FAIRLAND ASSOCIATION OF CLASSROOM TEACHERS, OEA/NEA, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. FAIRLAND LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Case No. 15CA23
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY
Released: 05/01/17
[Cite as Fairland Assn. of Classroom Teachers v. Fairland Local Bd. of Edn., 2017-Ohio-1098.]
McFarland, J.
NUNC PRO TUNC DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY1
Susan Hayest Kozlowski, William J. Steele, and Lora A. Molnar, Cloppert, Latanick, Sauter & Washburn, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants.
Susan L. Oppenheimer and Sue W. Yount, Bricker & Eckler LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
McFarland, J.
{¶1} Fairland Association of Classroom Teachers, OEA/NEA, and John McClung (McClung), collectively the Appellants, appeal the judgment entry entered November 9, 2015 in the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas. In the first assignment of error, Appellants contend the trial court erred by upholding the magistrate‘s decision that granted Appellee Fairland Local School District1
FACTS
{¶2} Appellants brought suit against Appellee on March 9, 2015, alleging the Fairland Local School District Board of Education (Board) had breached its Master Agreement (Agreement) and sought a declaratory judgment declaring the rights of McClung under the agreement. McClung was employed as a teacher and athletic director at Fairland High School during 2013-2014. The agreement governing the parties was in effect from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2015.
{¶3} Appellants alleged in the complaint that McClung, who was issued a supplemental contract for his position as athletic director during 2013 and 2014, was not timely notified of the Board‘s decision to non-renew his supplemental contract. Article 32, Section 32.1 of the agreement provides:
“All bargaining unit members granted additional compensation for supplemental duties shall be issued a written contract for such duties.
Such supplemental contracts shall be issued in addition to their regular contracts. The Board must notify bargaining unit members to April 30th in the year the supplemental contract is to expire of its intent to non-renew such supplemental contract.”
The provision required that McClung be notified by April 30, 2014. McClung was notified of the nonrenewal on or about May 5, 2014 by a hand-delivered letter from the board treasurer, Loretta Wirzfield, dated May 5, 2014.
{¶4} McClung timely filed a grievance with Appellee. A written decision denying the grievance was prepared and delivered on or about June 13, 2014. In the complaint, Appellants further allege that Appellee breached the agreement by failing to follow Article 4, Section 4.05(3)(d), Grievance Procedure-Formal, Level III, Local Board Hearing, which provides as follows:
“Within five (5) days of the meeting, the President of the Local Board shall provide the aggrieved with a written response, stating the position of the Board and suggestion for resolution of the grievance.”
The grievance denial decision was provided to McClung, again, by the treasurer and not by the board president.
{¶5} Appellants demanded a finding that Appellee was in breach of the agreement as well as an order that McClung be awarded the supplemental contract and be provided with back pay and benefits as necessary to make him whole. Appellants further demanded a declaration that Appellee must abide by the referenced articles of the agreement.
{¶6} Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to
{¶7} On July 8, 2015, Appellants filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision. The matter came on for a hearing on the objections on October 28, 2015. On November 9, 2015, the trial court found that the objections were untimely and further that Appellants had failed to request findings of fact and conclusions of law. As such, the trial court upheld the magistrate‘s decision to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and entered judgment in favor of the Appellee. This timely appeal followed.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
“I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED IT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ BREACH OF CONTRACT AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO CONSIDER OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION WHEN THE DECISION DID NOT COMPLY WITH OHIO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53.”
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶8} Because Appellants’ first and second assignments of error are
{¶9} We begin, however, with a brief discussion of Appellants’ second assignment of error, wherein it is argued that the trial court erred by failing to consider Appellants’ objections to the magistrate‘s decision when the decision did not comply with
{¶10} Notwithstanding, subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case; it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time. In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588, 997 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 77, citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781 (2002); State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). Because of this principle, the parties’ arguments under the second assignment of error are rendered moot and we decline to consider them. We proceed to consider whether the finding that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction was correct in the case herein.
B. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶11} Appellants’ complaint for breach of contract and declaratory judgment alleges two breaches of the terms of the agreement governing the parties.
{¶12} SERB is a state agency created by
{¶13} Consistent with the general rule that agencies created by statute have such jurisdiction as the General Assembly confers, SERB “has exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it pursuant to
{¶14} In Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn., an association and certain employees filed a complaint alleging three claims that asserted collective bargaining rights created by
“Although union members can have common-law contractual rights that exist independently of
R.C. Chapter 4117 , we note that plaintiffs did not specify the FOP constitutional provision that was allegedly violated. It appears that they referred to the FOP constitution only to the extent that they contendedR.C. 4117.19(C)(4) imposed a duty on the FOP to provide in its constitution for ‘the right of individual members to participate in the affairs of the organization * * *.’ In other words, as pleaded, plaintiffs’ claim under the FOP constitution was inextricably intertwined with rights purportedly created and imposed byR.C. Chapter 4117 . Because plaintiffs’ claims were dependent on the framework established inR.C. Chapter 4117 , plaintiffs were limited to the remedies and procedures provided in that chapter and the common pleas court was without jurisdiction.” Id. at 171.
{¶16} Several other Ohio Supreme Court and appellate court decisions provide guidance. In State ex rel. Cleveland v. Sutula, 127 Ohio St.3d 131, 2010-Ohio-5039, 937 N.E.2d 88, a union certified by SERB as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit composed of a group of city employees filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the city of Cleveland‘s duty to perform in accordance with its prestrike settlement offer, following two years of failed negotiations pursuant to
{¶17} The central question in Sutula was whether the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the union‘s action for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at ¶ 13-14. The Supreme Court of Ohio began by setting forth the dispositive test, “whether the claims ‘arise from or depend on the collective bargaining rights created by
{¶18} The Supreme Court also pointed out the union‘s common pleas court case alleged conduct that constituted unfair labor practices under
{¶20} Lastly, the Sutula opinion held the common pleas court‘s basic statutory jurisdiction over actions for declaratory judgment, specific performance, injunction, and damages did not vest that court with jurisdiction over the union‘s
{¶21} More recently, in State ex rel. OCSEA, supra, a union representing Ohio‘s public employees filed an action against multiple governmental defendants. The union also asserted an alternative declaratory judgment claim to determine whether employees at a correctional institution were public employees and entitled to corresponding public-employee benefits. The dispositive question in OCSEA was whether the claim that individuals employed at North Central Correctional Complex were “public employees” under
{¶22} However, OCSEA emphasized that the Sutula decision does not expand the scope of SERB‘s jurisdiction beyond the matters conferred on it by
“To be clear, we do not suggest that SERB has exclusive, original jurisdiction over every claim touching upon
R.C. Chapter 4117 . Nor do we undertake to define the circumstances in which a common pleas court might have jurisdiction over claims touching uponR.C. Chapter 4117 . Those questions are beyond the scope of OCSEA‘s claim, as pled in its amended complaint, and they simply are not before us at this time. We merely reiterate that “if a party asserts claims that arise from or depend on the collective bargaining rights created byR.C. Chapter 4117 , the remedies provided in that chapter are exclusive.” Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Applying that rule here, we conclude that jurisdiction over OCSEA‘s claim regardingR.C. 4117.01(C) lies exclusively with SERB.”
{¶23} In this case, both parties have directed our attention to Carter v. Trotwood–Madison City Bd. of Edn., 181 Ohio App. 3d 764, 2009-Ohio-1769, 910 N.E.2d 1088 (2nd Dist.). In Carter, retired teachers Carter and Toney sued the city education board for breach of contract, challenging denial of their requests for retirement incentives pursuant to collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The
“Under Ohio law, are the breach of contract claims preempted by
R.C. Chapter 4117 when Carter and Toney did not satisfy the statutory definition of ‘public employees’ at the time that their cause of action accrued?” Id. at 49.
{¶24} Carter and Toney argued that they did not satisfy the statutory definition of “public employee” when their causes of action accrued. Accordingly, they contended that the trial court erred in concluding that
{¶25} The Carter opinion went on to recognize that in E. Cleveland v. E. Cleveland Firefighters Local 500, I.A.F.F., 70 Ohio St.3d 125, 637 N.E.2d 878 (1994), the Ohio Supreme Court cautioned against applying the concept of an “arguable” unfair labor practice too broadly. Id. at 127-128, 637 N.E.2d 878. Carter at ¶ 62.6 Furthermore, the Carter opinion observed that the decision in E.
{¶26} The Carter court reasoned that “[t]he rights being asserted would not exist without the CBA and
General Assembly‘s vesting of SERB with exclusive jurisdiction to determine unfair labor practices defined in
{¶27} Considering the above case law, we find that SERB had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims raised in Appellants’ complaint. We find the reasoning set forth by the Second District in Carter, although not controlling, to be persuasive. It is true that the OCSEA decision emphasized at ¶ 54 that the principles announced in Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. are “not so broad as to place all claims that touch on
{¶28} For example, in E. Cleveland Firefighters, the city filed an application with the court of common pleas to vacate or modify the arbitration award, but the trial court denied the application and upheld the arbitrator‘s decision. In the E. Cleveland decision, the court at the appellate level found that the trial court and thus, the arbitrator, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to settle the grievance. The Eighth District Court of Appeals relied on several cases, Gunn v. Euclid City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 51 Ohio App.3d 41, 554 N.E.2d 130 (8th Dist. 1988), and State ex rel. Ramsdell v. Washington Local School Bd., 52 Ohio App.3d 4, 556 N.E.2d 197 (1982), for the proposition that SERB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide not only any unfair labor practice charge brought before it, but any conduct or grievance which arguably constitutes an unfair labor practice.
{¶29} In E. Cleveland, the Supreme Court of Ohio, citing Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn, supra, recognized SERB‘s exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity, or lack thereof, of unfair labor practices. However, the High Court pointed out that to find only SERB has jurisdiction to hear or determine anything that “arguably” constitutes an unfair labor practice is neither a complete nor totally correct statement of the law set forth in
“An agreement between a public employer and an exclusive representative entered into pursuant to
Chapter 4117 of the Revised Code governs the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of public employment covered by the agreement. If the agreement provides fora final and binding arbitration of grievances, public employers, employees, and employee organizations are subject solely to that grievance procedure * * *.”
{¶30} The Supreme Court explained:
“Carrying the appellate court‘s decision to its logical extreme, every grievance filed by an aggrieved party to a collective bargaining agreement could, as mentioned before, arguably be characterized as an unfair labor practice. Under such a standard, SERB would be forced to decide every grievance arising out of disputes related to the interpretation of terms to a collective bargaining agreement, no matter how innocuous they may be, and notwithstanding any binding arbitration process established in the agreement entered into by the parties thereto. (Emphasis added.) Since the court of appeals misconstrued the law in this context, its decision cannot stand.”
Our case is easily distinguished from the facts presented in E. Cleveland Firefighters, where it appears appellants attempted to circumvent a binding arbitration process made part of the collective bargaining agreement.
{¶31} Likewise, in Fischer v. Kent State Univ., 2015-Ohio-3569, 41 N.E.3d 840 (10th Dist.), ¶ 20, the language that “Additionally, pursuant to
“Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Fischer, his claims are predicated on allegedly wrongful conduct that is directly related to the terms and conditions of his employment, and such claims are dependent on an analysis or interpretation of the CBA. Accordingly, those claims are preempted by the CBA, and the trial court was without jurisdiction. Even if Fischer had asserted rights that were independent of
R.C. 4117 , jurisdiction would not be proper in the Court of Claims.”
{¶32} Our case is also distinguishable from Fischer in that the appellate court in Fischer was not called to rule upon the validity of Fischer‘s claims, nor does the case herein present the situation in which Appellants have filed in the Ohio Court of Claims. And, State ex rel. Union Twp. v. Union Twp. Professional Firefighters, IAFF Loc. 3412, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-09-067, 2013-Ohio-1611, also cited as supporting the subject-matter jurisdiction of the common pleas court, is inapposite. The only issue before the trial court was whether Union Township was entitled to mandamus to compel IAFF Local 3412 to sign a collective-bargaining agreement as a result of the conciliation process. There, pursuant to
{¶34} In 2006, the bus drivers traveled to Las Vegas, Nevada, for a bicycle conference but reported to their employer that some or all of their time off was for sick leave. Both drivers were criminally charged with theft in office. Ultimately, both pleaded guilty and no contest to falsification of records charges. One appellant was terminated and the other resigned.
{¶35} The drivers filed a complaint against the school board for abuse of process, negligent supervision, invasion of privacy, intentional tort, and a Public Records Act violation. The school board filed a motion to dismiss arguing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and governmental immunity. Even though the bus drivers opposed the appellee‘s motion, in their brief in opposition the drivers clearly stated several times that the facts of their complaint revolved around the issues of “wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment.” The appellants made the additional
{¶36} In the sole assignment of error, the bus drivers argued that the causes of action in their complaint against the school board were not governed by the CBA; therefore, the trial court should not have granted the appellee‘s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court disagreed, holding:
“The CBA by which these parties are governed sets forth the policies and procedures for the regulation of absences and pay as well as for discipline. Subsections 9.1 through 9.6 of the CBA cover sick leave generally, acceptable use of sick leave, documentation of sick leave, and accumulation of sick leave; subsection 6.9 covers disciplinary procedures. Id. at 14. Prior to filing the underlying action in the common pleas court, appellants filed a grievance, and the union agreed to represent them. Once the union learned that appellants had entered pleas to falsification of records * * * the union withdrew its representation. Appellants then withdrew their grievance. By filing a grievance originally, however, they acknowledged that the terms of the CBA govern their issues with appellee regarding their sick leave pay and terminations. Id. at 15.”
{¶37} While it is true the agreement herein does not provide for final and binding arbitration, and Provision 13 of the agreement contains language which does not limit the ability of the association members to raise a claim of breach of the agreement under
- Failure to notify McClung of the non-renewal of his supplemental contract by April 30th, as required by Art. 32, Sec. 32.1 of the agreement; and,
- Provision of notice to McClung of the grievance decision by the board treasurer and not by board president, as required by Art. 4, Sec. 405(3)(d) of the agreement.
{¶38} Here, as in Bringheli, the parties are governed by the policies and procedures set forth in the agreement. Article 32 covers supplemental contracts and the procedure for notification of non-renewal. Article 4 covers procedures for the grievance process, including notification of the grievance decision. All matters pertaining to wages, hours, or terms and other conditions of employment are subject to collective bargaining.
{¶39} Furthermore, McClung sought resolution through the grievance process, thereby acknowledging the terms of the agreement governed the issues with Appellee. As in Bringheli, we do not find merely because the Appellants filed a civil complaint in the common pleas court that they have
{¶40} For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court did not err by upholding the magistrate‘s decision which granted Appellee‘s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As such, we overrule both of the assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the Appellee recover of Appellants any costs herein.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Hoover, J.: Dissents.
For the Court,
BY: _______________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.