ERICKSON ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MORRISON ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 2020-0244
Supreme Court of Ohio
March 16, 2021
Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-746
KENNEDY, J.
Submitted January 13, 2021. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Guernsey County, No. 19CA18, 2019-Ohio-5430.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Erickson v. Morrison, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-746.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in thе opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-746
ERICKSON ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. MORRISON ET AL., APPELLEES.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Erickson v. Morrison, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-746.]
Marketable Title Act—
(No. 2020-0244—Submitted January 13, 2021—Decided March 16, 2021.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Guernsey County, No. 19CA18, 2019-Ohio-5430.
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals рresents the question whether a reference to a reservation of mineral rights in a surface landowner‘s root of title and in subsequently recorded title transactions is sufficiently specific to preserve the reservation of the mineral rights under Ohio‘s Marketable Title Act,
{¶ 2} Ohio‘s Marketable Title Act provides that an unbroken chain of title to land for a period of 40 years еstablishes marketable record title to the land, which generally extinguishes property interests that predate the landowner‘s root of title.
{¶ 3} Nothing in
{¶ 4} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Fifth District and reinstate the trial court‘s judgment.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 5} In February 1926, James T. and Rose L. Logan conveyed the surface rights to approximately 139 acres of land in Guernsey County to Edward and Alta Riggs. The Logans retained the mineral rights to the land‘s coal, oil, and gas through the following language in the deed: “Excepting and reserving therefrom all coal, gas, and oil with the right of said first parties, their heirs and assigns, at any time to drill and operate for oil and gas
{¶ 6} Between 1926 and 1975, the surface rights to the land were transferred five times through recorded instruments, with each instrument reciting thе same “excepting and reserving” language from the 1926 deed (but omitting the word “said” before the term “first parties” on four of the instruments).
{¶ 7} A deed recorded on May 1, 1978, conveying the land from Margaret J. Morrison to appellees, Paul E. and Vesta G. Morrison, stated: “EXCEPTING AND RESERVING THEREFROM all coal, gas and oil with the right of first parties, their heirs and assigns, at any time to drill and operate for oil and gas and mine all coal.” (Capitalization sic.) Subsequent transfers in the chain of title—from the Morrisons to themselves in joint tenancy with survivorship rights in 1983 and from the Morrisons to their respective trusts in 1998—reiterated this “excepting and reserving” language regarding the mineral rights in the land.
{¶ 8} On August 24, 2017, Tonning and the Ericksons filed this action in the Guernsey County Common Pleas Court to quiet title and for a declaratory judgment that they own the mineral rights to the land by virtue of the reservation. The Morrisons, individually and as co-trustees of their respective trusts, answered the complaint and counterclaimed for a dеclaration that the reservation of the
mineral rights had been extinguished under Ohio‘s Marketable Title Act or, alternatively, that the mineral rights were deemed abandoned under the 1989 version of
{¶ 9} The trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Tonning and the Ericksons, declaring that they owned the mineral rights defined in the reservation and quieting title to the rights in their favor.1
{¶ 10} On appeal to the Fifth District, the Morrisons asserted one assignment of error: “The trial court erred when it held that the severed mineral interest at issue was preserved from extinguishment under the Ohio Marketable Title Act.” 2019-Ohio-5430, 151 N.E.3d 110, ¶ 21. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the trial court‘s judgment, explaining that “the Reservation does not state by whom the interest was originally reserved, nor to whom the interest was granted. * * * Repetition of the Reservation does not endow it with the missing information, nor does it transform the Reservation from general to specific.” Id. at ¶ 40.
{¶ 11} We accepted the Ericksons’ appeal2 to review two propositions of law:
1. The Marketable Title Act does not require that a reservation
set forth the name of the person holding the interest in order to be specific and preserve the interest.
2. A property holder‘s fee simple interest is preserved under the Marketable Title Act where the party seeking relief under the Marketable Title Act had actual knowledge of the interest.
See 158 Ohio St.3d 1487, 2020-Ohio-1634, 143 N.E.3d 527. Because the resolution of the first proposition of law resolves this casе, it is not necessary for this court to reach the second proposition of law.
Positions of the Parties
{¶ 12} The Ericksons maintain that neither
{¶ 13} The Morrisons rely on our decision in Blackstone v. Moore, 155 Ohio St.3d 448, 2018-Ohio-4959, 122 N.E.3d 132, ¶ 16-18, for the proposition that when a reference to an interest created prior to the root of title does not provide the relevant conveyance index‘s volume and page, the reference is sufficient to preserve thе interest only if it includes both the type of interest created and the name of its owner. The Morrisons contend that under the Marketable Title Act, a title examiner needs to review only the language of the root of title and the instruments
recorded during the 40 years subsequent to the root of title to locate any specific references to an interest predating the root of title. And here, they argue, the prior interest cannot be located withоut a more extensive search, since none of the recorded title transactions within the relevant 40-year period refer to the Ericksons. According to the Morrisons, repetition of a pre-root-of-title interest in subsequently recorded title transactions with neither a reference to the named owners of the interest nor the recording information of the instrument creating it does not preserve that interest. As argued by the Morrisons, “Because thеre is nothing contained within the repetitions cluing the reader as to the owner of the pre-root interest, they are not specific references.”
{¶ 14} Based on those arguments, we address a single, dispositive question of law: whether a reference to a reservation of mineral rights in a surface landowner‘s root of title and in subsequently recorded title transactions is a “general reference” that is insufficient to preserve the reservatiоn pursuant to
Law and Analysis
{¶ 15} Reviewing the meaning of
{¶ 16} The General Assembly enacted Ohio‘s Marketable Title Act,
prior to the root of title, with “the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title,”
{¶ 17}
All interests and defects which are inherent in the muniments of which such chain of record title is formed; provided that a general reference in such muniments, or any of them, to easements, use restrictions, or other interests created prior to the root of title shall not be sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification be made therein of a recorded title transaction which creates such easemеnt, use restriction, or other interest * * *.
The “root of title” is “that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a person * * * which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being determined.”
{¶ 18} In Blackstone, we explained that
questions are yes, does the general reference contain a specific identification of a recorded title transaction?” Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶ 19} Applying our test in Blackstone here, the answer to the first question is yes—the muniments in the chain of title state that the surface rights in the land are subject to a reservation of mineral rights. We therefore turn to the second question: is the referenсe to the reservation a general reference?
{¶ 20} In Blackstone, we recognized that the Marketable Title Act does not define the term “general reference” and we therefore applied the ordinary meaning of the word “general,” which “is defined as ‘marked by broad overall character without being limited, modified, or checked by narrow precise considerations: concerned with main elements, major matters rather than limited details, or universals rather
{¶ 21} We also pointed out that our caselaw distinguishes between a general reference and a specific one. Blackstone, 155 Ohio St.3d 448, 2018-Ohio-4959, 122 N.E.3d 132, at ¶ 14. See also Toth v. Berks Title Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 338, 341, 453 N.E.2d 639 (1983) (“Any interest or defect which is referred to specifically in a muniment within the marketable record title of a parcel of property, as defined by
{¶ 22} In determining whether the reference at issue in Blackstone was general or specific, we declined to establish a bright-line rule that an interest created prior to the root of title is preserved only if a reference to it includes “either the
volume and page number where the interest was created or the date that the interest was recorded.” Id. at ¶ 16. We explained, “Our role is to apply statutes as they are written, and nowhere does the Marketable Title Act require reference to the volume and page number or the date that the interest was recorded.” Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 23} We concluded that the reference at issue in Blackstone was specific, not general, because the root of title included “information about the type of interest created * * * and specifie[d] by whom the interest was originally reserved * * *. There is no question which interest is referenced in the * * * deed. Thus, it is a specific reference.” Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶ 24} Relying on Blackstone, the Morrisons maintain that a reference to a reservation of mineral rights is insufficient to preserve the reservation under
{¶ 25} As in Blackstone, we begin here with the words of the statute. Nothing in the plain language of Ohio‘s Marketable Title Act provides that a recital of a prior interest is a general reference subject to being extinguished if it does not name the interest‘s owner. Language can refer to a specific interest in the chain of title without including a name, just as it can be sufficiently specific without “the volume and page number where the interest was created or the date that the interest was recorded,” id. at ¶ 16.
{¶ 26} In addition, we have explained that ” ‘[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of [a] statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.’ ” (First brackets
added in Turner.) State v. Turner, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-6773, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 18, quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988).
{¶ 28} In 1988, however, the General Assembly amended the Marketable Title Act to require greater specificity in order for recordеd notices to preserve preexisting interests. See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 502, 142 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4068, 4069-4070. That legislation established the current versions of
{¶ 29} But when the General Assembly amended the requirements for recording a notice of preservation to include the name of the interest‘s owner, a description of the property affected, and the recording information creating a property interest affected by the notice, it did not also amend
order to preserve a preexisting interest from being extinguished after 40 years from the root of title. The General Assembly could have—but did not—require that specificity, and we may not add that requirement to the statute now under the guise of statutory interpretation. See McConnell v. Dudley, 158 Ohio St.3d 388, 2019-Ohio-4740, 144 N.E.3d 369, ¶ 30.
{¶ 30} Moreover, as one commentator (who we quoted in Blackstone with approval, see 155 Ohio St.3d 448, 2018-Ohio-4959, 122 N.E.3d 132, at ¶ 16) has noted,
{¶ 31} Therefore, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Fifth District, a recitation of a preexisting interest in a recorded title transaction is not a general reference that is insufficient to preserve the interest under the Marketable Title Act simply because it does not name the owner.
subsequent conveyances are made subject to a specific, identifiable reservation of mineral rights recited throughout their chain of title using the same language as the recorded title transaction that created it. The reference to the reservation is therefore not a general reference, and there is no need to reach the third question articulated by this court in Blackstone, i.e., whether a general reference specifically identifies the relevant recorded title transaction, see Blackstone at ¶ 12.
Conclusion
{¶ 33} Through Ohio‘s Marketable Title Act, the General Assembly sought to balance the goals of simplifying and facilitating land-title transactions,
{¶ 34} It is the function of the General Assembly to balance such competing interests when enacting legislation. McConnell, 158 Ohio St.3d 388, 2019-Ohio-4740, 144 N.E.3d 369, at ¶ 32. Second-guessing the wisdom of the legislature‘s policy choices in striking that balance does not fall within the scope of our review. State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 20. Rather, “[o]ur role, in exercise of the judicial power granted to us by the Constitution, is to interpret and apply the law enacted by the General Assembly.” Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-5685, 983 N.E.2d 1253, ¶ 29.
{¶ 35} In enacting
conveyances of the surface rights are made subject to a specific, identifiable reservation of mineral rights using the same language that created it. Notwithstanding its failure to name the owner of the reserved rights, this reference is sufficient to preserve them from being extinguished under Ohio‘s Marketable Title Act.
{¶ 36} For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the trial court.
Judgment reversed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
DONNELLY, J., concurs in judgment only.
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., L.P.A., John P. Brody, William J. Levendusky, and Jane K. Gleaves, for appellants.
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Gregory W. Watts, and Matthew W. Onest, for appellees.
Theisen Brock, L.P.A., Daniel P. Corcoran, and Kristopher O. Justice, urging affirmance for amici curiae, Doris Craig, Paul Craig, Eleanor Craig, Nina Ice, Terry Ice, Sheila Stollar, Roger Stollar, Lisa Meyer, Kenneth Meyer Jr., Helen Craig, Evelyn Craig, Carissa R. Baker, and Corey A. Stollar.