In re D.R.
{¶ 1} Ohio’s juvenile-justice system, codified in
{¶ 2} The hybrid nature of juvenile courts—combining aspects of both the adult criminal-justice system and the parens patriae doctrine of protecting children—requires nuanced and balanced procedures. The General Assembly has specifically instructed this court to “liberally interpret[] and construe[]”
{¶ 3} A juvenile who commits a sexually oriented offense at the age of 14, 15, 16, or 17 is subject to classification as a juvenile-offender registrant when the juvenile court issues its dispositional order. See
{¶ 4} But under
{¶ 5} A juvenile court’s ability to individually assess and treat juvenile offenders is a key element to maintaining fairness in our juvenile-justice system. So, too, is shielding juveniles from carrying the consequences and stigma of their juvenile delinquency into adulthood. See State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, ¶ 1, citing State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000); State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, ¶ 19. And the juvenile-justice system values rehabilitation over punishment. See Hand at ¶ 36. As applied in this case,
I. FACTS
{¶ 6} In 2018, D.R. was adjudicated delinquent for sexually assaulting his 12-year-old friend in 2017 when he was 16 years old, conduct that would have constituted gross sexual imposition аgainst a victim under the age of 13 if
{¶ 7} A separate hearing was held pursuant to
{¶ 8} In 2019, at the end of D.R.’s disposition, the juvenile-court magistrate conducted a hearing at which D.R.’s attorney requested that the court terminate D.R.’s probation and juvenile-offender registration status. D.R.’s probation officer informed the court that D.R. had “done really well on probation,” that he had graduated from high school and planned to attend college, and that he was working. The prosecutor and D.R.’s attorney jointly submitted for review a risk-assessment report prepared by a psychologist as well as D.R.’s discharge summary from his treatment program. D.R.’s attorney argued that the reports demonstrated D.R.’s successful completion of the treatment program and that D.R. was by most indicators assessed as being at low risk for reoffending. D.R.’s attorney also argued that the statutes preventing the court from exercising discretion to terminate D.R.’s classification as a juvenile-sex-offender registrant violatеd D.R.’s due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
{¶ 9} The magistrate found that she had no ability to terminate D.R.’s classification as a juvenile-sex-offender registrant under the statutory scheme, and she continued D.R.’s Tier I classification. She terminated D.R.’s probation, however, finding that he had “successfully completed all conditions imposed upon him by [the] Court.” D.R. objected to the magistrate’s decision, arguing that the continuation of his juvenile-sex-offender classification violated his due-process rights. The juvenile court overruled D.R.’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s decision. In doing so, the court noted that it “was constrained by current precedent” established by the First District Court of Appeals in In re M.I., 2017-Ohio-1524, 88 N.E.3d 1276 (1st Dist.), which upheld the classification scheme against an equal-protection challenge. D.R. appealed the juvenile court’s decision.
{¶ 10} The First District agreed with D.R. It cоncluded that because
{¶ 11} The appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s judgment and remanded the cause for a new completion-of-disposition hearing to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion to continue D.R.’s Tier I classification or to “declassify” him. Id. at ¶ 17.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Due process in the juvenile-justice context
{¶ 13} “Due-process rights are applicable to juveniles through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.” In re D.S., 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 28. Because juvenile courts are not meant to function as adult criminal courts, many protections available to adult defendants are available to juvenile offenders only because of principles of due process. See D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, at ¶ 41-44. For example, the right to counsel is not guaranteed to juveniles by the Sixth Amendment but “flows to the juvenile through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 79.
{¶ 14} We examine juvenile procedural-due-process claims through a framework of fundamental fairness. See In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 72, citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.E.2d 647 (1971) (plurality opinion). Fundamental fairness requires a “balanced approach,” D.H. at ¶ 49, that assesses the “ ‘several interests that are at stake,’ ” In re C.S. at ¶ 80, quoting Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). This is not an exact test, but it is what is necessary to “preserve the special nature of the juvenile process.” In re C.P. at ¶ 73.
{¶ 15} Judicial discretion is essential to preserving that special nature of the juvenile process and to maintaining fundamental fairness in the juvenile-justice
{¶ 16} In accord with the purpose and goals of the juvenile-justice system and with the balancing approach required in this special process, we have determined that when a statute removes the discretion of the juvenile court at a critical time in the proceedings, it offends fundamental fairness. See In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 85. Similarly, the element of judicial discretion has been the saving factor in our decisions to uphold statutes that permit the extension of certain penalties for juveniles into adulthood. See D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, at ¶ 59 (finding that due process does not require a jury finding to impose a blended juvenile-adult sentence, because in juvenile proceedings, the judge’s expertise is critical); In re D.S., 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184, at ¶ 32‐37 (holding that the continuation of juvenile-offender registration into adulthood for а juvenile who committed a sexually oriented offense at age 14 did not offend due process, because the applicable statutes included procedural protections to safeguard fundamental fairness, which included “a hearing and the exercise of the court’s discretion”). Therefore, judicial discretion is a significant procedural protection in the juvenile-justice system and one that is necessary to promote that system’s rehabilitative purpose.
[a]lthough [this] court had recognized a due process interest in juvenile court proceedings as early as 1948, * * * the understanding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to juvenile proceedings because of the juvenile’s liberty interests was more fully developed in Kent [383 U.S. at 555, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84] (recognizing thаt “the admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness” and holding that a juvenile is entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived before being released to a criminal court for prosecution), and crystallized in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
{¶ 18} Because the General Assembly has vested the juvenile courts with exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile cases, see
{¶ 19} Therefore, it is our duty to ascertain precisely what procedure is due in juvenile cases while “being true to the core concept of due process in a juvenile case—to ensure orderliness and fairness.” In re C.S. at ¶ 81.
{¶ 20} Fundamental fairness does not provide an exact means by which to measure due process, but measuring duе process requires examining prior limitations set by any relevant precedents in similar juvenile contexts. See In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 80, quoting Lassiter, 425 U.S. at 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (explaining that a fundamental-fairness analysis begins with consideration of “any relevant precedents”). Therefore, we must approach the analysis in this case by considering prior limitations we have imposed through our precedents in similar contexts and by determining the proper balance of the process and interests at stake given the unique role of juvenile courts.
{¶ 21} The state agrees that fundamental fairness is the framework by which this court must evaluate D.R.’s constitutional argument.1 It contends that the First District isolated
{¶ 22} Most recently, in In re D.S., this court held that the General Assembly could impose a registration requirement on juvenile sex offenders and
{¶ 23} D.S. specifically challenged the juvenile court’s imposition of registration and notification requirements “beyond the age jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Id. at ¶ 12. In that case, we recognized that “ ‘fundamental fairness to the child demands the unique expertise of a juvenile judge.’ ” Id. at ¶ 30, quoting In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 76. We found that juvenile-sex-offender registration could be imposed beyond the age of 18 or 21 because sufficient procedural safeguards had been put in place, id. at ¶ 37, namely, the statutes imposing the registration into adulthood provided for a hearing and the exercise of the juvenile court’s discretion to consider “all relevant factors,” id. at ¶ 33, citing
{¶ 24} In In re D.S., we distinguished the registration scheme contemplated in
{¶ 25} In another case, D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, we examined the process by which a juvenile court determines whether a juvenile must be classified as a serious youthful offender. We reaffirmed that fundamental fairness dictates whether such a classification statute meets the requirements of due process. Id. at ¶ 61. And we disagreed with D.H.’s argument that the determination whether a juvenile should be classified as a serious youthful offender should be made by a jury. Id. Instead, we concluded that fundamental fairness requires that such a determination be made by a judge who is familiar with the history of the juvenile and the resources of the juvenile-justice system. Id. at ¶ 59.
{¶ 26} Under this court’s holdings in D.H., In re C.P., and In re D.S., juvenile registration and classification schemes may be constitutionally permissible even if they extend into adulthood, but their imposition requires procedural safeguards that include the exercise of a juvenile court’s discretion. Taking into account the framework established by these decisions, we now determine whether
C. The constitutionality of R.C. 2152.84 as applied to D.R.
{¶ 27} The state claims that
{¶ 28} The initial classification hearing is not being examined here. Nor has it been challenged. We note that the discretion employed by a juvenile court at the initial classification hearing serves a purpose different from the discretion employed at the completion-of-disposition hearing. Under
{¶ 29} But for D.R.—who was 16 years old when he committed a sexually oriented offense and who was initially classified as a Tier I offender—and similarly situated juveniles,
{¶ 30} Although the registration and notification procedures may have been harsher in In re C.P. than those at issue today, it was the automatic nature of the process in that case that offended due process. 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 85.
{¶ 31} Individualized assessments and judicial discretion are especially necessary in cases such as D.R.’s. In a system designed to advance rehabilitation over punishment and to shield juveniles from the stigma of their juvenile delinquency, D.R.’s automatic, continued status as a juvenile-offender registrant into adulthood is fundamentally unfair. Any decision to continue his classification requires a grounded determination by a juvenile court that such a penalty is warranted.
{¶ 32} The fact that D.R. could request termination of his registrаnt status after three years does little to mitigate the incongruities inherent in the process. The juvenile-court magistrate who presided over D.R.’s completion-of-disposition hearing found that D.R. had successfully completed all conditions the court had imposed on him during his disposition, that he had not been adjudicated delinquent for or convicted of any subsequent offenses, that he had successfully completed his period of probation, that he had successfully completed sex-offender treatment, and that he had graduated from high school and enrolled in college. D.R. was released from probation at that time, and the juvenile court seemed prepared to also terminate D.R.’s juvenile-offender classification.
{¶ 33} But at that critical moment, at the end of D.R.’s disposition, the juvenile court had no discretion to determine whether D.R.’s classification should be extended into adulthood—beyond the shield of the juvenile-justice system.
{¶ 34} Because of D.R.’s age when he committed his sexually oriented offense, the juvenile court was effectively prohibited by
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 35} Because
Judgment affirmed
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur.
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion.
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J.
FISCHER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 36} In this case, this court is askеd to determine whether
{¶ 37} The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that “[p]rocess is not an end in itself” and that procedural due process serves “to protect a substantive interest to which an individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). Thus, to find a violation of procedural due process—as the majority opinion does—an individual must first identify an existing protected substantive right.2
{¶ 38} While appellant, D.R., identifies a number of interests at stake in a completion-of-disposition hearing, neither the First District Court of Appeals nor D.R. have identified an existing protected substantive right. While juveniles may
{¶ 39} The majority opinion never points to any spеcific constitutionally protected right, and it never provides a deep-dive analysis to explain how the continuation of the sex-offender classification is a protected liberty interest, particularly in light of the fact that the Tier I designation in this case is not permanent. Rather, it is mandatory for only three years. See
{¶ 40} In In re C.P., this court found a violation of due process because the juvenile court lacked any discretion over the imposition of an automatic, lifetime, adult punishment—mandatory sex-offender registration—for a juvenile offender. Id. at ¶ 86. Thus, due-process rights are violated when there is an automatic imposition of a significant penalty without affording any discretion to the juvenile court. Id. at ¶ 77-78 (concluding that the automatic imposition of a lifetime
{¶ 41} This case is more similar to In re D.S., 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184. In that case, D.S. argued that his due-process rights were violated when a juvenile court imposed a juvenile-sex-offender classification on him that would continue past the age of majority. This court held that “[w]hat process is due depends on considerations of fundamental fairness in a particular situation,” id. at ¶ 28, and that the punishment imposed on D.S. was distinguishable from the irrevocable, automatic, lifetime classification that was held to be a violation of due process in In re C.P., In re D.S. at ¶ 32. This court held that the classification at issue in In re D.S. did not violate due process, because the juvenile court maintained sufficient discretion in determining the sentence, setting the original classification, and later reviewing the classification. Id. at ¶ 33-36.
{¶ 42} Likewise, when viewing the statutory scheme as a whole in this case, the juvenile court maintains sufficient discretion regarding tier classification for individuals like D.R. Therefore, the statutory scheme meets the fundamental-fairness requirements of due process. First, under
{¶ 43} Here, each of the alleged protected interests identified by D.R. are given sufficient consideration throughout the classification process set forth in
{¶ 44} One may question the wisdom of the General Assembly in creating such a policy, but because the policy provides sufficient procedural protections and does not run afoul of fundamental-fairness requirements, it is not for this court to judge whether the policy is a good one. Maybe the policy should be reviewed; maybe not. This court, however, lacks the constitutional authority to impose its own policy views on the citizens of Ohio and must leave that determination to the legislative branch. See Cleveland v. State, 157 Ohio St.3d 330, 2019-Ohio-3820, 136 N.E.3d 466, ¶ 40; Toledo v. State, 154 Ohio St.3d 41, 2018-Ohio-2358, 110 N.E.3d 1257, ¶ 31.
{¶ 45} Indeed, to adopt the First District’s position below, as the majority opinion does, ultimately requires this court to legislate from the bench. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new completion-of-disposition hearing to allow the juvenile court to exercise discretion to continue D.R.’s Tier I juvenile-offender-registrant classification or to “declаssify” him. 2021-Ohio-1797, 173 N.E.3d 103, ¶ 17. In affirming the judgment of the First District, the majority opinion effectively amends
{¶ 46} For these reasons, I would hold that the process provided by the legislature in
{¶ 47} The Ohio legislature passed a law that requires all 16- and 17-year-olds who commit sex crimes to register as sex offenders for at least three years after their juvenile cases end. The majority says that this law is unconstitutional because it violates the procedural-due-process rights of these juveniles under the United States Constitution. The majority’s determination that the law violates the federal constitution is wrong. But pеrhaps one shouldn’t be surprised: the majority’s insistence that the claim be analyzed under the rubric of procedural due process reveals its fundamental misunderstanding of this body of constitutional law.
Background
{¶ 48} Under the Adam Walsh Act, juveniles of a certain age who commit sex offenses are designated as sex offenders. See 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10. The juvenile court sets the juvenile offender’s classification level, which determines how often he must register as a sex offender.
{¶ 49} D.R. was 16 years old at the time of his offense. The juvenile court classified him as a Tier I sex offender, which is the tier that imposes the fewest
{¶ 50} D.R. appealed, arguing that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional because it does not allow the juvenile court to remove his classification until three years after the completion of his disposition. The First District agreed, holding that the statute violated D.R.’s procedural-due-process rights under the United States and Ohio Constitutions.3 2021-Ohio-1797, 173 N.E.3d 103, ¶ 8-9, 16. In doing so, the First District noted that this court has treated the federal and state provisions as equivalent. Id. at ¶ 9, citing State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 15 (“Aalim II”). D.R. has not advanced any argument that the Due Course of Law Clause under Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides different due-process protections than its federal counterpart, so I will confine my analysis to the federal provision.
{¶ 51} The majority now affirms, following the same analysis as the First District. It concludes that D.R.’s procedural-due-process rights are violated by the law requiring D.R. to register as a sex offender for at least three years following the end of his disposition. In the majority’s view, the law is constitutionally infirm because it does not allow a judge to end D.R.’s sex-offender-registration requirements early.
Procedural Due Process vs. Substantive Due Process
{¶ 52} The astute reader may already be confused. What I have described is a substantive-due-process claim. Yet both the majority and the First District granted relief under the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. Because
{¶ 53} The text of the Due Process Clause is familiar enough. It provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
{¶ 54} Substantive due process, on the other hand, reviews the content of a legislative enactment. As the Supreme Court has explained, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause “bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels at 331. When reviewing a substantive-due-process challenge to a statutory requirement that impairs a life, liberty, or property interest, courts ordinarily consider whether the requirement is rationally related to a legitimate government objective. See, e.g.,
{¶ 55} D.R.’s challenge obviously sounds in substantive due process. He is not arguing that there has been some procedural unfairness in the way the government has applied the law to him. He doesn’t like the law. He isn’t saying that a decision-maker short-shrifted him by taking away his rights through a process that was inadequate; he is saying that the legislature cannot pass a law that forces every 16- and 17-year-old sex offender to register for three years after his juvenile disposition ends.
{¶ 56} As a leading treatise explains,
When the legislature passes a law which affects a general class of persons, those persons have all received procedural due process—the legislative process. The challenges to such laws must be based on their substantive compatibility with constitutional guarantees.
3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, Section 17.8(c), 130 (5th Ed.2012); see also Stone, Constitutional Law at 972 (for laws of general application, “[p]rocesses of representation are a sufficient guaranteе of legitimacy, thus serving the same ends as a hearing”). The Supreme Court explained long ago that with regard to general statutes affecting individuals, “[t]heir rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.” Bi-Metallic Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915).
D.R.’s procedural-due-process claim fails
{¶ 58} The United States Supreme Court has firmly rejected the attempt to recast a substantive-due-process claim like D.R.’s under the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. See Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003). D.R. contends that guarantees of procedural due process require that instead of being subject to a blanket rule maintaining his classification for three years after disposition, he should be entitled to a hearing in which he can show that he no longer poses a threat to the public and that his continued classification will not serve the governmental policies the law was designed to carry out. This is almost precisely the argument that the Supreme Court shot down in Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety.
{¶ 59} There, a convicted sex offender brought a procedural-due-process challenge to a statute that required public disclosure of his registration information based solely on his status as a sex offender, without affording him a hearing and an individualized determination whether he was currently dangerous. The court explained that procedural due process requires the government to provide an opportunity to prove or disprove a particular fact only when that fact is relevant to the legal inquiry at issue. Id. at 7, citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971), and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). Thus, the challenge failed, because “the fact that respondent [sought] to prove—that he [was] not currently dangerous—[was] of no consequence under Connecticut’s Megan’s Law.” Id.
{¶ 60} The court elaborated on the distinction between procedural- and substantive-due-process claims:
Unless respondent can show that that substantivе rule of law is defective (by conflicting with a provision of the Constitution), any hearing on current dangerousness is a bootless exercise. * * * States are not barred by principles of “procedural due process” from drawing such classifications. Such claims “must ultimately be analyzed” in terms of substantive, not procedural, due process.
(Emphasis added in Michael H.) Id. at 7-8, quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120-121, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed. 2d 91 (1989) (plurality opinion). Thus, the court held: “Plaintiffs who assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in that hearing are relevant under the statutory scheme.” Id. at 8; see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-542, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) (“a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision” is not meaningful for the purposes of the Due Process Clause).
{¶ 61} In concurrence, Justice Scalia summed up why dressed-up substantive-due-process claims like D.R.’s are bound to fail:
[E]ven if the requirements of Connecticut’s sex offender registration law implicate a liberty interest of respondents, the categorical abrogation of that liberty interest by a validly enacted statute suffices to provide all the process that is “due”—just as a state law providing that no one under the age of 16 may operate a motor vehicle suffices to abrogate that liberty interest. Absent a claim (which respondent has not made here) that the liberty interest in question is so fundamental as to implicate so-called “substantive” due process, a properly enacted law can eliminate it. That is ultimately why, as the Court’s opinion demonstrates, a convicted
sex offender has no more right to additional “process” enabling him to establish that he is not dangerous than (in the analogous case just suggested) a 15-year-old has a right to “process” enabling him to establish that he is a safe driver.
Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 8-9, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
{¶ 62} And that is the problem here. The law requires the court to continue D.R.’s classification at the completion of his disposition, regardless of the threat he currently poses to the public. The facts that D.R. wishes to have an opportunity to prove—that he has been fully rehabilitated and is no longer a danger to others—are irrelevant to his continued classification as a juvenile sex offender under the statutory scheme.
{¶ 63} Indeed, following Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety, courts have routinely rejected claims like D.R.’s that have been brought by other juveniles. See, e.g., U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir.2012) (“Additional process is only necessary where it gives a sex offender the ability to prove or disprove facts related to the applicability of the registration requirement”); Doe v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 502 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety “foreclosed any procedural due process claim” against automatic registration for juvenile sex offenders); see also State v. N.R., 314 Kan. 98, 495 P.3d 16 (2021); State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of the State of Nevada (Logan D.), 129 Nev. 492, 306 P.3d 369 (2013); In re Z.B., 2008 S.D. 108, 757 N.W.2d 595 (2008); People in Interest of C.B.B., 75 P.3d 1148 (Colo.App.2003); In re J.R., 341 Ill.App.3d 784, 793 N.E.2d 687 (Ill.App.2003).
{¶ 64} The General Assembly requires any 16- and 17-year-old who has been adjudicated delinquent for committing a sexually oriented offense to be classified as a sex offender for at least three years following the completion of his
{¶ 65} Thus, D.R.’s procedural-due-process claim fails.
We should put out the dumpster fire that is our precedent
{¶ 66} So how could the First District and the majority make such a basic mistake? Surely, they must understand the difference between substantive and procedural due process, right? Well, the answer is that it is not entirely their fault. This court has some poorly reasoned precedent out there. We ought to clean it up.
{¶ 67} The confusion originates in this court’s decision in In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. That case involved a due-process challenge to another juvenile-sex-offender-registration statute. The law at issue automatically imposed lifetime registration and notification requirements on certain juvenile offenders. In reviewing the claim, the Fourth District Court of Appeals properly concluded that C.P.’s challenge was brought under the substantive comрonent of the Due Process Clause and found no constitutional violation. See In re C.P., 4th Dist. Athens No. 09CA41, 2010-Ohio-1484, ¶ 8-9, 16-17.
{¶ 68} But this court reversed and made a mess of things in the process. Because the classification in question applied generally to all juveniles convicted of certain charges, the challenge obviously invoked the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. But rather than evaluate C.P.’s claim under substantive-due-process standards, this court applied a procedural-due-process standard. This
{¶ 69} In re C.P. was obviously wrongly decided: it used a procedural-due-process standard to strike down a generalized enactment. But this сourt has never quite said so. We attempted to distinguish In re C.P. in In re D.S., 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 32-37, but we stopped well short of rejecting its faulty logic.
{¶ 70} In State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St. 3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862 (“Aalim I”), this court nearly made the same mistake as the majority does here. In that case, this court initially sought to incorporate the procedural-due-process standard of fundamental fairness into the Ohio Constitution and use it to strike down a generally applicable statute that required that juveniles who had committed certain offenses be bound over to the adult court automatically. Id. at ¶ 2, 18-20. But fortunately, the court recognized its error and reconsidered its erroneous judgment. On reconsideration, the lead opinion recognized that procedural due process was satisfied because Aalim had received a hearing, at which he was represented by counsel, on the only factors that were relevant under the statute: his age and whether there was probable cause to believe he had committed the offense. Aalim II, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, at ¶ 27. A concurring opinion elaborated on the confusion in our prior case law, explaining that a “challenge to a generalized legislative determination—for example, that all juveniles of a certain age who are charged with certain qualifying crimes must be
{¶ 71} One might have thought that Aalim II would have eliminated the confusion caused by In re C.P. But apparently not. Here, the First District relied heavily on In re C.P., and the majority breathes new life into its demonstrably erroneous analysis today.
{¶ 72} We really messed up when we decided In re C.P., and we should say so. We should realign our interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution with that of the United States Supreme Court and make clear that substantive-due-process claims are to be assessed under substantive-due-process standards. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution leaves us no other option.
Conclusion
{¶ 73} One might fairly criticize the wisdom of the statutory registration requirement at issue in this case. Perhaps it should be changed. But it is not our place to make such policy choices for the state.
{¶ 74} The majority’s decision today perpetuates a glaring error in our due-process precedent and erroneously invalidates a duly enacted statute along the way. I would bring our due-process analysis back in line with the United States Supreme Court and conclude that there is no procedural-due-process violation in this case. I would therefore reverse the contrary judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for it to consider D.R.’s remaining assignments of error.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.