MCCONNELL ET AL., APPELLEES, v. DUDLEY; COITSVILLE TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 2018-0377
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
November 20, 2019
Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4740
Political-subdivision immunity—R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)—The exception to political-subdivision immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle does not encompass an action alleging that the political subdivision negligently hired, trained, or supervised a police officer who was involved in a motor-vehicle accident while responding to an emergency call—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded.
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-4740
(Submitted June 12, 2019—Decided November 20, 2019.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 17 MA 0045, 2018-Ohio-341.
{¶ 1} This discretionary appeal from the Seventh District Court of Appeals presents the issue whether, under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act,
{¶ 2} Because the language of
{¶ 3} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
R.C. 2744.02(B)
{¶ 4}
(B) Subject to sections
2744.03 and2744.05 of the Revised Code, a political subdivision is liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or of any of its employees in connection with a governmental or proprietary function, as follows:(1) Except as otherwise provided in this division, political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority. The following are full defenses to that liability:
(a) A member of a municipal corporation police department or any other police agency was operating a motor vehicle while responding to an emergency call and the operation of the vehicle did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct * * *.
Today, we consider whether a political subdivision‘s training or supervision of a police officer may constitute “operation of the vehicle” for purposes of determining potential liability for an accident caused by the police officer.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 5} A few minutes before 8:00 a.m. on September 18, 2013, Coitsville Township Police Officer Donald C. Dudley Jr. responded to a dispatch alert
{¶ 6} As Officer Dudley approached an intersection, he began to radio his position and suddenly collided with a westbound Toyota Corolla driven by appellee Renee McConnell, who was on her way to work. McConnell‘s car struck a utility pole and overturned, landing on its roof; McConnell sustained serious injuries. Officer Dudley knew that the intersection was controlled by a stop light, but he had not noticed that the light was red as he entered the intersection—and because a house and a tree obstructed his view to the right, he had not seen McConnell‘s car approaching. At the time of the collision, his speed was approximately 35 m.p.h.
{¶ 7} McConnell, her husband, and their four daughters brought suit against Officer Dudley as well as Coitsville Township and its board of trustees and the Coitsville Township Police Department (collectively, “the township“). The complaint alleged that Officer Dudley‘s negligent, willful, or wanton operation of the police cruiser and the township‘s “negligent, willful and/or wanton” conduct in establishing policies and procedures for “pursuit training” and in its hiring and training of Officer Dudley directly and proximately caused McConnell to suffer “extreme and permanent physical injuries.” McConnell‘s husband and four daughters also alleged that Officer Dudley‘s and the township‘s conduct proximately caused them to suffer a loss of consortium of their spouse or mother.
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s judgment in part and reversed the judgment in part, concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Officer Dudley‘s actions constituted willful and wanton misconduct and whether the township was negligent in training and supervising him. 2018-Ohio-341, ¶ 30, 38, 41. However, because the McConnells had failed to plead a claim against Officer Dudley in his individual capacity, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in finding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether he was personally liable. Id. at ¶ 40.
{¶ 12} In denying the conflict, the court of appeals stated that it had not treated the McConnells’ allegations of the township‘s negligent hiring and training of police officers as stating an independent claim. Rather, the court stated that ”
{¶ 13} We accepted one proposition of law for review: “A political subdivision is immune from liability for allegations of negligent hiring, or failure to train or supervise police officers, as such allegations do not fall within any of the exceptions found within
{¶ 14} The township maintains that within
{¶ 15} The McConnells argue that the court of appeals did not recognize an independent claim for negligent hiring, training, or supervision. Rather, they assert that the defense to liability for emergency calls is not implicated, because the township‘s own negligence was directly and causally related to the operation of the police cruiser and is therefore actionable pursuant to
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we are asked to decide whether a political subdivision‘s alleged negligence in hiring, training, or supervising an employee who will be operating a vehicle may constitute negligent operation of a motor vehicle for purposes of the exception to a political subdivision‘s immunity set forth in
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
{¶ 17} “Whether a party is entitled to immunity is a question of law properly determined by the court prior to trial pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.” Pelletier v. Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611, 2018-Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 12, citing Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992); Riscatti v. Prime Properties Ltd. Partnership, 137 Ohio St.3d 123, 2013-Ohio-4530, 998 N.E.2d 437, ¶ 17.
{¶ 18} “The review of a summary judgment denying political-subdivision immunity is de novo and is governed by the summary-judgment standard set forth in
“Summary judgment may be granted when ‘(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.’ ”
Statutory Construction
{¶ 19} This case presents a straightforward question of statutory interpretation. “Our duty in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the language it enacted.” Pelletier at ¶ 14, citing Griffith v. Aultman Hosp., 146 Ohio St.3d 196, 2016-Ohio-1138, 54 N.E.3d 1196, ¶ 18; Fisher v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 20. “To discern legislative intent, we read words and phrases in context and construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.” Mahoning Edn. Assn. of Dev. Disabilities v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 137 Ohio St.3d 257, 2013-Ohio-4654, 998 N.E.2d 1124, ¶ 15. And as we explained in Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000), “[w]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory interpretation.” Rather, “[a]n unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.” Sears, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413, at paragraph five of the syllabus.
Political-Subdivision Immunity
{¶ 20}
{¶ 22} The second tier of the sovereign-immunity analysis involves determining whether any of the five exceptions to immunity that are listed in
{¶ 23} If any one of the five exceptions to immunity in
R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a)
{¶ 24} Our focus is on the second tier of the sovereign-immunity analysis; it is undisputed that—as to the first tier—operating a police cruiser in response to an emergency call is a governmental function. Pursuant to
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} This court‘s focus is on the operation of Officer Dudley‘s vehicle and whether the township‘s hiring or training of Officer Dudley falls within
{¶ 28} As we explained in Doe,
{¶ 29} Further, it is the employee‘s conduct, not the political subdivision‘s, that establishes the exception from immunity under the statute. The statutory exception to immunity specifically states that political subdivisions are liable for the “negligent operation of any motor vehicle by their employees when the employees are engaged within the scope of their employment and authority,” (emphasis added),
CONCLUSION
{¶ 31} In enacting the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, the General Assembly sought to “conserve[ ] the fiscal resources of political subdivisions by limiting their tort liability” while “permit[ting] injured persons, who have no source of reimbursement for their damages, to recover for a tort committed by the political subdivisions.” Menefee v. Queen City Metro, 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 181 (1990). Balancing these competing interests necessarily required the legislature to draw lines regarding what claims may be pursued against a political subdivision and what damages an injured person may recover from a political subdivision.
{¶ 32} It is the function of the General Assembly to weigh such competing policy concerns when enacting legislation. See Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St.3d 300, 302, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983). In contrast, “[o]ur role, in exercise of the judicial power granted to us by the Constitution, is to interpret and apply the law enacted by the General Assembly.” Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-5685, 983 N.E.2d 1253, ¶ 29.
{¶ 33} In this case, the trial court erred in failing to enter summary judgment on the relevant count of the McConnells’ complaint. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY, J., concur in judgment only.
STEWART, J., concurs, with an opinion.
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STEWART, J., concurring.
{¶ 34} I agree with the analysis and conclusions set forth in the majority opinion. I write separately only to point out that while a political subdivision is not liable under
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Rafidi, Pallante & Melewski, Ryan J. Melewski, and Mark A. Rafidi; and Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., Paul W. Flowers, and Louis E. Grube, for appellees.
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, Gregory A. Beck, James F. Mathews, and Andrea K. Ziarko, for appellants.
Kristen Bates Aylward, Canton Director of Law, and Kevin R. L‘Hommedieu, Canton Law Department; Andrea Scassa, Massillon Director of Law; and Jennifer L. Arnold, Alliance Director of Law, urging reversal for amici curiae cities of Canton, Massillon, and Alliance.
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., and Margaret M. Murray, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice.
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