In re C.B.
Rendered on the 14th day of May, 2010.
R. LYNN NOTHSTINE, Atty. Reg. No. 0061560, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W. Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant State of Ohio
MICHAEL E. DEFFET, Atty. Reg. No. 0051976, Assistant Public Defender, 117 S. Main Street, Suite 400, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant State of Ohio appeals from an August 7, 2009, trial court decision and judgment overruling the State’s objections to a magistrate’s decision, which adjudicated the juvenile defendant, C.B., as a delinquent child, and denying
I
{¶ 2} On the morning of May 14, 2009, Miamisburg Police Officer Bell was dispatched to Miamisburg High School on a complaint of an assault. Upon arriving at the school, Officer Bell learned that C.B., a juvenile, had repeatedly punched S.E. (Complainant) in the face. Officer Bell noted in his report that Complainant’s mouth was bleeding profusely, making it difficult to assess the extent of his injuries. It appeared that some of Complainant’s teeth had been knocked out and were only being held in place by his braces.
{¶ 3} Officer Bell transported C.B. to the juvenile detention facility. Officer Bell signed a complaint alleging that C.B. had assaulted Complainant, in violation of
{¶ 4} The following day, May 15, C.B. was brought before a magistrate for a detention hearing pursuant to
{¶ 5} At the close of the detention hearing, the magistrate started to schedule a preliminary hearing date. However, C.B.’s attorney suggested that the matter could be resolved that day. The following exchange occurred:
{¶ 6} “The Court: Well, the problem is, is one, I don’t have a police report. Only have what’s on intervention. And normally, I would - I would consider, you know, a resolution. I just don’t have all the information, and I’m not comfortable doing -
{¶ 7} “Mr. Deffet: So, he may admit today, but you don’t want to do disposition?
{¶ 8} “The Court: I would do disposition today if he admitted, but I wouldn’t amend it today is what I’m saying. If you want to make an admission today, you can do that. But, I just can’t amend it, because I don’t have the police report. I’m not comfortable doing that, an amendment. Because sometimes I will amend it to a disorderly conduct when I have a police report. I just don’t have that in front of me. * * *”
{¶ 9} The magistrate accepted C.B.’s admission to the “misdemeanor” assault charge at the detention hearing, and immediately proceeded to disposition, ordering six months of probation, counseling, and restitution in an amount to be determined at a later date. The magistrate’s decision and the attached judge’s preliminary order adopting the magistrate’s decision were filed on May 27, 2009. On June 1, 2009, Complainant’s mother filed objections to the magistrate’s decision
{¶ 10} The State filed a timely appeal, raising two assignments of error.
II
{¶ 11} At the outset, we point out that the State may appeal a juvenile court’s delinquency decision only in limited circumstances.
{¶ 12} By arguing that the court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision which found C.B. delinquent, the State purports to appeal a final verdict rendered against C.B., which it may not do. Rogers, 110 Ohio App.3d 106;
{¶ 13} However, in any case where a defendant is found delinquent (or guilty) which the State believes was based on erroneous interpretation of law by the court, there is no opportunity for appellate review. See, e.g., In re J.P., Licking App. No. 08-CA-148, 2009-Ohio-4730, ¶63 for the rationale behind
III
{¶ 14} We begin with the State’s second assignment of error, which states:
{¶ 15} “THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY OVERRULING THE OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION AND THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION.”
{¶ 16} In its second assignment of error, the State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling both the State’s objections and its motion to set aside the magistrate’s decision. The court’s ruling was based on its conclusion that “[s]ince the Court adopted the Decision of the Magistrate, jeopardy attached.” In essence, the State argues on appeal that the trial court’s decision was based on a premature attachment of jeopardy which prevented the court from conducting a de novo review on the merits of the State’s objections as required by
{¶ 17} The precise question before this Court is whether a trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s decision adjudicating a juvenile delinquent - following the magistrate’s acceptance of the juvenile’s admission of responsibility taken during a detention hearing and issued prior to the filing and consideration of timely objections - causes the Double Jeopardy Clause to prohibit the judge from conducting a de novo review of the magistrate’s decision pursuant to
{¶ 18} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “[n]o person shall * * * be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The bar against double jeopardy is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707.
{¶ 19} “The very history of the juvenile system has, essentially, mandated a disparity in treatment between adults and juveniles. As explained by the United States Supreme Court, ‘[f]rom the inception of the juvenile court system, wide differences have been tolerated indeed insisted upon between the procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles.’” In re Gillespie, Franklin App. No. 02AP-592, 2002-Ohio-7025, ¶20, quoting In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 14, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. See, also, In re Kash, Warren App. No. CA2001-06-057, 2002-Ohio-1425, quoting Bellotti v. Baird (1979), 443 U.S. 622, 635, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 3044, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (“‘acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from adults’”). “The State has ‘a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child’ * * * which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial.” Gillespie, supra, at ¶20, quoting Schall v. Martin (1984), 467 U.S. 253, 263, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207.
{¶ 20} The juvenile system, historically, is “neither a criminal prosecution, nor a proceeding according to the course of the common law.” In re Agler (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 72, quoting Prescott v. State (1869), 19 Ohio St. 184. This is because, “[f]rom their inception, juvenile courts existed as civil, not criminal courts. The basic therapeutic mission of these courts continues to this day. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that ‘a juvenile court proceeding is a civil action.’” Kash, supra, quoting In re Anderson, 92 Ohio St.3d 63, 67, 2001-Ohio-131.
{¶ 21} Nevertheless, juvenile delinquency proceedings do carry inherently criminal aspects. In re A.J., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, ¶26, citations omitted. Therefore, “certain basic constitutional protections afforded adults, for example the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and freedom from double jeopardy, are applicable to juvenile proceedings.” Gillespie, supra, at ¶20, citing Schall, supra, at 263. See, also, A.J., supra, at ¶25, citing In re Cross, 96 Ohio St.3d 328, 2002-Ohio-4183, ¶¶23-24, in turn citing Breed v. Jones (1975), 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346.
Authority of Juvenile Court Judges and Magistrates.
{¶ 22} Double jeopardy being applicable to juvenile court delinquency proceedings, we turn next to the source and scope of the authority of a juvenile court judge in relation to that of an appointed magistrate.
{¶ 24} As we have previously explained, “[m]agistrates are neither constitutional nor statutory courts. Magistrates and their powers are wholly creatures of rules of practice and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court. Therefore, magistrates do not constitute a judicial tribunal independent of the court that appoints them. Instead, they are adjuncts of their appointing courts, which remain responsible to critically review and verify the work of the magistrates they
{¶ 25}
{¶ 26} When a trial court reviews timely objections to a magistrate’s decision, the review is made de novo. See, e.g., In re A.W., Franklin App. No. 08AP-442, 2008-Ohio-6312, ¶5, citation omitted. Therefore, although an appellate court may
Double Jeopardy in the Context of a Two-Tiered System.
{¶ 27} Considering the significant differences between the roles of magistrates and judges, the United States Supreme Court in Swisher v. Brady (1979), 438 U.S. 204, 98 S.Ct. 2699, 57 L.Ed.2d 705, reviewed a Maryland procedural rule similar to Ohio’s
{¶ 28} The Swisher Court pointed out that in United States v. Scott (1978), 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, the Court previously found “that it is not all proceedings requiring the making of supplemental findings that are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, but only those that follow a previous trial ending in acquittal; in a conviction either not reversed on appeal or reversed because of insufficient evidence, see Burks v. United States [(1978), 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1], or in a mistrial ruling not prompted by ‘manifest necessity,’ see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978).” Swisher, supra, at 218. See, also, State v. Gustafson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432. The Court explained that it faced a different situation because Maryland had created a system, “in which an accused juvenile is subjected to a single proceeding which begins with a master’s hearing and culminates with an adjudication by a judge.” Id. at 215. Ohio’s
{¶ 29} The Supreme Court explained that Maryland’s rule did not serve to
{¶ 30} Moreover, the Swisher Court distinguished Breed, supra, wherein the Court held that a juvenile was placed in jeopardy twice when, after an adjudication before a juvenile court judge, he was transferred to an adult criminal court where he was tried and convicted of the same offense. The Court found Breed “inapplicable to the Maryland scheme, where juveniles are subjected to only one proceeding or ‘trial.’” Id. at 217-18. The case before us is more akin to the two-part, one-trial system addressed in Swisher than it is to the bindover procedures considered in Breed.4 As is true in Maryland, the State of Ohio has the power “to designate and empower the factfinder and adjudicator,” and, via
{¶ 31} Relying on Swisher, supra, other courts have upheld different two-step, one-proceeding processes, finding that they were not in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. For example, in United States v. Bearden (C.A.6 2001), 274 F.3d 1031, the court considered
{¶ 32} Additionally, in Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon (1984), 466 U.S. 294, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a two-tier trial system in which a defendant who
Expectation of Finality in Magistrate’s Decision.
{¶ 33} The primary purpose for the prohibition against double jeopardy “is to preserve the finality or integrity of judgments.” In re Kelly (Nov. 7, 1995), Franklin App. No. 95-APF05-613, citing United States v. DiFrancesco (1980), 449 U.S. 117, 128, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328. Therefore, any “[a]pplication of the Double Jeopardy Clause depends upon the legitimacy of a defendant’s expectation of finality in the judgment.” In re Burt, Stark App. No. 2006-CA-00328, 2007-Ohio-4034, ¶61, citing Kelly, supra, in turn citing DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117.
{¶ 34} Accordingly, we have previously held that a magistrate’s adjudication of delinquency is not a final appealable order precisely because
{¶ 35} In In the Matter of T.W., Cuyahoga App. No. 88818, 2007-Ohio-2775, during the adjudicatory hearing and over the juvenile’s objection, the magistrate vacated its finding of delinquency based upon the juvenile’s admission, after being advised that the charge should have been a felony rather than a misdemeanor. The Eighth District held that jeopardy did not attach when the magistrate accepted the admission. Id. at ¶8.
{¶ 36} The court explained that “[a]cceptance of a guilty plea or admission to delinquency is qualitatively different from a factfinder’s determination of guilt. It does not carry with it the same expectation of finality that a jury verdict or a judgment and sentence does. Among other things, the acceptance of a plea or admission to a lesser offense carries with it no implied acquittal of a greater offense. Ohio v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 493, 501-2; Jeffers v. United States (1977), 432 U.S. 137. In a case such as this, where the appellant’s admission was accepted and then vacated within a single proceeding, appellant was not placed in jeopardy in any meaningful sense. United States v. Santiago Soto (1st Cir.1987), 825 F.2d 616, 620.
{¶ 37} “In any case, although the magistrate indicated that he had accepted the appellant’s admission, the court did not. A magistrate’s decision is not effective unless adopted by the court.
{¶ 38} Moreover, we clarify that this final adoption does not refer to the
{¶ 39} In concluding that jeopardy attached upon the court’s initial adoption of the magistrate’s decision, the trial court relied on State v. Reddick (1996), 113
{¶ 40} The trial court, citing In re Hutchison, Belmont App. No. 07-BE-28, 2008-Ohio-3237, also found that any amendment to the charge subsequent to C.B.’s admission would violate
{¶ 41} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a trial court’s preliminary adoption of a magistrate’s decision adjudicating a juvenile delinquent - following the magistrate’s acceptance of the juvenile’s admission of responsibility taken during a detention hearing and issued prior to the filing and consideration of timely objections - does not cause the Double Jeopardy Clause to prohibit the judge from conducting a de novo review of the magistrate’s decision pursuant to
IV
{¶ 42} The State’s First Assignment of Error:
{¶ 43} “THE JUVENILE COURT MAGISTRATE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ACCEPTING AN ADMISSION TO THE COMPLAINT FOR MISDEMEANOR
{¶ 44} The State argues in its first assignment of error that the juvenile court magistrate abused his discretion in accepting Appellee’s admission and in immediately proceeding to disposition during his detention hearing, without notice or opportunity to be heard being given either to the State or the Complainant. On the other hand, Appellee points out that the State was given notice of the
{¶ 45} While we appreciate both the realities of a heavy case load and issues concerning the impact that the procedures may have on victims’ rights and the rights and obligations of the State6, see, e.g.,
{¶ 46} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
FAIN, J. and GRADY, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
R. Lynn Nothstine
Michael E. Deffet
Hon. Nick Kuntz