Hudson v. StateHudson v. State
Phell Hudson, Jr., appeals his convictions for malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and making a false statement, all stemming from the shooting death of Michael Allen.1 Hudson argues that the trial court erred by failing
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdicts, the trial evidence showed the following. On June 11, 2014, around 2:00 p.m., Hudson, Allen, and several other friends were sitting in chairs under a tree drinking beer on the outskirts of the parking lot of the International Longshoreman‘s Association (ILA), where they were employed at the time. There was a discussion about obtaining more beer. In that conversation, Allen said, referring to Hudson, “I‘m trying to get this mother f**ker to take me to the store.” Hudson,
Stephen Manes, a longtime co-worker of Allen and Hudson, thought the exchange was done, as the conversation was typical for when the men were drinking in the parking lot. A few minutes later, Hudson walked to his car, where he sat talking to his brother on his cell phone. Hudson got out, went to the trunk and “fumbled around” for a short period, and got back in his car. Hudson then returned to his trunk, grabbed a gun, and walked to Allen and the others, holding his phone in his left hand and a semi-automatic revolver with a red stripe on the handle in his right hand.
Upon reaching the group, Hudson was still on the phone, telling his brother something like “if anything happens, you know where my money is.” Hudson then told Allen he would kill him if he did not leave in five minutes; Allen ignored Hudson. Hudson waited five minutes, then kicked Allen out of his chair. At that point, Allen jumped up and Hudson took a swing at him; Allen swung back. The
Eight minutes after the shooting was reported over police radio, Sergeant Mike Arango spotted Hudson‘s vehicle and pulled him over. Sergeant Arango informed Hudson that he stopped him because his vehicle matched the description of one that was just involved in an incident at the ILA. Hudson denied being at the ILA at all that day, claiming he had been at a friend‘s house. A dispatch alert came over Sergeant Arango‘s radio that provided a description of the suspect; the description matched Hudson “to a tee.” Sergeant Arango asked Hudson if he had any weapons in the car; Hudson said
A search warrant was obtained for Hudson‘s vehicle; a Taurus .357 Magnum revolver with red marking on the handle was recovered. The gun contained three live rounds and two spent .357 Magnum shell casings.
Manes testified at trial that he did not see Allen with a gun that day. He also never saw Allen bullying or personally bothering Hudson, and was not aware of ongoing issues between Hudson and Allen. Johnson said in 20 years of knowing the men, he never saw Allen bullying Hudson.
1. The evidence was sufficient to convict Hudson.
Hudson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Nevertheless, as is our customary practice in murder cases, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find
2. The trial court did not err by declining to give jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter and insanity.
Hudson argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and insanity at the time of the crimes. A request to charge must be “legal, apt, and precisely adjusted to some principle involved in the case and be authorized by the evidence.” Barron v. State, 297 Ga. 706, 708 (2) (777 SE2d 435) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). “To authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” McClain v. State, 303 Ga. 6, 9 (2) (810 SE2d 77) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). It is a question of law for courts to determine whether the defendant has presented sufficient evidence to warrant a requested charge. See Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 850 (III) (815 SE2d 837) (2018). The trial court did not err in declining to give either requested charge.
(a) Voluntary manslaughter.
In his written requests for jury instructions, Hudson requested a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Relying on Johnson v. State, 297 Ga. 839, 843 (2) (778 SE2d 769) (2015), the court declined to give the charge, saying that “in this particular case, all we have is words. Words cannot result in the sufficient provocation necessary to justify a voluntary manslaughter charge.”
Voluntary manslaughter is causing the death of another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder when the defendant “acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person[.]”
The only evidence that Hudson cites to support such a charge is that Hudson became very angry when Allen called Hudson a “mother f**ker,” because Hudson‘s mother had recently died. In particular, Hudson cites Manes‘s testimony that Hudson went
(b) Insanity.
Hudson also requested a charge on insanity. Hudson pointed to witness testimony that Hudson was “acting crazy,” and testimony that he urinated in a trash can at the police station to support a charge of insanity. The trial court found that Manes‘s testimony that Hudson looked crazy was merely “a you-can‘t-tell-me-what-to-do look,” rather than “the person being criminally insane,” and Johnson‘s testimony “basically describes the individual as being
A defendant is presumed to be sane. See Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 612 (3) (724 SE2d 377) (2012). To establish the affirmative defense of insanity, the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was legally insane, that is, “at the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in
It is true that the jury heard testimony that Hudson was “acting crazy” at the time of the alleged offense and urinated in a trashcan at the police station. But there is no evidence that he was legally insane or operating under a delusion. See Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 878, 881 (3) (804 SE2d 357) (2017) (no evidence of legal insanity despite arguments that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia and manic depression and that he acted strangely after alleged stabbing); Phillips v. State, 255 Ga. 539, 541 (4) (340 SE2d 919) (1986) (defendant not entitled to instruction on insanity despite testimony that he had “mad,” “wild,” and “unnormal” look).
3. Any error in limiting cross-examination of a witness was harmless.
Hudson argues that the trial court erred and denied him his constitutional right of confrontation when it limited his cross-examination of Detective Santoro. More specifically, Hudson argues that he should have been allowed to cross-examine Detective Santoro about whether the detective asked him if he had any mental conditions or a mental illness that would preclude him from talking to the detective. Hudson contends that the detective‘s testimony on
Defense counsel informed the court that he wanted to ask, “Isn‘t it true you gave Miranda?” adding that he expected the officer to respond affirmatively. Counsel wanted to ask the follow-up question, “But you may ask additional questions given the circumstances of each case; is that correct?” Trial counsel did not proffer an expected response. He next proposed asking, “Well, during Miranda, isn‘t it true you asked him if you‘re under the influence of alcohol?” He said the officer “asked that question . . . because he knew they were drinking out there that day and he wanted to make sure he was not intoxicated.” Finally, counsel wanted to ask, “Isn‘t it true that you also asked him if he had any mental illness that would keep you from talking to me, and that‘s all I‘m going to ask him. The answer is yes, and I‘m through.” The State argued, “the trouble with that is he did interview him, and [the jury
The court agreed with the State and excluded any reference to an exchange between Hudson and Detective Santoro. The court told defense counsel that he could ask Detective Santoro if he had a reason to believe that Hudson had a mental illness, but if the answer was no, he could not follow up and ask, “Isn‘t it true that you asked [Hudson] if he had a mental illness?” In a post-trial order, the court explained, “the Defendant seemingly tried to bootstrap the affirmative defense of insanity in [through] the testimony of Detective [Santoro]. The Court limited that inquiry in order to prevent confusion or any misunderstanding by the jury.”
We review a limitation on the scope of cross-examination for an abuse of discretion. See Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 796 (4) (733 SE2d 715) (2012). But we need not decide whether such an abuse of discretion occurred here, because even if the court erred, any error was harmless. See State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 641 (571 SE2d 752) (2002) (A “constitutionally improper denial of a defendant‘s
The State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict; “the test is whether the evidence may have influenced the jury‘s verdict.” Mangum v. State, 274 Ga. 573, 577 (555 SE2d 451) (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted). The State argues that if any error was committed, it was harmless, because there is no support in the record to suggest that the question or answer was probative of Hudson‘s insanity defense. We agree.
As discussed above, the only evidence introduced at trial in support of an insanity defense was testimony that Hudson was acting “crazy” and urinated in a trash can. There was no evidence of legal insanity or a mental delusion to warrant a charge on insanity. Assuming Detective Santoro would have responded in the manner that Hudson predicted during the sidebar discussion with the court, it is not at all clear how answers from the detective ⸺ who was never qualified as a mental health expert ⸺ to the proposed questions
Judgment affirmed. Melton, C.J., Nahmias, P.J., and Blackwell, Boggs, Warren, Bethel, and Ellington, JJ., concur.