S17A1171. JACKSON v. THE STATE.
S17A1171
Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided August 28, 2017.
301 Ga. 878
MELTON, Presiding Justice.
FINAL COPY. Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Glanville.
Following a jury trial, Willie Jackson appeals his conviction for the murder of his sister, Willie Mae Jackson, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony.1 Jackson contends that the trial court erred by declining
his request to instruct the jury regarding both voluntary manslaughter and insanity. As neither requested charge was appropriate in this case, we affirm.
1. In the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that Jackson lived with Willie Mae in her apartment at the time of the murder, and he received his social security check at her address on the third of each month. On May 3, 2006, Steve Finch, a
him with a butcher knife raised in the air. Jackson stood there for a second, then walked past Finch toward Willie Mae. Willie Mae, who was lying in her bed, pulled out a machete from underneath the mattress. After Jackson walked toward Willie Mae, pushed her down, and raised the knife in the air, Finch fled the apartment and called police from a pay phone. Jackson stabbed Willie Mae repeatedly in the shoulder with the knife until the blade broke off in her flesh. Jackson then took the machete and continued to stab his sister.
After receiving a 911 call from Finch, law enforcement arrived, and Jackson broke out a window with the machete. The officers saw Jackson swinging the machete while repeating, “I killed her, I killed her.” A S.W.A.T. team later arrived to find Jackson leaning out of the apartment window with his head wrapped in duct tape.2 When the S.W.A.T. team attempted to enter the apartment, they found that the front door had been barricaded. Once inside, S.W.A.T. officers subdued and arrested Jackson. Willie Mae had been stabbed 31 times and died from her wounds.
This evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find Jackson guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. Jackson maintains that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury regarding a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter in addition to the instruction on self-defense that was given. The evidence, however, did not support the voluntary manslaughter charge.
Jury charges on self-defense and voluntary manslaughter are not mutually exclusive; however,
the provocation necessary to support a charge of voluntary manslaughter is different from that which will support a claim of self-defense. The distinguishing characteristic between the two claims is whether the accused was so influenced and excited that he reacted passionately rather than simply in an attempt to defend himself. Only where this is shown will a charge on voluntary manslaughter be warranted.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dugger v. State, 297 Ga. 120, 124 (7) (772 SE2d 695) (2015). While Jackson‘s testimony might support some level of provocation,3 it does not provide even slight evidence that Jackson stabbed his
sister due to a sudden, irresistible passion. To the contrary, Jackson stated repeatedly that he stabbed his sister because he believed that she had stolen his social security check, and the evidence shows that this belief was neither sudden nor irresistible. The evidence indicates that Jackson‘s suspicion developed over the course of an extended period of time, and, approximately an hour before the murder, Jackson stated his intention to kill his sister. Thereafter, Jackson slowly placed this plan into action. In addition, Jackson, himself, testified that he was not angry with his sister at the time that he confronted her. Furthermore,
arguments over money are not serious provocations requiring a voluntary manslaughter charge, nor in general are any words alone sufficient. See Gresham v. State, 289 Ga. 103, 104 (709 SE2d 780) (2011) (holding that no voluntary manslaughter charge was required based on an argument over money). See also Merritt v. State, 292 Ga. 327, 331 (737 SE2d 673) (2013) (“As a matter of law, angry statements alone ordinarily do not amount to ‘serious provocation’ within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) .“).
Johnson v. State, 297 Ga. 839, 844 (2) (778 SE2d 769) (2015). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Jackson‘s request for an instruction regarding voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense.
3. Jackson contends that the trial court erred by denying his request to
charge the jury regarding the defense of insanity.4 The evidence, however, did not support an insanity defense, and the trial court properly denied Jackson‘s requested charge.
In Georgia, a defendant is presumed to be sane. To overcome this presumption, a defendant wishing to assert an insanity defense has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time the crime was committed. See Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609 (3) (724 SE2d 377) (2012). This affirmative defense of insanity may be established by showing that, at the time of the act constituting the crime, the defendant either (1) “did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act,” or (2) had a mental disease causing “a delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.” See
intended to confront his sister because he believed that she had taken his social security check and that he set forth a plan of action to do so. In the absence of any evidence of legal insanity at the time the crime was committed, Jackson was not entitled to a related charge on that defense. See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 255 Ga. 539, 541 (4) (340 SE2d 919) (1986) (defendant not entitled to instruction on insanity despite testimony that he had “mad,” “wild,” and “unnormal” look). Jackson‘s arguments that he suffered from schizophrenia and manic depression and that he acted strangely after the stabbing do not change this result. Id. See also Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310, 312 (2) (454 SE2d 446) (1995) (“Legal insanity is not established by a medical diagnosis that an individual suffers from a mental illness such as a psychosis.“) Under the facts presented in this case, Jackson has not drawn any connection between these facts to show that he could not distinguish right or wrong at the time of the crime, especially in light of Jackson‘s own testimony that he knew exactly what he was doing, he knew the reason that he was doing it, and he believed that he was justified in doing so.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided August 28, 2017.
Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Glanville.
Daniel H. Petrey, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Michael V. Snow, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M. Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.