*1 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION BEAUMONT et al. No. 02-403. Argued March 2003 Decided June *3 J., delivered the opinion Souter, Court, of the in which Rehnquist, J., C. and Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, JJ., and Breyer, joined. Kennedy, J., an opinion filed concurring in the judgment, post, p. 163. Thomas, J., a filed dissenting opinion, J., in which Scalia, joined, post, 164. p. Deputy Solicitor General Clement the cause for argued petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Attorney Assistant General Gregory McCollum, G. Douglas Garre, Letter, N. Edward and Jona- Himmelfarb, Levy. H. James Bopp, Jr., argued cause for With respondents. him on the brief were Richard E. Coleson and Thomas J. Marzen.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were for filed the Association
of Trial Lawyers of by Jeffrey America White; Robert for the Brennan for Center Justice at New York University School by of'Law Neu- Burt borne, Schwarz, Frederick A. 0. and Deborah Goldberg; and for Public Citizen, Inc., et Nelson, al. L. by Scott Morrison, Alan B. and David C. Vladeck. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Taxpayers Alliance R by Dye; Alan for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Fetra; Deborah J. La and for Inc., RealCampaignReform.org, al. by et Olson, Miles, William J. John S. and Herbert W.Titus. of the delivered Court. opinion Souter Justice has barred from con- law 1907, corporations federal Since for office. We hold to candidates federal directly tributing nonprofit advocacy corpora- prohibition that applying Amendment. with the First consistent tions I it unlawful... for any statute makes corpora The current or to make a contribution ... expenditure tion whatever elections, federal Stat. with” certain connection § 441b(a), S. C. “contribution amended, renumbered each defined include “anything being or expenditure” 441b(b)(2). not, however, for The does § value,” prohibition administration, and solicitation establishment, “the bid fund to be utilized ato segregated separate § 431(4)(B). 441b(b)(2)(C); § Such political purposes.” committee that runs (so action called after PAC it) corporation, be controlled wholly sponsoring may members stockholders or generally whose employees §§ 441b(b)(4)(B)-(C); for contributions. See be solicited may Work v. National Election Comm’n Federal law federal While Comm., 197, 200, n. activities, their and disclose PACs register requires Massachu Election Comm’n §§ 432-434; see (1986), Inc., setts Citizens *4 well as as to make contributions the law leaves them free elections, with federal in connection other expenditures 441b(b)(2)(C). § as North Carolina known are a corporation
Respondents officers, and a North Carolina Inc., of its Life, to three Right sued the NCRL), who have (here, voter together, to set up the Commission, agency Election independent formulate and with, to obtain “administer, seek compliance §437c laws. the electoral to” federal with respect policy (b)(1). challenges § NCRL constitutionality 441b regulations FEC’s implementing section, 11 CFR §§114.2(b), (2003), 114.10 only but they so far apply as corporation NCRL. The organized is under laws North provide Carolina counseling pregnant women urge and to alternatives abortion, nonprofit as a advocacy corporation it exempted from federal taxation 501(e)(4) §by of the Internal Code, Revenue 26 U. S. C. ' 501(c)(4).1 § It has no and, shareholders although it receives some donations from traditional corporations, business it is “overwhelmingly by private funded contributions from indi App. viduals.” 14. NCRL has made contributions and ex penditures in connection with state elections, but not federal, § owing 2to U. S. C. 441b. Instead, it has established a PAC, North Carolina Life, Inc., Political Action Com
mittee, which has contributed to federal candidates. See
North
Carolina
to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett,
168 F. 3d
(CA4 1999),
(2000).
denied,
cert.
The District granted Court summary judgment to NCRL §441b and held applied unconstitutional as corpora- to the tion, both as to direct independent contributions and expend- (EDNC 2000). itures. Supp. 137F. 2d A divided Court Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 278 F. 3d 261 (2002), relying primarily on Massachusetts Citizens in which this Court held it apply unconstitutional to the stat- independent ute to expenditures by Massachusetts Citizens nonprofit for Life, Inc., advocacy corporation in some re- 501(c)(4)(A) Section grants “[cjivic exemption to leagues or organiza tions not organized profit operated but exclusively for promotion welfare,... of social the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.” An organization “may carry on lawful political activities and remain exempt under section 501(c)(4) long as it is primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare.” 81-95,1981-1 Rev. Rui. Cum. Bull. 332. Unlike contributions 501(c)(3) §to organizations, donations to those 501(c)(4) § recognized under not are tax deductible. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash, 461 *5 Appeals that ruled, first, like The Court of spects NCRL. independent expenditures may be not prohibition on acknowledged Although panel that applied to NCRL. Life, NCRL, for unlike had a formal Citizens Massachusetts against accepting corporate donations, see Massachu- policy supra, (describing 263-264 this fea- at setts Citizens Life, for organization holding”), our nev- as “essential to it ture materially indistinguishable as treated ertheless NCRL Citizens for Massachusetts Life. present purposes, Appeals point for
To the the Court of hold likewise un- went on to the ban on direct contributions majority applied as to NCRL. While the constitutional recognized regulation campaign court the divided greater contributions has received deference under First regulation independent expendi- Amendment cases (citing Missouri tures, 3d, 278 F. at Nixon Shrink (2000)), PAC, 528 Government it held the “[Mas- unjustified applied ban on direct contributions Life]-type corporations,” sachusetts Citizens which it for thought “pose[d] deployment no risk of ‘unfair of wealth for ” political purposes.’ (quoting 3d, 278 F. at 275 Massachu- 259). Appeals setts Citizens The Court of “[t]he [Mas- reasoned that rationale utilized the Court in prohibitions sachusetts Citizens to declare on inde- Life] pendent expenditures applied [the unconstitutional as ad- vocacy corporation there] equally applicable involved the context of direct contributions.” 3d, 278 F. at 275. Judge Gregory point, dissented from the others on this since way square he saw no their conclusion with this Court’s reasoning in to Work. 3d, F. 282.
After the denying Fourth Circuit divided 7 to 4 in rehear- ing petitioned banc, en solely the FEC for certiorari as to constitutionality of the ban on direct contributions.2 Be-
2We thus have no occasion to say whether the Court cor Appeals rectly held NCRL entitled to the so-called “Massachusetts Citizens for exception” to expenditures. the statute’s ban on independent Life *6 cause on that issue the Fourth Circuit conflict with the Kentucky Right Terry, to Inc. v. Sixth, see 108 F. 3d 637, (1997) 645-646 a law provision (upholding Kentucky to we analogous §441b), certiorari, 537 1027 granted (2002). We now reverse.
II
A
attack on
Any
the federal
of direct
prohibition
political contributions
the current of a
goes against
century
congressional
efforts
curb corporations’
potentially
“deleterious
influences on federal elections,” which we have
times before. United
States Auto
canvassed a
number
v.
mobile Workers,
id.,
567,
(1957);
585
see
570-584;
at
see also Pipe-
Work,
208-209;
at
U.
v. United States, United
385,
(1972);
S.
fitters
CIO,
States
Since resulting political activity, in re sometimes tion feature, in overhaul.3 One law, sometimes finement legisla throughout stayed “careful this however, has intact laws,” National adjustment of electoral the federal tive periodic Work, 209, and much of pro strengthen original, core was meant amendment Foreign The corporate contributions. direct hibition *7 example, the broadened 1925, for Corrupt Act of Practices “anything value,” of to include on ban receiving match the a contribution to the act criminalized making 368, §§302, 313, 43 Stat. criminality of one. Ch. Manage instance, the 1947Labor So, in another 1070,1074. permanently within unions labor Act drew ment Relations prohibition to include invigorated the earlier the law’s reach “exp 159; §304, 61 120, Stat. as well. Ch. enditure[s]” supra, at 402. Pipefitters, see “special character- focuses on the
Today, law 1907,the as in integrity that threaten corporate structure” istics of the Right Work, 459 U. process. National political of the Michigan Chamber also Austin id., 207; at see 209; at (1990); 652, Massachusetts 658-659 S. Commerce, 494 U. Election 257-258; Federal S., 479 Citizens Life, Comm., Action Political National Conservative Comm’n v. Austin, explained it in As we 480, 470 500-501 3 19, 822; See, e. Act of June 1910, 392, Aug. g., Act of 25, 36 Stat. ch. 368, 1925, Act, 25; ch. Corrupt Practices 1911, 33, Federal ch. Stat. (Hatch Dis Act), 767; War Labor 19, 54 Stat. 1070; July Stat. Act 167; 9,§ Relations 144, Management Act, 57 Stat. Labor 1943, ch. putes 718; §21,65 159; 31, 1951, 1947, of Oct. Stat. Act, §304,61 Act Stat. (FECA), 3; Amendments 86 Stat. FECA of 1971 Act Campaign Election 1976, 475; FECA 1263; 90 Stat. Amendments FECA Stat. ofAct 1339; Reform Campaign Bipartisan 93 Stat. Amendments of 2002, 116 81. Stat. grants corporations
“State law special advantages —such liability, perpetual as limited life, and favorable treat- ment of the accumulation and distribution of assets— ability capital their enhance to attract deploy and to their ways resources that maximize the return on their shareholders’ investments. These state-created advantages only not corporations allow play a domi- nant role in economy, the Nation’s permit but also them to use ‘resources amassed in the marketplace’ economic ‘an obtain unfair advantage in political market- ” place.’ atS., (quoting Massachusetts 257). Citizens supra, public Hence, the interest in “restrict[ing] the influence of political war through chests funneled corporate form.” National Conservative Political Comm., Action supra, at (“[Sub- 500-501; see Work, at 207 aggregations stantial of wealth special amassed ad- vantages go which with the organization form of should not be into converted ‘war chests’ which could be used incur legislators”). debts from excerpts
As these opinions from recent only show, not has original ban direct contributions endured, *8 but so original have the rationales for the bar- In law. ring corporate earnings from conversion into “war chests,” the ban was and “preven[t] intended corruption appearance or the corruption.” of National Conservative supra, Political Action Comm., at 496-497; see also First Nat. Bank Boston Bellotti, v. 435 U. 765, S. 788, n. 26 of (1978) (“The importance governmental pre- interest in venting [corruption] doubted”). has never been But the ban always has duty done further in protecting “the individuals paid money who have into a corporation pur- or union for poses other support than the of candidates having money support political used to they candidates whom may opposed.” be National supra, to Work, 208; at supra, CIO, S., 113; Austin, see also at 673-678 335 U. see (Brennan, concurring). J., corruption aside from war-chest and the interests
Quite regu- however, owners, and another reason contributors emerged re- lating electoral involvement has with contributions, individual and have on recent cases strictions organi- restricting recognized that various against hedges use as “circum- their conduits for zations [valid] Election contribution limits.” Federal vention of Republican Campaign Comm., v. Colorado Comm’n (2001); supra, 456, Austin, at 664. 431, and n. 18 533 U. S. degree corporation that a could contribute to To the it, or it, individuals “who created who own candidates, the employs,” Promotions, v. Kushner Ltd. whom it Cedric (2001), King, bounds could exceed the money by diverting imposed on their own contributions through corporation, Republican, cf. Colorado subject limiting coordi- at 446-447. As we said on the expenditures experience by political parties, nated “demon- parties limits donors, and test the candidates, strates how beyond law, it serious doubt how the current shows to circum- if inducement contribution limits would be eroded Id., vent them were enhanced.” at 457. repre- campaign regulation sum,
In our cases finance special respect “legislative judgment that the sent require particu- characteristics of the structure larly regulation.” Right Work, careful 209-210. And deference we have understood that such Congress legislative particularly choice is when warranted regulates campaign they plain carrying contributions, do political integrity plain threat to counter and a warrant appearance reality corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages. g., Buckley See, Valeo, 424 S. e. (1976) curiam). (per 26-28, As we said Colorado Republican, clearly justi- “limits on contributions are more *9 by link corruption fied a to limits on other kinds of . . spending . (corruption are being under- only quid pro quo stood not agreements, but also as undue judgment, influence on an officeholder’s appearance and the influence).” (citation omitted). of such atS.,U.
B prologue That historical discourage would any broadside attack on campaign regulation finance regula- or tion of contributions, and accordingly ques- NCRL § only tions 441b to the extent places the law nonprofit advo- cacy corporations like itself general under the ban direct contributions. But not even this more challenge focused can claim a Judge slate, blank Gregory rightly said in . his explanation dissent that our in National to Work all but against decided the issue position. NCRL’s §441b to provision Work addressed the restricting corporation a nonstock membership to its when soliciting contributions to its PAC,4 and we considered nonprofit whether a corporation advocacy without members of the usual sort could be held to violate by the soliciting law a donation to its any PAC from individual who had at one time contributed corporation. See 459 S., at 199- 200. We position sustained FEC’s that a fund drive as beyond broad as this went per- solicitation of “members” §by mitted 441b, history and we invoked distilled above holding that the statutory infringement restriction was no on those First rights Amendment closely associational akin speech. Id., at 206-209. We concluded congres- that judgment sional regulate corporate political involvement 441b(b)(4)(A) Section bars corporation from soliciting contributions to a PAC established by the corporation, except from stockholders or other specified categories of persons. 441b(b)(4)(C), Section the specific provi Work, National Right sion at issue provides, in relevant part, 441b(b)(4)(A) § “shall prevent corporation not a . . . without capital stock ... from soliciting contributions PAC [a established the corporation] members such .. . corporation.” *10 and “reflects a considerable deference” permissi- “warrants to the of the by assessment dangers posed [corporations] ble Id., at 207-211. process.” electoral Right to read our conclusion National be hard would It Work, that the to restrictions were constitu- PAC solicitation on the that the tional, except understanding practical corpo- was to make contributions lim- ration’s capacity legitimately indirect donations within the allowed to ited to PACs. scope g., id., See, e. “the both (reviewing statutory prohibi- the fact, In we tions exceptions”). specifically rejected made to here, that deference congressional judg- argument about limits on contributions turns ments proper corporate form or the affluence of on details particular corporate In breath, the same we remarked corporations. §441b and labor
broad applicability “corporations well resources, unions without financial as as those great situated,” more and made a fortunately point refusing a determination as to the need for “second-guess legislative where is the evil feared.” measures prophylactic corruption Id., at 210.
Later cases without have repeatedly acknowledged, ques Right of National as Work tioning, reading generally contributions, §441b on direct approving prohibition even re financial “without by nonprofit corporations great Ibid. In National Political Ac Conservative sources.” tion Committee, of National we not example, only spoke Right to Work as consistent with “the well-established con stitutional con validity legislative regulation tributions to candidates for went on to re office,” but public affirm that in that case had Court concluded “rightly Congress include, with labor unions and might along corpora tions contributions prohibited traditionally making candidates, contri membership corporations, though butions not evil that latter exhibit all of the by might traditional organized corpora economically id., (describ- tions S., exhibit.” at 495, 500; at 500 ing National giving Work “proper deference to congressional a determination of the need prophylactic for a rule”). Relying again on to Work, we made point similar in Austin when we Michigan’s sustained ban on direct though contributions, even the ban “in- cluded] scope within closely its corporations held that do possess not vast capital.” reservoirs of 661. *11 “Although. closely corporations, some held just as some publicly may held ones, not significant have accumulated they amounts wealth, of special receive from the the State benefits by conferred the present structure and potential the distorting for the process. po- This tential justifies for [the distortion law’s]general state appli- cability corporations.” to all Ibid.
But National to Work does not stand alone in its bearing on the equal here, issue significance must be accorded to Massachusetts Citizens very the case for upon which Appeals NCRL and the Court of placed have principal prohibition There, reliance. we held the on in- dependent expenditures §441b under unconstitutional as applied nonprofit to a advocacy corporation. While the majority explained generally “potential that the for unfair deployment political purposes” wealth jus- fell short of tifying a ban on expenditures by groups like Massachusetts Citizens for pose Life “do that danger not corrup- tion,” the majority’s response pointed to the dissent to a dif- ferent present resolution the case. 479 S., at 259. dissenting opinion noted that Massa- The Chief Justice’s chusetts Citizens for Life “was not corporation unlike” the at issue in Right Work, which he sup- read as porting independent ban on expenditures. 479 U. S., at 269. Without disagreeing similarity about the of the two organizations, majority nonetheless distinguished Na- tional ground Work on the addressing its regula- tion of expenditures. contributions, not See 479 U. S., at (“[R]estrictions on require less com- restrictions on spend- justification independent pelling “In in historical role of contributions light ing”). of the for a broad electoral need pro- corruption process, rule thus sufficient was contributions] [against phylactic Right Work]” [National Id., at 260.
C held that, The have never we upshot squarely although with- NCRL’s we could not hold for it here, position against our of the risks of harm out posed recasting understanding contributions, of the sig- corporate political expressive of contributions, nificance and of the deference consequent what do about them. owed on legislative judgments efforts, however, fail to unsettle law any NCRL’s existing of these points. "[Massa that on a
First, NCRL class-wide basis argues Life]-type chusetts Citizens no corporations pose poten tial of so that the threat to the system,” governmen tal interest is as weak as the Court combating corruption consid held it to be in relation to the particular corporation *12 ered in Massachusetts Citizens Brief for Re for Life. 19. But this does not hold spondents generalization up. For we will assume present advocacy corporations purposes, are from traditional different business generally corpora that tions in the they might improbability make would end causes that some of their supporting up Massachusetts Citizens members would not See approve. supra, at 260-262.5 But concern about the Life, corrupt- for 5 said, That is not wholly inapplicable advocacy corpora this concern to tions, as that an “persons may organization desire use their contributions cause, may organization further a but not want the their certain to use solely for or candidates money opposition to urge support S., Massachusetts Citizens at Life, basis of that cause.” 479 U. for event, 261. corruption In we have never intimated that any the risk See, alone support regulation is contributions. insufficient Commerce, e. g., Austin v. Chamber 652, Michigan 658-659 S. Comm., (1990); Comm’n 459 Federal Election to Work National ing potential ban underlying may indeed be implicated by advocacy corporations. like their They, for- profit benefit from counterparts, significant “state-created supra, Austin, 659, advantages,” well may be able to ” amass substantial 'war chests,’ “political Work, S.,U. at 207. Not all corporations that qualify for favorable tax § treatment 501(c)(4) under of the Internal Revenue Code lack substantial resources, and the category covers some of the most Nation’s politically powerful organi- zations, the AARP, including the National Rifle Association, and the Sierra Club.6 Nonprofit advocacy corporations are, moreover, no less susceptible traditional business com- panies misuse as for conduits circumventing contribu- tion limits on individuals. Austin, imposed Cf. at 664 (noting a nonprofit is corporation of “serv- capable as a for ing] conduit corporate political spending”).7 197, U. (1982); S. cf. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC, Government 6See (as http://www.aarp.org/press/disclosure.html 12, 2003) visited June (available file) in Clerk of (AARP); Court’s case http://www.give.org/ (as 2003) reports/index.asp (available visited June in Clerk of Court’s file) (National case Rifle Club). Association Sierra These examples answer NCRL’sargument that the Massachusetts Citizens excep for Life tion “self-limiting.” (“If See Respondents Brief for [a Massachusetts Citizens Life}-type corporation begins generating receiving or substan for tial business income or corporation business contributions, definition, by it automatically is no longer [aMassachusetts Citizens type corpora Life]- tion” (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Inc., (1986))). 238, 263-264 The nonprofit advocacy corporations (one has, mentioned fact, which been granted "[Massachusetts Citizens Life]-type” status a Court ofAppeals, see, e. g.,FEC v.National Rifle ” (CADC Assn., 2001)) 173, 192 254F. 3d show that “political“warchests’ ma y be amassed simply members’ contributions. 459 207. 7NCRL suggests that the Government’s interest in combating circum *13 of campaign vention the finance laws would be sufficiently bymet allowing subject limited contributions to the earmarking §441a(a)(8), rule of which that provides “contributions are in which any way or earmarked otherwise through directed intermediate or an conduit to [a] candidate” are treated (thus as contributions the candidate the triggering require- disclosure
161 on its the ban Second, that of NCRL argues application be to a strict level of scrutiny, should subject contributions § 441b that does not limit contribu ground the merely on for bans them of Brief tions, but on the basis their source. the overlooks however, 14-16. This argument, Respondents in First Amendment we followed have basic premise setting the financial restrictions: standards reviewing political the of the based on scrutiny “political level importance or association. at issue” to effective activity speech political Colo Massachusetts Citizens 259; 479 U. Republican, Nixon, rado 440-442, 6-7; S., at and nn. 533 U. Buckley Valeo, S., at 386-388. back to v. 528 U. Going have contributions (1976), restrictions political restrictions sub treated as been merely “marginal” speech the First Amend under review relatively complaisant ject to the ment, because contributions lie closer edges Republican, See Colorado core of political expression. result political at 440.8 “While contributions may the, ... if a candidate or an association spent by expression involves into debate transformation of contributions 434(b)(3)(A)). § this Respondents rejected Brief for 31. We ments of Re- v. Colorado in Federal Election Comm’n however, precise argument, Comm., (2001), we con- S. where publican Campaign directly difficulty identifying “ignores practical it cluded Id., at 462. conditions.” under actual combating circumvention attempts only clumsy would reach the most “The earmarking provision... earmarking to candidates. To treat pass through contributions disarm seri- any would provision acceptable tailoring outer limit of as the Ibid. ous limit [circumvention].” effort to contributions generally, Within the realm of First corporations’ since political expression, are furthest from core derived largely and association interests are speech Amendment Patterson, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. members, see, g., e. those of their information, (1958), public receiving and of the S. Bellotti, 765, 777 Nat. Bank Boston see, g., First e. of cor A members ban contributions leaves individual on direct contributions, public porations deprives make their own free to little or information. no material
speech by someone other than the Buckley, contributor.” supra, at This is 20-21. the reason that instead requiring regulations contribution to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, “a limit contribution in- volving ‘significant interference’ with rights” associational passes it muster if satisfies the lesser being demand “ ” ‘closelydrawn’ ‘sufficiently to match a important interest.’ supra, Nixon, (quoting at 387-388 Buckley, 25); supra, at Austin, cf. S., at Buckley, 657; supra, at 44-45.9 recognition
Indeed, degree this of scrutiny turns on activity nature of regulated only practical is the way square leading two cases: National to Work ap- proved strict solicitation limits on a organized PAC to make contributions, see 459 U. at 201-202, whereas Massachu- setts applied Citizens compelling a interest test to for Life invalidate the advocacy ban an corporation’s expenditures light regulatory PAC burdens, see 479 S.,U. at 252-255; see id., also at (opinion of O’Connor, Each case J.). involved §441b, after all, the same “ban” on the same “sources” of activity applied in both cases.
It is not that the difference between a ban and limit is ignored; to be just it is that the time to consider it is when applying scrutiny at the level selecting selected, not in standard of review itself. But even urges pre when NCRL cisely § that, and asserts that is sufficiently 441b not “closely drawn,” the claim still on a premise, rests false for NCRL simply wrong §441b in characterizing complete as a ban. As we have said before, the “permits section participa some tion of unions corporations proc the federal electoral 9Judicial deference is particularly where, here, warranted we deal with a congressional judgment that has remained essentially unchanged throughout a century of “careful legislative adjustment.” National Right Work, supra, at Nixon, 209; supra, at 391 (“The cf. quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny legislative judg ments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justifi raised”). cation pay to establish and by allowing them
ess administrative [PACs].” supra, expenses Work, supra, Austin, 660; also Citizens 201; Massachusetts option The PAC at 252. allows *15 participation temptation political without the corpo to use quite possibly influence, rate funds with odds of some shareholders or the sentiments and it lets members, regulate campaign activity through regis the Government jeopardizing disclosure, §§432-434, and tration without advocacy organizations’ rights of members, the associational Patterson, ex rel. 449, 462 see NAACP v. Alabama 357 U. S. (1958) (holding membership that disclosure of “Compelled advocacy organization engaged particular in in an beliefs” Amendment). may violate the First prevail, simply by arguing cannot then, NCRL that a ban advocacy corporation’s on an direct is bad tai- contributions loring. would NCRL have to demonstrate that the vio- law allowing lated the First in Amendment contributions to be only through subject made its PAC to a adminis- PAC’s trative burdens. But a unanimous in Court National regulatory to Work did not think the PACs, burdens on in- cluding ability funds, restrictions on their to solicit rendered advocacy corporation’s PAC unconstitutional as an sole making political avenue for contributions. 459 See U. 201-202. There is no reason to think burden on advo- cacy corporations any greater today, or to reach a different conclusion here.
III judgment The Appeals of the Court is reversed.
It is so ordered. Justice in Kennedy, concurring judgment.
My position, expressed dissenting previous opinions in in sustaining cases, has been that the erred in certain Court state speech and federal in the cam- restrictions misapprehended First paign basic finance context and doing principles in See Nixon v. Shrink Amendment so. (2000) (Ken PAC, 377, 409 S. Missouri Government U. Michigan dissenting); Com Chamber nedy, J., Austin v. (1990) dissenting); J., merce, S. (Kennedy, Campaign Federal Republican Colorado Federal Comm. (1996) (Kennedy, J., Comm’n, Election dissenting part). concurring judgment in I adhere give weight to no those authorities view, this and so can the instant case. Elec- acknowledged said,
That it must be Inc., 479 tion Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens (1986) (MCFL), language supporting the contains S. reg- be holding can Court’s here that closely corporate expenditures. The lan- ulated more guage upon reconcile tends to which the Court relies ear- approach in and the Court’s *16 tension MCFL between v. National lier decision in Federal Election Comm’n Comm., to Work 197 U. S. presented in which distinction we with case
Were expenditures the whole under and between contributions review, campaign regulation were under finance scheme opinion. dissenting The might join I Justice Thomas’ comprehensive examination Court does not undertake that language in here, there is MCFL however. And since judgment. today’s holding, supports I in the concur with whom Justice Scalia Thomas, joins, Justice dissenting. are sub- finance laws
I continue to believe that campaign Election v. Colo- Federal Comm’n strict scrutiny. ject Campaign 431, Republican Comm., 533 U. S. rado Federal II) (Colorado (2001) J., Col- (Thomas, dissenting); Campaign Republican Comm. v. Federal orado I) (Colorado (1996) 604, 640 Comm’n, Election J., in dissenting part). (Thomas, judgment concurring PAC, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government also See Colo- (2000) As J., dissenting). (Thomas, II, rado S. C. does not here that U. Government argue In- survives review under that standard. §441b rigorous could not. deed, it traditional strict scrutiny, “[U]nder in the ... caps giving political process broad prophylactic Colorado 640-641, unconstitutional,” are . . . I have because, before, are not narrowly explained they id., interest, to meet relevant state any tailored compelling II, Nixon, also Colorado 641-644; at 427-430. See supra, at 465-466. I affirm the would judg- Accordingly, dissent ment of the Court Appeals respectfully the Court’s contrary disposition.