Hyden v. StateHyden v. State
Following a March 29 to 31, 2004 jury trial, Clark Milton Hyden was found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, kidnapping with bodily injury, and various other offenses in connection with the beating death of Tommy Crabb, Sr.1 On appeal, Hyden contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his kidnapping conviction under the standard set forth in
Garza v. State, 284 Ga. 696 (670 SE2d 73) (2008); that the trial court erred by allowing the State to waive its initial closing argument; that Hyden was denied his right to a speedy appeal; and that Hyden‘s trial counsel was ineffective. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Although Hyden challenges the sufficiency оf the evidence only with regard to his kidnapping with bodily injury conviction, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support all of his convictions, consistent with our customary practice in murder cases. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 306 Ga. 579 (1) (832 SE2d 420) (2019).
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime[s] beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation and emphasis omitted.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). On appeal, “this Court does not re-weigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony, but instead defers to the jury‘s assessment of the weight
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial reveals that, on November 6, 2002, Crabb, an electrician, went to Hyden‘s home to teach Hyden how to fix a kitchen light. Crabb knew Hyden because Hyden had helped Crabb with odd jobs in the past. Crabb‘s wife became worried when Crabb did not come home for lunch that day as he normally would, and she and her children began to drive around looking for him.
A family friend named Danny Fulcher and Fulcher‘s stepdaughter began looking for Crabb as well, and they went to Hyden‘s mobile home to see if Crabb might be there. Although Fulcher and his stepdaughter had driven by the mobile home several times on November 6 and seen lights on in the mobile home, Hyden‘s truck parked outside, and movement inside the mobile home, no one answered when Fulcher and his stepdaughter stopped and knocked on the door during the day. They returned to Hyden‘s mobile home around 1:00 a.m. and saw Hyden sitting on his front porch. They
Later that morning, Crabb‘s daughter and Fulcher‘s stepdaughter continued to search for Crabb, and they knocked on the door of a mobile home behind Hyden‘s. As they were leaving, they saw Crabb‘s truck, which was parked between Hyden‘s mobile home and the mobile home of one of his neighbors. Crabb‘s daughter went to the truck, where she discovered her father‘s dead body, covered by a spare tire, lying in the bed of the truck. Crabb‘s daughter called 911, and police arrived at the scene soon thereafter. Hyden came out of his mobile home after police arrived at the scene and said, “Oh damn there is [Crabb].”
Police went into Hyden‘s mobile home and noticed the
Hyden was arrested at the scene, and, after signing a waiver of
Later that month, while in custody in the Franklin County Jail, Hyden admitted to another inmate that he had killed Crabb by beating him to death with a rubber mallet during a dispute over money. He also admitted to dragging Crabb out of his mobile home, putting Crabb in a truck, and parking the truck next door to his mobile home. Hyden also admitted to another inmate that he beat Crabb to death with a hammer and that he put Crabb in a truck and threw a spare tire on top of him, but Hyden also said that he intended to push the truck into a lake but “never got around to it.”
The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Hyden guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Hyden admitted to beating Crabb to death with a rubber mallet and placing his body in the truck where it was found, and there was an abundance of physical evidence at Hyden‘s home that connected him to the crime. See, e.g., Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 891 (1) (b) (834 SE2d 21) (2019) (evidence was “easily sufficient” to sustain murder
Hyden contends with regard to his conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury that the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to prove the asportation element of kidnapping required under Garza. Specifically, he argues that, because Crabb was either already dead at the time that he was moved, or because the movement that occurred was merely incidental to the other crimеs that he committed, Hyden could not be found guilty of kidnapping with bodily injury under the legal standard that was applicable at the time of his trial.
With respect to the asportation element of kidnapping,
Garza ultimately held that . . . the movement necessary to establish asportation must be more than “merely incidental” to other criminal aсtivity, and four judicially created factors must be considered before a court can conclude that more than “merely incidental” movement had occurred.
(Citation omitted.) Sellars v. Evans, 293 Ga. 346, n. 1 (745 SE2d 643) (2013). The four factors are:
(1) the duration of the movement; (2) whether the movement occurred during the commission of a separate offense; (3) whether such movement was an inherent part of that separate offense; and (4) whether the movement itself presented a significant danger to the viсtim independent of the danger posed by the separate offense.
(Citation omitted.) Garza, supra, 284 Ga. at 702 (1). Generally, the satisfaction of all four factors is not required in order for the
While it is unclear from the record exactly how far Hyden moved Crabb, it is clear that Hyden dragged Crabb out of the mobile home and to a truck that was ultimately moved and pаrked between his mobile home and his neighbor‘s home; the movement occurred after the beating that led to Crabb‘s death had already taken place (but while evidence indicates he was still alive); and the movement itself further endangered Crabb by isolating him from a place where he could have been more easily found. See, e.g., Inman v. State, 294 Ga. 650 (1) (b) (755 SE2d 752) (2014); Williams v. State, 291 Ga. 501 (1) (b) (732 SE2d 47) (2012); Chatman v. Brown, 291 Ga. 785 (1) (733 SE2d 712) (2012). There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that Crabb was still alive at the time that he was moved,
The evidence was sufficient to sustain Hyden‘s conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury under Garza. See Williams, supra, 291 Ga. at 504 (1) (b).
2. Hyden argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to waive its initial closing argument and present its entire argument after Hyden‘s closing in violation of former
3. Hyden contends that his constitutional right to a speedy appeal was violated due to the 15-year delay between the filing of his motion for new trial and its resolution.3
“[S]ubstantial delays experienced during the criminal
(a) Length of the Delay. “The length of delay that will provoke a constitutional inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
(b) Reason for the Delay. Although strategic delays by the State are weighted heavily against the State, “[a] . . . neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.” Barker, supra, 407 U. S. at 531 (IV). See also De La Cruz, supra, 303 Ga. at 30-31 (6) (ii). The delay in this case stems from reasons including negligence rather than from an intentional or strategic delay caused by the
(c) Defendant‘s Assertion of His Right to Appeal. Even though Hyden testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he wrote to his trial counsel three times in the years after his conviction, his
(d) Prejudice to Defendant.
[T]he prejudice necessary to establish a due process violation based on post-conviction direct appeal delay is prejudice to the ability of the defendant to assert his arguments on appeal and, should it be established that the appeal was prejudiced, whether the delay prejudiced the defendant‘s defenses in the event of retrial or resentencing.
(Footnote omitted.) Chatman, supra, 280 Ga. at 260 (2) (e).
“[A]ppellate delay is prejudicial when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the delay, the result of the appeal would have been different.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 260-261 (2) (e). “In determining whether an appellate delay violates due process, prejudice, unlike in the speedy trial context, is not presumed but must be shown.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Veal, supra, 301 Ga. at 168 (3). See also, e.g., Norman v. State, 303 Ga. 635, 642 (5) (814 SE2d 401) (2018) (“[W]here prejudice is clearly lacking, we will not reverse a conviction, even if the other factors favor the defendant.“); Veal, supra, 301 Ga. at 168 (3) (“[W]e have repeatedly found that the failure to make this showing [of prejudice] in an appellate delay claim [is] fatal to the clаim, even when the other three factors weigh in the appellant‘s favor.“).
The record reveals that Hyden has not made the requisite showing of prejudice. Specifically, Hyden claims he suffered prejudice because, during the pendency of his motion for new trial, the original trial judge died, and his motion with respect to the general grounds had to be considered by a newly assigned judge. However, “after a thorough review of the case, еven a successor judge may exercise a significant discretion to grant a new trial on the general grounds.” White v. State, 293 Ga. 523, 525 (2) n.4 (753 SE2d 115) (2013). The newly assigned judge considered Hyden‘s claims on the general grounds and rejected them after “having considered all relevant matter presented to or made known to [the] Court.” Furthermore, Hyden‘s “implicit argument that the first
Hyden also claims that, during the delay, the court reporter lost the original recording of his custodial interview, which deprived him of the opportunity of having the new judge hear the interview before deciding the issues raised in his motion for new trial.4 However, despite the loss of the recording, the court reporter did produce a transcript of the interview. Hyden does not explain how hearing the interview (as opposed to reаding it) would have changed the trial court‘s ruling, and generalized speculation that consideration of the recording would have somehow resulted in a different outcome is insufficient to show prejudice. See Lord v. State, 304 Ga. 532 (8) (820 SE2d 16) (2018); Payne v. State, 289 Ga. 691 (2) (b) (715 SE2d 104) (2011).5
Finally, Hyden contends that the delay was prejudicial because he was “completely without counsel” for 15 years. However, an absence of counsel alone does not equate to prejudice. Indeed, where, as here, “we have found no merit to the other enumerations raised herein,” Hyden cannot show prejudice. Owens, supra, 286 Ga. at 826-827 (2) (d). See also Loadholt, supra, 286 Ga. at 406 (4). This is so because “[t]here can be no prejudice in delaying a meritless appeal.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. Because we have concluded that Hyden‘s other enumerations of error are meritless, he has failed to establish a “reasonable probability that, but for the delay, the result of [his] appeal wоuld have been different.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chatman, supra, 280 Ga. at 260-261 (2) (e). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of Hyden‘s speedy appeal claim.
4. Finally, Hyden asserts a cursory argument that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel (see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)), claiming only that his trial counsel may have been ineffective “if the foregoing errors [asserted in this appeal] were not preserved” below. However, as Hyden himself concedеs, trial counsel did properly preserve his argument relating to the State‘s waiver of its initial closing argument by making a timely objection below. Furthermore, even if trial counsel had not objected, a claim of ineffective assistance would have still been meritless, as trial counsel‘s objection would have been futile in light of controlling precedent allowing the State to waive its initial closing argument. See, e.g., Bradham, supra, 243 Ga. at 639 (2). See also Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 343 (8) (806 SE2d 573) (2017) (“The failure to pursue a futilе objection does not amount to ineffective assistance.“) (citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, this Court traditionally has not required enumerations relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to be preserved through trial court objections, and, in any event, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Hyden‘s convictions. See Division 1, supra. Finally, the issue regarding the
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.