EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C.EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C.
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-1229. Argued March 25, 2025—Decided June 18, 2025
The Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a comprehensive venue framework for judicial review of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions designed to ensure proper distribution of cases among federal courts. Under
Under the CAA‘s renewable fuel program, most domestic refineries must blend specified amounts of ethanol and other renewable fuels into transportation fuels they produce. The Act provides a phased exemption scheme for small refineries—those processing no more than 75,000 barrels of crude oil daily—allowing them to petition EPA for exemptions based on “disproportionate economic hardship.”
EPA then proposed and ultimately denied 105 small refinery exemption petitions in two omnibus notices issued in April and July 2022. EPA‘s denials were based on two principal determinations: first, its interpretation that “disproportionate economic hardship” covers only hardship directly caused by renewable fuel program compliance; and second, its economic theory that Renewable Identification Number (RIN) costs are fully passed through to consumers, creating a presumption against granting exemptions. EPA applied these determinations uniformly while conducting confirmatory reviews of individual refinery circumstances. EPA asserted in its denial notices that the denials were reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit, either as “nationally applicable” actions or, alternatively, as locally applicable actions “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
Small refineries challenged these denials in multiple regional Circuits. Most Circuits either dismissed the challenges for improper venue or transferred them to the D. C. Circuit. However, the Fifth Circuit retained jurisdiction, rejecting EPA‘s venue arguments and ruling for the refineries on the merits. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that EPA‘s actions were merely locally applicable because their “legal effect” was limited to the petitioning refineries, and that the actions were not based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect because EPA still examined refinery-specific facts before issuing denials.
Held: EPA‘s denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or regionally applicable actions that fall within the “nationwide scope or effect” exception, requiring venue in the D. C. Circuit. Pp. 6–21.
- Section 7607(b)(1) creates a two-step inquiry for determining venue. First, courts assess whether an EPA action is nationally applicable or only locally or regionally applicable. If nationally applicable, the case belongs in the D. C. Circuit. If locally or regionally applicable, courts proceed to the second step to determine whether the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies to override the default rule of regional Circuit review. Pp. 6–13.
- To identify the relevant “action,” courts must look to the authorizing CAA provision rather than how EPA packages its decisions. The enumerated “actions” in
§7607(b)(1) make clear that this provision “treats each activity the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to take as a distinct ‘action.‘” Kentucky v. EPA, 123 F. 4th 447, 460. Because the CAA allows “[a] small refinery” to “petition [EPA] for an extension of [its] exemption” and requires EPA to “act on any petition submitted,” each EPA denial of a refinery‘s exemption petition constitutes its own “action” for venue purposes. Pp. 7–8. - An action is “nationally applicable” if it applies “[o]n its face” throughout the entire country, or only “locally or regionally applicable” if it applies only to particular localities or regions. Sierra Club v. EPA, 926 F. 3d 844, 849. EPA‘s denial of a single refinery‘s exemption petition applies only to that refinery, a particular entity in a particular place, making such denials paradigmatically “locally or regionally applicable” actions. Pp. 8–10.
- To identify the relevant “action,” courts must look to the authorizing CAA provision rather than how EPA packages its decisions. The enumerated “actions” in
- EPA‘s argument that it can control the unit of “action” for venue purposes by aggregating similar petitions into omnibus notices lacks any statutory limiting principle and would effectively give EPA veto power over venue. EPA‘s position that any action affecting more than one Circuit is nationally applicable would render actions with plainly local or regional focus “nationally applicable” simply because the locality or region straddles Circuit lines. Pp. 10–13.
- Because EPA‘s actions are locally or regionally applicable, the Court must determine whether the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies. This exception requires that (1) the action “is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” and (2) EPA “finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” All agree the second requirement is satisfied. Pp. 13–21.
- A “determination” refers to EPA‘s justifications in taking the action. Determinations are of nationwide “scope” if they apply throughout the country “as a legal matter (de jure)” and of nationwide “effect” if they so apply “as a practical [matter] (de facto).” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th, at 465. An EPA action is “based on” a determination of nationwide scope or effect only if that determination “lie[s] at the core of the agency action” and forms the primary explanation for and driver of EPA‘s action. Texas v. EPA, 829 F. 3d 405, 419. This requires more than but-for causation; it requires that a justification of nationwide breadth be the most important part of EPA‘s reasoning. Courts should evaluate this de novo. Pp. 13–17.
- Applying this framework, EPA‘s exemption denials were based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. EPA‘s interpretation of “disproportionate economic hardship” under
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) and its RIN passthrough theory are clear determinations of nationwide scope or effect that apply generically to all refineries regardless of geographic location. These determinations formed the core basis for EPA‘s denials because EPA used them to reach a presumptive resolution to deny all petitions, then considered refinery-specific factors only to confirm it had no reason to depart from this presumptive disposition. Where EPA relies on determinations of nationwide scope or effect to reach a presumptive resolution, those determinations qualify as the primary driver of its decision. EPA‘s confirmatory review of refinery-specific facts is “[m]erely peripheral” by comparison. Texas, 829 F. 3d, at 419. Pp. 17–18. - The Court rejects EPA‘s argument that “determination” covers only the resolution of unsettled issues, as well as respondents’ argument that “determination” is a term of art applicable only when a CAA provision textually directs EPA to make a “determination” for the entire Nation. The Court also rejects the argument that EPA‘s consideration of refinery-specific facts precludes the exception‘s application,
noting that the exception requires an action be “based on,” not “based solely on,” a determination of nationwide scope or effect. Pp. 18–21.
86 F. 4th 1121, vacated and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 23–1229
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONER v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C., ET AL.
[June 18, 2025]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a tripartite system for determining venue in CAA litigation. Challenges to “nationally applicable” Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions belong in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit, while challenges to “locally or regionally applicable” EPA actions ordinarily belong in a regional Circuit.
I
A
In 1977, Congress replaced this patchwork system with the CAA‘s current scheme, which makes all EPA actions directly reviewable in a federal court of appeals. 91 Stat. 776 (codified as amended at
Congress also created a third venue category in the 1977 amendments. This category provided an exception to the default rule that locally or regionally applicable actions should be reviewed in the regional Circuits. Congress instructed that a locally or regionally applicable action must be reviewed in the D. C. Circuit “if [it] is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and “if in taking such action [EPA] finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination.”
B
The EPA actions at issue in this case relate to the CAA‘s renewable fuel program (RFP). The RFP “requires most domestic refineries to blend a certain amount of ethanol and other renewable fuels into the transportation fuels they produce.” HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., 594 U. S. 382, 385 (2021). Each covered refinery‘s precise obligation turns on its proportional share of various “nationwide volume mandates.” Id., at 385–386; see
Covered refineries demonstrate compliance through a system of Renewable Identification Number credits (RINs). See
The CAA contains a phased exemption scheme for small refineries—i.e., refineries whose “average aggregate daily crude oil throughput for a calendar year . . . does not exceed 75,000 barrels.”
C
This case arose in the aftermath of HollyFrontier. Pending that decision, the D. C. Circuit had been holding in abeyance challenges to EPA‘s resolution of 36 small refineries’ exemption petitions for the 2018 compliance year. Afterwards, that court granted EPA‘s motion for remand without vacatur, so that EPA could reconsider its orders in light of the HollyFrontier litigation. Order in Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 19–1196 etc. (CADC, Dec. 8, 2021), p. 3. The D. C. Circuit instructed EPA to issue its new decisions within 120 days. Ibid.
After receiving comments, EPA followed through and denied the pending exemption petitions in two omnibus notices. EPA issued the first in April 2022 to deny the 36 petitions subject to the D. C. Circuit‘s deadline.
EPA also asserted in the denial notices that its denials were reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit. According to EPA, the notices were “nationally applicable” actions under
Notwithstanding EPA‘s position, small refineries challenged these denials in a host of regional Circuits. Agreeing with EPA that the litigation belonged in the D. C. Circuit, most of these Circuits either dismissed the petitions for improper venue or transferred them to the D. C. Circuit.1
The Fifth Circuit took a different approach. Evaluating the petitions filed by six small refineries (respondents here), the Fifth Circuit held that the litigation was properly before it. The majority rejected the arguments for transfer raised by EPA and a group of intervenors, reasoning that EPA‘s notices were merely locally or regionally applicable actions, because their “legal effect” was limited to the petitioning refineries. 86 F. 4th 1121, 1131–1132 (2023). And, contra EPA, the notices were not based on any determination of nationwide scope or effect. Both EPA‘s new interpretation
Judge Higginbotham dissented on venue grounds. In his view, EPA‘s denial notices were nationally applicable because they applied throughout the country: EPA applied a consistent approach to small refineries spanning “eighteen different states, in the geographical boundaries of eight different circuit courts.” Id., at 1143–1144. And, if the notices were only locally or regionally applicable, then EPA was correct to find that the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applied: EPA‘s statutory interpretation and its passthrough theory were “core determinations” that have nationwide scope or effect in that they “are applicable to all small refineries no matter the location or market in which they operate.” Id., at 1145. We granted certiorari to clarify where venue properly lies. 604 U. S. ____ (2024).
II
A
To properly categorize EPA‘s actions at the first step, we must determine what the relevant “action” is, and what it means for an action to be “nationally applicable” as opposed to “locally or regionally applicable.” Once those principles are clarified, the categorization here is straightforward.
1
Because
To determine which framing matters for purposes of
The enumerated “actions” in
Accordingly, for both
2
The next question is whether a given action is “nationally applicable” or only “locally or regionally applicable.” Because
The statutory context supplied by
3
Applying these principles here, we treat each EPA denial of a refinery‘s exemption petition as its own “action” for venue purposes. And, EPA‘s denial of a single refinery‘s petition plainly is only locally or regionally applicable.
This conclusion follows from how the CAA defines the submission and evaluation of an RFP exemption petition. The CAA allows “[a] small refinery” to “at any time petition [EPA] for an extension of [its] exemption” from RFP obligations.
Against this backdrop, our classification decision is straightforward. By definition, EPA‘s denial of a single refinery‘s exemption petition only applies to that refinery, which is a particular entity located in a particular place. That limited reach makes EPA‘s denials paradigmatically “locally or regionally applicable” actions. See Sierra Club, 926 F. 3d, at 849.
B
We are unpersuaded by EPA‘s and the intervenors’ counterarguments. EPA proffers its omnibus denial notices as the relevant “actions” on the ground that it has the discretion to structure its decisions. According to EPA, it is free to “aggregate similar petitions for joint resolution” in a single “action“—here, its omnibus Federal Register notices—given its right as an agency “to fashion [its] own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting [it] to discharge [its] multitudinous duties.” Brief for Petitioner 26–27 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 143 (1940)). But, whatever discretion EPA has to manage its internal affairs, Congress conclusively defined the term “action” in
Tellingly, EPA‘s position that it can control the unit of “action” used to determine venue lacks any statutory limiting principle. If EPA had free rein to group decisions into a single “action” for venue purposes, then it could bundle even unrelated matters into one Federal Register pronouncement that is, in the aggregate, nationally applicable. Such a possibility would effectively give EPA a veto power over venue under the CAA. we see no reason to read
Because EPA does not dispute that the actions here can be nationally applicable only if it is right that the omnibus denial notices are the relevant “actions,” we need not resolve EPA‘s remaining arguments. At a minimum, however, we note that EPA‘s theory for distinguishing between nationally applicable and locally or regionally applicable actions cannot withstand scrutiny. EPA argues that any agency action is nationally applicable if it affects more than one Circuit. But, as we have recognized, the term “nationally applicable” bears its ordinary meaning, supra, at 8–9, and EPA‘s view would render actions with a plainly local or regional focus “nationally applicable” simply because the locality or region at issue straddles Circuit lines. For exam-ple, some EPA air quality control regions cover metropolitan areas that extend into two Circuits. It would defy credulity to say that an EPA action regarding such a region would therefore be nationally applicable rather than locally or regionally applicable. Cf. Brief for Small Refinery Respondents 41 (“Can there be any doubt that an EPA disapproval of a regional implementation plan for only Region 90 (Metropolitan Kansas City) is a ‘regionally applicable’ action even though that action touches both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits?“). Whatever the precise line should be, see n. 3, supra, EPA‘s line cannot be it.
EPA justifies its position based on
Finally, we find no merit in the intervenors’ arguments for why the denial of an individual refinery‘s exemption petition should still be considered nationally applicable. According to the intervenors, the individual denials are nationally applicable because they have follow-on effects for the amount of renewable fuel that must be produced under the RFP and because EPA in issuing the denials announced a new standard for adjudicating exemption petitions. But, again, we determine an action‘s range of applicability by “look[ing] only to the face of the [action], rather than to its practical effects.” American Road & Transp. Builders Assn., 705 F. 3d, at 456. Any follow-on implications of EPA‘s denials have no bearing on our analysis of their facial applicability. Cf. Sierra Club, 47 F. 4th, at 744 (“The fact that ‘EPA‘s interpretive reasoning’ may have ‘precedential effect in future EPA proceedings . . . does not make [an action] nationally applicable‘“).
III
Because we conclude that EPA‘s actions were only locally or regionally applicable, we must proceed to the second step of the
A
Here too, we begin by laying out the framework for deciding whether an action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” We conclude that this requirement is met if such a determination supplies a core justification for EPA‘s action and that courts should evaluate the basis for EPA‘s determinations de novo. Applying that framework, we hold that this case is one in which the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies.
1
To understand the phrase “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” we again turn to ordinary meaning. Burrage, 571 U. S., at 210. In particular, we look to the plain meaning of this phrase‘s component words, which are all terms of everyday usage. And, we read these words “in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989).
To begin, a “determination” is the “settling and ending of a controversy,” or “the resolving of a question by argument or reasoning.” Webster‘s 616; see also 4 Oxford English Dictionary 548 (2d ed. 1989) (“[t]he decision arrived at or promulgated; a determinate sentence, conclusion, or opinion“). In an EPA action, EPA‘s underlying “determinations are the justifications [it] gives for the action,” which “can be found in [its] explanation of its action.” Texas v. EPA, 829 F. 3d 405, 419 (CA5 2016).
In turn, a determination‘s “scope” and “effect” refer, respectively, to its “formal ‘area’ of operation” and to its “‘operative influence.‘” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th, at 465; see, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary 1164 (1969) (defining “scope” as the “area covered by a given activity or subject“); Webster‘s 724 (defining “effect” as “something that is produced by an agent or cause“). An agency‘s determinations are of “nationwide” scope or effect if they apply “throughout [the] entire nation.” Id., at 1505. Taken together, an agency action involves determinations of nationwide “scope” if they apply throughout the country “as a legal matter (de jure)” and determinations of nationwide “effect” if they so apply “as a practical one (de facto).” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th, at 465.
Of course, nearly all agency actions can be said to involve justifications of nationwide reach or consequence. For example, most EPA actions presumably rely on EPA‘s interpretations of its governing statutes.
The key question, then, is the degree of causality contained in the phrase “based on.” And, the meaning of that phrase is context dependent. In many cases, it “indicates a but-for causal relationship.” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 63 (2007). But-for causation is a comparatively lenient standard, which is met so long as a result “would not have occurred in the absence of—that is, but for—[a party‘s] conduct.” Burrage, 571 U. S., at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other cases, however, more is needed. Congress sometimes uses phrases such as “based on” to cover
It follows that an EPA action is “based on” a particular determination only if that determination “lie[s] at the core of the agency action,” so as to form the most important part of the agency‘s reasoning. Texas, 829 F. 3d, at 419. Put more concretely, an EPA action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect only if a justification of nationwide breadth is the primary explanation for and driver of EPA‘s action. A determination of nationwide scope or effect does not rise to this level if EPA also relied in significant part on other, “intensely factual” considerations, or if the key driver of EPA‘s action is otherwise debatable. Id., at 421; see also id., at 419 (“The default presumption is that petitions for review of locally or regionally applicable actions ‘may only be filed in the United States Court of Appeal for the appropriate circuit‘“).
2
In deciding whether a particular EPA action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” courts should assess EPA‘s reasoning de novo. This standard follows from the structure of the “nationwide scope or effect” exception: The exception applies only “if” a locally or regionally applicable action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect “and if” EPA, in taking the action, finds and publishes that the action has this basis.
The upshot is that courts must “make an independent assessment of the scope of [EPA‘s] determinations.” Texas, 829 F. 3d, at 421. That is, they should parse the reasoning offered by EPA in taking an action to decide which determinations primarily drove the action. Courts routinely analyze filings to identify their substance, and the language of the “nationwide scope or effect” exception directs them to do the same here.
In so holding, we do not downplay the importance of EPA‘s role. Because the “nationwide scope or effect” exception can
the possible determinations of nationwide scope or effect.4 Thus, EPA‘s choices will matter, even as courts must assess the bases for EPA‘s actions themselves.
3
Applying this framework, we conclude that EPA‘s denials of the small refineries’ exemption petitions were based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. We agree with EPA‘s finding—published in both its April and June denial notices—that its interpretation of the phrase “disproportionate economic hardship” under
Both conclusions are clear determinations of nationwide scope or effect: EPA invoked both its statutory interpretation and its passthrough theory in justifying its denials, and both points apply generically to all refineries, regardless of their geographic location. After all, the CAA is a federal statute, and
These conclusions also can be deemed the “basis” for EPA‘s denials here. EPA decided, in light of the foregoing determinations, that it would presumptively deny all the exemption petitions before it. Supra, at 4–5. It then considered other, refinery-specific considerations only to confirm that it had no reason to depart from its presumptive disposition. Supra, at 5. In this posture, EPA‘s statutory interpretation and passthrough theory plainly are the most important parts of its reasoning. Or, put another way, where EPA relies on determinations of nationwide scope or effect to reach a presumptive resolution, those determinations qualify as the primary driver of its decision. EPA‘s confirmatory review of refinery-specific facts is “[m]erely peripheral” by comparison. Texas, 829 F. 3d, at 419.
Accordingly, we agree with EPA that the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies here. The Fifth Circuit should have transferred this case.
B
We are unpersuaded by the counterarguments raised by EPA, respondents, the Fifth Circuit, and the dissent.
Although we agree with EPA‘s bottom-line position that the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies, we reject its roundabout approach to the word “determination.” EPA argues that “[t]he word ‘determination’ ” in
Moreover, we do not see how EPA‘s proposed approach can be squared with its requested disposition. If a “determination” covers only the resolution of an unsettled issue, it is not obvious why EPA‘s June denials contain any determinations: EPA‘s June notice purported to “appl[y] the approach . . . adopted in the April” notice. App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a. EPA attempts to avoid this difficulty by proposing a holistic assessment of novelty that considers factors such as “whether EPA announced the rule or policy at roughly the same time as the challenged agency action itself.” Brief for Petitioner 41. But, we do not see how this amorphous test follows even from EPA‘s view.5
Respondents argue that the word “determination” in
The dissent would similarly limit the “nationwide scope or effect” exception to reach only statutorily enumerated determinations, but its arguments fare no better. The dissent highlights that various CAA substantive provisions require EPA to make particular “determinations” before taking an action. Post, at 3–6, 10 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). But, it does not follow that Congress meant to encompass only statutorily enumerated determinations when it spoke generally in the exception of actions “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
Finally, we are unpersuaded by respondents’ argument, accepted by the Fifth Circuit, that the “nationwide scope or effect” exception is inapplicable in light of EPA‘s consideration of refinery-specific facts. That exception requires that an EPA action be “based on” a determination of nationwide scope or effect, in contrast to another part of
*
*
*
We agree with the Fifth Circuit that EPA‘s actions here are only locally or regionally applicable, although we clarify that the relevant actions are EPA‘s individual denials of the small refineries’ exemption petitions. But, under a proper understanding of
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.
Though I would reach a different judgment, the Court and I travel much of the way together. This case involves six small refineries. Each petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency for a hardship exemption from the Clean Air Act‘s renewable fuel mandates. The agency denied all six refineries’ petitions. The question we face does not concern the merits of what EPA did, only where the small refineries’ lawsuit challenging the agency‘s actions should be heard. The Act instructs that litigation over “nationally applicable” EPA “actions” belongs in the D. C. Circuit, while disputes over “locally or regionally applicable” agency “actions” generally belong in a regional circuit.
But then, in Part III of its opinion, the Court pivots. Even when a case challenges only a “locally or regionally applicable” action, the Court observes, the Act routes it to the D. C. Circuit if EPA‘s action “is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” Applying a new multistep test it announces, the Court concludes that EPA‘s actions at issue here were based on such a determination. As a result, the
In my view, that pivot is a mistake. The Clean Air Act‘s venue provision works in harmony with its substantive provisions. Throughout, those substantive provisions direct EPA to make certain “determinations” before it may take certain “actions.” When it comes to acting on a small refinery‘s hardship petition, nothing in the Act‘s substantive provisions calls on EPA to make a “determination of nationwide scope or effect.” Instead, the Act requires the agency to evaluate only whether a particular small refinery seeking an exemption would suffer a hardship without one. Accordingly, the Act‘s venue provision routes this dispute to a regional circuit, just as the Fifth Circuit recognized below. The Court‘s new and reticulated test for assessing venue disputes under the Act strikes me as both mistaken and likely to render simple venue questions unnecessarily difficult and expensive to resolve.
I
Start with how I would analyze this case. The Clean Air Act‘s venue provision, found in
As I see it, the Act itself supplies the answer. Working in concert with the Act‘s venue provision, the Act‘s substantive provisions tell us what kinds of “actions” the agency is lawfully authorized to take and when those actions may be based on “determinations of nationwide scope or effect.” Here, the relevant substantive provisions permit EPA to take a specific “action“—namely, the granting or denying of a small refinery‘s hardship petition. But, by their terms, those provisions do not call for a nationwide “determination” when the agency acts. Instead, the only decisions EPA must make are refinery-specific ones. Accordingly, the dispute before us belongs in an appropriate regional circuit.
A
To appreciate how the Act‘s substantive and venue provisions interact, begin with a look at the substantive provisions addressing the renewable fuel standards that lie at the heart of this case.
As a rule,
Now apply these observations about
The substantive provisions at issue in today‘s companion case illustrate the same point. That litigation revolves around federal air quality standards and the State Implementation Plans (SIPs) States must prepare to meet them. See Oklahoma v. EPA, 605 U. S. ___ (2025) (slip op., at 2–3). Section 7410 sets forth the general rules about what SIPs must contain and how EPA must go about assessing them. But that section also authorizes EPA to take certain actions inconsistent with those rules after making certain determinations. (For its part,
Now consider where the Act‘s venue provision sends disputes about EPA actions under these substantive provisions. Suppose EPA determines that it is “necessary” to extend the submission deadline for SIPs across the country, and the agency acts accordingly pursuant to
B
With that much in hand, return to the question whether the Act‘s venue provision directs this lawsuit to a regional circuit or the D. C. Circuit.
As we have seen,
Just walk through the substantive provisions addressing small refineries one by one. To account for the fact that small refineries may have more difficulty meeting evolving renewable fuel mandates than their larger rivals, Congress in 2005 granted them a blanket exemption until 2011. See
Any doubt on that score is resolved by comparing these substantive provisions with others we have encountered. Section
EPA‘s own statements convey the same message. The agency represents that it ” ‘consider[s] each petition on the merits’ ” and examines ” ‘individual refinery information’ ” when passing on individual hardship petitions. 86 F. 4th, at 1133. EPA represents, too, that it “determined that none of the petitioning small refineries” merited a hardship exemption only after completing “a thorough evaluation of the data and information provided” by each small refinery. Brief for Petitioner 10; App. to Pet. for Cert. 94a–95a.
As I see it, this same insight defeats EPA‘s suggestion that its actions were “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
II
Turn now to how the Court resolves this case. As we have seen, the Court first holds that EPA‘s decision whether to grant or deny an individual small refinery‘s hardship petition is a locally or regionally applicable “action.” See Part II, ante. Accordingly, the Court starts with the (correct) presumption that the suit before us belongs in a regional circuit. Ibid. But then, the Court reverses course. While EPA‘s challenged actions are local or regional ones, the Court concludes, this case belongs in the D. C. Circuit because the agency‘s actions were “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” See Part III, ante. That portion of the Court‘s opinion strikes me as both mistaken and likely to cause confusion about where Clean Air Act disputes should be heard.
To understand why, consider how the Court proceeds. Pursuing what it calls an “ordinary-meaning” approach, the Court observes that the word “determination” often refers to the ” ‘settling and ending of a controversy.’ ” Ante, at 14 (quoting Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 616 (1976)). Extrapolating from that dictionary definition, the Court reasons that “any EPA conclusion within the four corners of an action” qualifies as a “determination.” Ante, at 18 (emphasis added).
But, the Court continues, whether an action is ” ‘based on’ ” a conclusion of nationwide scope or effect depends on a “degree of causality.” Ante, at 14. Nor will just any degree of causality do. Proving that some nationwide conclusion (or now, the Court adds, “justification” or “reasoning“)
Applying all those ideas to this case, the Court holds that all of EPA‘s challenged actions were based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. That is so, the Court says, because EPA‘s actions (its decisions to deny the small refineries’ petitions) rested at their “core” on a common (or “nationwide“) understanding of the statutory phrase ” ‘disproportionate economic hardship’ ” and a common (or “nationwide“) economic model. Ante, at 17 (quoting
I find that chain of reasoning unpersuasive for a few reasons. For one thing, it seems to me pretty far afield from the statutory text. As we have seen, the Clean Air Act‘s venue provision speaks of actions and determinations, and the Act‘s substantive provisions do too. And when a substantive provision calls for either a nationally applicable “action” or a “determination” of nationwide scope or effect, it says so. To decide where a case belongs, then, no special judicially devised test is required. Instead, lawyers and judges need only open the statute books, find the relevant substantive provision, and follow its lead. As we have seen, the Court takes just this approach when addressing the meaning of the term “action” in the Act‘s venue provision. There, it concludes EPA took no nationally applicable “action” because the Act‘s substantive provisions “pe[g]” an action to a decision to grant or deny an individual hardship petition. Ante, at 10; see Part I–B, supra. On my view, we should employ that same statute-driven approach to the meaning of “a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
For another thing, the Court‘s test conflates a determination with the reasons that inform it. Statutes often “distinguis[h] between ‘considerations’ that inform [a] ‘determination,’ and the ‘determination’ itself.” Commissioner v. Zuch, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 6) (alteration omitted). The Clean Air Act is no different. It authorizes EPA to take certain actions (like waiving renewable fuel mandates or disapproving a single Governor‘s suspension of a SIP component). The Act authorizes those actions if certain determinations are made (like a determination that enforcing the renewable fuel mandates would severely harm the national economy or a determination that a Governor‘s partial SIP suspension doesn‘t satisfy certain criteria). And to support its determinations, the agency may offer any number of reasons. To avoid accusations of arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking, too, the agency will usually employ consistent reasoning in like cases. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. 211, 222 (2016). But none of that means we should conflate the determinations EPA must make under the Act with the reasons the agency offers to support them.
For another thing still, I worry that the Court‘s test will prove tough for lower courts and lawyers to apply in practice. Having conflated a “determination” with
” ‘[L]itigation over whether the case is in the right court is essentially a waste of time and resources.’ ” Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee, 446 U. S. 458, 464, n. 13 (1980). When it comes to the simple preliminary question where a case should be filed, the rules of the road should be “clear and easy to apply.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. 17, 25 (2017); see Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 94–95 (2010). The test the Court announces today can claim neither of those virtues. For the lawyers and judges tasked with applying it, I can only wish them luck.
III
To get a sense of the challenges the Court‘s test poses for future litigants and lower courts, compare this case to its companion. See Oklahoma v. EPA, 605 U. S. ___ (2025).
As we have seen, that dispute involves SIPs, plans States must submit to EPA outlining how they intend to comply with national air quality standards. See Part I–A, supra;
EPA responds that the SIPs case is, in every way that matters, like the small refineries’ case and thus belongs in the D. C. Circuit too. After all, the agency points out, it employed a common statutory interpretation and a common methodology to assess each State‘s proposed SIP—just as it did when considering the small refineries’ petitions. If the one case belongs in the D. C. Circuit, EPA argues, so must the other. See Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 23–1067 etc., pp. 30, 34–36; Tr. of Oral Arg. in Oklahoma v. EPA, O. T. 2024, No. 23–1067 etc., pp. 39, 47.
Along those lines, EPA observes that, in assessing each SIP, it asked whether the state plan before it would contribute more than “1% of the permissible ozone level to a downwind State.” Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12); Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 23–1067 etc., at 9, 35. In practice, EPA argues,
The Court disagrees. As it must under the test it announces, the Court begins by consulting all the various reasons EPA offered (some 60-plus pages of them appear in the Federal Register). Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 10–13).2 In doing so, the Court acknowledges that EPA used a common (or nationwide) statutory interpretation and a common (or nationwide) methodology when assessing all of the SIPs. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). The Court recognizes, too, that the 1% threshold played a significant role in separating the SIPs EPA approved from those it rejected. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 12–13). Still, when it comes to weighing the role that EPA‘s common (or nationwide) justifications played, the Court concludes, they were not the “primary drivers” of the agency‘s challenged actions. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). Instead,
“factual determinations particular to the State at issue” predominated. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relying on that assessment, the Court holds that Oklahoma‘s and Utah‘s lawsuit challenging EPA‘s rejection of their SIPs belongs in a regional circuit. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13).
Maybe that‘s right. But I can certainly imagine arriving at the opposite outcome under the Court‘s test. After all, EPA used a common statutory interpretation and a common methodology when assessing all of the SIPs, proceeding much as it did when evaluating the small refineries’ hardship petitions. In both cases, too, the agency factored in certain local considerations, like individual “Stat[e] circumstances” in the SIPs case, id., at ___ (slip op., at 10), and individualized “data and information” in the small refineries’ case, App. to Pet. for Cert. 94a–95a. Of course, the Court thinks EPA leaned more heavily on individualized reasons in the SIPs case, and more heavily on common ones in the small refineries’ case. Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11). But without any objective standard for weighing which predominates, there seems to me ample room for good-faith disagreement between litigants and among lower courts. And it is just that kind of ambiguity that promises protracted and expensive venue litigation going forward.
To avoid that problem, I would resolve the SIPs case the same way I would resolve the small refineries’ case: by looking to the Act itself.
*
At the end of the day, venue rules are like traffic laws. They simply tell litigants where to go, and they should be easy to follow. As I read it, the Clean Air Act provides a clear rule for cases like this one. Applying that rule here, I would direct the parties to the appropriate regional circuit. The Court doing otherwise, I respectfully dissent.