) deducted from by and are required law to be are by ordered member, and forfeitures including fines pay of such retainer taxes, in waived order courts-martials, and amounts employment Federal [disability payments].” title 38 under title 5 or compensation to receive 1408(a)(4)(B). § may by any a member be enforced means available provided law other than the means under under this sec- any permit- in case which the maximum amount tion [the payments mechanism] . under . . direct been ted has 1408(e)(6) added). § (emphasis paid.” argues saving that, Mansell because Mrs. clause ex- payments” pressly contemplates “other in excess of those payments under mechanism, made the direct the Act does “attempt they may may to tell the courts not state what underlying property.” Appellee do with the not Brief for For the below, 17. reasons discussed we find a in- different plausible. terpretation saving In our view, more clause purpose any defeating serves limited inference displaced the federal direct mechanism the author- ity garnish property state courts divide and not covered (to Hisquierdo, the mechanism. Cf. S., 439 U. at 584 garnishment prohibit prohibit property); is to division of (1950)(same). Wissner, Wissner 338 U. garnishment argument First, the most serious flaw the 1408(c)(1). completely ignores § pro- is that it Mrs. Mansell explanation no for vides the fact that the defined term —“dis- 1408(c)(1) posable pay” retired or retainer used —is specifically plainly limit the extent which state courts community property. treat solely garnishment Second, the view that the isAct stat- pre-empt not ute and therefore intended to only §by 1408(c)(1), state courts is contradicted not but also 1408(c). 1408(c)(2), the other subsections of Sections (c)(4) (c)(3), impose new substantive limits on state power courts’ to divide Section 1408(c)(2) prevents spouse transferring, a former sell- *9 ing, disposing community or otherwise of her interest in the 1408(c)(3) military pay.10 provides Section a that 1408(c)(2) Report expressly contemplates Senate pre 10 The that will (1982). 97-502, empt Rep. p. law. state S. No. 16
591 military retire so that a member to state cannot order court receiving por immediately begin spouse her can the former 1408(c)(4) prevents pay.11 military And tion of spouses shopping favorable di for a State with forum pre-empts provisions each of these vorce laws.12 Because pre-emptive argument ef Act has no that the law, state placed Significantly, Congress fect fail.13 of its own must Act expressed hearings at the Senate on the 11 Therewas some concern See, g., e. a member to retire. that state courts could direct Manpower and of the Sen Hearings on Personnel before the Subcommittee (1982) Services, Sess., Cong., 97th 2d 132-133 ate Committee on Armed (Air Force). (veterans’ (Sen. id., Exon); id., Thus group); at 184 at 70-71 1408(c)(3)in order to ensure the Senate version of the bill contained 8 97-502, power, Rep. supra, at state have S. No. courts did not such provision. H. R. Conf. agreed to add the at conference the House 97-749, Rep. p. 167 No. 12 A treat state court not by military member reason of jurisdiction over the unless it has (1) residence, jurisdic by military assignment in the territorial than other (3) 1408(c)(4). (2) domicile, court, Although the tion consent. of the 8 any shopping restric forum Senate had decided not to include Committee tions, by re jurisdiction of the courts to limit the State seeing “no need 97-502, ,” Rep. . . . No. stricting afforded this bill S. the benefits restrictions, and at supra, at version of bill contained House 97-749, conference, Rep. No. to add them. H. R. Conf. agreed the Senate supra, at 167. 81408(c)(1) be, Congress intended the substantive limits 13 That extent, payments mecha on the direct from the limits some distinct 1408(d) compromise legislative demonstrated nism contained 8 only for being available payments mechanism that resulted the direct years married to the retiree for spouses had been mer who bill, 1408(d)(2). version of the re the House or more. Under couple community property only if the be treated as tirement could 97-749, Rep. years H. R. Conf. No. or more. had been married for considered, rejected, but such had supra, at 165. The Senate Committee 97-502, agreed 9-11. The conferees Rep. supra, at provision. No. Instead, they limited the federal di to remove the House restriction. years or more. marriages had lasted rect mechanism compromise, supra, 166-167. R. Under H. Conf. No. portion dispos to award a granted the state courts have been mili- spouses who were married to the military retired to former able *10 592
each of these substantive on state in restrictions courts the 1408(c)(1). § the same section of Act as it We think unlikely 1408(c), § of every 1408(c)(1), that subsection in- except was state law. pre-empt tended
In such the face of plain precise statutory language, faces a daunting Mrs. Mansell standard. She cannot prevail without clear evidence that the reading language literally g., e. the would thwart obvious of the Act. purposes See, Pipeline Trans Alaska Cases, Rate 436 U. S.
The legislative history does not indicate the reason for Con- decision shelter from gress’ law that of portion waived to receive veter- ans’ But disability payments.14 the absence legislative of his- on this tory decision is in immaterial of the light plain and of precise statute; the language Congress is not required build a in record the legislative history to defend its policy choices.
Because of the absence evidence of specific intent in the legislative history, Mrs. Mansell resorts to arguments about the broad Act. purposes But this reliance is misplaced because, at general level, are there statements that both contradict and support her Her arguments. argument the Act federal no is contemplates pre-emption supported by in statements the Senate Report the House Conference tary years, member than spouses may for less but such former not take advantage of the direct mechanism. only reference to the definitional section is contained the Senate Report which pay, states that the including deductions from total retired waived payments, favor “gener veterans’ ally parallel existing those deductions which be made employees personnel Federal and before subject such garnishment alimony support for or child payments under section 459 of (42 659).” Security Act. supra, Social U. C. S. No. statement, however, 1408(a)(4). 14. This describes the defined term helpful why It is not in determining use chose to the defined “disposable pay” retired or retainer limit state-court term — —to 1408(c)(1). §in purpose overcome the Report is to Act power McCarty States.15 But to restore to the decision *11 Report Report also the House Conference the and Senate Congress rejected indicating un- the that contain statements removing pre-emption complicated option and all federal of returning a bill Indeed, to the States.16 unlimited pre-emption in the died eliminated all federal that have would argument Congress primarily Her that Senate Committee.17 supported by spouses protect evidence is intended to former by, responding Congress and were moved that Members of military plight a di- wives after to, of the distressed economic Report debates con- House the and the vorce.18 But Senate 15 (“The purpose of 97-502, primary See, g., Rep. supra, at 1 e. No. S. Court decision Supreme of the the to the effect United States bill is remove (1981). accomplish would McCarty, in 210 The bill McCarty v. 453 U. S. courts, Federal, con-' State, other objective by permitting and certain laws, retired again once consider appropriate with the to sistent divorce, ato dis rights parties property the the fixing when between 16; id., 5 H. at R. solution, separation”). also legal or See annulment 97-749, supra, at 165. Rep. Conf. No. 16 (“The amendment 97-749, House supra, at 165 Rep. R. Conf. H. No. property as be considered retired to permit would conditions”) added); (emphasis specified under certain divorce settlements provisions that would (“The contained several House Amendment ibid. Rep. No. pay”); S. of retired place on the division restrictions the (“[Senate] on division or limits imposes three distinct supra, 4 1814 cases”) divorce against military retired enforcement of court orders added). (emphasis provided “[f]or law” bill of the “Nonpreemption Entitled State any of member or former member of purposes of division marital marriage, the law of upon of such member’s armed dissolution the forces proceeding was instituted marriage the dissolution of the which State retired, of any division dispositive on matters pertaining all to shall be former retirement, or member pay to which such member or retainer Cong., 1st 97th Sess. will become entitled.” S. entitled or “frequent change-of-station pointed out that 18 TheSenate Committee military spouse a home on the special pressures placed moves pursue affording a career economic extremely maker make it difficult 97-502, supra, at job protection.” No. security, pension S. skills history, Act, legislative is written language and much its 6. tain statements which reveal that was concerned as protecting with the interests well members.19 history, legislative Thus, the a whole, read as indicates Congress intended both to create new benefits for for- spouses place designed and to mer protect military limits on state courts interpret
retirees. Our' task tois the stat- second-guess we not can, ute best' the wisdom of the congressional policy g., Rodriguez choice. See, e. v. United (1987) curiam) (per (“Deciding States, U. competing what values will will not be sacrificed particular objective very of a achievement is the essence choice”). legislative Congress’ purposes, Given mixed history legislative clearly support does not Mrs. Mansell’s giving *12 plain precise language view that effect to the and purposes the statute would thwart the obvious of the Act. reading literally may We realize that the statute inflict eco- many spouses. nomicharm on former But we decline to mis- sympathetic read the statute order to reach a result when reading requires a plain such us do to violence to the lan- guage ignore legislative of the statute and to much of the his- tory. Congress language requires chose the us to de- Congress change do, cide as we free is to it.
Ill For the reasons above, stated we hold that the Former Spouses’ grant Protection Act does not state courts the terms, gender neutral and there no applies equally is doubt that the Act former both husbands and quite former wives. But “it is evident from history legislative largely response acted plight military Horkovich, of the Spouses’ Uniformed Services Former wife.” Congress’ McCarty McCarty Protection Act: Beyond Answer to Goes (1982-1983) Question, (em- 287, 23 Air Fundamental Force L. Rev. phasis in original). 19See, g., e. (“All supra, agreed No. at 7 that some form of remedial legislation equitable which is fair and spouses to both was nec id., essary McCarty provide decision”); 11; a to the solution see also 10, 11, supra. nn. upon power divisible divorce treat as veterans’ dis- that has been waived to receive retirement ability judgment of the California Court benefits. Appeal hereby fur- the case is remanded for reversed, and opinion. proceedings ther not inconsistent with this
It is so ordered. with Blackmun O’Connor, joins, whom Justice Justice dissenting.
Today that the federal Uniformed Services the Court holds (Former Spouses’ Protec- Act Former Protection Act) power in a to order tion state courts the Act or denies pay unilat- divorce the division of decree erally veterans’ dis- a retiree in order to receive waived reality holding ability is that for- harsh of this benefits. The Gaye spouses consent, their be can, mer Mansell without like ex-spouse’s denied their a fair share of pay simply income after-tax he elects to increase his because by converting portion of that into benefits. reading Spouses’ Protection of the Former On the Court’s monthly Gaye nearly percent will Act, Mansell lose received she would otherwise have income holding community property. as incon- I view the Court’s language purposes Act, of the and the sistent with both respectfully I dissent. *13 McCarty, recognized McCarty in v. 453 U. S. The Court (1981), plight ex-spouse aof retired “the of an 210, 235 that holding In that fed- one.” service member is often serious nondisability dividing precluded from eral law state courts pursuant community property military pay to state retired Congress McCarty to with an invitation to laws, concluded Congress promptly en- so and issue. did reexamine the Today, despite Spouses’ Protection Act. acted the Former Congress overwhelming intended to overrule evidence military pre-existing McCarty completely, federal alter pre-emptive eliminate the effect law so as to retirement McCarty, authority discovered in to restore to the States affecting military pay to issue divorce decrees Congress law, consistent with state Court assumes that only partially rejected McCarty apply and that the can States community property pay their laws to only Spouses’ to the extent that the Former Protection Act grants affirmatively authority Ante, them to do so. at 588. McCarty decision, however, did not address retirement disability identify waived to receive nor did it benefits; any explicit statutory provision precluding the States from characterizing such waived retirement property. reject premise I Thus, the Court’s central precluded by McCarty characterizing the States are community property any waived to receive grant authority benefits absent an affirmative Spouses’ the Former Protection Act. my by enacting
In view, intended, the Former McCarty’s Protection Act, to eliminate the effect of pre-emption holding altogether and to return to the States military pensions their “to treat in the same they manner as treat other retirement benefits.” S. (1982). (“The p. primary No. id., See also purpose of the bill is to remove the effect of the United States Supreme McCarty McCarty, Court decision 453 U. S. accomplish objective by per- The bill would mitting Federal, State, and certain other courts, consistent appropriate again with the laws, to once consider re- fixing property rights par- when between tired legal separation”); ties divorce, dissolution, to a annulment or (“[T]he legislation id., at 5 committee intends the to restore permitted the law to what it was when the courts were apply pay”); State divorce laws id., retired at 16 (“The provision pre- is intended to remove the federal emption Supreme found to exist the United States Court permit jurisdiction competent State other courts of apply pertinent determining State or other laws
597 should be divis- whether retired retainer (1982) (“The 18314 amendment sim- ible”); Rec. Cong. treat military returns to courts the to ply authority State (re- retired it does other and public private pensions”) Schroeder, marks bill sponsor). of Rep. is an area of state
Family traditionally concern, law and we Hisquierdo Hisquierdo, (1979), v. U. S. state in this authority have not found federal pre-emption has area absent a determination that “Congress ‘positively enactment’ that state law be required by pre-empted.” direct Ibid, Markoe, (1904)). Wetmore 196 U. (quoting The Former Protection Act does not re- “positively Spouses’ States to abandon their own law the divisi- quire” concerning waived in order bility divorce of upon benefits. contrary, obtain veterans’ On whole the Act was to restore to the States their tra- thrust of in area of relations. Even ditional domestic authority restoration, beyond Congress sought provide greater ex- federal than protection military spouses assistance rem- McCarty by creating a federal garnishment isted before That, awards. aid of state court edy community property of the Act’s fact, is the central purpose preoccupation Pro- framework. The Former statutory complex a remedial statute a mecha- creating tection Act is primarily court orders former armed with state whereby spouses nism them in obtain- the Federal Government to assist enlist divorce. The upon of their entitlements some ing limited, created the Act is remedy federal garnishment have not, assistance and as the Court would but it serves as Thus, the at 10 it, provision a hindrance to former spouses. 1408(a)(4)(B) (1982 V) of the Act Supp. U. ed. S. C. exclude retired or retainer pay” defining “[disposable under title compensation waived order to receive “amounts 1408(c)(l)’s commu- and its into 38,” incorporation 5 or title the federal limits provision, only garnishment nity property It not limit the created the Act. does remedy *15 pay to characterize States such waived retirement as com- munity property law. under state reading by legislative history, is reinforced
This the which specific “[t]he that indicates deductions that are to be made monthly pay generally from total the retired and retainer parallel existing may those be deductions which made from pay employees personnel the of Federal before subject garnishment, alimony sup- such for or child port payments Security under section 459 of the Social Act (42 659).” (em- supra, U. S. C. No. 97-502, at 14 added). phasis The Court finds that “is this statement not helpful determining why Congress in chose to use the defined ‘disposable pay’ retired or retainer limit state- term— court —to 1408(c)(1).” authority § Ante, in 592, n. True, 14. singularly unhelpful supporting it is in the Court’s view 1408(c)(1) § authority state denies courts to characterize disability in waived lieu of benefits as commu- nity property. By helpful determining why contrast, it is in Congress “disposable pay” chose use or retired retainer limiting garnish military as the term state court light disability In of the fact that benefits exempt garnishment are from in cases, most S. U. C. §3101(a) (1982 V), Supp. ed., had not excluded in “amounts waived” order to receive veterans’ remedy garnishment by benefits from the federal created the Former Protection Act it would have eviscerated 3101(a). § provisions the force of the anti-attachment advantage garnishment remedy, To take of the federal provides payment by which for direct to for- Government specified spouses spouses mer circumstances, former must appropriate Secretary serve on service court orders requirements. meeting certain In the case of a division of property, provid[e] “specifically the court order must for the payment expressed percent- amount, of an or as a dollars age disposable pay, disposable retired or retainer 1408(a) retired retainer of a member.” 10 U. S. C. V). (2)(C) (1982 Supp. ed., It must contain certain informa- 1408(b) 1408(b)(1)(B), §§ regular on its face. tion and be 1408(b)(2)(1982 V). 1408(b)(1)(D), (1)(C), Supp. ed. and Secretary procedures Act followed sets forth the to be 1408(d) making payments directly spouses. to former (1982 V). Supp. Finally, places ed. and the Act limits on the paid total amount be 1408(e)(4) §§1408(e)(1), Secretary spouses, to former (B) (1982 V), procedures Supp. *16 it to ed. and and clarifies conflicting multiple be or court or- followed in the event of (1982 V). 1408(e)(3)(A) 1408(e)(2), §§ Supp. ed., ders. 1408(c)(1) application of this fed- Subsection authorizes community garnishment remedy property eral awards to may disposable providing re- “a court treat retired or that solely pay property payable tainer to a member . . . either as spouse of the as of the member and his member or jurisdiction in accordance with the law of the of such court.” added.) pre- (Emphasis provision read to This should not be characterizing clude from waived States only property but receive benefits as preclude payments the use of the federal direct mechanism (c)(2), (c)(3), §§1408 attach that waived Nor do (c)(4) Congress pre- compel intended to the conclusion gross military empt characterizing States upon community property divorce. Those as divisible may provisions “not” do. That indicate what States three Congress explicitly courts in cer- restricted the of support respects, specific however, the infer- tain does not 1408(c)(1) grant power of ence that affirmative —an —should everything grant. interpreted precluding it does not be contrary, supports inference that ex- it On the pre- directly precluded plicitly those matters it wished responsibility empt entirely, leaving in the the balance respect, In this area of domestic relations to the States. insisting Gaye argument as Mansell’s Court mischaracterizes contemplates pre-emption. . . .” no federal that “the Act 1408(c) Ante, at 592. Subsection has substantive effects on power paragraph expands the powers of state courts—its first those
(“a treat”); may remaining paragraphs court its re- (“this powers strict those “[t]his section does create”; not treat”). “[a] may section does not authorize”; court not That portions remain States free to characterize waived community property unambiguously un- language saving derscored the broad of the clause con- 1408(e)(6). provides: Act, tained in the That clause “Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a liability payment alimony, member of for the child support, payments required by or other a court order on grounds made out of re- tired or retainer under this section have been made permitted (1) in the maximum amount paragraph under (B) subparagraph paragraph Any such unsat- obligation by any member be isfied enforced means available pro- under law other than the means any vided under this section in case which the maxi- permitted (1) mum paid paragraph amount under has been *17 (42 and under Security section 459 of the Social Act 659) any U. S. C. case in which the maximum amount (B) permitted (4) subparagraph paragraph under has added.) paid.” (Emphasis been explains saving The Court the that clause “serves the limited purpose defeating any inference that the federal direct displaced authority mechanism of state courts garnish property to divide and not covered the mecha- added). (emphasis Ante, nism.” agree. at 590 I IWhat do not understand is how the Court saving can read the Act’s yet clause in this manner and conclude, without contradic- may tion, that California pay not characterize retirement waived for community property. benefits All garnish California seeks to do “divide not cov- [federal payments] ered direct mechanism.” Ibid. Specifically, California wishes to exercise its traditional fam- portion community property ily powers to divide as law unilaterally Major con which he retirement Mansell’s garnishment disability benefits, and use state-law verted into portion Gaye Mansell’s to attach the value remedies 1408(e)(6) § precisely property. what That is any contrary by “defeating” inference, saves to the States displaced the ante, Act has State’s at that the any “by means available under to enforce its divorce decrees provided ...” under this section. than the means law other 1408(e)(6). put aptly Supreme Court so As the California emphasized saving limita that “the it, in the clause ability secretary’s retiree’s to reach the tions on the service gross pay [are] the state a limitation on not to be deemed community property ability interests court’s to define Thompson, 3d 42 Cal. the time of dissolution.” Casas denied, 479 933, cert. U. S. 131, 150, (1986). 720 P. 2d spouse not re a words, In while former other percent community property payments exceed 50 ceive through the direct retirement of a retiree’s 1408(e)(1), garnishment court is mechanism, a state federal community prop gross free characterize jurisdiction, erty depending and former the law of its on remedy any spouses may pursue law” “available under other “Nothing” satisfy Former that interest. liability under retirees of relieves Protection Act equal they possess to the value of assets law if other such gross spouse’s share of the former reading precluding the of the Act as the Court’s Under characterizing gross as commu- States from unilaterally power nity property, retiree has the separate property community property in- into convert ex-spouse’s expense of his income, at the crease his after-tax *18 security property read the entitlements. To financial military pocket percent, permitting retiree to 30 statute as pay by gross percent, percent con- retirement 50 even 80 thereby verting avoid his ob- it into benefits ligations community property under state law, however, is to beyond recognition purpose distort and to thwart the main recognize statute, which is to the sacrifices made mili- tary spouses protect security and to their economic in the generally face of a divorce. Women suffer a decline in their living following standard of a divorce. Weitzman, See Consequences Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Property, Alimony Support and Child Awards, 28 UCLA L. (1981). Military special Rev. wives face diffi- “frequent change-of-station culties because moves and the special pressures placed military spouse on the as a home- extremely pursue maker make it difficult to a career afford- ing security, job pension protection.” economic skills and Rep. average military 97-502, No. couple at 6. The married years for 20 experi- times, moves about 12 wives unemployment ence an rate than more double that of their counterparts. civilian Equity Brief for Women’s Action League et al. pay, as Amici Curiae 10-11. Retirement single moreover, acquired is often most valuable asset military couples. Id., Indeed, at 18. the one clear theme emerges legislative history from the of the Act is that Congress recognized plight many military the dire wives sought protect after divorce and their access to their ex- Rep. husbands’ See S. No. (1982) Cong. (“[FJrequent at 6; Rec. preclude spouses pursuing moves often from their own ca- establishing independence. reers and economic As a result, military spouses frequently are unable to vest in their own plans coverage or obtain health insurance from a private employer. Military spouses who become divorced often lose all access to retirement and health benefits—de- (remarks spite military”) a ‘career’ devoted to the Schumer). id., See 18315, 18316, also 18317, 18320, Reading precluding 18323, 18328. the Act as not States characterizing waived to receive disabil- ity upon benefits divisible divorce is faithful to *19 purposes the clear way remedial of the statute a that the interpretation Court’s is not. may gross conclusionthat States treat retire- upon
ment as divisible divorce is not inconsist- 3101(a) (1982 § V). ent with Supp. 38 U. S. C. ed., This provision provides disability anti-attachment that veterans’ levy, benefits by “shall not be liable attachment, or seizure any legal equitable or process under whatever, either be- receipt by beneficiary.” fore Gaye or after ac- Mansell 3101(a) knowledges, § precludes must, as she her from garnishing Major under state law Mansell’s disabil- veterans’ ity gross benefits in satisfaction of claim her to a share of his 1408(c)(1) pay, § just precludes retirement her invoking the federal direct in sat- mechanism 3101(a) recognize protects isfaction of that claim. To specific the funds from a source, however, does not mean that 3101(a) prevents Gaye recovering per- Mansell from her 50 Major cent gross interest in Mansell’s out of any income or assets he have other than veterans’ his disability long benefits. So as those benefits themselves are protected, Gaye calculation of Mansell’s entitlement on the Major gross basis Mansell’s not con- does stitute an disability “attachment” of his veterans’ benefits. 3101(a) designed Section to ensure that of dis- needs abled veterans and met, Rose, their are families see Rose (1987), U. without interference from credi- purpose long tors. That is fulfilled so as the benefits them- protected by provision. selves are the anti-attachment interpretation In sum, under the Court’s of the Former spouses Congress sought Act, Protection the former protect having security severely risk their economic un- ex-spouses dermined a unilateral decision of their to waive in lieu of benefits. It is inconceiv- Congress able that purposes intended the broad remedial way. the statute to be thwarted in sure, such To be as the Congress sought equitable” notes, Court be “fair to re- spouses. protect divorced as well members tired service explicitly protected n. 19. Ante, limiting percentage re- members *20 remedy garnishment subject to the federal tirement by expressly providing could not be members 1408(e)(4)(B), 1408(e)(1), §§ 10 U. S. C. retire. See to forced 1408(c)(3). advantaged waiv- is still Moreover, a retiree disability the ing benefits: lieu subject mecha- federal direct to the waived is not spouse to the more resort instead must the former nism, and garnish- seeking costly process a state cumbersome pay. H. R. against See of that waived the value order ment (1984)(discussing pp. faced difficulties 4-5 No. orders). obtaining garnishment Even by ex-spouses in state directly processes retir- cannot attach state these satisfying purposes for benefits ee’s given property the anti-attachment the strictures of division 3101(a). for con- provision There is no basis of 38 U. S. C. protect Congress sought inter- cluding, however, that deny unilaterally by allowing them ests of service members any opportunity spouses a fair share of to obtain former their couple’s inequity Congress again up address the once It is now But be- this one. such as in situations created Court already expressed in- its has I believe that cause authority to characterize that the have tention States upon I divorce, divisible waived dissent.