In re F.D.M.
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 23rd day of October, 2009.
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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by CARLEY J. INGRAM, Atty. Reg. #0020084, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
NOEL EDWARD KAECH, Atty. Reg. #0038602, 200 North Fountain Avenue, Springfield, Ohio 45504
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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FAIN, J.
{¶ 1} F.D.M., a juvenile, appeals from her adjudication as a delinquent and the disposition imposed by the trial court following an adjudication that F.D.M. committed an assault оn an employee of a “private child placing agency.”
{¶ 2} F.D.M. contends that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction of the subject
{¶ 3} We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, because the trial court failed to rule on F.D.M.’s objections to the magistrate’s report. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. We are including a somewhat lengthy discussion of the procedural history of the case, due to numerous procedural issues in proceedings held in the Clark and Montgomery County Juvenile Courts.
I
{¶ 4} In April 2007, a complaint was filed in Clark County Juvenile Court, alleging that F.D.M., a thirteen-year-old juvenile, was delinquent, because she had struck a staff member of Visions for Youth in the shoulder. A specification was included, which elevated the charge to a fifth degree felony, in that the victim of the offense was an employee of a “private child placing agency,” and the offense related to the employee’s official duties.
{¶ 5} No transcript of the arraignment is in the recоrd, but an entry filed in May 2007, states that F.D.M. admitted the facts in the complaint. The record does not indicate that an attorney or guardian ad litem was appointed for F.D.M. before her admission. F.D.M.’s case was then transferred to Montgomery County Juvenile Court, where a guardian ad litem and attorney were apрointed. Montgomery County transferred the case back to Clark County, due to procedural defects regarding the admission. Clark County then vacated the admission and appointed
{¶ 6} An adjudicatory hearing was scheduled for October 31, 2007, at 10:30 a.m. There is no transcript of this hearing in the record. The record does contain a transcript of a hearing that was held in a different case earlier the same day. F.D.M.’s attorney represented another juvenile, D.W., at that hearing.1 During the hearing, F.D.M.’s attorney discussed stipulating to the facts stated in D.W.’s complaint. The attorney’s intent was to challenge the issue of whethеr Visions for Youth is a “private child placing agency” for purposes of elevating the offense in question to a felony. F.D.M.’s attorney indicated that the same testimony about Vision’s status would apply to F.D.M.’s case. However, the attorney stated that he would have to talk to F.D.M. before committing to the other issues. The attorney also said that he had not yet discussed this issue with F.D.M.
{¶ 7} Testimony was then presented from the executive director of Visions for Youth, which is a non-profit agency that operates group homes and also has a license for independent living placements. Visions does not, however, place children in foster homes, nor does it place children for adoption.
{¶ 8} At the end of the hearing, the magistrate stated that she would issue a written decision. The magistrate asked F.D.M.’s attorney if he wanted F.D.M.’s case reassigned so that he could talk to F.D.M. The attorneys and the court also discussed thе fact that F.D.M.’s trial was set for 10:30 that day, and whether the
{¶ 9} The next document in the file is a Magistrate’s Decision that was apparently filed about four months after the hearing date. The decision, although not time-stamped, is docketed as having been filed on February 26, 2008. It is also incomplete, consisting of only one page, with one paragraph entitled “Findings of Fact.” There are no findings of law, no signature of the magistrate, and none of the cautionary statements required by
{¶ 10} Presumably, the magistrate concluded that Visions for Youth is a private child placing agency, because F.D.M. subsequently objected to the magistrate’s decision on this basis. In July 2008, the Clark County Juvenile Court filed an amended judgment entry, overruling F.D.M.’s objection. The court noted that the matter was before the court upon stipulation by the parties that F.D.M. had committed the act described in the complaint. The court also noted that the State had presented evidence that Visions for Youth is a private child placing agency in the State of Ohio. The court concluded that the phrase “private child placing agency” is not defined in
{¶ 11} The court found F.D.M. delinquent, and formally transferred her to Montgomery County Juvenile Court for disposition. Montgomery County then conducted further proceedings, again appointing an attorney and guardian ad litem for F.D.M.
{¶ 13} The magistrate filed a decision on August 11, 2008, stating that F.D.M.’s rights were explained, including the right to counsel, and the possible consequences of the hearing, whereupon F.D.M. acknowledged that she understood what had been explained to her.4 The magistrate imposed a suspended sentence to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS), not to extend beyond F.D.M.’s twenty-first birthday. The magistrate then plaсed F.D.M. at the Center for Adolescent Services, which is known as “CAS.” The entry indicated that F.D.M.’s participation and cooperation at CAS was a condition of the suspension of the commitment to ODYS. The trial court immediately adopted the magistrate’s decision.
{¶ 14} F.D.M. filed an objection to the magistratе’s decision on August 19,
{¶ 15} On September 25, 2008, the trial court filed an entry granting F.D.M.’s request for a transcript, even though the transcript had already been filed. The trial court granted F.D.M. fourteen days after the filing of the entry, in order to supplement her objections. The court then indicated that all other parties would have ten days thereafter to file a response to the objections. Finally, the trial court denied the motion for stay, and stated that F.D.M. would remain in the placement of CAS, as ordered by the Magistrate’s Decision, until further order of the court.
{¶ 16} F.D.M. filed a notice of appeal on October 16, 2008, prior to a ruling from the trial court on her objections to the magistrate’s decision.
II
{¶ 17} F.D.M.’s sole assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 18} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN THE JUDGMENT OF JULY 2, 2008, WAS RENDERED PREDICATED UPON THE FACT THAT THE COURT LACKED THE REQUISITE JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND OF THE PERSON OF THE APPELLANT.”
{¶ 20} Before we address this assignment оf error, we must consider the issue of our own subject-matter jurisdiction, which “may not be waived or bestowed upon a court by the parties to the case.” State ex rel. White v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 79 Ohio St.3d 543, 544, 1997-Ohio-366. Appellate courts may also raise the issue on their own motion. Id.
{¶ 21} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court never ruled on F.D.M.’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. Instead, the court simply granted F.D.M.’s request for a transcript, and denied F.D.M.’s motion for a stay pending a ruling on the objections. The issue is whether this ruling constitutes a final order for purposes of our jurisdiction.
{¶ 22}
{¶ 23} Final orders are defined by
{¶ 24} “An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without rеtrial, when it is one of the following:
{¶ 25} “(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;
{¶ 26} “(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment * * *.”
{¶ 27} We recently concluded that delinquency proceedings are not “special proceedings” for purposes of
{¶ 28} “the adjudication of delinquency and the sentence of сonfinement imposed on N.C. by the judgment of January 26, 2009, affected N.C.‘s substantial rights. When such a judgment adopts a magistrate‘s decision, the court is required by
{¶ 29} As in N.C., the trial court in the case before us immediately entered judgment on the magistrate’s report. F.D.M. filed timely objections to the report, and the trial court’s order did not prevent a judgment under
{¶ 30} We also noted in N.C. that the juvenile’s timely objection automatically stayed execution of the trial court’s judgment of delinquency under
{¶ 31} This appeal is Dismissed for lack of a final appealable order.
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FROELICH and WOLFF, JJ., concur.
(Hon. William H. Wolff, Jr., retired judge from the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).
Copies mailed to:
Mathias H. Heck
Carley J. Ingram
Noel Edward Kaech
Hon. Nick Kuntz