State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. BlackwellState ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell
Lead Opinion
(¶ 1} This is an expedited election case in mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to perform certain acts allegedly required by Ohio’s Campaign Finance Law. Because we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to determine in an original
{¶ 2} On September 7, 2006, relator, Ohio Democratic Party, filed this action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, Ohio Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell, to (1) “inform Common Sense 2006 that its electioneering communication disclosure statements are inaccurate and incomplete, due to their failure, inter alia, to disclose the identities of Common Sense Ohio’s contributors” and (2) “require Common Sense Ohio and Common Sense 2006 to timely file a complete and accurate supplemental or amended electioneering communication disclosure statement disclosing all information required by law (pursuant to
{¶ 3} Relator claims that the Secretary failed to order Common Sense 2006, an electioneering-communications entity, to comply with
{¶ 4} On September 12, 2006, we stayed discovery and the filing of merit briefs and evidence pursuant to S.CtPrac.R. X(9) and ordered the parties to brief the following jurisdictional issue:
{¶ 5} “Does the court have jurisdiction in this expedited election case to issue a writ of mandamus in light of the fact that the Ohio Elections Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over acts and failures to act underR.C. 3517.151 and 3517.153? See State ex rel. Taft-O’Connor ’98 v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1998),83 Ohio St.3d 487 ,700 N.E.2d 1232 .”111 Ohio St.3d 1201 ,2006-Ohio-4703 ,854 N.E.2d 1081 .
{¶ 6} In accordance with our order, the parties filed briefs on this issue on September 19 and 22.
{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the jurisdictional question.
Jurisdiction, In General
{¶ 8} “ ‘Jurisdiction’ means ‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’ ” Pratts v. Hurley,
Jurisdiction Over Acts or Failures to Act Under
{¶ 9} Relator’s mandamus claim is premised on its allegations that Common Sense Ohio and Common Sense 2006 are so interrelated that they constitute the same entity and that they thus violated
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} Relator complains about the following alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 3517: (1) Common Sense 2006 violated
{¶ 12} These claimed violations of the electioneering-communications-disclosure-statement provisions of
{¶ 13} In construing these statutory provisions, the court’s paramount concern is legislative intent. State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted,
{¶ 14} Relator asserts that under these provisions, it could not file a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission against the Secretary because the commission’s jurisdiction is restricted to complaints against persons and entities who must comply with the election laws, not the public officials who must enforce the election laws.
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} Had the General Assembly intended to authorize other tribunals or courts to exercise the initial jurisdiction to consider “acts or failures to act under” the specified sections of R.C. Chapter 3517, it would have so provided, but it did not. Instead, the General Assembly employed broad, sweeping language to confer the exclusive, initial jurisdiction to consider these alleged violations on the Ohio Elections Commission. Jurisdiction is conferred on courts in these matters only after the commission has rendered a final determination.
Taft-O’Connor ’98
{¶ 17} This result is supported by precedent. In State ex rel. Taft-O’Connor ’98 v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1998),
{¶ 18} We granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the Ohio Elections Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims raised in the common pleas court case because of
{¶ 19} “Relator contends, among other things, that Judge Connor had no jurisdiction to enter the restraining order in Friends of Fisher and has no jurisdiction to take any other action in that matter because the Ohio Elections Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims raised in that litigation. We agree.
{¶20} “The Ohio Elections Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims of fraudulent and false statements raised by Friends of Fisher in the underlying action.R.C. 3517.151(A) expressly provides that ‘complaints with respect to acts or failures to act under the sections listed in division A ofsection 3517.153 of the Revised Code shall be filed with the Ohio elections commission * * *.’ (Emphasis added.)R.C. 3517.153(A) provides for filing a complaint with the commission for violations ofR.C. 3517.08 to 3517.13, 3517.17, 3517.18, 3517.20 to 3517.22, 3599.03, or 3599.031.R.C. 3517.21(B)(10) forbids persons, during any campaign for nomination or election to public office, by means of television advertisement, to knowingly and with intent to affect the outcome of the campaign ‘[p]ost, publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate a false statement concerning a candidate, either knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not, if the statement is designed to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.’ ”
{¶ 21} “Additionally, actions for declaratory judgment and injunction are generally considered to be inappropriate where, as here, special statutory proceedings would be bypassed. See, generally, State ex rel. Albright v. Delaware Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1991),60 Ohio St.3d 40 , 42,572 N.E.2d 1387 , 1389. By filing a declaratory judgment and injunction action in the common pleas court, plaintiff in Friends of Fisher bypassed the mandatory statutory procedure provided by R.C. Chapter 3517 for the filing of complaints with the OhioElections Commission. Thus, in Friends of Fisher, the respondents had no jurisdiction to resolve matters committed to special statutory proceedings, the lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, and an extraordinary writ will therefore issue.” Id. at 488-489, 700 N.E.2d 1232 .
{¶ 22} Subsequently, in State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker (1999),
{¶ 23} Here, as in Taft-O’Connor ’98, the Ohio Elections Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims raised concerning the electioneering-communications-disclosure-statement provisions of
Constitutional Jurisdiction in Mandamus
{¶ 24} Relator asserts that even if
{¶ 25} “Under Section 2(B)(1)(b), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, the Supreme Court of Ohio has original jurisdiction in mandamus actions, and pursuant to Section 2(B)(3), Article IV, ‘[n]o law shall be passed or rule made whereby any person shall be prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.’ ” State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2000),
{¶ 26} Relator relies on Section 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967),
{¶ 27} First, Section 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution is inapplicable. Section 2(B)(3) precludes any law or rule from preventing any person “from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.” “Prior to 1913, the Supreme Court had the discretion to decline to exercise its original jurisdiction
{¶ 28} Under this rule, “an action in mandamus could not be filed originally in this court without the court’s permission, for the reason that ‘it can more speedily and conveniently be heard in the District Court.’ ” State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967),
{¶ 29} The sentence now contained in Section 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution was proposed by the 1912 Constitutional Convention and was adopted by the Ohio electorate, effective January 1, 1913. Pressley,
{¶ 30} “The supreme court has very little original jurisdiction. It is fair to assume that the purpose in giving the supreme court this original jurisdiction was for the benefit of the litigant and not for the benefit of the court. The supreme court has been laboring with congested dockets and for a number of years has required anyone seeking to invade the jurisdiction to first get the consent of the court to file his appeal. The result has been in quo warranto and mandamus and other cases in which original jurisdiction is invoked, the court has required suitors to go to the circuit court. One result has been that in many cases brought by the attorney general he has been required to go to the circuit court of Franklin county. This has, therefore, added largely to the work of this circuit, and after all it has not put on the supreme court any considerable amount of work because cases of that kind generally wind up in the court of final resort. We have taken from the supreme court one-half or more of all its jurisdiction when we have secured a ratification of the Peck proposal, and that being so there is no longer any reason why the supreme court cannot exercise the jurisdictionconferred upon it by this amendment to the constitution.” (Emphasis added.) 2 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention (1912) 1831.
{¶ 31} “From this it would appear that the purpose of the amendment was to end the procedural discretion then being exercised by the supreme court.” Note, Constitutional Law — Refusal to Take Jurisdiction on a Writ of Mandamus (1954), 15 Ohio St.L.J. 474, 476. Consistent with this purpose, we held that our previous practice was invalid because the constitutional amendment to Section 2, Article IV “will not permit this court either to adopt or adhere to a rule which requires permission to invoke the exercise of its original jurisdiction.” Toledo,87 Ohio St. at 449 ,101 N.E. 352 .
{¶ 32} This case, however, has nothing to do with a rule by which this court may refuse to consider an otherwise viable original action in mandamus. It also does not involve a statute authorizing this discretion. Therefore, the purpose of Section 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution is not contravened by vesting exclusive original jurisdiction over claims related to certain election provisions in the Ohio Elections Commission.
{¶ 33} Second, Pressley is similarly distinguishable. In that case, the court merely held that pursuant to Toledo,
{¶ 34} Third, Wilke does not support relator’s contention. The statute that we noted was constitutionally invalid under Sections 2(B)(1)(b) and 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution in Wilke recognized the right of a probate judge who disagreed with the amount appropriated for the court by the county board of commissioners to file a mandamus action, but improperly limited that right to a mandamus action in the court of appeals. See
{¶ 35} Therefore, nothing in Sections 2(B)(1) and 2(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and cases like Wilke and Pressley construing those provisions justifies holding that this court retains jurisdiction over the claimed violations of
Exclusive Jurisdiction Prevents Judicial Intervention
{¶ 36} At the time the pertinent provisions of
{¶ 37} “ ‘If the General Assembly has provided a remedy for the enforcement of a specific new right, a court may not on its own initiative apply another remedy it deems appropriate.’ ” Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991),
{¶ 38} More pertinently, we have held that courts that have general constitutional jurisdiction in mandamus, e.g., courts of appeals — see Section 3(B)(1)(b), Article IV, Ohio Constitution — patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over mandamus claims concerning matters that are vested in the exclusive, original jurisdiction of another tribunal. See, e.g., State ex rel. Geauga Cty. Budget Comm. v. Court of Appeals for Geauga Cty. (1982),
{¶ 39} Similarly, we lack jurisdiction to consider relator’s claims alleging violations of campaign-finance law that are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the elections commission.
True Objective — Adequate Remedy
{¶ 40} Relator argues that we should exercise jurisdiction over its mandamus claim because relief through the complaint procedure in the elections commission would be inadequate. Mandamus is not available where there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
{¶ 41} Relator’s contention fails because of our manifest lack of jurisdiction due to the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the elections commission. See Geauga Cty. Budget Comm., 1 Ohio St.3d at 113, 1 OBR 143,
{¶ 42} Moreover, it is evident that the true objective of relator’s mandamus action is to obtain disclosure of the Common Sense Ohio contributors’ identities. See State ex rel. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Am. v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp.,
{¶ 43} Relator requests the writ to compel the Secretary to inform Common Sense 2006 that its electioneering-communications disclosure statement is inaccu
{¶ 44} It is readily apparent from their motion to quash subpoenas filed in this case that even if we were to order the requested writ to compel the Secretary to order them to file a corrected statement, Common Sense 2006 and Common Sense Ohio would not disclose the donors’ names because of their claim that
{¶ 45} As relator itself acknowledges, if Common Sense Ohio and Common Sense 2006 refuse the Secretary’s order for them to file a complete electioneering-communications disclosure statement, the Secretary would then have a duty to file a complaint against these entities in the elections commission.
{¶ 46} Under these circumstances, the requested writ would place relator in no better position than it would have been in had it simply filed a complaint against Common Sense Ohio and Common Sense 2006 with the elections commission itself pursuant to
{¶ 47} Therefore, assuming disclosure of contributor names is indeed relator’s ultimate goal, its mandamus claim is not appropriate because issuance of the writ will not achieve that goal. It is well established that “ ‘[mjandamus will not issue to compel a vain act.’ ” State ex rel. Oberlin Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Talarico,
{¶ 48} Because the General Assembly has vested the exclusive, original jurisdiction over complaints concerning acts or failures to act under
{¶ 49} This decision does not limit or otherwise affect this court’s general constitutional and statutory jurisdiction in mandamus. We simply hold that, based on the plain and unambiguous language of
(¶ 50} We refrain from addressing the merits of relator’s claim in accordance with the court’s general rule that “ ‘we will not issue advisory opinions, [a rule that] applies equally to election cases.’ ” State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell,
Cause dismissed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 51} I dissent from the majority’s determination that the complaint in this mandamus case must be dismissed. Rather, the Ohio Elections Commission does
{¶ 52} A majority of this court in State ex rel. Taft-O’Connor ’98 v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1998),
{¶ 53} In Taft-O’Connor ’98, this court issued a writ of prohibition to prevent a trial court judge from entertaining an action for declaratory judgment and injunction when the subject of the complaint filed in the trial court involved the content of a certain political television commercial. The specific action that was filed in the trial court was based on the allegation that the television ad was false and fraudulent. In granting the writ of prohibition, this court determined that under the circumstances, the allegation was so manifestly appropriate for determination by the Ohio Elections Commission that the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider it.
{¶ 54} This case, in contrast, does not involve any allegations regarding the truthfulness or falsity of a campaign ad. This case seeks to compel the Secretary of State to perform his statutory duties regarding the alleged failure to disclose the identity of contributors. Although the Ohio Elections Commission may be a possible alternative venue in which relator may seek relief, that body does not have exclusive, original jurisdiction over the allegations raised in the complaint before this court in this situation, for two main reasons.
{¶ 55} Unlike the majority, I would first hold that the statutory scheme within R.C. Chapter 3517 does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the elections commission to adjudicate relator’s complaint. For that reason, I would proceed to reach a second conclusion, which is that under these facts, the potential remedy available through the elections commission would not be an adequate one. Consequently, this court should retain jurisdiction over this case.
{¶ 56} Nothing in the statutory scheme involving the elections commission expressly indicates that the elections commission has exclusive jurisdiction to handle all election complaints. See Taft-O’Connor ’98,
{¶ 57} In order for a writ of mandamus to issue, three criteria must be met. The relator must establish a clear legal right to the relief requested, there must be a corresponding clear legal duty on the respondent to take the action sought by the relator, and the relator must not have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See State ex rel Union Cty. Veterans Serv. Comm. v. Parrott,
{¶ 58} For a particular remedy to be adequate, it must be “complete, beneficial, and speedy.” State ex rel. Arnett v. Winemiller (1997),
{¶ 59} “[T]he elections commission is in many circumstances unable to provide a meaningful remedy to a candidate who suffers substantial, irreparable injury as the result of election law violations, especially when the injury occurs close to the election date. * * *
{¶ 60} “ * * * [W]hen certain, substantial, and irreparable harm is imminent as the result of an election law violation, that jurisdiction may not provide a constitutionally adequate remedy.” Taft-O’Connor ’98,
{¶ 61} In the 2000 election season, the group Citizens for a Strong Ohio ran questionable ads seeking to influence the results of the election and refused to reveal the identity of its donors. Complaints against the group were filed with the Ohio Elections Commission, but the group was able to extend the process of resolving the complaints for years through various maneuvers, including filing appeals. In Ohio Elections Comm. v. Ohio Chamber of Commerce & Citizens for a Strong Ohio,
{¶ 62} If anything was definitively established by that experience, it was that the Ohio Elections Commission is absolutely unable to provide speedy and
{¶ 63} For all the foregoing reasons, I would not dismiss the cause, but would retain jurisdiction over relator’s mandamus claim. Further, I would deny the pending motions to quash, would deny respondent’s recent motion to remove this case from the expedited-elections calendar, and would set a schedule for the submission of briefs and evidence.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 64} I write separately in dissent to state my view that the Ohio Democratic Party has properly filed its mandamus action in this court. Section 2(B)(1)(b), Article TV of the Ohio Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in mandamus actions, and Section 2(B)(3), Article IV specifies that “[n]o law shall be passed or rule made whereby any person shall be prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.”
{¶ 65} To obtain a writ of mandamus, a party is required to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief requested, a clear legal duty on the part of the governmental actor requested to perform the acts, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. See State ex rel. Smith v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas,
{¶ 66} Accordingly, I would afford the parties an opportunity to brief the issues before the court and consider the matter on its merits. Therefore, I dissent.