Eric Adams v. New York City Campaign Finance BoardEric Adams v. New York City Campaign Finance Board
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
The New York City Campaign Finance Board‘s (the “Board” or “CFB“) Vision Statement provides that “[w]hen every New Yorker is empowered to participate meaningfully in elections, candidates for office will be reflective of the communities they serve, elected leaders will be accountable to the public, and New Yorkers will have a democracy they can trust.”1 And the Board‘s mission is to make the city‘s “local democracy more open, transparent, and equitable.”2 In line with its vision and mission statements, the Board provides strong incentives to candidates to “finance their campaigns by engaging with average New Yorkers,” rather than “seeking large contributions from special interests.”3 The Board‘s voluntary public financing program matches small-dollar contributions from individuals residing in
On May 27, 2025, Petitioners-Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs“), including New York City Mayor Eric Adams, his reelection campaign (the “Adams Campaign“), the Treasurer of the Adams Campaign, Sharon Adams and some individual supporters of Mayor Adams,5 brought this civil action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, against the CFB. (Not. of Removal (Dkt. 1) ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs’ operative Petition6 alleges that by denying the Adams Campaign public matching funds under the New York City Campaign Finance Program, the CFB committed various state law and federal constitutional violations. (See generally Am. Pet.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the CFB “acted arbitrarily, capriciously, illegally, and unconstitutionally” in denying the Adams Campaign $3,439,168 in campaign matching funds to which it is entitled pursuant to the Campaign Finance Act based on the matchable contributions totaling $429,896. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 32-34.)
On June 16, 2025, pursuant to
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following allegations are drawn from Plaintiffs’ Amended Petition and exhibits attached thereto, the CFB‘s Answer and exhibits attached thereto, as well as the public filings on the docket, of which the court takes judicial notice.7
A. CFB Matching Funds Program
The CFB is a five-member independent and nonpartisan agency of the City of New York established by the New York City Campaign Finance Act (“CFA“). (Decl. of Paul S. Ryan (“First Ryan Decl.“) (Dkt. 11-1) ¶ 2;8 see also Am. Pet. ¶ 23.) The CFB derives its rulemaking authority from the CFA and the New York City Charter. See
The Board administers the New York City Campaign Finance Program (the “Program“), which provides public matching funds to eligible candidates running for New York City public office who satisfy various eligibility requirements. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 4; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 31.) Participating candidates who qualify for matching funds receive $8 in public funds for every dollar a New York City resident contributes (up to $250 per contributor) to that candidate‘s campaign. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 11.) There are 13 payment dates for the 2025 election cycle. (Id. ¶ 12; see also Second Decl. of Paul S. Ryan (“Second Ryan Decl.” (Dkt. 15-1) ¶ 2.) The CFB reassesses the participant‘s eligibility for public matching funds on each payment date, making the most recent payment determination the operative one by the Board. (First
The CFB Rules establish mandatory eligibility criteria for public matching funds. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 8.) For example, the mandatory ineligibility criteria under CFB Rules 3-01(d)(i)(A)(2) and (3), provide, respectively, that public funds will not be paid to a candidate (i) who fails to provide the Board, upon the Board‘s request and by the deadline imposed by the Board, documents or records required by Chapter 4 of the CFB Rules, or other information that verifies campaign activity, and (ii) where the difference between the candidate‘s reported receipts and documented receipts exceeds 10%. (Id.) Similarly, CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(A)(4)‘s mandatory ineligibility criterion provides that public funds shall not be paid to a candidate if the candidate fails to demonstrate compliance with
The Board can also find candidates ineligible for matching funds on a discretionary basis pursuant to CFB Rules 3-01(d)(i)(B) and (d)(ii)(B). As relevant here, under CFB Rule 3-01(d)(i)(B), the Board may deny a public funds payment to a candidate “if there is reason to believe that the candidate has committed a violation of the [CFA]” or the Board Rules. (See id.) CFB Rule 3-01(d)(i)(B) provides that the CFB may deny public funds to a
Moreover, CFB Rule 3-01(a) provides that the CFB must determine that the candidate has met all eligibility requirements before a candidate can receive matching funds. (Id. ¶ 9.) And pursuant to CFB Rule 7-09(a), after the CFB provides a written determination to a candidate with the basis for payment or non-payment of public funds, the candidate may petition the CFB for reconsideration of the determination. (See id. ¶ 10.) A candidate waives his right to appear before the CFB unless the petition includes a request to do so. (Id.)
B. Adams Campaign Matching Fund Denials
The CFB denied the Adams Campaign matching funds in December 2024, January 2025, March 2025, and April 2025. (Am. Pet. ¶¶ 37, 41, 44, 48.) The chart below summarizes the CFB‘s bases for each denial. (See id.)
| Justification | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reason to Believe Candidate Engaged in Detrimental Conduct | Candidate‘s Failure to Respond to CFB | Candidate‘s Failure to File Annual Disclosure | 10% or Greater Variance in Gross Receipts | |
| December 2024 | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| January 2025 | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| March 2025 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| April 2025 | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
The court now details the CFB‘s bases for the denials.
On September 26, 2024, federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York (“SDNY“) unsealed a five-count indictment (the “Indictment“) charging Mayor Adams with various crimes. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 16.) The Indictment charged Mayor Adams with wire fraud, bribery, campaign finance violations involving contributions from foreign nationals, and conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes. (Id.) Specifically, it alleged that Mayor Adams was part of a scheme to use straw donors to hide illegal contributions and obtain matching funds. (Id.) Thereafter, following the recommendation of the CFB staff, on December 16, 2024, the CFB held a public meeting during which the Board voted to deny the Adams Campaign matching funds. (Id. ¶ 22; Am. Pet. ¶ 37.) In a supplemental notice issued to the Adams Campaign on December 18, 2024, the CFB explained:
The Board has reason to believe that Eric Adams (the “Candidate“) has, in the course of public funds program (the “Program“) participation, engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of federal and City law, including the Campaign Finance Act and Board Rules, as described in the September 26, 2024 indictment of Eric Adams (see United States v. Adams, 24 CR 556), and is therefore ineligible for a public funds payment. Pursuant to Board Rules 3-01(d)(i)(G) and (ii)(I),9 the Board‘s reason to believe that the Candidate has violated federal and City laws is a basis for ineligibility for public funds.
(Suppl. Not. Dated 12/18/2024 (“December Not.“) (Dkt. 1-1 at ECF p. 59) at ECF pp. 59-60; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 40.) In January
On April 2, 2025, Judge Dale E. Ho of the SDNY dismissed the Indictment against Mayor Adams with prejudice. (See id. ¶ 46; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 8.) And on the morning of April 15, 2025, CFB staff briefed the CFB and recommended that the CFB deny the Adams Campaign matching funds. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 49.) Accordingly, later that morning, the CFB held a public meeting and voted to deny the Adams Campaign matching funds. (Id. ¶ 50; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 48.) In a supplemental notice issued to the Adams Campaign on April 15, 2025, the CFB explained:
The Board has reviewed the information contained in the September 26, 2024 indictment of Eric Adams (see United States v. Adams, 24 CR 556); a complaint alleging crimes committed by Adams’ associate Mohamed Bahi in conjunction with an alleged straw donation scheme for Adams’ 2021 mayoral campaign; a February 7, 2025 letter from former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Danielle Sassoon to Judges Dale E. Ho and Analisa Torres of the Southern District of New York, notifying them of Bahi‘s alleged intent to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud; an information alleging that Adams’ associate Erden Arkan committed wire fraud, in conjunction with an alleged straw donation scheme for Adams’ 2021 mayoral campaign; the transcript of Arkan‘s allocution in which he pled guilty to that crime; . . . and Judge Ho‘s April 2, 2025 Opinion and Order dismissing the charges against Adams with prejudice. The Board has reason to believe that Eric Adams has, in the
course of public funds program participation, engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of federal, state, and/or City law, including the Campaign Finance Act and Board Rules.
(Suppl. Not. Dated 4/15/2025 (“April Not.“) (Dkt. 1-1 at ECF p. 78) at ECF p. 78; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 51.)
2. Other Bases
a. Failure to Respond to the CFB‘s Request for Information
On November 15, 2024, Jesse Schaffer, Director of Special Compliance for the CFB, sent a letter to Vito Pitta, counsel to the Adams Campaign, requesting documents and communications relating to five fundraisers referenced in the Indictment, contributions from employees of Bay Atlantic University also referenced in the Indictment, and “any other documents, affidavits or arguments that support the 2025 Campaign‘s eligibility to receive public funds.” (Schaffer Letter (Dkt. 11-2 at ECF p. 338) at ECF pp. 338-39.) The letter requested the Adams Campaign to submit the requested information by December 6, 2024 and noted that “[f]ailure to respond timely or adequately may result in suspension of public funds payments.” (Id. at ECF p. 339.) One day before the deadline, Mr. Pitta informed Mr. Schaffer that the Adams Campaign would not be responding to the requests because “the requests relate specifically to events that were referenced in the Indictment.” (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 18.)
In its December 2024 supplemental notice to the Adams Campaign regarding the denial of matching funds, the CFB explained:
Campaigns must provide to the Board, upon its request, documents, records, or other information that verifies campaign activity and failure to respond can make a campaign ineligible for public funds pursuant to Board Rule 3-
01(d)(i)(B).10 On November 15, 2024, CFB staff made a request for documentation and information related to allegations in the indictment from the Campaign with a response deadline of December 6, 2024. On December 5, 2024, an attorney for the Campaign called CFB Staff and left a voicemail stating that the Campaign would not respond to the CFB staff‘s request at this time because the requests were related to incidents referenced in the indictment. This failure to respond to a request for information is a basis for ineligibility for public funds.
(December Not. at ECF p. 60; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 40.) The CFB cited the Adams Campaign‘s failure to provide the requested documentation and information to the CFB as a basis for its denial of matching funds to the Adams Campaign in January 2025 and March 202511 as well. (First Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 28, 31, 40-43.)
After Judge Ho dismissed the Indictment with prejudice, at 10:38 p.m. on April 14, 2025, Mr. Pitta responded, via an email letter, to the CFB‘s November 15, 2024 request for documents and communications. (Id. ¶ 48; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 52.) Mr. Pitta‘s letter stated that the Adams Campaign “reviewed [its] records and have found no documentation responsive to the request that has not already been submitted to the CFB.” (Pitta Letter (Dkt. 11-2 at ECF p. 543) at ECF p. 543.) The following morning, the CFB voted to deny the Adams Campaign matching funds. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 49; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 48.) In its April 2025 supplemental notice issued to the Adams Campaign, the CFB explained that the campaign‘s failure to timely respond to the CFB‘s request for information is a basis for ineligibility for public funds. (April Not.
b. Noncompliance With Admin. Code § 12-110
On March 17, 2025, the CFB held a public meeting during which the Board voted to deny the Adams Campaign matching funds. (First Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 40-41; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 44.) In a nonpayment determination issued that same day, the CFB explained that the Adams Campaign was ineligible for payment “because it ha[d] not demonstrated compliance with
Mayor Adams filed his annual disclosure (“COIB disclosure“) on April 14, 2025. (Am. Pet. ¶ 47.) On April 15, 2025, the CFB held a public meeting and voted to deny the Adams Campaign matching funds. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 50; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 48.) In a determination issued that same day, the CFB stated that the “Adams Campaign was ineligible for payment “because it ha[d] not demonstrated compliance with
On March 17, 2025, the CFB held a public meeting during which the Board voted to deny the Adams Campaign matching funds. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 44.) In a nonpayment determination issued that same day, the CFB explained that “[t]he Campaign is not eligible for payment because the difference between the Campaign‘s reported receipts and documented receipts is equal to or greater than 10%.” (Am. Pet. ¶ 44 (citing, inter alia,
C. Appeal of the April 2025 Nonpayment Determination
The April 2025 nonpayment determination is the “operative determination by the Board” with respect to the Adams Campaign because it is the Board‘s “most recent payment determination.” (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 13.) The CFB denied the Adams Campaign matching funds on April 15, 2025 for three independent reasons. First, “[t]he Adams Campaign had not demonstrated compliance with
The CFB delegated the authority to make a determination regarding the petition to the Chair of the Board, Frederick Schaffer.14 (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 61; Am. Pet. ¶ 54.) On May, 2,
2025, the Chair of the Board denied the Adams Campaign‘s petition. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 63; Am. Pet. ¶ 53.) Also on May 2, 2025, Joseph Gallagher, the CFB‘s General Counsel, emailed the counsel to the Adams Campaign a Corrected April 15 Nonpayment Determination and an Amended April 15 Supplemental Notice (“Amended Notice“). (First Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 64-65; Gallagher Email (Dkt. 1-1 at ECF p. 88); Am. Nonpayment Determination Dated 5/2/2025 (“Am. Nonpayment Determination“) (Dkt. 1-1 at ECF p. 91); Am. Suppl. Not. Dated 5/2/2025 (“Am. Not.“) (Dkt. 1-1 at ECF p. 94).)
In his email, Mr. Gallagher explained that a “Rule 7-09 Petition is not an opportunity for the Campaign to show that they have resolved their ineligibility for a public funds payment, rather the Petition must demonstrate that at the time the payment determination was made, April 15, the Campaign was eligible for payment.” (Gallagher Email at ECF p. 88.) In addition, Mr. Gallagher stated that Mayor Adams’ COIB disclosure on April 14, 2025, was both incomplete and not submitted at least three days before the payment date as required by CFB Rule 3-05(b). (Id.)
The Amended Notice informed the Adams Campaign that “[b]ased on a preliminary analysis, . . . pursuant to Board Rules 3-01(d)(i)(A)(2), 3-01(d)(ii)(A)(4), and 3-01(d)(ii)(B),” the campaign failed “to demonstrate eligibility for a public funds payment.” (Am. Not. at ECF p. 94; see also Am. Nonpayment Determination at ECF p. 91 (providing three reasons for denial of matching funds).) With respect to the CFB‘s reason to believe that Mayor Adams violated federal, state, and/or city laws, the Amended Notice identified a list of such violations based on the Indictment and other public documents. (Am. Not. at ECF pp. 94-95; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 58.) As to the November 2024 request, the Amended Notice explained that the Adams Campaign responded
On May 12, 2025, the CFB ratified the Chair‘s denial of the Adams Campaign‘s petition. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 69; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 60.) The following day, the CFB provided the Adams Campaign with a letter notifying the campaign of the CFB‘s determination. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 70; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 60.) This lawsuit followed.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed this civil action against the CFB on May 27, 2025, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County and amended their petition on June 5, 2025.16 (See Not. of Removal ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs seek various forms of relief, including (i) “vacating and setting aside the CFB‘s determination to deny matching campaign funds to the Adams campaign and directing the CFB to grant matching funds to the Adams Campaign,” pursuant to
The CFB removed the case from Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County to this court pursuant to
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Judgment on the Pleadings
Under the
To survive a motion to dismiss under
B. Sections 1983 and 1988
C. Article 78 , Agency Determination, and Supplemental Jurisdiction
An agency may “adopt regulations that go beyond the text of its enabling legislation, so long as those regulations are consistent with the statutory language and underlying purpose.” In re Acevedo v. N.Y. State Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles, 29 N.Y.3d 202, 221 (2017). “The standard for judicial review of an administrative regulation is whether the regulation has a rational basis and is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” Id. at 226. Judicial review of an agency‘s determination is limited to the facts and record adduced before the agency. See In re Rizzo v. N.Y. State. Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 6 N.Y.3d 104, 110 (2005). “As a general rule, ‘courts must defer to an administrative agency‘s rational interpretation of its own regulations in its area of expertise.‘” Andryeyeva v. N.Y. Health Care, Inc., 33 N.Y.3d 152, 174 (2019) (quoting In re Peckham, 12 N.Y.3d at 431). An agency‘s regulation should be upheld if it is not “irrational or unreasonable.” Id.
Furthermore, as relevant here, “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same
However, “Supreme Court precedent suggests . . . that federal courts do in fact have jurisdiction over
D. CPLR 3001
In relevant part, pursuant to
Where “Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim seeks resolution of legal issues that will, of necessity, be resolved in the course of the litigation of the other causes of action[,]” courts dismiss it as “duplicative in that it seeks no relief that is not implicitly sought in the other causes of action.” Sofi Classic S.A. de C.V. v. Hurowitz, 444 F. Supp. 2d 231, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern, 693 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (reasoning that “[t]he fact that a lawsuit has been filed that will necessarily settle the issues for which the declaratory judgment is sought suggests that the declaratory judgment will serve no useful purpose“).
IV. DISCUSSION
The Adams Campaign challenges the CFB‘s denials of matching funds made in December 2024, January 2025, March 2025, and April 2025. (See Am. Pet. ¶ 2.) The April 2025 denial, however, is the operative decision. (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 13.) And for that
The court finds that the CFB provided two independent valid grounds for denying the Adams Campaign public matching funds: (1) failure to timely respond to the CFB‘s request for information and (2) failure to timely file the COIB disclosure. To that end, the court grants the CFB‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies Plaintiffs’ request for relief pursuant to
A. COIB Disclosure
The CFB is entitled to judgment on the pleadings because undisputed material facts demonstrate that Mayor Adams failed to make a timely COIB disclosure before the April 15, 2025 meeting. The CFA requires mayoral candidates to “fulfill the requirements of section 12-110 of the administrative code of the city of New York, including payment of any penalties as determined by the” COIB.
A participating candidate shall fulfill the requirements of section 12-110 of the administrative code to the satisfaction of the [COIB] by the twenty-fifth day after the last day for filing his or her designating or independent nominating petitions pursuant to the election law in the year of the covered election, or such other later date as the [CFB] shall provide by rule, ... provided that a participating candidate seeking public funds for a December 15, January 15, February 15, March 15, or April 15 payment date shall file a report or reports as required by subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of subdivision b of section 12-110 and in order for such candidate to receive public funds on any such payment date the participating candidate shall fulfill the requirements of section 12-110 to the satisfaction of the [COIB] by no less than three days prior to such payment date.
Additionally, a “candidate who fails to adhere to the requirements” of
Here, the parties agree that Mayor Adams did not file his COIB disclosure at least three days before the April 15, 2025, payment date to the COIB‘s satisfaction. (See Opp. at 30; Reply at 1.) Indeed, not only did Mayor Adams submit his COIB disclosure on April 14, 2025—the day before the April 15 payment date—but his COIB disclosure was also incomplete and therefore not to the COIB‘s satisfaction.19 (Gallagher Email at ECF p. 88; First Ryan Decl. ¶¶ 54-55.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs contend that because Mayor Adams successfully filed his COIB disclosure on April 25, 2025, the CFB “had no lawful basis for deciding on May 12, 2025 that the Adams Campaign was not eligible for campaign funds.” (Opp. at 30.)
Plaintiffs’ argument stems from a misunderstanding of the May 12, 2025, decision. This decision was the CFB‘s ratification of the Chair of the Board‘s denial of the Adams Campaign‘s petition
Plaintiffs argue that “[e]ven assuming the annual disclosure was the basis for the CFB‘s decision, the deadline for filing the annual disclosure is, at best, unclear.” (Opp. at 28.) But the deadlines set forth by New York election law, the COIB Rule 4-05, and the CFB Rules appear to be consistent. The relevant time window for Mayor Adams to file his petition for independent nomination for New York City mayoral general election was between May 20, 2025, and May 27, 2025.
Nevertheless, Mayor Adams‘s late COIB disclosure is not a complete bar to his claim for matching funds in the future; rather, it “may result in a delay of any payment of public funds by the board.”
B. Failure to Respond to the CFB‘s Request
The CFB is also entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the Adams Campaign failed to timely respond to the CFB‘s request for information and documents. The CFA and the CFB Rules provide the CFB with broad authority to seek documents and information. In pertinent part, the CFA states that “[t]o be eligible for optional public financing,” a candidate must “obtain and furnish to the campaign finance board, and his or her principal committee or authorized committees must obtain and furnish to the board, any information it may request relating to his or her campaign expenditures or contributions and furnish such documentation and other proof of compliance[.]”
On November 15, 2024, the CFB sent a letter to counsel to the Adams Campaign, requesting certain records relating to the campaign‘s activities, including documents and events referenced in
Judge Ho dismissed the Indictment against Mayor Adams with prejudice on April 2, 2025. (See
The Adams Campaign plainly did not comply with
C. The CFB‘s “Reason to Believe” Standard
Plaintiffs raise multiple challenges, including facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, to the CFB‘s “reason to believe” standard in CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B). The court acknowledges that when “a case may be resolved on other grounds, courts may decline to reach a constitutional question to ‘avoid deciding constitutional issues needlessly.‘” Kreisberg v. HealthBridge Mgmt., LLC, 732 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002)). However, considering the next payment date of July 15, 2025, and the upcoming mayoral
1. First Amendment Free Speech Clause
First, the court concludes that Plaintiffs plausibly allege that CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B), as applied to the Adams Campaign, violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to free speech—political expression and political association—under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the New York State Constitution.24
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
It is the settled law of this land that any government regulation related to “contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). And it is also “well established that contributors to political parties and campaigns engage in protected First Amendment activities.” Corren v. Sorrell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 479, 493 (D. Vt. 2015); see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee [of the First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.“) Thus, “[t]he statutory and regulatory scheme ... implicates the First Amendment” where it “provides an administrative board with discretion to determine candidates’ eligibility for subsidies for speech—that is, public matching funds to political candidates.” Liu, 2015 WL 1514904, at *9 (concluding that the political campaign suing the CFB for matching funds “alleged sufficient facts to establish standing“).
Although not exacting as strict scrutiny, this standard of review is nevertheless rigorous. See Upstate Jobs Party v. Kosinski, 106 F.4th 232, 249 (2d Cir. 2024). The government “bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.” McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 572 U.S. 185, 210 (2014) (plurality opinion); see also United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (same). And while “consistently reject[ing] attempts to restrict campaign speech based on other legislative aims[,]”
As an initial matter, the court acknowledges that the “reason to believe” standard set forth in CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) “does not prevent” the voters or supporters “from making a contribution“; rather it “minimize[s] the value of that contribution” when the Board denies matching funds pursuant to that rule. See Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 193. Put differently, the Board‘s denial under the rule does not prevent the underlying contribution from reaching the campaign. It logically follows then that when analyzing Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge here, the court must apply “the less stringent standard of review” of whether the rule is “closely drawn to address a sufficiently important [municipal] interest” in order to survive such challenge. Id.
Next, applying the above standard to the facts here, this court finds that although the CFB meets its burden of identifying a sufficiently important interest justifying the “reason to believe” standard, the standard itself is not closely drawn to address that interest. Defendant argues that “the Rule and its application to
The CFB further argues that “the Rule is closely drawn because it is ‘reasonable, commensurate with the interest served, and not necessarily the least restrictive means but a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.‘” (Mot. at 33 (quoting Upstate Jobs Party, 106 F.4th at 254).) Other than arguing that the rule “only targets candidate conduct that is detrimental to the Program during Program participation” and claiming that “[i]t
When applying CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) to the Adams Campaign, the Board did not engage in any independent fact-finding. Instead, on November 15, 2024, about 7 weeks after the Indictment was unsealed, the Board requested certain information from the Adams Campaign, having already determined that “[b]ased on the indictment, there is reason to believe that the Campaign[] committed violations of various federal statutes, Campaign Finance Act provisions, and Board Rules[.]” (Schaffer Letter at ECF pp. 338-39.) When the Adams Campaign did not provide the records requested in the CFB‘s November 2024 letter, on December 18, 2024, the Board issued its first nonpayment determination to the Adams Campaign. (December Not.) Once again, the Board did not engage in any independent fact-finding. Instead, the CFB concluded that it “ha[d] reason to believe that Eric Adams ... ha[d], in the course of public funds program ... participation, engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program .. . as described in the September 26, 2025 indictment.” (
But “an indictment is not evidence of guilt.” United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Awadallah, 457 F. Supp. 2d 246, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“An indictment is merely an accusation. It is proof of nothing. You may
Significantly, even after Judge Ho dismissed it with prejudice, the CFB continued to rely on the Indictment in denying matching funds to the Adams Campaign. (See Am. Not. at ECF pp. 94-95.) In its brief, the Board argues that “[t]here is no indication that the DOJ moved for dismissal, or that Judge Ho ordered dismissal of the charges for lack of merit.” (Mot. at 18.) The Board is correct: Judge Ho did not dismiss the Indictment for lack of merit. Indeed, in an opinion dismissing the Indictment, he voiced his “substantive concerns about the reasons for dismissal offered by the Justice Department itself,” and noted that the dismissal was not “any kind of statement about the merits of the allegations against the Mayor in the Indictment.” United States v. Adams, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 24-CR-556 (DEH), 2025 WL 978572, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2025). But even then, he emphasized that the “decision ... [was] not about whether Mayor Adams is innocent or guilty,” either, because “Mayor Adams, like any person accused of a crime, is presumed innocent until proven guilty.”
The court appreciates the unique circumstances of Mayor Adams‘s indictment, followed by the dismissal of the same with prejudice. But the Board‘s reliance on the now-dismissed Indictment to exercise its discretionary authority under CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) to deny the matching funds is not narrowly tailored to achieve the objective of curtailing corruption. It is not even clear to this court that the Board would not have relied on the Indictment or trial testimony, had Mayor Adams‘s criminal case proceeded to trial and resulted in full acquittal. Would the CFB still have relied on the Indictment to deny the matching funds? What if Mayor Adams was not indicted at all, but was accused of misconduct based on the same facts in a newspaper article or in a series of social media posts? Would the Board have denied around $3.5 million in matching funds based on those allegations? The court is unable to find answers to these questions in the CFB‘s briefs or pleadings. And the CFB‘s consistent reliance on the Indictment from November 2024 (only a few weeks after the Indictment was unsealed) to May 2025 (after Judge Ho dismissed the Indictment with prejudice) does not foreclose those possibilities. That is precisely the problem with the “reason to believe” standard as applied to the Adams Campaign.
To be clear, the Board need not have applied the rule in the least restrictive way possible to survive Plaintiffs’ as-applied First Amendment challenge. It simply needed to rely on the rule as “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective” of preventing corruption or its appearance. Upstate Jobs Party, 106 F.4th at 254. But Plaintiffs correctly point out that the rule completely excludes “the Campaign from participating altogether in the City‘s matching fund[s] program,” and does not simply limit
The court also notes that Defendant‘s reliance on Liu is misguided. There, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ as-applied First Amendment challenge to then-CFB Rule 5-01(f) which—similar to the rule at issue here—provided the Board with authority to deny matching funds based on the “reason to believe” standard. Liu, 2015 WL 1514904, at *9. But Judge Richard J. Sullivan in Liu examined the following facts that justified the outcome: “given the prosecution and conviction of [the campaign treasurer and candidate‘s fundraiser], the evidence introduced at their trial, and the separate investigation conducted by the Board and its investigator, Thacher Associates, there was ample basis for the Board to believe that Plaintiffs had violated the [CFA] and Board rules.”
Furthermore, neither the criminal complaint filed against Mohamed Bahi nor Erden Arkan‘s Plea of Guilty convinces this court otherwise. With respect to the former, Mr. Bahi is entitled to the same presumption of innocence as is Mayor Adams.26 As to Mr. Arkan, in relevant part, CFB Rule 1-02 defines the term “Candidate” as “every authorized committee of the candidate, the treasurer of each such committee, and any other agent of the candidate.” But Mr. Arkan was never a member of the Adams Campaign, Mayor Adams‘s administration, or otherwise an agent of Mayor Adams. See United States v. Arkan, No. 25-CR-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (Information (Dkt. 1) ¶ 2 (alleging that Mr. Arkan “direct[ed] certain of his employees to make contributions to the 2021 Campaign for New York City Mayor“).) Ultimately, the relevant rule authorizes the Board to deny matching funds if it has “reason to believe that ... the candidate has engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of any other applicable law.” CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) (emphases added). Because Mr. Arkan is not a “candidate” under CFB Rule 1-02, the Board cannot rely upon Mr. Arkan‘s Plea of Guilty to support a finding that it had “reason to believe” that Mayor Adams “engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of any other applicable law.” (
Lastly, it is exactly because of Judge Sullivan‘s well-reasoned opinion in Liu that this court also concludes that Plaintiffs’ facial challenge fails. Considering that the language of the rule in Liu was almost the same as CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B), the court finds that the latter is not “unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Upstate Jobs Party, 106 F.4th at 245 (explaining that “a facial challenge” can only succeed if the plaintiff can “establish[] that no set of circumstances exists under which” the law “would be valid“). For instance, had the CFB denied matching funds to the Adams Campaign after Mayor Adams or his campaign treasurer, Sharon Adams, was convicted of or entered a Plea of Guilty to any relevant criminal charges, neither of which is the case here, the Board‘s reliance on Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) would have been appropriate. See CFB Rule 1-02. Similarly, had the CFB engaged in independent fact-finding and investigation after such convictions, as it did in Liu, Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge would have likely failed. See 2015 WL 1514904, at *9. Because under those circumstances the rule‘s application would have been reasonable, the court finds that CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) is not facially unconstitutional.
To conclude, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) as applied to the Adams Campaign is unconstitutional under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the New York State Constitution because it is not “closely drawn to address a sufficiently important state interest” of preventing corruption or its appearance. Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 193; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (noting that the “First
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
Second, Plaintiffs also plausibly allege that CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B), as applied to the Adams Campaign, violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution.28 In relevant part,
Plaintiffs appear to raise a procedural due process claim only. (See Am. Pet. ¶ 162 (“It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)))); see also Opp. at 20 (explaining the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine).) The CFB, contradicting itself, interprets Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause claim as a substantive Due Process Claim as well. (Compare Mot. at 24 (identifying Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Clause claims as “a ‘constitutional right to participate in the mayoral election on the same terms as other candidates’ and ... depriv[ation] ... of their interests in ‘the continued availability of the opportunity to participate in the Democratic Party‘s mayoral primary’ and ‘to participate in the general election‘” (quoting Am. Pet. ¶¶ 138, 142)), with id. at 25 (identifying the same claims as “what appear[] to be ... substantive due process claims“).) For the avoidance of the doubt, the court addresses both substantive and procedural Due Process Clause claims, in that order.
a. Substantive Due Process Claims - Free Speech & Property
Plaintiffs cannot bring a successful substantive due process challenge; while their due process claim based on their free speech
The Supreme Court has previously “afforded constitutional protection” to certain benefits “as a species of property protected by the federal Due Process Clause.” Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970) (describing “welfare entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity‘“)). As a general rule, “[i]n determining whether a given benefits regime creates a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause,” the Second Circuit “look[s] to the statutes and regulations governing the distribution of benefits.” Id. Thus, “[w]here the administrative scheme does not require a certain outcome, but merely authorizes particular actions ... , the scheme does not create ‘entitlements’ that receive constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O‘Rourke, 930 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1991) (“If
Like certain government benefits, “[f]reedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” De Jonge v. State of Or., 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). Relatedly, however, “where another provision of the Constitution provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection, a court must assess a plaintiffs claims under that explicit provision and not the more generalized notion of substantive due process.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 293 (1999) (holding that “[c]hallenges to the reasonableness of a search by government agents clearly fall under the Fourth Amendment, and not the Fourteenth,” because “[i]n essence[,]” the respondent “argues that the prosecutors searched him in an unreasonable manner“); see also Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 103 (2d Cir. 2019) (collecting cases and explaining that “the plaintiffs’ substantive Due Process claim is subsumed by their Equal Protection claim” because “the Supreme Court [has] narrowed the scope of substantive Due Process to claims that are not covered by other provisions of the Constitution“). Accordingly, where a due process claim is duplicative of a more specific claim under the federal constitution, it “is either subsumed in [the] more particularized allegations, or must fail.” Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 94 (2d Cir. 2005).
Here, Plaintiffs identify two kinds of interests allegedly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause. Specifically, they argue that the Board‘s application of CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) deprived them of their liberty interest, to exercise their right to free speech, and property interest, in receiving matching funds, without due process. (Opp. at 20 n.12.) The court addresses each argument in turn.
First, Plaintiffs have a liberty interest in their free speech, as campaign contributions, that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause. See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 191 (“If the First Amendment protects flag burning, funeral protests, and Nazi parades-despite the profound offense such spectacles cause-it surely protects political campaign speech despite popular opposition.“); see also De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364. But the First Amendment already “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection” for Plaintiffs’ liberty interest. Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 293. Accordingly, this court will not assess Plaintiffs’ substantive Due Process Clause claim arising out of their liberty interest in their free speech under the “generalized notion of substantive due process.” Id. That claim is duplicative of and subsumed by their First Amendment challenge this court already addressed above. See Velez, 401 F.3d at 94 (explaining
Second, the CFB‘s matching funds program provides government benefits to qualified political campaigns. See Liu, 2015 WL 1514904, at *10 (describing the CFB‘s discretion to provide “public matching funds to political candidates” as a process of “determin[ing] candidates’ eligibility for subsidies for speech“). But Plaintiffs’ expectation of receiving such benefits does not automatically create a property interest in it. See Kapps, 404 F.3d at 113. Because the CFB Rules provide “an independent source ... that secure [these] benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits,” see Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, the court must look to CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) to “determin[e] whether ... [the matching funds] regime creates a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause,” Kapps, 404 F.3d at 113.
The Board has promulgated the rule as a rule of “Discretionary ineligibility.” CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B). And the rule provides almost unbridled discretion to the Board to deny “public funds payment” to a candidate that it has “reason to believe . . . engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of any other applicable law.” Id. This rule “does not require a certain outcome“; instead, it “merely authorizes particular actions[,]” leaving it outside the “constitutional protection [of] the Fourteenth Amendment.” Sealed, 332 F.3d at 56. The court finds the Second Circuit‘s reasoning in Plaza Health particularly instructive. There, the Second Circuit closely analyzed “whether the provider of services” in the Medicaid context “had a property right ... to continue to participate in the program.” Plaza Health, 878 F.2d at 581-82. In suggesting that the provider likely does not have such a right, the court underlined a provision allowing the New York State Department of Social Services to terminate the provider‘s participation “if the department f[ound] that the
Therefore, because CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) “vests in the [Board] significant discretion over the continued conferral of [the matching funds] benefit,” O‘Rourke, 930 F.2d at 175, Plaintiffs do not “have a legitimate claim of entitlement” to those funds to establish a property right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause, Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Plaintiffs’ failure to allege that they have property interest in public matching funds is fatal to their claim.
In sum, the court concludes that while Plaintiffs’ first substantive due process claim is duplicative of their First Amendment challenge, their second substantive due process claim is meritless because Plaintiffs do not have a property interest in public matching funds that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process clause.
b. Procedural Due Process - Void for Vagueness
The court finds that Plaintiffs adequately allege that the CFB violated Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B), as applied to the Adams Campaign, is void for vagueness. “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the ... Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Thus, claims based on lack of procedural due process are “composed of two elements: (1) the existence of a property or liberty interest that was deprived and (2) deprivation of that interest without due process.” Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep‘t, 692 F.3d 202, 218 (2d Cir. 2012).
Because the “void for vagueness” doctrine “is chiefly applied to criminal legislation,” civil enactments “receive less exacting vagueness scrutiny.” Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982) (“The Court has also expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.“). However, “as Grayned suggests, vagueness in the law is particularly troubling when First Amendment rights are involved.” Farrell, 449 F.3d at 485; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (“Where a statute‘s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.“). And the Supreme Court “has recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law‘s vagueness, especially with
Plaintiffs raise both as-applied and facial vagueness challenges against CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B). (Am. Pet. ¶¶ 165-66.) They allege that the rule is void for vagueness because it “fails to identify with any clarity the conduct that resulted in the CFB‘s decision to deny campaign matching funds to the Adams Campaign,” and “is not clearly defined; it is not defined at all.” (Id. ¶¶ 163-64; see also Opp. at 20 (arguing that “the ‘reason to believe’ standard contained in Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) at the very least ‘encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement’ of the regulation” (quoting Hill, 530 U.S. at 732)).) The CFB counters that “Mayor Adams was reasonably on notice that an Indictment charging alleged straw donations and bribery would provide reason to believe that he had engaged in conduct considered contrary to the goals of the Program, and indeed, detrimental” to it. (Mot. at 29.) Likewise, the Board contends that “the Rule has a defined standard preventing arbitrary application,” and “[e]ven if the Rule does not provide a clear standard, Mayor Adams‘s actions as alleged in the Indictment fall directly within the core of the Rule‘s prohibition on conduct detrimental to the program[.]” (Id.) As to the facial challenge, while Plaintiffs do not appear to advance any arguments in the opposition brief, the CFB mainly relies on its arguments regarding the as-applied challenge and Judge Sullivan‘s reasoning in Liu. (Mot. at 29-30.)
The court addresses the as-applied challenge first, because “a finding of facial constitutionality does not foreclose ‘as-applied’ challenges.” Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 184 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, Plaintiffs have a liberty interest in their
Next, as to the due process element, the court first discusses the notice prong of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. The court notes that the CFB‘s most recent denial of public matching funds to the Adams Campaign on April 15, 2025, (see April Not.), post-dates Judge Ho‘s dismissal of the Indictment with prejudice on April 2, 2025, see generally Adams, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 978572. Without determining whether the rule adequately put the Adams Campaign on notice that a pending indictment would result in adverse action, the court does not see how the Adams Campaign should have reasonably been on notice of this outcome after the criminal charges against Mayor Adams were dismissed. It is not clear how the Adams Campaign could have “act[ed] accordingly” given that after the Indictment was dismissed, no “person of ordinary intelligence [would have] a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. To the contrary, because “Mayor Adams, like any person accused of a crime, is presumed innocent until proven guilty,” see Adams, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 978572, at *2, he had no adequate notice that the dismissed indictment would give the Board a “reason to believe” that Mayor Adams engaged in conduct detrimental to the Program, see also Deck, 544 U.S. at 630 (acknowledging the presumption of innocence of the criminal defendant); Powell, 287 U.S. at 52 (same); Prigg, 41 U.S. at 576 (same). Indeed, the CFB Rules do not provide any guidance as to what constitutes “conduct detrimental to the Program that is in violation of any other applicable law.” CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B). Consequently, to the extent the Board relied on the Indictment-after its dismissal
The court also emphasizes that because “First Amendment rights are involved” in this case, see supra Part IV.C.1, the “vagueness in [Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B)] is particularly troubling.” Farrell, 449 F.3d at 485. Although the rule “is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment,” it does not offer “a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts” to survive the void-for-vagueness challenge as applied to the Adams Campaign. Smith, 415 U.S. at 573. And the fact that the rule has no “scienter requirement [that] may mitigate [its] vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to [Mayor Adams] that his conduct is proscribed,” further cuts in favor of this court‘s conclusion. Vill. of Hoffman Ests., 455 U.S. at 499.
While Plaintiffs adequately allege an as-applied challenge on the first independent and sufficient prong of the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine, the court finds that the rule, as applied to the Adams Campaign, survives the challenge with respect to the second, enforcement standards, prong of the test. This court need not determine, however, whether the rule “provide[d] sufficiently clear standards to eliminate the risk of arbitrary enforcement,” because preventing corruption, which is the targeted conduct at issue here, “falls within the core” of the rule‘s prohibition. See Cunney, 660 F.3d at 621-22. As the court explained above in discussing the First Amendment challenge, see supra Part IV.C.1, given the CFB‘s Vision and Mission Statements, it is reasonable to infer that the Board promulgated CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) to “prevent[] ... quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.” Cruz, 596 U.S. at 305-06. And such conduct, or its appearance, would be “detrimental to the Program.” CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B). Ultimately, however, because the court already
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ facial due process clause claim fails. For similar reasons that this court concluded that a facial First Amendment challenge to CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) fails, it finds that the rule is not void for vagueness “in all of its applications.” Upstate Jobs Party, 106 F.4th at 245. Again, the Liu court‘s interpretation of the “reason to believe” standard in an almost identical CFB rule is persuasive. See 2015 WL 1514904, at *13 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge under the First Amendment because the “reason to believe” standard “is sufficiently definite to guide the CFB‘s action“). The court acknowledges that the Liu court did not analyze the vagueness of the rule as part of a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. Even then, the facts in Liu convince this court that the language of CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B) “give[s] the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know” that the campaign treasurer‘s and fundraiser‘s convictions arising out of campaign-related criminal acts would lead to nonpayment decisions as to public matching funds. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. As such, the rule is not void for vagueness in all circumstances.
In conclusion, despite the court‘s findings as to the procedural due process claim, undisputed material facts show that the Board had independently sufficient reasons to deny the Adams Campaign the matching funds. For those reasons, the CFB is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
The CFB is entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim under the
To adequately plead a class-of-one claim, “plaintiffs must show an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves.” Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.); see also Hu, 927 F.3d at 92 (same). Thus, to succeed on a class-of-one claim,
a plaintiff must establish that he and a comparator are prima facie identical by showing that (i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate government policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances and difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendant acted on the basis of a mistake.
Hu, 927 F.3d at 92. Plaintiff also “bear[s] the burden of sufficiently alleging similarly situated comparators” in their pleadings. See NRP Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo, 916 F.3d 177, 204 (2d Cir. 2019).
Plaintiffs claim that the denial of matching funds “violates the right of Mayor Adams, the Adams Campaign, and the Mayor‘s supporters to participate on an equal basis with all other candidates in the mayoral campaign.” (Am. Pet. ¶ 64; see also id. ¶¶ 137-43.) However, in their opposition, Plaintiffs present their equal protection claim as a “class-of-one claim” predicated on the notion that Mayor Adams and Andrew Cuomo are “identically
Additionally, while the CFB denied the Adams Campaign matching funds based on multiple violations of the CFB Rules on multiple occasions since December 2024, it only believed that Mr. Cuomo violated a single CFB Rule. (See Reply at 14-15.) Furthermore, the Board initially denied Mr. Cuomo‘s campaign public matching funds on April 15, 2025 as well based on violations of a different CFB rule. (See Second Ryan Decl. ¶ 7.) And it only reversed course after Mr. Cuomo‘s campaign “successfully provided enough of the[] statements” that the relevant CFB rule demanded (Id.)
On July 10, 2025, Plaintiffs, with leave of court, filed a response letter to the Second Declaration of Paul Ryan. (Pls.’ Letter (Dkt. 16).) In the letter, among other things, Plaintiffs state that Mr. Ryan‘s declaration revealed that the CFB “revised the amount of the withholding” from the Cuomo campaign “based on subsequent documentation provided to the Board and in response to a Rule 7-09 petition,” while it refused to consider the Adams Campaign‘s late submissions when it held a meeting on May 12, 2025. (Id. at 1.) To that end, Plaintiffs argue that “Mr. Ryan‘s Second Declaration thus establishes that the Adams Campaign was treated less favorably than the Cuomo Campaign.” (Id. at 1-2.)
Therefore, Plaintiffs, in their petition, fail to allege any candidates in similar circumstances that the CFB has treated differently. See, e.g., Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59-60 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal because the complaint failed to allege specific examples of applications that were made by persons similarly situated); NRP Holdings, 916 F.3d at 198-99 (affirming dismissal because the complaint provided insufficient details about unnamed similarly situated developers). Accordingly, undisputed material facts demonstrate that the CFB is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to the equal protection claim.
D. Remaining Issues
1. CFB‘s Rulemaking Authority
The court concludes that the CFB did not exceed its rulemaking authority under the CFA. The Board has the statutory authority to promulgate CFB Rule 3-01(d)(ii)(B). The CFA sets forth eligibility requirements for “optional public financing.” Admin. Code § 3-703. Accordingly, among other things, candidates must meet certain ballot requirements, file a written certification opting into the Program, provide the CFB with requested information regarding campaign contributions or expenditures, and comply with contribution limits. See
Under New York law, “an administrative regulation will be upheld only if it has a rational basis, and is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” N.Y. State Ass‘n of Cntys v. Axelrod, 78 N.Y.2d 158, 166 (1991) (collecting cases). The burden is on “[t]he challenger [to] establish that a regulation is so lacking in reason for its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary.” Id. Also relevant here, agencies are “permitted to adopt regulations that go beyond the text of [their] enabling legislation.” In re Acevedo, 29 N.Y.3d at 221. An agency, “as a creature of the Legislature, is clothed with those powers expressly conferred by its
Here, the CFB has broad rulemaking powers entrusted to it by the CFA. Not only does it “have the authority to promulgate such rules and regulations . . . necessary for the administration of” Chapter 7 of the CFA, see
The CFA‘s purpose is to help ensure the ethical conduct of electoral candidates and elected city officials by reducing their reliance on large contributions, enabling them to communicate with the electorate, and keeping voters informed of local campaign issues, and increasing public confidence in the electoral process. See Jeffrey D. Friedlander, Stephen E. Louis & Laurence D. Laufer, The New York City Campaign Finance Act, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 345, 354-55 (1988). Similarly, as the court discussed above, the Board‘s goals include preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. Thus, the court finds that the CFB
2. New York City Administrative Procedure Act
Plaintiffs’ claim under the New York City Administrative Procedure Act (“CAPA“) (codified at N.Y.C. Charter § 1041 et seq.) is also unavailing. CAPA Section 1046(f) states that “[w]here any agency is authorized to conduct an adjudication ... [a]ny recommended decision, final decision, determination or order shall be in writing, or stated in the record if the parties are present, and shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law.” N.Y.C. Charter § 1046(f). In turn, CAPA Section 1041(1) defines “Adjudication” as “a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of named parties are required by law to be determined by an agency on a record and after an opportunity for a hearing.” N.Y.C. Charter § 1041. Plaintiffs contend that the CFB violated CAPA when it denied the Adams Campaign public matching funds without making any findings of fact. (Am. Pet. ¶¶ 89-94 (citing N.Y.C. Charter § 1046).)
However, the CFB did not conduct any hearing before reaching its decision. Nor was it required to do so under the CFB Rules or the CFA. While Plaintiffs are correct that CAPA Section 1046 requires that agencies provide “findings of fact” to support their “conclusions of law,” CAPA Section 1046 applies only to determinations made after hearings conducted as part of adjudications. See N.Y.C. Charter § 1046(f). And “[a]djudications” under CAPA are “proceeding[s] in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of named parties are required by law to be determined by an agency on a record and after an opportunity for a hearing.” N.Y.C. Charter § 1041(1) (emphasis added); see also In re Landmark West! v. Tierney, No. 107387/05, 2005 WL 2108005, at *2 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (“Charter Section 1046 applies
3. CFB Rules 7-08 & 7-09
The court finds that the CFB complied with its own rules in providing written explanations to the Adams Campaign in denying the campaign‘s request for matching funds. In pertinent part, CFB Rule 7-08, titled “Notice to candidates,” requires the Board to “notify the candidate in writing of any non-payment determination.” Such notice must “specify[] the basis for payment or non-payment of public funds[.]” CFB Rule 7-09(a). Plaintiffs allege that the Board “has failed to comply with Rules 7-08, 7-09, and 10-03 in denying campaign matching funds to the Adams Campaign.” (Am. Pet. ¶ 81.) In support of this claim, they further allege that the CFB‘s Amended Notice issued to the Adams Campaign on May 2, 2025 did not provide any specific factual basis for denying matching funds. (Id. ¶ 58.)
But the Board correctly points out that CFB Rule 7-09 “addresses the review process for non-payment decisions.” (Mot. 12 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs appear to confuse the procedure with substance. The Amended Notice informed the Adams Campaign that it failed “to demonstrate eligibility for a public funds payment.” (Am. Not. at ECF p. 94; see also Am. Nonpayment Determination at ECF p. 91 (providing three independent reasons for denial of matching funds).) In doing so, the Board notified the Adams Campaign of all the bases, namely, “Board Rules 3-01(d)(i)(A)(2), 3-01(d)(ii)(A)(4), and 3-01(d)(ii)(B),” for its denial of matching funds. (Am. Not. at ECF p. 94.) Furthermore, the Amended Notice listed a full paragraph of records that the Board reviewed in reaching the decision, satisfying CFB
4. Delegation of Authority to the Chair of the CFB
Next, the CFB properly delegated its authority to make determinations to the CFB‘s Chair of the Board regarding Mayor Adams‘s petition filed pursuant to CFB Rule 7-09. In relevant part, CFB Rule 7-09(c)(i) provides that the CFB “may delegate to the Chair of the Board ... authority to make a determination regarding the petition,” if (i) a petition for reconsideration is filed; (ii) the candidate waives his right to appear before the Board; and (iii) the Board is unable to convene within five business days of receipt of the petition. Here, the Adams Campaign filed a petition for reconsideration on April 25, 2025. (See Adams Campaign Appeal.) And Mayor Adams waived his right to appear before the Board in connection with the petition. (Id. at ECF p. 81.) The CFB “was unable to convene within five business days of receipt of the petition and therefore delegated to the Chair of the Board, Frederick Schaffer, the authority to make a determination regarding the petition.” (First Ryan Decl. ¶ 61.) Thereafter, the Chair of the Board denied the Adams Campaign‘s petition. (Id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiffs assert that the rule “does not confer on the Chair the authority to act when the CFB cannot meet, it simply allows the CFB to delegate that authority to the chair.” (Opp. at 28 n.16.) But this argument ignores the clear language of the text of the relevant rule, which provides that the CFB “may delegate ... authority to make a determination regarding the petition.” CFB
***
Finally, the court also agrees with Defendant that while the Petition “is styled as containing fourteen causes of action (of which the parties have stipulated to discontinue causes of action thirteen and fourteen), Plaintiffs do not allege fourteen distinct claims.” (Mot. at 9.) And because the court grants Defendant‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies Plaintiffs’ request for relief under Article 78 on two independent grounds, to the extent there are outstanding arguments raised by Plaintiffs that the court has not addressed above, it need not reach them. See Steinberg v. PRT Grp., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Because I am granting the motions on other grounds, I need not reach the[] [remaining] issues.“); see also Winnik v. Chater, No. 95-CV-695 (DC), 1998 WL 151041, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1998) (taking the same approach).
The CFB provided two independent valid reasons for its decision to deny the Adams Campaign public matching funds: (1) failure to timely respond to the CFB‘s request for information and (2) failure to timely file the COIB disclosure. Thus, the court GRANTS Defendant‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings and DENIES Plaintiffs’ demand for relief pursuant to CPLR Article 78. The court also DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claims, request for money damages, and attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses. The Clerk of Court is respectfully DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
July 11, 2025
s/Nicholas G. Garaufis
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS
United States District Judge
Notes
There is nothing in the record suggesting that the Adams Campaign requested an extension from the CFB to respond to the November 2024 request for documents. The Adams Campaign is aware such extensions are available, as they have obtained at least one extension from the CFB for a separate request. (See Second Ryan Decl. ¶ 19 n.1.)
Furthermore, the CFB contends that there is “a significant gap” in the campaign‘s eventual response to the November 15, 2024 request because “the response did not say that Mayor Adams had reviewed his own records for responsive documents.” (Mot. at 11; see also Reply at 4.) The court notes that the CFB addressed its November 15, 2024 request to the “2021 and 2025 campaigns of Eric Adams,” and not to Mayor Adams personally. (Schaffer Letter at ECF pp. 338.) If the Board intends to seek information from Mayor Adams himself, it should explicitly state so.