Johnson v. StateJohnson v. State
Appellant Farren Johnson was found guilty but mentally ill оf malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of his stepfather, Clarence Alston. On appeal, his only contention is that the trial court erred when it denied his request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Finding no such error, we affirm.1
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence at trial showed the following. Appellant, who was 24 years old at the time of the shooting, lived in a duplex in Savannah with his mother, Monica Johnson (“Ms. Johnson“), and the victim. Police had been called to the duplex several times due to fights between Appellant and the victim. Appellant, who believed the victim was using his mother financially, typically instigated the altercations, which usually ended with the victim pinning Appellant to the floor until he calmed down. On two occasions, Appellant threatened to kill the victim. In the months leading up to the shooting, Ms. Johnson had been telling Appellant that he needed to move out of her house and find his own way. Ms. Johnson was in the process оf finding a new
That evening around 8:30 p.m., Ms. Johnson returned home from work and found Appellant standing outside. Before she could enter the house, Appellant stopped her, told her not to go inside, and asked her to call 911. When she asked why, Appellant said, “I did something wrong. I did something bad.” Ms. Johnson told Appellant to call the police since he knew what had happened. Appellant then called 911 and said that he shot the victim in the head. Ms. Johnson asked Appellant why he shot the victim, and Appellant said, “[b]ecause he was taking you away from me.” When the police arrived, Appellant told them, “I shot him. He‘s inside the house . . . . I shot him in the head. I killed him. He was trying to kill my mother.” Officers found the victim inside the duplex, lying dead in a pool оf blood that had begun to coagulate and crust over. The police also found a .38 caliber gun on the front porch; Appellant had purchased the gun nine days earlier and the key to its hammer lock was found in his pocket. Appellant was arrested and taken to the police station, where he was interviewed.
In the video-recorded interview, which was played for the jury at trial, Appellant said that he had come home around 6:00 p.m. and discovered the furniture missing and the victim sitting in a lawn chair inside the duplex, watching television, drinking a beer, and laughing. Appellant claimed that he became angry because he believed the furniture had been repossessed due to the victim‘s lack of financial responsibility and the victim was laughing about it. Appellant then went to his room, took out his new gun, unlocked the hammer with the safety key, loaded it, and went back to where the victim was sitting. Appellant said, “I‘m almost out the [front] door, but I — I dropped something. I picked it up and I was like, man, forget this, man. I can‘t go — keep going and letting my mother go through this. . . . That was the boiling point. . . . And I snapped.” Appellant claimed that he turned around, closed his eyes, and squeezed the trigger, shooting the victim four times in the back of the head. Appellant said that he and the victim did not exchange any words, explaining, “I just walked out and shot him.” Appellant also talked about the disputes that he had with the victim in the months leading up to the shooting and again claimed that he had just “snapped” after seeing the furniture missing and the victim laughing.
At trial, the detective who questioned Appellant on the night of the killing testified that Appellant kept bringing up the past disputes with the victim during the interview, but thеre was “never an
Five experts testified at trial about Appellant‘s mental capacity at the time of the shooting. Appellant called a psychologist and a psychiatrist who had treated him at Georgia Regional Hospital while he was awaiting trial. They both testified that he expеrienced delusions that were not overtly bizarre and that lasted for at least a month and that they therefore diagnosed him with a delusional disorder of the persecutory type that focused on the victim. Appellant‘s third expert, a forensic psychologist, testified that Appellant had a delusional disorder and was suffering frоm a delusional compulsion at the time of the shooting. In rebuttal, the State called forensic psychologist Amy Leeper, who testified that there was not enough evidence to diagnose Appellant with any mental illness, that there was no evidence he was operating from a delusional compulsion at the time of the shooting, and that his behavior instead seemed to be motivated by anger and frustration. Forensic psychologist Phillip Barron, who had been appointed by the trial court to conduct an evaluation of Appellant, see
Appellant does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, as is this Court‘s practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.‘” (citation omitted)).
2. Appellant‘s sole contention is that the trial court erred in denying his written request to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. “When instructing the jury in a murder case, a trial court is required to grant the defendant‘s request for a charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter if there is аny evidence, however slight, to support such a charge. Whether such slight evidence exists is a question of law.” Blake v. State, 292 Ga. 516, 518 (739 SE2d 319) (2013) (citation omitted). The trial court here ruled that there was no evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter charge, and we agree.
“A charge on voluntary manslaughter must be supported by evidence that thе defendant ‘act[ed] solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.‘” Humphrey v. Lewis, 291 Ga. 202, 211 (728 SE2d 603) (2012) (quoting
Appellant argues that he was provoked to kill his stepfather due to passion — anger and frustration — caused by his antagonistic rеlationship with the victim, the family‘s financial problems, and the victim‘s laughter when Appellant arrived home on the evening of the shooting. But this Court has consistently held that, as a matter of law, these sorts of provocations are not sufficiently serious to provoke a “sudden, violent, and irresistible passion” that would compel a rеasonable person to kill. Thus, the evidence of Appellant‘s generally antagonistic relationship with the victim, even to the extent it involved physical confrontations, did not require a voluntary manslaughter charge. See, e.g., Francis v. State, 296 Ga. 190, 193 (766 SE2d 52) (2014) (“‘Though there was evidence of ongoing marital difficulties between (Francis) and (his wife) and past аcts of violence committed by (his wife) against (Francis), there was no evidence of any specific provocation at or around the time of the murders such as would generate the “sudden . . . and irresistible passion” necessary to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.‘” (citation omitted)); Demons v. State, 277 Ga. 724, 725 (595 SE2d 76) (2004) (“Testimony regarding discоrd in the relationship between [the defendant] and the victim does not constitute evidence of provocation or passion.“).
This is especially so given the lengthy interval between the past altercations and the killing. See Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737-738 (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (holding that “the evidence in this case does not rise to a level sufficient to support a vоluntary manslaughter charge,” when “the evidence shows that the prior altercation and fighting involving appellant‘s relatives occurred some 30 or 40 minutes before
Likewise, arguments ovеr money are not serious provocations requiring a voluntary manslaughter charge, nor in general are any words alone sufficient. See Gresham v. State, 289 Ga. 103, 104 (709 SE2d 780) (2011) (holding that no voluntary manslaughter charge was required based on an argument over money). See also Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327, 331 (737 SE2d 673) (2013) (“As a matter of law, angry statements alone ordinarily do not amount to ‘serious provocation’ within the meaning of
In Pace v. State, 258 Ga. 225 (367 SE2d 803) (1988), the defendant killed his brother and was found guilty but mentally ill of murder. In support of his request for a voluntary manslaughter charge, he pointed to the following statement he had made:
[The victim] said that [the lights] were going to be cut off tomorrow. [The victim] said that we weren‘t helping him pay the bills . . . . That made me mad and I jumped up. We started passing a few words. I had a lot of pressure on me and I just popped. I had on some paratrooper pants and I had my gun in my right pocket. The gun is a .25 automatic. . . . I pulled the gun out and started shooting him. I think I shot him 6 times.
Id. at 225-226. This Court held “as a matter of law that these facts do not present the necessary evidence of sufficient provocation to exсite the passions of a reasonable person which would have entitled the defendant to a charge on voluntary manslaughter.” Id. at 226. It follows that there was no evidence of serious provocation in this case, where Appellant‘s anger was not triggered by an immediate argument and instead of just pulling out a gun and shooting, hе had to go
It is undisputed that, while [the victim] was in [Appellant‘s] presence on [the day of the killing], [the victim] did not use threatening words, make aggressive movements, оr pull a weapon. Under these circumstances, [Appellant‘s] response to the provoking incident was objectively unreasonable, and nothing in the evidence required a charge on voluntary manslaughter.
Johnson v. State, 292 Ga. 785, 787 (741 SE2d 627) (2013). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant‘s request for a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.