THE STATE EX REL. BANC ONE CORPORATION ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WALKER, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 99-168
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
July 28, 1999
86 Ohio St.3d 169 | 1999-Ohio-151
Submitted June 22, 1999 — APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County, No. E-97-092.
{¶ 1} Appellee Donald A. Sibbring is an independent insurance agent who conducts business through appellee Data Analysis Services Company (“DASCO“), a company he owns and operates. In 1979, representatives of appеllants Banc One Corporation and Banc One Ohio Corporation1 (collectively referred to as “Banc One“) engaged in negotiations with Sibbring concerning his potential appointment as agent of record for Banс One‘s collateral protection insurance (“CPI“) program. CPI is a type of insurance purchased by a lender to protect its interest in collateral in case a borrower breaches an agreement to maintаin required insurance on the collateral, e.g., an automobile purchased with loan proceeds. When a borrower breaches an agreement to purchase the required insurance on the collateral, the
{¶ 2} From 1980 to 1984, Sibbring acted as agent of record for various Banc One affiliates and procured their CPI. In mid-1984, Banc One canceled its аgency agreement with Sibbring, and, effective November 1984, placed its entire CPI program with Transamerica Premier Insurance Company, the corporate predecessor to appellant TIG Premier Insurance Company (“TIG“). Transamerica Premier Insurance Services, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary or affiliate of these entities. Transamerica Premier Insurance Company and Transamerica Premier Insurance Services, Inc. are collectively referred to as “Transamerica” in this opinion.
{¶ 3} In 1994, Sibbring and DASCO filed a complaint in the Erie County Common Pleas Court against Banc One, Transamerica, and TIG. Sibbring and DASCO claimed that Transamerica and TIG tortiously interfered with Sibbring and DASCO‘s contractual relationship with Banc One; that the combined efforts of Banc One, Transamerica, and TIG violated the Valentine Act,
{¶ 4} In August 1997, Banc One аnd TIG filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Erie County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Walker from proceeding in the underlying action or, alternatively, for writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering Judge Walker to transfer thе underlying case from Erie County
{¶ 5} This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right by Banc One and TIG.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., David S. Cupps and Anthony J. O‘Malley, for appellant Banc One et al.
Flynn, Py & Kruse, L.P.A., William Charles Steuk and Wm. R.S. Steuk, for appellant TIG.
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gary A. Lickfelt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Judge Robert D. Walker.
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., John T. Murray and Sylvia M. Antalis, for appellees Sibbring and DASCO.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 6} Aрpellants assert that the court of appeals erred in denying the writs. Based on the following, we find that appellants’ claims are meritless and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Prohibition; Primary Jurisdiction; Exclusive Jurisdiction
{¶ 7} Appellants first claim that they arе entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Walker from proceeding in the underlying action. Although it is evident that Judge Walker and the common pleas court have basic statutory jurisdiction over the claims in Sibbring and DASCO‘s civil action pursuant to
{¶ 8} The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally сognizable in a court and enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues that have been placed within the special expertise of an administrative body. United States v. Western Pacific RR. Co. (1956), 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 165, 1 L.Ed.2d 126, 132; United States v. Haun (C.A.6, 1997), 124 F.3d 745, 749. Under this doctrine, the judicial process is suspendеd pending referral of the issues to the administrative body for its views. Id.
{¶ 9} Contrary to appellants’ contentions, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not divest a court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Reiter v. Cooper (1993), 507 U.S. 258, 268-269, 113 S.Ct. 1213, 1220, 122 L.Ed.2d 604, 617-618. In Reiter, 507 U.S. at 268, 113 S.Ct. at 1220, 122 L.Ed.2d at 617, the United States Supreme Court rеjected a claim that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required dismissal of a court action where petitioners did not initially present their unreasonable-tariff-rate claims to the Interstate Commerce Commission becаuse potential referral of issues to an administrative agency did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Appellants similarly claimed here that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required dismissal of the underlying action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶ 10} Therefore, because it is not a jurisdictional defect, appellants’ claim that primary jurisdiction patently and unambiguously divested Judge Walker of jurisdiction is meritless. In other words, potential referral of an issue to an administrative agency under the primary jurisdiсtion doctrine where an action is filed does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the matter so as to require dismissal of the case. Id.
{¶ 12} The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit similarly notеd in an appeal involving a federal class action against Bank One, Columbus, N.A., and TIG concerning their CPI program that ” ‘[t]he fact that the unlawful practices alleged in the instant case involve a scheme for passing on the cost of insurance premiums does not convert this case into one limited to the insurance industry.’ ” Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A. (C.A.6, 1996), 92 F.3d 384, 393, quoting Bermudez v. First of America Bank Champion, N.A. (N.D.Ill.1994), 860 F.Supp. 580, 591. We have also permitted a comparable claim against TIG for tortious interference with a contractual relationshiр to proceed in common pleas
{¶ 13} None of the cases cited by appellants requires a contrary result. Significantly, most of the authorities relied on by appellants were resolved by appeal rather thаn by extraordinary writ. See, e.g., Salvation Army v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N. Ohio (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 571, 636 N.E.2d 399; Elwert v. Pilot Life Ins. Co. (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 529, 602 N.E.2d 1219; Strack v. Westfield Cos. (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 336, 515 N.E.2d 1005; Allen v. Golden Rule Ins. Co. (Aug. 15, 1990), Montgomery App. No. 12109, unreported, 1990 WL 119288; Orra v. Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting Assn. (Mar. 31, 1988), Lucas App. No. L-87-233, unreported, 1988 WL 36380; Kimpel v. Dairy Farm Leasing Co., Inc. (Jan. 9, 1987), Williams App. No. WMS-86-8, unreported, 1987 WL 5310. Further, Salvation Army based its main holding on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which is a nonjurisdictional defect. Jones v. Chagrin Falls (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 456, 674 N.E.2d 1388, syllabus. The court of appeals in Elwert expressly permitted a trial court to proceed on a former insurance agent‘s claim for tortious interference with a business relationship against a life insurance company. And the insurance claims found not to be cognizable in courts in Elwert, Strack, Allen, Orra, and Kimpel were based on specific, alleged violations of R.C. Title 39. In contrast, Sibbring and DASCO‘s claims do not expressly assert a right to recovery based on any alleged insurance law violations.
{¶ 14} Appellants’ reliance on State ex rel. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of N. Ohio v. Carroll (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 263, 21 OBR 307, 487 N.E.2d 576, is also misplaced. In Blue Cross, the court of appeals granted a writ of prohibition to prevent a trial court judge from enforcing a preliminary injunction on restraining an insurance company‘s allegedly misleading or deceptive advertising. The claims in Blue Cross were completely remediable by the Department of Insurance and its Superintendent.
{¶ 15} Therefore, Judge Walker does not patently and unаmbiguously lack jurisdiction over Sibbring and DASCO‘s claims, and appellants have an adequate remedy by appeal in the underlying action to raise their contentions. State ex rel. Red Head Brass, Inc. v. Holmes Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 149, 152, 684 N.E.2d 1234, 1236. Apрellants are consequently not entitled to the requested writ of prohibition.
Mandamus and Prohibition; Venue
{¶ 16} Finally, appellants are not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Walker to transfer venue of the underlying action from Erie County to Franklin County. Nor are they entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Walker from proceeding in the underlying action because of the claimed improper venue in Erie County. Extraordinary relief in mandamus or prohibition generally does not lie to challenge a decision on a motion to change venue because appeal following a final judgment provides an adequate legal remedy. State ex rel. Lyons v. Zaleski (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 623, 625, 665 N.E.2d 212, 215. The cases relied on by appellants are inapposite because there is neither a prospect of simultaneous multiple actions nor a risk of appellants’ having to resort to an additional remedy besides mere retrial of a case following potеntial reversal on appeal. 75 Ohio St.3d at 625-626, 665 N.E.2d at 215, distinguishing State ex rel. Starner v. DeHoff (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 163, 18 OBR 219, 480 N.E.2d 449, and State ex rel. Ohio State Racing Comm. v. Walton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 246, 525 N.E.2d 756.
{¶ 17} Banc One specifies no facts establishing that appeal would not be a complete, beneficial, and speedy remedy, and TIG‘s contentions that appeal from any subsequеnt adverse final judgment would be inadequate because it would be “too costly” are without merit. State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 395, 678 N.E.2d 549, 553-554. The mere fact that postjudgment appeal
{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, appellants did not establish entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief. Therefore, we аffirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.