McCLAIN v. StateMcCLAIN v. State
Aaron McClain was tried by a Newton County jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of his wife, Betty Mulbah McClain, and the wounding of his 12-year-old stepdaughter, T.S.1 McClain appeals, contending that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial shows as follows. McClain and Mulbah married in December 2013. Their relationship deteriorated, however, in the months that followed, beset by allegations that each of them had been unfaithful. During that time, Mulbah complained to a coworker about her marriage problems, and she went to the office of the district attorney to inquire about securing a temporary protective order against McClain. Also during that time, McClain purchased a High Point .380 pistol, ostensibly for protection. At some point, Mulbah told McClain that she was going to leave him, and he responded, “I will kill you.” McClain also told Mulbah that he would kill her if he ever saw her with someone else.
On April 1, 2014, McClain arrived home from work around 5:30 in the afternoon. Shortly thereafter, Mulbah left the home to go shopping with T.S. and McClain‘s 3-year-old grandson, N.M. (T.S. and N.M. both lived with McClain
When law enforcement and emergency response personnel arrived at the home, they found that T.S. had suffered a gunshot wound to the base of her thumb, but she nevertheless had a mostly calm demeanor. N.M. was not physically hurt, but he was crying, and his hands were covered in blood. An officer trained to interview children spoke with T.S., and she told the officer that
Officers issued a BOLO alert for McClain and his vehicle. McClain was apprehended later that night in South Carolina, where he was found asleep in his car, parked next to a motel. The arresting officers found a High Point .380 pistol inside the vehicle.
An autopsy revealed that Mulbah had been shot four times — once in the left side of her head (a little above and behind her left ear), once in the back of her head, and twice in the back of her torso. No stippling was found around any of the wounds, meaning that the pathologist could not determine from how far away the shots were fired. Three of the four shots would have been fatal. The pathologist could not say whether Mulbah was lying down or standing when she was shot, but the pathologist concluded that it was “extraordinarily unlikely” that any of her wounds were self-inflicted. According to the pathologist, the odds that Mulbah had shot herself — while not zero — were “incontestably small.”
McClain contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions because there were no eyewitnesses to Mulbah‘s shooting and the pathologist could not definitively rule out the possibility that she shot herself. This contention is without merit. Among other things, the State presented evidence that McClain and Mulbah‘s marriage was deteriorating to the point that he twice threatened to kill her, and she was looking into the possibility of a restraining order. T.S. testified that, when she saw McClain shortly before Mulbah was shot, he was the aggressor and had full control of the gun — he either punched or pushed Mulbah to the floor and then shot T.S. in the hand. This testimony was consistent with the statements that T.S. made to an officer on the evening of the killing. The pathologist testified that it was highly unlikely that any of Mulbah‘s wounds were self-inflicted. And McClain fled the scene immediately after the shooting, which the jury could have considered as an act reflecting consciousness of guilt. See Woolfolk v. State, 282 Ga. 139, 140 (2) & n.2 (644 SE2d 828) (2007).
2. McClain also contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request to charge the jury on the principle of accident and misfortune. See
Here, it is highly probable that an accident-and-misfortune instruction would not have changed the outcome of the trial. To accept McClain‘s theory of accident, the jury would have had to believe his account of the shooting — that Mulbah accidentally pulled the trigger and shot herself while he was trying to wrest the gun away from her. It is undisputed, however, that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of malice murder and the requisite malicious intent, an intent that is absolutely incompatible with McClain‘s theory of accident. When the jury found McClain guilty of malice murder, it necessarily must have discredited his account of the shooting. Thus, even if the trial court had given a charge on accident and misfortune, there is no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different. See Sears v. State, 290 Ga. 1, 4 (3) (717 SE2d 453) (2011) (“The jury‘s conclusion that [defendant] acted with malice . . . necessarily means that it would have rejected any accident defense, which is premised on the claim that he acted without any criminal intent.“); Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 197 (2) (599 SE2d 177) (2004) (trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to charge on accident, in part because “the jury was fully charged on the State‘s burden to prove every element of the crime of murder, including intent,” and “[a]s the jury believed [defendant] to be guilty of malice murder, it could not have believed [victim‘s] death to be the result of an act committed in the absence of criminal intent“). Accordingly, any error in the trial court‘s refusal to instruct the jury on accident was harmless and does not warrant a reversal.
3. Finally, McClain argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce evidence that, on the date of Mulbah‘s death, McClain received an email notifying him that he had insufficient funds in his bank account. McClain contends that this evidence was irrelevant and served only to impugn his character. We disagree. “Decisions regarding relevance are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 429 (2) (b) (788 SE2d 433) (2016). Under
Relevant evidence still may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.