ERNEST FRANCIS v. CORRECTION OFFICER BRIATICO ET AL.*
(AC 44192)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
August 2, 2022
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Palmer, Js.
* In thе summons and complaint, the three defendants are identified by title and last name only. Because the full names of two of the defendants are otherwise not apparent from the record, we refer to those defendants by title and last name only.
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Syllabus
The plaintiff, an inmate in a state correctional institution, sought, inter alia, to recover damages, pursuant to federal law (
Argued February 15—officially released August 2, 2022
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the alleged violation of the plaintiff‘s federal constitutional rights, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Wahla, J., granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Zenobia Graham-Days, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee (defendants).
Opinion
PALMER, J. The self-represented plaintiff, Ernest Francis, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Captain Bryan Viger,1
The record before the trial court reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On August 8, 2013, at 2:45 p.m., an electrical outlet in cell 142 of the housing unit at Cheshire known as North Block 1 malfunctioned and caught fire. Although the plaintiff‘s cell was located in North Block 1, the fire was not in his cell. As soon as they became аware of the fire, the two inmates assigned to that cell began banging on the cell door and yelling. Correction Officer Briatico responded immediately and called a “code red,” thereby bringing the incident to the attention of other officers and staff, including Captain Viger and Lieutenant Wilkens, who also responded. Fire extinguishers were used to put out the fire, which was limited to sparks and smoke coming out of an electrical outlet within one cell, and exhaust fans were deployed for ventilation purposes. The fire was quickly extinguished, and Viger cleared the code at approximately 2:48 p.m. The facility returned to normal operation at about 3 p.m.
Medical staff evaluated all inmates assigned to North Block 1, and the plaintiff was so assessed at 3:10 p.m. On the basis of that assessment, and because the plaintiff demonstrated no serious ill effects following a short period of observation, he returned to the unit.
At the time of the fire, there were ninety-two inmates in North Block 1. As occurs each day, there was a scheduled shift change of department staff at 2:45 p.m., marking the end of the first shift and the beginning of the second. In addition, a daily, facility wide headcount of inmates was scheduled to be conducted at 3 p.m. According to the sworn statement of Captain Viger, “[i]t would [have] compromise[d] safety and security to move [ninety-two] inmates outside of the facility in response to an electrical fire contained
Finally, in its memorandum of decision, the court summarized the plaintiff‘s sworn statement as follows. “The affidavit of the plaintiff . . . states in pertinent part that, on August 8, 2013, he was incarcerated at . . . Cheshire . . . in the North One Unit. There was a fire in the unit and the officers involved did not evacuate the unit. As a result, he suffered from smoke inhalation and to date he suffers from labored breathing. During the time that he was incarcerated at the subject facility, it was locked down one day each week for officer training. To the best of his knowledge this training was teaching the officers how to evacuate a unit in case of fire, and . . . officers have been trained to . . . leave the inmates in their cell in case of a fire and in transportation vehicles in case of accident. The plaintiff goes on to state that he now fear[s] being locked in a cell.”
In June, 2016, the plaintiff initiated this action against the defendants in their individual capacities, alleging, in one count, negligence and negligent supervision in connection with their handling of the electrical fire in cell 142 of North Block 1. The plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint to include a claim under
The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to both the plaintiff‘s state law negligence and § 1983 claims. Insofar as the latter is concerned,7 the court determined that Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1986), a case involving the alleged use of excessive force by prison officials seeking to quell a prisоn disturbance, sets forth the applicable standard, which, for purposes of proving an eighth amendment violation, requires evidence that prison authorities engaged in the allegedly culpable conduct “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 320-21. The trial court reasoned that this standard, rather than the less exacting “deliberate indifference” standard of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976), which is applicable generally to claims seeking redress under the eighth amendment for alleged inhumane conditions of confinement, applied to the plaintiff‘s claim because the defendants were responding to an apparent emergency situation. Concluding that the facts were insufficient to demonstrate the kind of malevolent intent required under Whitley, the court rendered summary judgment for the defendants.
On appeal, the plaintiff maintains that the court incorrectly determined that the standard adopted in Whitley is applicable to the present case. Rather, the plaintiff contends, the court should have applied the test articulated in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. 97, and its progеny, pursuant to which he would have been required to demonstrate that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety in connection with their response to the electrical fire. Id., 104. We need not decide which test is applicable to the present case because, as we explain more fully hereinafter, the plaintiff cannot prevail on his eighth amendment claim even under the less demanding “deliberate indifference” standard.
Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff‘s claim, we set forth the legal principles governing the trial court‘s decision granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and our standard of review. ”
With respect to the plaintiff‘s claim of a constitutional violation, it is well established that the eighth amendment protects inmates from cruel and unusual punishment by prison officials; see, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991); because, “when the [s]tate takes a person into its custody and holds him there аgainst his will, the [c]onstitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being. . . . The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the [s]tate by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual‘s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the [e]ighth [a]mendment . . . .” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989). In this prison context, however, punishment will be deemed cruel and unusual only upon a showing of “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. 103. To succeed on a claim founded on the eighth amendment, therefore, an inmate must allege and prove “two elements, one subjective and one objective“; Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015); namely, (1) a deprivation that is “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,‘” and (2) “a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind‘” on the part of the defendant officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994); see also Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, 288 Conn. 326, 338-39, 952 A.2d 764 (2008) (same).8
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hat is necessary to establish an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation. . . . For example, the appropriate inquiry when an inmate alleges that prison officials failed to attend to serious medical needs is whether the officials exhibited ‘deliberate indifference.’ See Estelle v. Gamble, [supra, 429 U.S. 104]. This standard is appropriate because the [s]tate‘s responsibility to provide inmates with medical care ordinаrily does not conflict with competing administrative concerns. Whitley [v. Albers, supra, 475 U.S. 320].
“By contrast, officials confronted with a prison disturbance must balance the threat unrest poses to inmates, prison workers, administrators, and visitors against the harm inmates may suffer if guards use force. Despite the weight of these competing concerns, corrections officials must make their decisions ‘in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance.’ [Id.] We accordingly concluded in Whitley that application of the deliberate indifference standard is inappropriate when authorities use force to put down a prison disturbance. Instead, ‘the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on “whether force was applied in a good faith
As noted previously in this opinion, the court applied the heightened Whitley standard to the plaintiff‘s claim and concluded that he could not meet that exceedingly rigorous test under the circumstances presented because there is no evidence that, once the defendants learned of the electrical fire, they decided not to evacuate the plaintiff in bad faith and with the sole purpose of causing him harm. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court should have used the “deliberate indifference” standard, the application of which, he further maintains, would give rise to a triable issue for determination by the fact finder. Although the defendants make a strong argument that the court was correct in concluding that the Whitley standard, rather than the “deliberate indifferenсe” standard set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. 104, is applicable under the emergent circumstances of this case, we need not decide which test applies because it is apparent that the plaintiff cannot surmount even the lesser hurdle erected under the “deliberate indifference” standard.9
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Farmer v. Brennan, supra, 511 U.S. 835, for eighth amendment purposes, “deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence” but “is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” In other words, “delibеrate indifference [lies] somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other . . . .” Id., 836. Clarifying the meaning of “deliberate indifference,” the court in Farmer equated it with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law“; id., 839; and explained that, pursuant to such a standard, “a prison official cannot be found liable under the [e]ighth [a]mendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id., 837. Thus, “an official‘s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not . . . [does not violate the eighth amendment].” Id., 838. Indeed, “[b]ecause . . . prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment, it remains open to the officials to prove that they were unaware even of
Moreover, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted. A prison official‘s duty under the [e]ighth [a]mendment is to ensure reasonable safety . . . a standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials’ unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions . . . . Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the [eighth amendment].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 844-45. Finally, as is apparent from this explication of the “deliberate indifferеnce” test, it is itself a “stringent standard of fault.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 288 Conn. 339.
Applying this standard to the present case, we conclude that it is abundantly clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail because the facts, even viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, simply do not support a finding that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference merely because they did not evacuate him following the electrical fire. The defendants responded immediately to the fire, which did not occur in the plaintiff‘s cell and was confined to the one cell in which it did occur, and it was extinguished within three minutes of when the inmates occupying that cell saw and reported it. Even though smoke from the fire spread throughout the plaintiff‘s unit and into his cell, the plaintiff was afforded medical attention minutes after the fire was brought under control. Although it is regrettable that the plaintiff and others suffered smoke inhalation, the plaintiff was evaluated by medical staff, and his cell block was returned to normal, very shortly after the fire was extinguished. Considering the extremely limited duratiоn of the incident and the swift amelioration of any harm that possibly could have resulted from it, there simply was no need for the defendants to evacuate the plaintiff or any other inmates residing in his unit. The decision not to evacuate the affected or potentially affected inmates is all the more justifiable in light of the fact that there were ninety-two inmates in that unit, and staff was beginning a shift change at the very moment the fire was discovered. In such circumstances, we will not second-guess the reasoned judgment of the defendants that inmate security and safety would be best served by the approach they took. Cf. Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 315 Conn. 231, 248, 106 A.3d 266 (2014) (“The judgment of prison officials . . . like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior . . . . It therefore is not the role of this court to second-guess that decision, especially when, as in the present case, there is ample reason, based on the undisputed evidence, to support it.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).
In sum, there is nothing in the rеcord to suggest that the defendants, aware of a significant risk of harm to the plaintiff, ignored that risk in determining that evacuation was unnecessary. On the contrary, the facts establish the opposite: the defendants acted quickly, reasonably and with
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.