In re D.R., 225 N.E.3d 894

Background

In 2017 D.R., age 16, sexually assaulted a 12-year-old; he was adjudicated delinquent in 2018 and placed on probation after commitment was suspended.
At an R.C. 2152.83 initial classification hearing the juvenile court classified D.R. as a Tier I juvenile-offender registrant and advised him of a required completion-of-disposition review.
At the completion-of-disposition hearing the court found D.R. had completed treatment, finished probation, and presented low-risk assessments, but R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(b) mandated continuation of a Tier I classification for offenders who were 16–17 at the time of the offense.
Under R.C. 2152.85(B)(1) a juvenile like D.R. may petition for declassification only three years after the completion-of-disposition hearing, so the Tier I label carries into adulthood without a termination option at that hearing.
The First District held R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(b) unconstitutional as applied to D.R.; the state appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding the statute is fundamentally unfair as applied because it strips the juvenile court of discretion at the critical completion-of-disposition stage and remanded for a new hearing where the court may continue or terminate the Tier I classification.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)(b) violates juvenile procedural due process/fundamental fairness by denying the juvenile court discretion at the completion-of-disposition hearing for 16–17‑year‑old Tier I offenders	D.R.: statute eliminates court discretion to terminate or modify Tier I status at completion, forcing continuation into adulthood despite rehabilitation; violates fundamental fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment and Ohio Constitution	State: scheme is constitutional; juvenile receives initial classification hearing and can seek declassification after three years under R.C. 2152.85(B)(1); no due-process violation	Held: statute is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles who were 16–17 at offense and classified Tier I because it denies the juvenile court discretion at the completion-of-disposition hearing; remand for a new hearing to decide continuation or termination
Whether the challenge is properly analyzed as procedural (fundamental fairness) or substantive due process (and whether Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Safety controls)	D.R.: framed claim under procedural due process—juvenile process requires individualized assessment and judicial discretion	State/dissent: the claim is substantive (a statutory classification) and Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety forbids recasting a substantive claim as procedural; statute is a valid legislative classification requiring only legislative review	Held by majority: applied juvenile procedural/fundamental-fairness framework and found statutory removal of discretion unconstitutional as applied; dissent argued majority misapplied procedural analysis and should have analyzed the claim substantively

Key Cases Cited

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (U.S. 1966) (juvenile proceedings must avoid procedural arbitrariness and afford certain protections)
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1967) (establishing essential due-process protections for juveniles)
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (U.S. 1971) (juvenile procedures judged by standard of fundamental fairness)
Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2003) (procedural-due-process claims must show the facts sought in a hearing are relevant under the statute; substantive challenges cannot be recast as procedural)
In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012) (struck an automatic juvenile sex‑offender scheme as fundamentally unfair where juvenile-court discretion was eliminated)
In re D.S., 54 N.E.3d 1184 (Ohio 2016) (upheld juvenile registration into adulthood where statutes preserved hearing protections and court discretion)
State v. D.H., 901 N.E.2d 209 (Ohio 2009) (emphasized importance of judicial discretion in juvenile dispositions)