SHELTON v. LEE
S16A0106
Supreme Court of Georgia
DECIDED JULY 5, 2016.
299 Ga. 350 | 788 SE2d 369
BENHAM, Justice.
fоrmance . . . was deficient and the deficiency prejudiced [Metoyer‘s] defense, had appellate counsel raised this issue on appeal [Metoyer] would have been entitled to a reversal of his armed robbery convictions.” Crawford v. Thompson, 278 Ga. 517, 520 (603 SE2d 259) (2004). See also Stanford v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 468 (2) (554 SE2d 480) (2001) (where error would have mandated a new trial, prejudice is “obvious“). As the habeas court correctly granted Metoyer‘s habeas petition, the judgment of that court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JULY 5, 2016.
Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Oldham, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Wallack Law, Sanford A. Wallack, for appellee.
S16A0106. SHELTON v. LEE.
(788 SE2d 369)
Appellant William Lee Shelton was tried by a jury in the Pike County Superior Court and convicted of malice murder and robbery by force. He was sentenced to life in prison. On direсt appeal in 2005, this Court affirmed Shelton‘s convictions and rejected, among other things, an evidentiary challenge to venue in Pike County, because, even though conflicting evidence was presented regarding where the injury causing death was inflicted, the body was discovered there. Thus, we concluded, the evidence was sufficient to establish venue in Pike County beyond a reasonablе doubt. Shelton v. State, 279 Ga. 161, 162-163 (4) (611 SE2d 11) (2005).
On July 11, 2013, Shelton filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, in which he asserted that his due process rights were violated by the instruction to the jury which closely tracked language found in
1. We agree with Shelton that a due process challenge to the jury instruction on venue was neither raised nor ruled upon in his direct appeal. In Shelton‘s direct appeal, this Court addressed only the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to venue. Shelton v. State, supra. The warden concedes that the habeas court‘s finding that this ground for habeas relief was barred by res judicata was erroneous. In a hаbeas corpus proceeding, res judicata bars only those issues actually litigated and decided on direct appeal. See Schofield v. Palmer, 279 Ga. 848, 851 (2) (621 SE2d 726) (2005) (a claim that was not raised in earlier proceedings is not procedurally barred for habeas corpus review). Although we conclude the habeas court erred in finding Shelton‘s due process challenge was barred by res judicata, we nevertheless decide, for the reasons that follow, that the habeas court reached the right result in denying habeas relief. As a result, the habeas court‘s denial of relief on this ground is hereby affirmed under the right for any reason rule. See Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357, 362 (3) (767 SE2d 24) (2014) (finding the habeas
2. (a) Shelton asserted in his amended petition for habeas rеlief that the Eleventh Circuit‘s opinion in Owens v. McLaughlin2 established a change in the law in his favor that would allow him to overcome his procedural default. See Rollf v. Carter, 298 Ga. 557 (784 SE2d 341) (2016); Bruce v. Smith, 274 Ga. 432 (2) (553 SE2d 808) (2001). Because we conclude the Eleventh Circuit‘s opinion misunderstands Georgia‘s substantive law of venue, we disapprove that court‘s conclusion that a jury instruction based upon the language used in
(b) The Eleventh Circuit in its Owens opinion noted that this Court “has repeatedly held that the instruction given here does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof.” 733 F3d at 326 (III) (A) (citing this Court‘s opinion in Owens‘s direct appeal, Owens v. State, 286 Ga. 821, 827 (3) (693 SE2d 490) (2010); Edmond v. State, 283 Ga. 507 (661 SE2d 520) (2008); and Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769 (2) (583 SE2d 825) (2003)). The instruction given in the Owens case was substantially identical to the one given to Shelton‘s jury: where it cannot be readily determined in what county the cause of death was inflicted “it shall be considered that the cause of death was inflicted in the county in which the dead body was discovered.” Owens v. McLaughlin, supra, 733 F3d at 325 (III) (A). Because the Eleventh Circuit found that the “shall be considered” language suggests a mandatory presumption that effectively relieved the state of the burden of proof on the issue of venue, it found the instruction had violated Owens‘s constitutional rights. In arriving at this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit found that the instruction given to Owens‘s jury on venue violated the rule in Sandstrom3 that a jury instruction violates the due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment if it creates a presumption that shifts to the defendant the burden of proof of an element of the crime charged. As we have in other cases involving substantially similar instructions, but for somewhat different reasons, we conclude again that the instruction given to Shelton‘s jury did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof on
the element of venue. Instead, it is our view that the Eleventh Circuit in Owens v. McLaughlin did not properly construe Georgia‘s constitutional and statutory law on venue, and therefore it mistakenly concluded that jury instructions based directly on Georgia‘s venue law improperly shift to the defendant the burden of proof with respect to venue.
Venue, as a matter of constitutional law in Georgia, is “wherе the crime was committed” and that is where the defendant “shall be tried.” See
The Constitution‘s venue provision leaves room for the General Assembly to create statutory rules concerning the manner in which a jury should determine where certain crimes were committed. The legislature has done just that in its enactment of
The United States Supreme Court has held that, generally speaking, statutory construction of a state‘s own law is a matter left to the courts of that state,4 and we reiterate that subsection (c) of
was inflicted nor the county in which the death occurred, then the jury is required to determine the county in which the dead body was discovered. Applying the venue statute, the homicide “shall be considered,” as a matter of law, as having been committed in the county in which the body was discovered. Once the jury has determined from the facts presented, and pursuant to these substantive statutory rules, the location where the crime was committed, it can then determine whether proper venue has been established by the state.
Neither the Constitution nor the venue statute is sensibly interpreted as meaning that a defendant in a homicide case cannot be convicted if the county in which the cause of death was inflicted cannot be determined beyond a reasonable doubt, even though it is clear that a homicide occurred, that the defendant caused the victim‘s death, and that the county in which the victim died or was found dead can be determined. Further, if a defendant believes the venue statute violates the Constitution‘s venue provision, it should be challenged on that ground, which would raise a question of state constitutional law. See Hinton v. State, supra, 280 Ga. at 814 (2); Bundren v. State, supra, 247 Ga. at 180 (1). Shelton did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
In Napier, this Court correctly rejected the assertion that a jury instruction based upon the language of
Rather than creating burden-shifting presumptions regarding venue, Code section 17-2-2 was intended by the legislature to provide means by which a jury can ensure that the constitutional mandate of establishing venue beyond a reasonable doubt has been satisfied in cases such as this one, where the State has brought forth evidence to establish venue and the defendant has introduced evidence intended to counter that showing.
276 Ga. at 771 (2). But this Court went astray in Napier when we engaged in a discussion of whether the language of the jury instructions, based upon the statute, could be interpreted as requiring the jury to make compulsory findings regarding venue. Instead, as set forth above, a jury instruction based on this statute requires the jury only to make factual findings about the county in which certain events happened. Once those findings are made, venue is determined as a matter of law.
As did the specially concurring Justices in Napier, we conclude it is entirely proper to instruct the jury that, once certain factual findings are made - i.e., the county in which the cause of death was inflicted - the proper jurisdiction for venue purposes “shall be considered” to be established as a matter of law. To instruct a jury thаt it “may consider” that location to be the county in which venue is proper confers authority upon the jury that does not exist under Georgia law. See Napier v. State, supra, 276 Ga. at 776 (Carley, J., concurring specially). Instead, since venue is a jurisdictional fact that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt,6 the jury must be instructed where venue properly lies as a matter of law in order for the jury to determine as a matter of fact whether the state has proved venue to support a conviction. The factfinder has no discretion with regard to the law of venue. Id. at 777. For that reason, it is proper for the jury to be instructed where venue “shall be considered,” as a matter of law, once it has determined certain facts.
The Eleventh Circuit focused on this Court‘s advice in Napier to trial courts in future cases that the better practiсe would be to instruct the jury that it “may consider whether” the cause of death was inflicted in the county in which the death occurred or in which the body was discovered. See Napier v. State, supra, 276 Ga. at 772 (2). But as set forth above, we now disapprove
jury was not told to presume any element of the crime without factual proof beyond a reasonable doubt.8
3. Thus, to the extent Shelton claims the law regarding venue instructions in a homicide case has changed in his favor, it has not. For the reasons just explained, the law is still against him. Consequently, Shelton could not overcome his procedural default based on a change in the law in his favor.
Likewise, Shelton‘s claim that his procedural default may be overcome by the ineffective assistance of his counsel cannot be sustained. See Humphrey v. Walker, 294 Ga. 855, 858 (II) (A) (757 SE2d 68) (2014) (“A common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial аnd direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance. . . .” (Citation and punctuation omitted)). The standard for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel for purposes of meeting the cause and prejudice requirement of
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED JULY 5, 2016.