State v. Aalim (Slip Opinion)State v. Aalim (Slip Opinion)
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} In this сase we are asked whether certain provisions of the Revised Code that make the transfer of juveniles to adult court mandatory in specific circumstances violate constitutional due-process and equal-protection provisions. We hold that the mandatory transfer of juveniles without providing for the protection of a discretionary determination by the juvenile-court judge violates juveniles’ right to due process.
{¶ 2} In December 2013, a complaint was filed in the Juvenile Division of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that appellant, Matthew I. Aalim, engaged in conduct that would be considered aggravated robbery in violation of
{¶ 3} After conducting a hearing, the juvenile court found that Aalim was 16 years old at the time of the alleged offense and that there was probable cause to believe that he committed the conduct alleged in the complaint, including the firearm specification. The juvenile court automatically transferred the case to the general division of the common pleas court as the statute required. An indictment was issued charging Aalim with two counts of aggravated robbery in violation of
{¶ 4} Aalim filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and transfer his case back to juvenile court, arguing that the mandatory transfer of juveniles pursuant to
{¶ 5} The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, rejecting Aalim’s challenges to the mandatory-transfer statutes. Rejecting Aal-im’s due-process argument, the court of appeals relied on a previous decision to hold that the mandatory-transfer scheme of
{¶ 6} We accepted jurisdiction over two propositions of law, which ask us to hold that
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Argument Summary
1. The statutes
{¶ 7}
(A) A child who is alleged to be a delinquent child is eligible for mandatory transfer and shall be transferred as provided insection 2152.12 of the Revised Code in any of the following circumstances:
(1) The child is charged with a category one offense and either of the following apply:
(a) The child was sixteen years of age or older at the time of the act charged.
(b) The child was fourteen or fifteen years of age at the time of the act charged and previously was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that is a category one or category two offense and was committed to the legal custody of the department of youth services upon the basis of that adjudication.
(2) The child is charged with a category two offense, other than a violation of section 2905.01 of the Revised Code, the child was sixteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the act charged, and either or both of the following apply:
(a) The child previously was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that is a category one or a category two offense and was committed to the legal custody of the department of youth services on the basis of that adjudication.
*466 (b) The child is alleged to have had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under the child’s control while committing the act charged and to have displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated possession of the firearm, or usеd the firearm to facilitate the commission of the act charged.
Aggravated robbery is a category-two offense,
{¶ 8} To prevail on a facial constitutional challenge to a statute, the challenging party must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. State v. Romage,
2. Positions of the parties
{¶ 9} Aalim presents facial due-process and equal-protection challenges to the mandatory-transfer statutes. His arguments regarding due process are (1) that fundamental fairness requires that every juvenile receive an opportunity to demonstrate a capacity to change, (2) that youth must always be considered as a mitigating—not aggravating—factor, (3) that the irrebuttable presumption of transfer contained in the statutes is fundamentally unfair, and (4) that juveniles have a substantive due-process right to have their youth and its attendant characteristics taken into account at every stage of the proceedings (including transfer).
{¶ 10} In support of his equal-protection claim, Aalim argues (1) that the mandatory-transfer statutes create classes of similarly situated juveniles who are treated differently based solely on their ages, (2) that a juvenile’s status as a juvenile is a suspect class for purposes of equal-protection analysis, and (3) that the age-based distinctions in the mandatory-transfer statutes are not rationally related to the purpose of juvenile-delinquency proceedings.
{¶ 11} The state counters that the only process due to juveniles is codified in the mandatory-transfer statutes as a special measure created for certain specified
B. Due Process
{¶ 12} The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
{¶ 13} As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “For all its consequence, ‘due process’ has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined.” Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., North Carolina,
{¶ 14} “[NJeither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” In re Gault,
{¶ 15} Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” We have explained that the Ohio Constitution provides unique protection for Ohioans:
The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions may not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the United States Supreme Court has provided in its*468 interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to individuals and groups.
Arnold v. Cleveland,
{¶ 16} The juvenile courts “occupy a unique place in our legal system.” In re C.S.,
{¶ 17} A common thread underlying the analysis in our juvenile cases is the recognition “that a juvenile could ‘receive}] the worst of both worlds’ in the juvenile-court system by being provided ‘neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.’ ” Id. at ¶ 70, quoting Kent v. United States,
1. Juveniles are entitled to fundamental fairness
{¶ 18} In considering a juvenile’s right to counsel during juvenile proceedings, we noted that the phrase “due process”
*469 “expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness,’ a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.”
C.S. at ¶ 80, quoting Lassiter,
{¶ 19} We have recently discussed the concept of fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings in holding that automatic, lifelong registration and notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system violates due process. In re C.P.,
[Fundamental fairness is not a one-way street that allows only for an easing of due process requirements for juveniles; instead, fundamental fairness may require, as it does in this case, additional procedural safeguards for juveniles in order to meet * * * the juvenile system’s goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
Id. at ¶ 85.
{¶ 20} Aalim argues that we should apply the principles of our previous juvenile cases to hold that he is entitled to be treated as a juvenile under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and that he should receive an amenability hearing before any transfer to the general division of common pleas court. He asserts that juvenile-court judges are in the best position to evaluate each juvenile’s suitability for juvenile or adult court, that fundamental fairness requires that juveniles have the opportunity tо demonstrate a capacity to change
2. The special status of juveniles
{¶ 21} The legislative decision to create a juvenile-court system, along with our cases addressing due-process protections for juveniles, have made clear that Ohio juveniles have been given a special status. This special status accords with recent United States Supreme Court decisions indicating that even when they are tried as adults, juveniles receive special consideration. See Roper v. Simmons,
{¶ 22} In this line of cases, the Supreme Court has established that youth is a mitigating factor for purposes of sentencing. Roper at 570, citing Johnson v. Texas,
First, children have a “ ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper,543 U.S., at 569 ,125 S.Ct. 1183 [quoting Johnson at 367], Secоnd, children “are more vulnerable * * * to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievable] deprav[ity].” Id., at 570,125 S.Ct. 1183 [161 L.Ed.2d 1 ].
(Ellipsis sic.) Miller at 471.
{¶ 23} We have acknowledged these federal principles in our own recent holdings with respect to Ohio law. See State v. Long,
{¶24} For purposes of delinquency proceedings, the General Assembly has chosen to treat every person under the age of 18 as a child until transfer has occurred.
{¶ 25} We now recognize that because children are constitutionally required to be treated differently from adults for purposes of sentencing, juvenile procedures themselves also must account for the differences in children vеrsus adults. The mandatory-transfer statutes preclude a juvenile-court judge from taking any individual circumstances into account before automatically sending a child who is 16 or older to adult court. This one-size-fits-all approach runs counter to the aims and goals of the juvenile system, and even those who would be amenable to the juvenile system are sent to adult court. Juvenile-court judges must be allowed the discretion that the General Assembly permits for other children. They should be able to distinguish between those children who should be treated as adults and those who should not. Cognizant of our statement in C.P. that fundamental fairness may require additional procedural safeguards for juveniles in order to meet the juvenile system’s goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society, we hold that the right to due process under the Ohio Constitution requires that all children have the right to an amenability hearing before transfer
{¶ 26} Given the special status of children, we are unconvinced by the state’s argument that the only process due in these circumstances is codified in the mandatory-transfer statutes as a special measure created for certain specified circumstances. The existence of a juvenile-court system and the principles set forth in our previous cases dictate that children are fundamentally different from adults. All children are entitled to fundamental fairness in the procedures by which they may be transferred out of juvenile court for criminal prosecution, and an amenability hearing like the one required in the discretionary-transfer provisions of the Revised Code is required to satisfy that fundamental fairness.
3. Discretionary transfer
{¶ 27} The General Assembly has provided for discretionary transfer of children aged 14 or older when there is probable cause to believe the child committed the charged act, the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.
In making its decision under this division, the court shall consider whether the applicable factors under division (D) of this section indicating that the case should be transferred outweigh the applicable factors under division (E) of this section indicating that the case should not be transferred. The record shall indicate the specific factors that were applicable and that the court weighed.
{¶ 28} The discretionary-transfer process satisfies fundamental fairness under the Ohio Constitution. It takes into аccount the fact that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of an eventual sentencing after findings of guilt. Its factors account for the differences between children and adults noted by the Miller court: children’s lack of maturity, their vulnerability to negative influences and outside pressures, and their more malleable character that makes their actions less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity. In doing so, the discretionary-transfer process ensures that only those children who are not amenable to dispositions in juvenile court will be transferred. Thus, while we hold that the mandatory-transfer statutes violate juveniles’ right to due process as guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution, transfer of juveniles amenable to adult court may still occur via the discretionary-transfer process set forth in
{¶ 29} “When this court holds that a statute is unconstitutional, severing the portion that causes it to be unconstitutional may be appropriate.” Cleveland v. State,
“(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts cаpable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only?”
Geiger v. Geiger,
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 31} We hold that the mandatory transfer of juveniles to the general division of a common pleas court violates juveniles’ right to due process as guaranteed by Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. We also hold that the discretionary transfer of juveniles 14 years old or older to the general division of a common pleas court pursuant to the process set forth in
{¶ 32} We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the juvenile court for an amenability hearing pursuant to
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
. The two counts of aggravated robbery in the indictment reflected the fаct that there were two victims of the alleged conduct.
. Aalim also raised a cruel-and-unusual-punishment challenge, which the Second District rejected.
.
. Because our analysis relies on the concept of fundamental fairness as developed in this court’s decisions, our holding is limited to claims arising under the Ohio Constitution, and we make no statement in this opinion on corresponding claims arising under the United States Constitution.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 33} I agree with the majority that the discretionary-bindover process under
{¶ 34} State courts are “free to construe their state constitutions as providing different or even broader individual liberties than those provided under the federal Constitution.” Arnold v. Cleveland,
{¶ 35} Here, the majority is silent as to whether the mandatory-bindover procedure violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Instead, the majority quotes the generalized statement in Arnold that “ ‘[t]he Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force,’ ” majority opinion at ¶ 15, quoting Arnold at paragraph one of the syllabus, without engaging in any textual or historical analysis of the particular provision of the Ohio Constitution that is at issue. While I agree with the majority that the Ohio Constitution can be a document of independent force, to leap to the legal conclusion that Article I, Section 16 provides unique protection to juveniles without analysis of the “protection [that] the United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of’ the Fourteenth Amendment, Arnold at paragraph one of the syllabus, suggests that the majority’s determination is not based on constitutional interpretation but, rather, on its “sense of judicial necessity,” State v. Mole,
{¶ 36} Similarly, the majority’s conclusion that
“There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. ‘The problem,’ we have stressed, ‘is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.’ In re Gault,387 U.S. 1 , 13-14,87 S.Ct. 1428 , 1436-1437,18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). We have held that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles. See Id., at 31-57,87 S.Ct., at 1445-1459 [18 L.Ed.2d 527 ] (notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship,397 U.S. 358 ,90 S.Ct. 1068 ,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones,421 U.S. 519 ,95 S.Ct. 1779 ,44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (double jeopardy).”
(Brackets sic.) State v. D.H.,
{¶ 38} Fundamental fairness is a “unique doctrine [that] is not appropriately applied in every case but only in those instances when the interests involved are especially compelling.” In re W.Z.,
{¶ 39} Article IV, Section 4(C) of the Ohio Constitution provides that there shall be “divisions of the courts of common pleas as may be provided by law.” Pursuant to this authority, the General Assembly created Ohio’s juvenile courts in R.C. Chapter 2151, and consequently, juvenile courts are creatures of statute. State v. Wilson,
{¶ 40} The majority takes this unique, statutorily created court system and bootstraps onto it “fundamental fairness” requirements that are not required by
{¶ 41} In D.H., we acknowledged that in order to comply with the fundamental-fairness due-process standard, juvenile proceedings must provide such “basic constitutional protections” as notice of the charges and the rights to counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination.
{¶ 42} “It is undisputed that the General Assembly is ‘ “the ultimate arbiter of public policy” ’ and the only branch of government charged with fulfilling that role.” C.P. at ¶ 97, quoting Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson,
{¶ 43} The majority, however, now uses Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution as a tool to rewrite the balance the General Assembly struck between ensuring that dangerous juvenile offenders receive punishment commensurate with their crimes and allowing other juvenile offenders the opportunity for rehabilitation and reintegration. By elevating a juvenile’s statutory right to an amenability hearing under
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 44} I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 45} The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” And Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution states, “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” Until recently, this court had long held that the Ohio Constitution’s “due course of law” provision is “the equivalent of the ‘due process of law’ clause in the Fourteenth Amеndment.” Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton,
{¶ 46} To be sure, as a document of independent force, the Ohio Constitution may provide greater protections of individual rights and civil liberties than the United States Constitution mandates. Arnold v. Cleveland,
{¶ 47} While asserting no basis—other than mere permissibility—for holding that the Ohio Constitution affords juveniles greater due-process protections regarding transfer than the United States Constitution provides, and without considering whether the federal Due Process Clause guarantees juveniles an individualized amenability hearing, the majority concludes that Ohio’s mandatory-transfer provisions—
{¶ 48} Appellant, Matthew I. Aalim, raises a facial due-process challenge to Ohio’s mandatory-transfer procedures. In 1969, the General Assembly enacted a statutory scheme by which a juvenile court could remove certain juveniles from its authority and transfer them to adult court for criminal prosecution. State v.
{¶ 49} Aalim, as a 16-year-old alleged to be delinquent as a result of a category-two offense committed with a firearm, fell within the category of juveniles subject to mandatory transfer.
{¶ 50} Aalim argues that Ohio’s mandatory-transfer provisions are unconstitutional because due process requires an amenability hearing—giving the juvenile the opportunity to demonstrate a capacity for change—before a juvenile-court judge may transfer any juvenile to adult court. To succeed on his due-process challenge, Aalim must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ohio’s mandatory-transfer provisions are clearly incompatible with constitutional due process. State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher,
{¶ 51} The phrase “due process” “expresses the requirement of ‘fundаmental fairness,’ ” and applying the Due Process Clause is “an uncertain enterprise which must discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation.” Lassiter v. Durham Cty. Dept. of Social Servs.,
{¶ 52} Ohio’s mandatory-transfer provisions do not offend either substantive or procedural due process.
{¶ 53} Substantive due process protects only “fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ * * * and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’ ” Glucksberg at 720-721, quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland,
{¶ 54} It is evident from the history and evolution of juvenile proceedings in this country, as well as courts’ consistent rejection of claims of fundamental rights to juvenile proceedings, that there is no fundamental right deeply rooted in the nation’s history to juvenile-court proceedings or to an amenability hearing. Juvenile courts are legislative creations rooted in social-welfare philosophy. In re C.S.,
{¶ 56} This court has repeatedly held that any right to juvenile proceedings is purely statutory. Agler at 72, citing Prescott v. State,
{¶ 57} Aalim’s claim fares no better under procedural due process. To demonstrate a procedural-due-process violation, a plaintiff must first show that the state deprived him or her of a protected interest in life, liberty or property. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
{¶ 58} There is “no doubt” that the Due Process Clause applies in juvenile proceedings. Schall v. Martin,
{¶ 59} To be sure, a juvenile facing a delinquency adjudication in juvenile court is entitled to certain basic constitutional rights enjoyed by adults accused of a crime. Schall at 263; Agler at 76. These include the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine ■witnesses, the right to use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof, and the right to be free from double jeopardy. Schall at 263, citing Gault at 31-57, In re Winship,
{¶ 60} The majority opinion states:
A common thread underlying the analysis in our juvenile cases is the recognition “that a juvenile could ‘receive} ] the worst of both worlds’ in the juvenile court system by being provided ‘neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.’ ”
Majority opinion at ¶ 17, quoting C.S. at ¶ 70, quoting Kent,
{¶ 61} In Kent, the Supreme Court expressed concern that juvenile courts were not measuring up to their laudable purpose of “providing] measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.” Kent at 554. The concern that a juvenile could receive “the worst of both worlds” in the juvenile court system stemmed from juvenile courts discarding procedural safeguards available to adults in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 556; Gault,
{¶ 62} But even if we were to conclude that mandatory transfer to adult court does deprive a juvenile of a liberty interest, I would nevertheless also conclude that the process and substance of that transfer provide appropriate, predeprivation procedural protections. Because the legislature has exclusive authority to provide for treatment as a juvenile, it “may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved.” Woodard,
{¶ 63} The majority cites this court’s prior recognition that juveniles have a “special status” under Ohio law and that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing in support of its holdings that statutory transfer provisions must account for the differences in children versus adults and that a juvenile-court judge must have discretion to determine which children should be treated as adults and which children should not. Majority opinion at ¶ 21, 24-25. But while a majority of this court may prefer to afford juvenile-court judges discretion to determine, in all instances, whether a juvenile offender should be treated as an alleged delinquent in juvenile court or as a criminal defendant in adult court, that is an issue for the General Assembly. The Due Process Clause does not invest this court with the power to sit as a super-legislature to second-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
{¶ 64} The majority also cites a line of recent Eighth Amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court that establishes that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing and that youth is a mitigating factor. See Roper v. Simmons,
{¶ 65} The Ohio decisions that the majority cites are no more persuasive on the question before us. In State v. Long,
{¶ 66} In re C.P.,
{¶ 67} Finally, the majority in Bode,
{¶ 68} I agree with the majority that “[a]ll children аre entitled to fundamental fairness in the procedures by which they may be transferred out of juvenile court for criminal prosecution.” Majority opinion at ¶ 26. In my view, however, the concept of fundamental fairness does not preclude mandatory transfer. Fundamental fairness and the requirements of procedural due process are met when, after a probable-cause hearing, the juvenile court determines that the juvenile qualifies for mandatory transfer pursuant to duly enacted statutory prerequisites and that there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the charged offense. The procedures set out in the mandatory-transfer provisions and in the Juvenile Rules provide the requisite process and afford the juvenile fundamental fairness. I therefore conclude that
{¶ 69} Because I conclude that Ohio’s mandatory-transfer provisions do not violate due process, I briefly consider—but ultimately reject—Aalim’s argument that they violate the right to equal protеction under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. The standards for determining whether a statute violates equal protection are “essentially the same under the state and federal Constitutions.” State v. Klembus,
{¶ 70} A statute that does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification does not violate equal protection if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. State v. Williams,
{¶ 71} Aalim argues that Ohio’s mandatory-transfer provisions irrationally treat children who are 16 or 17 when they commit a category-two offense with a firearm and are subject to mandatory transfer differently from children who are 14 or 15 and who are subject to discretionary transfer. Aalim states that “no ground can be conceived to justify” those age-based distinctions. I disagree.
{¶ 72} We grant substantial deference to the General Assembly when conducting an equal-protection, rational-basis review. Williams at ¶ 40. “ ‘[A] legislative choice * * * may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data,’ ” Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ.,
{¶ 73} The mandatory-transfer provisions are “part of Ohio’s response to rising juvenile crime” and “one of the hallmarks of [the General Assembly’s] ‘get tough’ approach.” State v. Hanning,
{¶ 74} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
O’Donnell, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.