Facts
- Daniel Keith Duffield was charged with possession with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance and possession of a firearm during a drug crime [lines="6"].
- Investigations by law enforcement identified Duffield's associate as being involved in manufacturing controlled substances, leading to surveillance of a Jeep used by them [lines="22-24"].
- Upon Duffield's arrest, drugs, firearms, and personal items belonging to him were found in the Jeep [lines="37-41"].
- Duffield had the Jeep's key fob at the time of his arrest and was observed driving it previously [lines="36-70"].
- The prosecution introduced photos from Duffield's phone and Facebook showing him with various firearms, which were argued to be similar to those found in the Jeep [lines="43-49"].
Issues
- Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish Duffield's knowing possession of the drugs and firearms found in the Jeep [lines="51-52"].
- Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of firearms and plastic baggies under CRE 404(b) [lines="122-123"].
- Whether the jury instructions lowered the prosecution's burden of proof [lines="168-169"].
Holdings
- The appellate court found sufficient evidence to conclude that Duffield knowingly possessed the drugs and firearms, allowing the jury to infer both possession and knowledge [lines="75-80"].
- The trial court did not err in admitting the firearm evidence, as it did not suggest bad character and was relevant to the case [lines="126-127"].
- The jury instructions were deemed sufficient to inform the jury of the governing law, thus not lowering the prosecution's burden of proof [lines="204-205"].
OPINION
ARIANA HUEMER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SANTA CRUZ COUNTY ANIMAL SHELTER FOUNDATION, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 21-cv-07372-SVK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
June 13, 2024
SUSAN VAN KEULEN, United States Magistrate Judge
Re: Dkt. Nos. 93, 102
Plaintiff Ariana Huemer (“Huemer”) is the founder and president of an animal rescue and rehabilitation organization, Plaintiff Eeyore‘s Hen Harbor (“Hen Harbor”), located in the Santa Cruz Mountains. This case involves the seizure by Defendant Santa Cruz Animal Shelter Foundation (“Shelter”), an agency of the County of Santa Cruz, of over 300 chickens and other birds in two searches of Hen Harbor in an investigation concerning suspected animal welfare violations. Ultimately, the County did not institute charges against Huemer, but several dozen birds were never returned to Plaintiffs. After Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed several claims and defendants, Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against the Shelter and various Shelter employees are a claim under the Fourth Amendment for unreasonable seizure and state law claims for violation of the Bane Act and conversion.
Now before the Court are the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. Dkt. 93 (“Defendants’ MSJ”); Dkt. 102 (“Plaintiffs’ MSJ”). All Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. 9, 18, 33, 72. The Court held an in-person hearing on May 28, 2024. After considering the Parties’ briefs and their arguments at the hearing and for the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Ariana Huemer (“Huemer”) founded Plaintiff Eeyore‘s Hen Harbor (“Hen Harbor”) in 2012, and she is the president, director, and principal employee of the organization. Dkt. 58 (Third Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 4, 5, 17. Hen Harbor, a nonprofit corporation located in Felton, California, rescues, rehabilitates, and provides long-term housing for abused and neglected chickens, other birds, and occasionally other animals. Id. ¶¶ 5, 17.
Defendant Santa Cruz Animal Shelter (the “Agency”) is an agency of the County of Santa Cruz. Id. ¶ 6. Defendant Melanie Sobel (“Sobel”) is the General Manager of the Agency. Id. ¶ 7. Sobel is the direct supervisor of Defendant Todd Stosuy (“Stosuy”), who is Field Service Manager of the Agency. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Defendant Carlos Montes (“Montes”) works for the Agency as Animal Control Officer II. Id. ¶ 9. Sobel, Stosuy, and Montes are referred to as the “Individual Defendants.” Three other Defendants named in the Third Amended Complaint—Dana Gleason DVM, Hillary Stern DVM, and Anne Terry DVM—have been dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 10-12; Dkt. 88, 116.
According to Plaintiffs, since at least 2011, Huemer has frequently and publicly criticized multiple policies and actions of the Agency and its employees. Dkt. 58 ¶¶ 18, 39-47. During the August 2020 CZU fire, which burned tens of thousands of acres in Santa Cruz County, Huemer allegedly warned the public not to take their animals to the Agency because it had a policy or propensity to kill healthy animals, and she warned that the Agency would not attempt to rescue animals. Id. ¶¶ 35, 46. Huemer offered to do what she could to rescue animals the Agency refused to help, and she claims to have rescued approximately 100 chickens during the fire by bringing them to Hen Harbor until their owners could reclaim them after forced evacuations were lifted. Id.
On September 9, 2020, Stosuy received an email from Daphna Nachminovitch, a Senior Vice President in the Cruelty Investigations Department of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), that relayed concerns about Hen Harbor, including a potential hoarding situation. Dkt. 99 ¶¶ 2-3; Dkt. 99-1. Between September 10 and 12, 2020, Montes investigated the matter by speaking and/or emailing with at least nine people. Dkt. 96 ¶¶ 2-11; Dkt. 96-1 to 96-9.
On or about September 21, 2020, a Santa Cruz County Superior Court judge signed the search warrant. Dkt. 96-15. The search warrant commanded the search of “[a]ll buildings on the property, and/or the curtilage of the property known as Hen Harbor at 7331 West Zayante Road in Felton California 95018, where animals may be located as well as articles of personal property tending to establish the identity of the person in control of the premises, attics, basements.” Id. at ECF p. 2. The search warrant authorized the seizure of “all animals (alive or dead),” among other items. Id.
On September 21, 2020, Defendants executed the search warrant at Hen Harbor and seized 240 fowl, as well as two goats and various other items. Dkts. 96-16, 96-18.
Defendants were not able to seize all the birds at Hen Harbor during the September search. See Dkt. 96-20 at ECF p. 6. On or about September 30, 2020, after again consulting with an Assistant District Attorney, Montes submitted an application for a second search warrant, along with a probable cause affidavit. Dkt. 96-20. A Superior Court judge issued the warrant on October 1, 2020. Id.
Defendants executed the second search warrant on October 2, 2020 and seized 80 birds at Hen Harbor. Dkt. 96-22.
In October 2020, Huemer obtained a post-seizure hearing concerning each seizure pursuant to
Defendants acknowledge that some birds died while in Defendants’ possession and that of the 320 birds seized in the two raids, “[n]o less than 267 birds were returned to Ms. Huemer.”
Huemer filed this lawsuit on September 22, 2021, asserting causes of action for violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments; Monell liability; liability under the California Unruh Act, Bane Act, and unfair competition statutes; trespass to land; conversion; and strict liability. Dkt. 1 (corrected at Dkt. 13). After the Court granted two motions to dismiss with leave to amend (Dkt. 34, 40), Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint. Dkt. 58. Three causes of action in the Third Amended Complaint are no longer at issue: Plaintiffs dismissed their first (First Amendment retaliation) and sixth (trespass) causes of action (Dkt. 90), and they have dismissed all Defendants named in the third cause of action (Fourteenth Amendment – due process) (Dkt. 88, 116).
Defendants now seek summary judgment, or in the alternative partial summary judgment, on all of Plaintiffs’ remaining causes of action: the second cause of action (unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment – against the Individual Defendants); third cause of action (violation of the Bane Act,
In Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment, they seek summary judgment on the issues of the validity of the September and October search warrants and the lawfulness of the seizures pursuant to the two warrants. Dkt. 102.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move for summary judgment on any claim or defense, or for partial summary judgment on part of a claim or defense.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Where the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of persuasion at trial, such as where the moving party seeks summary judgment on its own claims or defenses, the moving party must establish “beyond controversy every essential element of its [claim].” So. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Where the moving party seeks summary judgment on a claim or defense on which the opposing party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, “the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party‘s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. Id. at 1103. If the nonmoving party does not produce evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
“The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant‘s favor.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014). However, the party opposing summary judgment must direct the court‘s attention to “specific, triable facts.” So. Cal. Gas, 336 F.3d at 889. “[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff‘s position” is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” City of Pomona, 750 F.3d at 1049-50 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
A. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
In Defendants’ reply in support of their motion for summary judgment, they object to the following statement in Plaintiffs’ opposition brief: “Disregarding the overwhelming numbers of healthy chickens, on the first day, Defendants chased, captured, and thus stressed the entire flock.” Dkt. 106 at 1 (citing Dkt. 101 at 3:5-6). In support of this statement in their brief, Plaintiffs cite this passage in the transcript of Defendant Montes‘s deposition:
Q: How many birds did you capture that first day?
A: From what I can remember, 200 – between 250 and 260.
Q: The numbers I‘ve seen were 240; does that accurate (sic)?
A: It was approximately 240.
Dkt. 101 at 3:5-6 (citing Dkt. 107-1 at 131:4-9).
According to Defendants, the assertion in Plaintiffs’ opposition brief violates Civil Local Rule 7-5(a), which requires that “[f]actual contentions made in support of or in opposition to any motion must be supported by an affidavit or declaration and by appropriate references to the record.” Dkt. 106 at 1. Defendants request that the Court disregard Plaintiffs’ assertion. Dkt. 106 at 1.
Defendants are correct that the cited deposition testimony does not support the assertion in Plaintiffs’ brief and therefore the Court disregards that assertion in deciding the present motions.
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
Plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleges that the Individual Defendants unreasonably seized animals in the first and second searches of Hen Harbor, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Dkt. 58 ¶¶ 118-121. Plaintiffs’ original opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim focused primarily on the alleged lack of probable cause for the September and October search warrants and was premised on Plaintiffs’ mistaken assumption that Defendants had not submitted an affidavit of probable cause in support of the applications for those search warrants. See Dkt. 101 at 6-10. After briefing on Defendants’ summary judgment motion was completed, Plaintiffs formally withdrew this argument and
1. Overbreadth
Plaintiffs argue that by permitting the seizure of “all animals (alive or dead)”—regardless of whether the animals were healthy or sick—the warrants were overbroad because “nothing in the Warrants tied the seizures to animals that could provide evidence in any way of a crime.” Id. at 10-11. The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and provides that no warrants shall issue without “particularly describing ... the persons or things to be seized.” “To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must not be overbroad; its breadth must be limited to the scope of the probable cause on which the warrant was based.” Blight v. City of Manteca, 944 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 926 F.2d 847, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1991)). This inquiry involves determining “whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude that the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause,” which “is not a high bar.” Blight, 944 F.3d at 1066 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the issue of whether a search warrant is overbroad is tied closely to the question of whether probable cause supported issuance of the warrant.
As noted above, Plaintiffs have belatedly admitted that Defendant Montes submitted sworn statements of probable cause in applying for the September and October Warrants, and they have acknowledged that “[t]his effectively withdraws Plaintiffs’ arguments ‘The September Warrant is not supported by probable cause’ ... and ‘The October Warrant is not submitted by probable cause‘” in their opposition brief. Dkt. 117 at 3. Accordingly, it appears that Plaintiffs have
Plaintiffs’ argument misses the main point under Blight, which is whether the scope of the warrant is tied to the showing of probable cause upon which the warrant was based. See Blight, 944 F.3d at 1066. Plaintiffs in essence argue that there was no probable cause to allow the seizure of healthy animals. To evaluate this argument, “[t]he superordinate and controlling issue here is thus whether there was probable cause” to seize healthy animals. See id. As the Montes probable cause affidavits make clear, Defendants sought the search warrants as part of their investigation of possible violations of
Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a) or (c), a person who overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, drink, or shelter, cruelly beats, mutilates, or cruelly kills an animal, or causes or procures an animal to be so overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded, overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, drink, shelter, or to be cruelly beaten, mutilated, or cruelly killed; and whoever, having the charge or custody of an animal, either as owner or otherwise, subjects an animal to needless suffering, or inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the animal, or in any manner abuses an animal, or fails to provide the animal with proper food, drink, or shelter, or protection from the weather, or who drives, rides, or otherwise uses the animal when unfit for labor, is, for each offense, guilty of a crime punishable pursuant to subdivision (d).
Every owner, driver, or keeper of any animal who permits the animal to be in any building, enclosure, lane, street, square, or lot of any city, county, city and county, or judicial district without proper care and attention is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any peace officer, humane society officer, or animal control officer shall take possession of the stray or abandoned animal and shall provide care and treatment for the animal until the animal is deemed to be in suitable condition to be returned to the owner. When the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that very prompt action is required to protect the health or safety of the animal or the health or safety of others, the officer shall immediately seize the animal and comply with subdivision (f). In all other cases, the officer shall comply with the provisions of subdivision (g). The full cost of caring for and treating any animal properly seized under this subdivision or
pursuant to a search warrant shall constitute a lien on the animal and the animal shall not be returned to its owner until the charges are paid, if the seizure is upheld pursuant to this section.
Both code sections capture a wide range of animal mistreatment, including deficient environments for the keeping of animals, and do not hinge on the binary question of whether an animal is healthy or sick. For example, section 597(b) extends liability to one who “fails to provide [an] animal with proper food, drink, or shelter, or protection from the weather.” The probable cause affidavits submitted in connection with the search warrant applications detailed not only reports of sick and deceased chickens, but also chickens caged in overcrowded conditions, food for the chickens and turkeys in open containers with chickens sitting in them and rats nearby, and broken and dilapidated chicken coops. See, e.g., Dkt. 96-14 at ECF pp. 6-7; Dkt. 96-20 at 5-6.1 By allowing the seizure of “all animals (alive or dead),” the search warrants were sufficiently tied to the showing of probable cause on which the warrants were based and therefore are not overbroad.
2. Qualified immunity
The Individual Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs had identified a triable issue of fact that would preclude summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment claim, the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Dkt. 93 at 18-21. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful
In Messerschmidt, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]here the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or, as we have sometimes put it, in ‘objective good faith.‘” Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–923 (1984)). Nonetheless, issuance of a warrant “does not end the inquiry into objective reasonableness,” and an exception to qualified immunity exists when “it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). In explaining this exception, the Supreme Court cited a situation “where the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). However, the Supreme Court also explained that “the threshold for establishing this exception is a high one, and it should be,” and “[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate‘s probable-cause determination” because “[i]t is the magistrate‘s responsibility to determine whether the officer‘s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The plaintiffs in Messerschmidt argued that the case fell into the narrow exception to qualified immunity because the officers who sought the search warrant “failed to provide any facts or circumstances from which a magistrate could properly conclude that there was probable cause to seize the broad classes of items being sought,” and “[n]o reasonable officer could have presumed that such a warrant was valid. Id. at 548. The Supreme Court rejected that argument. Id.
In their opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs argued that Messerschmidt differs from this case on the “key point” that “[t]wo affidavits accompanied Messerschmidt‘s warrant applications” whereas “[n]o sworn statements were submitted here by Officer Montes or third parties.” Dkt 101 at 14. As discussed above, Plaintiffs’ eleventh-hour
Plaintiffs’ additional argument that the warrants were “facially deficient ... in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized” (Dkt. 101 at 15) also falls short because as discussed in section III.B.1. above, the warrants in this case satisfy the particularity standard.
As Defendants note and Plaintiffs effectively concede, it was Montes and not the other Individual Defendants (Sobel and Stosuy) who applied for the warrant. Plaintiffs’ arguments as to why Sobel and Stosuy are not entitled to qualified immunity assume that Montes is not entitled to immunity and argue that Sobel and Stosuy must also face suit because of their role in Montes‘s decision to seize animals and their supervision of Montes. Dkt. 101 at 15-16. The foregoing analysis in this section explains why Montes is entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs have offered no facts regarding the roles played by Sobel and Stosuy that would deprive them of qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim.
Accordingly, all three Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, and are therefore entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
3. Collateral estoppel
Having already concluded that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, the Court need not reach Defendants’ additional argument that Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating the legality of the October search because that issue was already decided in a state administrative hearing. See Dkt. 93 at 13-14.
For the foregoing reasons, the Individual Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim is GRANTED.
C. STATE LAW CLAIMS
1. Bane Act
The Bane Act provides a private cause of action where “a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.”
On the first element of a Bane Act claim, for the reasons discussed in section III.B. above, the Court concludes that Defendants did not actually interfere with Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights; nevertheless, under the terms of the Bane Act, an “attempt[] to interfere” with a plaintiff‘s constitutional rights is sufficient. See
To prove intimidation, the test is “whether a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the plaintiff, would have been intimidated by the actions of the defendants and have perceived a threat of violence.” Richardson v. City of Antioch, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2010). A Bane Act claim that relies on a theory of coercion requires allegations of “such force, either physical or moral, as to constrain [the plaintiff] to do against his will something he would not otherwise have done.” Herrera v. AllianceOne Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1288 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (citations omitted).
Many of the arguments in Plaintiffs’ opposition brief as to why Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the Bane Act claim are fatally undercut by Plaintiffs’ later admission that the September and October 2020 warrant applications were each accompanied by a probable cause affidavit executed by Montes. See, e.g., Dkt. 101 at 18-20 (pointing to “Defendants’ execution of a facially invalid search warrant,” “Officer Montes‘s unexplained failure to include his statements of probable cause in the September Application or October Application,” and Montes‘s “fail[ure] to include the manufactured statement of probable cause in either warrant application.”). That leaves Plaintiffs’ other arguments, which focus on the “totality” of the circumstances, most significantly Montes‘s August 2020 visit to Hen Harbor while Huemer was not present, and which Plaintiffs contend amount to intimidation or coercion. Specifically, Plaintiffs question the circumstances of Montes‘s August 2020 visit and argue that because Plaintiffs run an animal shelter, it is intimidating and coercive for animal control to come onto Plaintiffs property, even if Huemer did not learn about it until later, especially in light of Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Shelter had been thwarted in previous attempts to enter the property. Plaintiffs also point to the Shelter‘s conduct in seizing hundreds of mostly healthy animals and not returning some of them.
Even if the evidence before the Court was of sufficient quantum or quality to support an inference that Defendants’ conduct intimidated or coerced Plaintiffs, however, the “essence” of Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim is still missing because they have not shown that Defendants’ purported intimidation or coercion “tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” Johnson, 591 F. Supp. 3d at 668–69 (emphasis); see also Est. of Crawley v. Kings Cnty., No. 1:13-CV-02042-LJO, 2014 WL 2174848, at *14 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:13-CV-02042-LJO, 2014 WL 2801046 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 2014) (“the type of conduct the Bane Act was intended to prevent” is that which “force[s] [plaintiff] to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law”). This is not a situation where Defendants, for example, coerced or intimidated Huemer into allowing them to search Hen Harbor without a warrant. See, e.g., Freeman v. Mata, No. EDCV 22-1732 JGB (KKx), 2023 WL 4291850, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2023) (on motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff had plausibly stated a Bane Act violation by alleging that a search of his backpack was facilitated by intimidation and/or coercion where several armed police stopped him for no reason and asked to “check” him); Est. of Crawley, 2014 WL 2174848, at *14 (on motion to dismiss, finding sufficient allegations that defendants intimidated plaintiff by forcibly entering
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim is GRANTED.
2. Conversion
Plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action for conversion is based on Defendants’ failure to return dozens of Plaintiffs’ birds seized in the September and October 2020 searches of Hen Harbor. See Dkt. 58 ¶¶ 131-134. Defendants admit that at least 318 birds were seized from Plaintiffs (240 birds in the first search and 78 birds in the second search).2 Defendants also acknowledge that some birds died while in Defendants’ possession and that “[n]o less than 267 birds were returned to Ms. Huemer.” Dkt. 93 at 9, 12, 24. Thus, despite Defendants’ careful wording, it appears that at least 51 birds were seized but not returned.
The elements of a claim for conversion under California law are: “(a) plaintiff‘s ownership or right to possession of personal property, (b) defendant‘s disposition of property in a manner inconsistent with plaintiff‘s property rights, and (c) resulting damages.” Voris v. Lampert, 7 Cal. 5th 1141, 1150 (2019) (citations omitted). Defendants challenge the merits of Plaintiffs’ conversion claim on several grounds.
a. Ownership or possession
In their opening summary judgment brief, Defendants argue that “Ms. Huemer cannot demonstrate ownership over all of the at-issue property.” Dkt. 93 at 24. In support of their argument, Defendants cite Huemer‘s deposition testimony in which she stated that not all of the birds at Hen Harbor belonged to her. Id. (citing Dkt. 94-4 at 35:19-37:13; 40:16-41:3). Plaintiffs counter this argument by correctly pointing out that they do not need to prove ownership, only the right to possession of the property at issue. Dkt. 101 at 20-21 (citing Lee v. Hanley, 61 Cal. 4th 1225, 1240 (2015) and Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP, 84 Cal. App. 4th 38, 45 (2010)). Defendants’ reply brief does not further address the ownership/possession issue and appears to
b. Intent
Defendants next argue that there is no evidence that they had the intent or purpose to convert Plaintiffs’ property. See Dkt. 93 at 24. According to Defendants, “not every failure to deliver property to the rightful owner constitutes a conversion” and “[t]o establish a conversion, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show an intention or purpose to convert the goods and to exercise ownership over them, or to prevent the owner from taking possession of the property.” Id. (citing Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assn., 114 Cal. App. 4th 208, 222 (2003) and cases cited therein). Defendants assert that “[t]he foundation for a conversion claim ‘rests upon the unwarranted interference by defendant with the dominion over the property of the plaintiff from which injury to the latter results.‘” Dkt. 93 at 24 (quoting Spates, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 222); see also Voris, 7 Cal. 5th at 1150 (“[t]oday, the tort of conversion is understood more generally as ‘the wrongful exercise of dominion over personal property of another‘”).
However, as Plaintiffs note (Dkt. 101 at 21), the California Supreme Court‘s 2019 Voris decision stated that “conversion is a strict liability tort” that “does not require bad faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession.” Voris, 7 Cal. 5th at 1158. Defendants emphasize that the animals were “seized on a temporary basis, for the purpose of the warrant.” Dkt. 93 at 24; see also Dkt. 106 at 13-14 (“The Opposition provides no evidence that Defendants knowingly or intentionally sought to prevent Ms. Huemer from taking possession of any of the birds” which “were only seized by a lawful search warrant, for the duration of the warrant.”).
c. Conclusion on conversion claim
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs’ conversion claim is DENIED.
3. Immunity
Defendants argue that regardless of the merits of Plaintiffs’ Bane Act and conversion claims, Defendants are immune from liability. Dkt. 93 at 21-23.
a. Immunity of Individual Defendants
The Individual Defendants claim immunity for the searches and seizures under
Each Individual Defendant also argues for immunity for any claims in connection to his or her individual involvement in the decision to apply for search warrants pursuant to
However, as discussed in section III.C.2. above, Plaintiffs’ conversion claim depends at least in part on events that occurred after Defendants obtained search warrants and seized animals from Plaintiffs. Defendants do not identify any statute or other authority that would immunize their post-seizure conduct. See Dkt. 93 at 21-22.
In earlier cases, some courts afforded immunity under a statute granting prosecutorial immunity,
In summary, the Individual Defendants are immune on Plaintiffs’ state law claims insofar as those claims are based on those Defendants’ conduct in obtaining and executing the September and October warrants, but they are not immune from Plaintiffs’ conversion claim insofar as it arises from the Individual Defendants’ post-seizure conduct.
b. Immunity of Shelter
Defendants argue that “to the extent it is deemed involved and/or responsible for the actions of its employees, the Shelter is equally immune.” Dkt. 93 at 22 (citing
With respect to the conversion claim, Defendants also argue that regardless of the merits of that claim against the Individual Defendants,
The cases cited by Defendants (see Dkt. 93 at 23) stand for the proposition that the party moving for summary judgment need only address theories alleged in the complaint, but none of the cases address section 815.2(a) at all, much less impose a requirement that a complaint specifically cite that statute before the plaintiff may seek to impose liability on a public entity for torts committed by its employees. In any event, “[i]t is well-settled that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in federal court irrespective of the source of the subject matter jurisdiction, and irrespective of whether the substantive law at issue is state or federal.” Zaragoza-Rios v. City of Concord, No. 18-cv-06803-JCS, 2019 WL 2247856, at *5 (quoting Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiffs therefore “need only satisfy the pleading standard of Rule 8 – as interpreted by Twombly, Iqbal, and other relevant precedent – under which a complaint need not identify the statutory or constitutional source of the claim raise in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Zaragoza-Rios, 2019 WL 2247856, at *5 (denying motion to dismiss claims for excessive force and battery against city where complaint did not identify section 815.2). Defendants have not shown the Court must impose a different pleading standard at the summary judgment stage, or how that would work as a practical matter.
Both a public entity‘s immunity for liability for common law torts under section 815(a) and the entity‘s vicarious liability under section 815.2(a) are provided by statute. See generally D.V. v. City of Sunnyvale, 65 F. Supp. 3d 782, 785 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Specifically, “Section 815(a) immunizes public entities from liability for injuries arising from [their] acts or omissions except as provided by statute” and “Section 815.2 is one such statute.” Whooley v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist., 399 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2019). As discussed above, under section
D. DAMAGES CLAIMS
1. Emotional distress damages
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for animal-related emotional distress damages on the grounds that “California law only permits animal-related emotional distress for intentional acts,” arguing that the only claims that would support such an award—Plaintiffs’ Bane Act and conversion claims—fail. Dkt. 93 at 24-25 (citing McMahon v. Craig, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1502, 1514-15 (2009), as modified on denial of reh‘g (Aug. 31, 2009) and Plotnik v. Meihaus, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1590, 1605-07 (2012)); see also Dkt. 106 at 14 (“Plaintiffs’ prayer for animal-related emotional distress damages fail because their Bane Act and conversion claims fail”). However, as discussed in section III.C.2. above, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ conversion claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for emotional distress damages is DENIED.
The Individual Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages. Dkt. 93 at 25. They acknowledge that punitive damages are available on: (1) a section 1983 claim where the defendant‘s conduct is “shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or where it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others” (id. (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983))); and (2) a state law claim where it is proven “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice” (id. (quoting
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim and the Bane Act claim, and therefore Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover punitive damages in connection with those claims. However, as also discussed above, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for conversion. Pursuant to
The Individual Defendants argue there is no evidence that they acted in such a manner. Dkt. 93 at 25. However, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Defendants gave a turkey that was seized from Plaintiffs to a third party (see Dkt. 107-8 at 190:15-21) and that a veterinarian consulted by the Shelter recommended euthanasia of 3 to 5 of the chickens that were seized (see Dkt. 107-5 ¶ 8). It is undisputed that several dozen birds seized by the Shelter were never returned to Plaintiffs. The Court finds there is an issue for the trier of fact regarding whether Defendants
IV. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment on the following issues:
- Whether the September search warrant was invalid as a matter of law;
- Whether the October search warrant was invalid as a matter of law; and
- Whether the seizures pursuant to the two warrants were lawful.
Dkt. 102 at 1. Plaintiffs base their summary judgment motion largely on an argument concerning the purported lack of a probable cause affidavit in support of each warrant (see id. at 4-8), but as discussed above Plaintiffs have now conceded that probable cause affidavits were submitted in support of each warrant application. Dkt. 117. Plaintiffs also argue that the search warrants were overbroad because they allowed seizure of “all animals (alive or dead)” (see Dkt. 102 at 8-10), but as discussed in section III.B.1 above, the Court rejects that argument. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
- Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment (second cause of action) and the Bane Act (fourth cause of action).
- Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim for conversion (fifth cause of action).
- Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for emotional distress damages is DENIED.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages is DENIED. - Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 13, 2024
SUSAN VAN KEULEN
United States Magistrate Judge