Keitt v. HawkKeitt v. Hawk
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Andrew T. Baxter
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
This matter has been referred to me for Report and Recommendation pursuant to
Presently before the court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant
DISCUSSION
I. Facts and Contentions
This case was transferred from the Southern District of New York on July 18, 2013, after being filed on March 28, 2012.1 (Complaint “Compl.”) (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint (“SAC”) March 18, 2013.2 (Dkt. No. 38). The second amended complaint lists fifteen defendants in the caption, eleven defendants in the section entitled “Parties,” and thirteen defendants in the body of the second amended complaint. (See SAC Caption; ¶¶ 4-12; 15, 37, 53, 70, 83, 97, 136, 150, 172, 187, 205, 236, 250). The caption lists the following defendants: T. Hawk; M. Lira; D. Uhler; J. Otis; D. Rock; B. Fischer; J. Bellnier; D. Martuscello; P. Melecio; C. Miller; D. Ali; A. Perez; E. Killar; State of New York; and the New York State Department of Correction and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”).
A. Defendants Fischer, State of New York, and DOCCS and Upstate Defendants: Hawk, Lira, Uhler, Otis, Rock
Plaintiff alleges that he is of the Muslim faith, is dyslexic, cannot read or write, is a Type-A Diabetic, and has a bullet lodged in his head. Plaintiff states that he must
Plaintiff repeats almost identical paragraphs against defendants M. Lira, the Deputy Superintendent for Programs at Upstate; D. Uhler, the Upstate Deputy Superintendent of Security; and J. Otis, the Deputy Superintendent for Administration
Plaintiff claims that former DOCCS Commissioner Fischer was responsible for the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates because he “failed to follow guidelines implementing proper procedure and policies to ensure/enforce [state and federal laws and directives].” (SAC ¶ 100). Plaintiff claims that this defendant was “made aware” of the violations based upon “appeals from C.O.R.C.,” and that defendant Fischer should have known that there were disabled inmates who needed “accommodations.” (SAC ¶ 103).
B. Defendants Fischer, Bellnier, State of New York, and DOCCS and Coxsackie Defendants: Martuscello, Melecio, Miller, and Ali
Plaintiff repeats the religious meal claims against defendant Fischer, but adds claims that plaintiff is not allowed to wear his religious headgear, known as a kefiya, turban, faus, or fezs at all times. (SAC ¶¶ 112-18). These religious clothing claims originated after his transfer to Coxsackie. He makes the same claims about his religious robe or Jâlâbiyah. (SAC ¶¶ 128-34). Plaintiff has requested permission to wear these head coverings “throughout the facility and on outside trips.” (SAC ¶¶ 118, 132). Plaintiff states that the turban must be nine feet long, and the kefiya may be 52 by 52 or 72 by 72 inches. (SAC ¶ 120). Plaintiff states that he is only allowed to wear
Plaintiff also alleges that because he is dyslexic and cannot read, he is entitled to be provided with the “reasonable accommodation” of religious “books on tape” or “auxiliary aides [sic],” while attending religious classes. (SAC ¶¶ 122-27). Plaintiff claims that he informed defendant Fischer that plaintiff “sincerely believes” that he must wear his Jâlâbiyah Religious Robe. Defendants allow him to wear the robe only “at one place” in the facility and during religious services only. (SAC ¶¶ 128-29). Plaintiff claims that other inmates are allowed to wear their “Jackits [sic]” throughout the facility and on outside trips, but when he requested permission to do so, he was denied.8
Plaintiff’s last two served defendants, the State of New York and DOCCS, which plaintiff holds responsible for all his claims, including the Ramadan meals in 2008 and 2010, the religious clothing claims, and “reasonable accommodation” claims. (SAC ¶¶ 236-303).
Defendants have filed a substantial number of exhibits, including plaintiff’s deposition, declarations by defendants and non-defendants, and decisions from a previous Northern District of New York case, brought by plaintiff in 2010. (Dkt. No. 67-2–67-26). Rather than detail all the defendants’ facts at the outset, I will discuss the evidence as I analyze the issues presented by defendants’ motion.
II. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and, based on the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The moving party has the burden to show the absence of disputed material facts by informing the court of portions of pleadings, depositions, and affidavits which support the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must move forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d at 273. In that context, the nonmoving party must do more than “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). However, in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, a court must resolve all ambiguities, and draw all inferences, against the movant. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d at 272.
III. Statute of Limitations
A. Legal Standards
Federal courts borrow the state law personal injury statute of limitations period for purposes of filing section 1983 actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). In New York State, the relevant limitations period is three years. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1989). See
B. Application
Defendants argue that any claims regarding plaintiff’s Ramadan meal which accrued during Ramadan 2008 are barred by the statute of limitations. This court agrees. Plaintiff claims that Ramadan was in September of 2008, during which time, he alleges that he was not allowed to obtain the “fast” breaking meal each evening. Even assuming that the last such meal occurred on September 30, 2008, plaintiff did not file this action in the Southern District of New York until March 28, 2012. (Dkt. No. 1). The three-year statute of limitations has clearly run.9
Plaintiff concedes that he knew his rights were being violated in 2008. However, plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations for the 2008 claims should be equitably
The doctrine of equitable tolling allows the court to extend the statute of limitations past the time of expiration as necessary to avoid inequitable circumstances. Johnson v. Nyack Hospital, 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). In order to apply equitable tolling, the court must find that “extraordinary circumstances” prevented the plaintiff from performing the required act, and that plaintiff acted “with reasonable diligence” during the period that he seeks to toll. Walker v. Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Although on the surface, plaintiff’s argument might have some appeal, the court notes that plaintiff brought an action in the Northern District of New York in 2010, in which he made claims regarding his ability to read and regarding his inability to properly participate in a disciplinary hearing.10 Keitt v. Annetts, No. 10-CV-157 (TJM/CFH). In 10-CV-157, plaintiff made claims regarding disciplinary hearings that
IV. Personal Involvement (Ramadan Meal)
A. Legal Standards
Personal involvement is a prerequisite to the assessment of damages in a section 1983 case, and respondeat superior is an inappropriate theory of liability. Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003). In Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit detailed the various ways in which a defendant can be personally involved in a constitutional deprivation, and thus be subject to individual liability.
A supervisory official is personally involved if that official directly participated in the infraction. Id. The defendant may have been personally involved if, after learning of a violation through a report or appeal, he or she failed to remedy the wrong. Id. Personal involvement may also exist if the official created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred or allowed such a policy or custom to continue. Id. Finally, a supervisory official may be personally involved if he or she were grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or
Some courts have discussed whether all of the Colon factors are still viable after Ashcroft. See Conklin v. County of Suffolk, 859 F. Supp. 2d 415, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing cases). However, the court in Conklin ultimately determined that it was unclear whether Colon had been overruled or limited, and continued to apply the factors outlined in Colon. Id. In making this determination, the court in Conklin stated that “it remains the case that ‘there is no controversy that allegations that do not satisfy any of the Colon prongs are insufficient to state a claim against a defendant supervisor.’” Id. (quoting Aguilar v. Immigration Customs Enforcement Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 811 F. Supp. 2d 803, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). This court finds that even if the Colon factors are considered, and are all still viable, plaintiff has not alleged the requisite personal involvement of the named Upstate defendants and defendant Fischer. Accordingly, no damages may be assessed against them.
B. Application
During his deposition, plaintiff was asked why he named defendants Hawk, Lira, Uhler, Otis, Rock, and Fischer. (Pl.’s Dep. at 114-25). Plaintiff testified that he named these defendants because they were “policy makers,” and they “created” the policy which excluded plaintiff from participating in his religious exercise. (Id.) With respect to defendant Fischer, plaintiff testified that Fischer “upheld” every CORC determination. (Pl.’s Dep. at 123). Plaintiff did not know whether defendant Fischer
Plaintiff’s testimony describes the doctrine of respondeat superior, and therefore, he has failed to allege the personal involvement of defendants Hawk, Lira, Uhler, Otis, Rock, and Fischer. However, even if plaintiff had made the proper allegations, defendants have come forward with sworn evidence, showing that none of these defendants were, or could have been, personally responsible for inmates’ diets, religious or otherwise.
Defendants have filed the declaration of Elizabeth Culkin,11 the Assistant Director (“Ass’t Dir.”) of DOCCS Office of Nutritional Services (“ONS”). (Culkin Decl. ¶ 1) (Dkt. No. 67-12). In her declaration, Ass’t Dir. Culkin states that the ONS is under the supervision of DOCCS Deputy Commissioner of Administrative Services, and ONS is responsible for providing nutritionally adequate meals for DOCCS’ “approximately 54,700 inmates.” (Culkin Decl. ¶ 4). Ass’t Dir. Culkin states that she is responsible for providing guidance with respect to DOCCS nutrition policies and procedures, and that “absent an emergency, the correctional officials at an individual facility like Upstate . . . do not have the authority to deviate from the general
Based upon Ass’t Dir. Culkin’s declaration, none of the Upstate defendants named by plaintiff in this case could have had any responsibility for plaintiff’s diet or for changing the diet at plaintiff’s request. Personal involvement requires that the individual who is, or becomes aware of, the violation, have the ability to take action to correct the problem. See Conklin v. City of Suffolk, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 441-42 (personal involvement requires knowledge and the ability to take action). Supervisory individuals such as defendants Fischer, Lira, Hawk, Uhler, Otis, and Rock would not have the expertise to determine what meals, or how many meals, a diabetic inmate (or any inmate) should or should not eat. Defendants Rock, Uhler, Lira, Otis, and Hawk each submit a declaration affirming that the dietary decisions about which plaintiff complains are strictly governed by ONS, and none of them have any responsibility for creating or changing any inmate’s diet, regardless of whether the diet is therapeutic12 or whether the inmate is eating the food served to the general population.13 (Rock Decl. ¶¶ 2-5; Uhler Decl. ¶¶ 2-5; Lira Decl. ¶¶ 2-5; Otis Decl. ¶¶ 2-5; Hawk Decl. ¶¶ 2-5). In addition, and as discussed further below, the DOCCS Medical Nutrition Therapy
V. Religion Claims
A. Legal Standards
1. First Amendment
Inmates have the right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to freely exercise a chosen religion. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). However this right is not limitless, and may be subject to restrictions relating to legitimate penological concerns. Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990). The analysis of a free exercise claim is governed by the framework set forth in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) and Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). This framework is one of reasonableness and is less restrictive than the standard ordinarily applied to the alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights. Ford, 352 F.3d at 588.
The Second Circuit has examined the standard for analyzing a First Amendment religion claim. Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 220-23 (2d Cir. 2014). In Holland, the court discussed the degree of burden required for a First Amendment claim. Id. at 220-21. The Second Circuit has not decided whether, to state a claim under the First Amendment, the inmate must show at the onset that the disputed conduct “substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Id. at 220 (citing Salahuddin, supra at 274-75; Ford, supra at 592 (where the court assumed without deciding that the substantial burden test applies)). While the court in Holland did not decide the issue, it assumed the continued validity of the substantial burden test and analyzed the case
Once a substantial burden is found, the court must examine whether the challenged action has a legitimate, rational connection to the governmental objective; whether prisoners have alternative means of exercising the burdened right; the impact on guards, inmates, and prison resources of accommodating that right; and the existence of alternative means of facilitating the exercise of that right that have only a de minimis adverse effect on the valid penological interests. See King v. Bennett, No. 02-CV-349, 2007 WL 1017102, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. March 30, 2007) (citing Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274). Finally, once prison officials state a legitimate penological interest to justify their actions, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show that the defendants’ concerns are “irrational.” Ford, 352 F.3d at 595.
2. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
RLUIPA provides that
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person -
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
B. Application
1. Religious Meals
a. RLUIPA
As stated above, in plaintiff’s second amended complaint, he asks only for damages with respect to his dietary claims. Monetary damages are not available under RLUIPA. Sosamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1659 (2011); Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d at 224. Additionally, plaintiff has been transferred out of Upstate, where the alleged violations occurred. An inmate’s transfer from a prison generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials of that facility. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006). Thus, to the extent that plaintiff could have requested injunctive relief, that request would be moot as against
b. First Amendment
The Free Exercise Clause applies to an inmate’s diet and participation in religious meals. McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d at 204-205; Ford, 352 F.3d at 597. The Constitution requires that an inmate be provided, at a minimum, with nutritionally adequate meals, “but otherwise retain ‘considerable discretion’ over dietary decisions.” Smith v. Perlman, No. 9:11-CV-20, 2014 WL 7333229, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2014)17 (quoting Walker v. Fischer, No. 9:10–CV–01431, 2012 WL 1029614, *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012)). It has generally been found that to deny an inmate food that satisfies the dictates of his faith does unconstitutionally burden the inmate’s free exercise rights.” Id. (quoting McEachin, 357 F.3d at 203). However, courts are “‘reluctant to grant dietary requests when the cost is prohibitive, or the accommodation
At the times in question, plaintiff was a practicing Muslim.18 There is no dispute that during Ramadan, practicing Muslims are required to fast during the day. After sundown, the individuals who participate in the fast are served a special meal to break the fast. Plaintiff has been diagnosed with diabetes. Although he disputes whether he was on a specific therapeutic meal plan in 2010,19 he states in his amended complaint that, during the time in question, he was required to take his medication with food, and thus, he was not able to fast during the day. However, he believes that in addition to his three regular meals, he was entitled to be served the special meal, given to those inmates who participated in the fast, even though he did not do so. This would involve
As background, in her declaration, Asst. Dir. Culkin states that in addition to the state-wide menu, DOCCS has a Religious Alternative Menu (“RAM“), initiated in 1996, which was designed to accommodate the needs of inmates who may have “different dietary requirements due to their religious beliefs or personal dietary beliefs,” and is available to any inmate who wants it, regardless of religious affiliation. (Culkin Decl. ¶¶ 6-8). The RAM program is served at the same time and in the same fashion as the regular menu, but provides an alternative to the meat entrees. (Culkin Decl. ¶ 8).
In order to accommodate Muslim inmates, who do not eat pork, DOCCS serves a pork entree only once per month and offers a pork alternative at that meal. (Culkin
As stated above, the DOCCS Medical Nutrition Therapy Manual states that religious menus must be strictly followed and may not be combined with medical therapeutic diets. (Culking Decl. ¶ 19 & Def.s’ Ex. B at 7). The manual also provides that in general, double portions are not considered therapeutic and are not provided. (Def.s’ Ex. B at 7). Ass‘t Dir. Culkin states that the purpose of the special Ramadan meal, served to fasting Muslims after sundown, is to provide participating individuals with a meal to break their fast. Allowing plaintiff to participate in this meal would essentially give him four meals, and a substantial number of extra calories, per day.22
Inmates who are on therapeutic diets may choose to participate in the Ramadan
In Smith v. Perlman, the court granted summary judgment for defendants on a similar, but not identical issue. The plaintiff in Smith was on a “Controlled A” therapeutic diet, and could not eat the RAM diet for medical reasons. Defendants in Smith refused to serve plaintiff a special menu combining the elements of the RAM diet with the Controlled A diet. The court found that the defendants’ refusal to combine the menus was “justified by the legitimate penological concern of meeting the disparate needs of approximately 54,700 inmates in an economically feasible way.” 2014 WL 7333229, at *11. The court held that there was clearly a rational relationship between the legitimate penological interest and the defendants’ policy, which offers numerous menus, tailored to meet the needs of different inmates. Id. The defendants’ refusal to
Plaintiff in this case does not claim that he was unable to obtain food which met his religious dietary requirements. He does not allege in his second amended complaint that his meals were nutritionally inadequate. Instead, he claims that he could not participate in the meal to break a fast in which he was not participating. Participation in this meal would involve plaintiff obtaining extra food which would not be consistent with his medical requirements.23 The refusal to allow plaintiff to obtain extra food in an amount that would be medically contraindicated, particularly when he had not participated in the fast during the day, serves a legitimate penological interest and is rationally related to that interest.
A policy which prohibits mixing different types of meal plans is also rationally related to the legitimate penological interest in the orderly and cost-effective provision of nutritional meals for a substantial number of inmates. The requirement that only
2. Clothing/Books on Tape/Religious Services at Coxsackie
Plaintiff lists items of religious clothing (head scarf, turban, and robe) that he wished to wear all though the facility and on outside visits. Plaintiff is free to wear these items in his cell and when he attends congregate services. He is also allowed to wear his kefiya (head scarf) in the shower in order to clean it. Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he does not own a turban because it is too expensive. (Pl.‘s Dep. at 70-71). Plaintiff also claims that because he is dyslexic, he is entitled to books on tape and other reading aids for his religious books. Plaintiff does request injunctive relief with respect to his clothing claims and reading aids, and therefore, plaintiff may pursue his RLUIPA cause of action with respect to this claim to the extent that it relates to DOCCS policy in general.24 With respect to attendance at religious services, plaintiff
Defendants first argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to any of his clothing claims prior to bringing this action.
a. Exhaustion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, (PLRA),
The grievance procedure in New York is a three-tiered process. The inmate must first file a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee (IGRC).
At the same time that the Second Circuit decided Giano, it also decided four other related cases, clarifying the law in the Second Circuit regarding the PLRA‘s
Although the Second Circuit has not explicitly held that Hemphill remains good law after Woodford, it has noted in more recent cases, that the exhaustion requirement may be excused, as have other district courts.26 See, e.g., Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 2007) (using the three-part inquiry); Davis v. State of New York, 311 F. App‘x 397, 399 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that there may be exceptions to the exhaustion requirement); Snyder v. Whittier, 428 F. App‘x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2011) (using the three part inquiry); Carlson v. Parry, No. 06-CV-6621, 2013 WL 5354517, at *9-10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013) (recognizing that the exhaustion requirement may be excused); Morrison v. Hartman, 898 F. Supp. 2d 577, 581 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (same).
In support of their exhaustion argument, defendants have submitted the declaration of Karen Bellamy, Director of the DOCCS Inmate Grievance Program. (Bellamy Decl.) (Dkt. No. 67-7). In her declaration, Dir. Bellamy states that plaintiff did not file any grievances regarding his clothing, reading aids (books on tape), or attendance at religious services until March 29, 2012. (Bellamy Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4 & Ex. B). The grievance was not finally decided by the CORC until August 29, 2012. (Id.) This action was filed in the Southern District of New York on March 28, 2012, before he even filed his grievance and long before the CORC made a final decision on his grievance.27 The court notes that plaintiff‘s original complaint contained claims regarding his religious clothing. (See e.g. Compl. ¶ 190 – head covering).
The court also finds that none of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply in this case. It is clear that the grievance procedure was available to the plaintiff, and that none of the defendants prevented him from utilizing it. Plaintiff simply did not exhaust his remedies prior to filing this action, and there are no extenuating
b. Merits
Even if plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies before filing this action, the court would recommend dismissing plaintiff‘s claims. Plaintiff claims that he should be able to wear a turban or kefiya, and his Jâlâbiyah robe throughout the facility and on outside visits. Plaintiff claims that the Sikhs are allowed to wear their turbans and other inmates are allowed to wear their jackets, throughout the facility.
First, the court would point out that plaintiff does not, and has never owned a turban. (Pl.‘s Dep. at 67). Plaintiff testified that he has a kefiya, and that a turban is “similar.” (Id. 65-66). Plaintiff also stated that “another inmate” told plaintiff that he was supposed to wear his head covering at all times, but he did not remember who that inmate was and whether the inmate had any religious training. (Id. at 62-63). Plaintiff also testified that, although he can wear his kefiya in his cell, he does not wear it all the time, and in fact, only wears it approximately 65 percent of the time. (Id. at 64). Sometimes he forgets to wear it, and he does not wear it when it is dirty. (Id. at 63). Plaintiff‘s robe is white and is knee length. (Id. at 112). Plaintiff testified that he does not wear the robe in his cell because he does not want the robe to get dirty, but he is
By his own testimony, plaintiff does not wear his kefiya or his robe at all times even when he is allowed to do so. Thus, it is questionable that any policy that restricts plaintiff‘s use of these items to his cell, religious services, and in the shower (for his kefiya) substantially burdens the exercise of plaintiff‘s religion because it is questionable that plaintiff sincerely believes that he must wear these items “all the time.” In any event, the court notes that DOCCS Directive No. 4202 was amended in July of 2014. The revised directive permits any male inmate, belonging to any faith group, to wear the type of turban that had previously been permitted only for Sikh males, apparently without limitation on the location.30 See Rossi v. Fischer, No. 13-CV-3167, 2014 WL 5778702, at *4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2014) (discussing the provisions contained in the revised directive). Thus, plaintiff‘s request for injunctive relief with
The court also notes that although plaintiff claims that he is dyslexic, there is absolutely no showing that he cannot read or that he would need books on tape for religious studies. In plaintiff‘s previous case in the Northern District of New York, Magistrate Judge Hummel recommended dismissing an ADA claim because plaintiff‘s 2006 test scores from the Test of Adult Basic Education (“TABE“) showed that plaintiff had an 8.7 grade reading level, indicating that he could read proficiently. Keitt v. Annetts, No. 9:10-CV-157, at 4, 13 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012) (Def.s’ Ex. B). Magistrate Judge Hummel concluded that a rational fact-finder would not find that plaintiff had an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. Id. Senior Judge McAvoy adopted the recommendation, and the Second Circuit dismissed plaintiff‘s appeal as frivolous. Keitt v. Annetts, No. 13-972 (2d Cir. Aug. 7, 2013).
Defendants ask this court to find that the dismissal of plaintiff‘s 2010 claim based upon dyslexia collaterally estops plaintiff from claiming in this action that defendants violated his religious rights and his rights under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act when they refused to “reasonably accommodate” plaintiff‘s dyslexia by giving him religious books on tape or other reading aids.31 Plaintiff argues that the defendants’ “serious misconduct” should prevent them from asserting collateral
Res judicata includes two concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel. Rivera v. City of New York, __ F. App‘x __, 2014 WL 5463320, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 2014). Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. The doctrine bars subsequent litigation if the earlier decision was (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) the previous action involved the plaintiff or those in privity with him, and (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been raised in the prior action. Id. (quoting Monahan v. New York City Dep‘t of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2000)). See also Ajamian v. Nimeh, No. 1:14-CV-320, 2014 WL 6078425, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2014) (citing EDP Med. Computer Sys., Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation omitted)). Under claim preclusion, even if the plaintiff‘s claims are based upon different legal theories, they are barred in the subsequent action, provided they arise from the same transaction or occurrence. Id. (citing LTec Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that once a court has actually and necessarily decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may
The issue of plaintiff‘s dyslexia was finally litigated in plaintiff‘s 2010 action. Although plaintiff claims that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, even a cursory reading of Magistrate Judge Hummel‘s Report-Recommendation refutes this allegation. Magistrate Judge Hummel reviewed plaintiff‘s pre-incarceration educational records, produced by plaintiff himself. (Def.s’ Ex. B at 3-4). When plaintiff was deposed in that action, he stated that he was dyslexic, not illiterate, and
In recommending that the court grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Magistrate Judge Hummel found that plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability. Although reading is considered a major life activity, plaintiff had failed to establish that his alleged impairments “limit his ability to hear, read, think, or communicate in a substantial manner.” (Id. at 12). Because plaintiff failed to establish the first prong of an ADA claim, the claim was dismissed. This issue was central to plaintiff‘s ADA claim, and there is no indication that plaintiff was prevented from litigating his claim. Thus, plaintiff cannot base another ADA claim on his alleged dyslexia. In any event, plaintiff was not prohibited from obtaining his own books on tape and was not prevented from attending religious worship because of his impairment.
Additionally, defendants have submitted defendant Ali‘s declaration, indicating that plaintiff arrived at Coxsackie on March 13, 2012, and that he was transferred out of that facility on July 9, 2013. (Ali Decl. ¶ 3). Defendant Ali alleges that approximately two weeks after plaintiff‘s arrival at Coxsackie, he filed a grievance against Dr. Ali, alleging that he failed to provide plaintiff with books on tape and failed to place him on call-out for religious services. (Ali Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. B). Dr. Ali claims that prior to April 12, 2013, plaintiff never requested such attendance. (Ali Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. C). With respect to the books-on-tape and “auxiliary” aids, Dr. Ali states that he never had any
VI. Miscellaneous Statutes and Claims
Plaintiff has listed a variety of statutes upon which he bases his claims. The court notes that lack of personal involvement is also fatal to a claim under
Plaintiff also cites
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
RECOMMENDED, that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 67) be GRANTED, and the complaint DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY, and it is
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff‘s cross-motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 73) be DENIED.
Pursuant to
Dated: January 8, 2015
Hon. Andrew T. Baxter
U.S. Magistrate Judge