HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC, ET AL. v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION ET AL.
No. 20-472
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 25, 2021
OCTOBER TERM, 2020
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
Syllabus
HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC, ET AL. v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-472. Argued April 27, 2021—Decided June 25, 2021
When Congress created the renewable fuel program (RFP) requiring most domestic refineries to blend renewable fuels into the transportation fuels they produce, see
Here, three small refineries initially received an exemption, saw it lapse for a period, and then again petitioned for an exemption under subparagraph (B)(i). EPA granted the exemptions, and a group of renewable fuel producers objected. The Tenth Circuit vacated EPA‘s decisions, concluding that the small refineries were ineligible for an “extension” under subparagraph (B)(i) because they had allowed previous exemptions to lapse.
Held: A small refinery that previously received a hardship exemption may obtain an “extension” under
(a) The key term here—“extension“—is not defined in the statute. Sometimes it can refer to an increase in time. 5 Oxford English Dictionary 597. Other times it can refer to the act of offering or making something available, such as the granting of a benefit. Id., at 595. Here, three textual clues show subparagraph (B)(i) uses “extension” in its temporal sense. First, subparagraph (A)(i)‘s initial exemption is described temporally (as lasting “until calendar year 2011“). Second, subparagraph (A)(ii)‘s exemption is also described temporally—authorizing EPA to “extend the exemption under clause (i) . . . for a period of not less than 2 years.” Finally, subparagraphs (A)(ii) and (B)(i) share an identical title—“Extension of exemption“—underscoring the likelihood that the two neighboring provisions use the term “extension” in one consistent sense. Pp. 4–5.
(b) Subparagraph (B)(i)‘s temporal use of “extension,” however, does not require unbroken continuity. The Tenth Circuit erred by imposing such a requirement here and concluding that a small refinery is permanently ineligible for an extension once an exemption lapses. Pp. 6–12.
(1) The plain meaning of “extension” does not require unbroken continuity. Dictionary definitions contemplate the possibility of resumption after an interruption. Federal rules permit litigants to seek (and courts to grant) an “extension” of time even after a lapse. See
(2) A different statutory context might make for a different outcome, for example, where Congress uses modifying language requiring an extension to be “consecutive” or “successive.” See, e.g.,
(3) Respondents contend the statute establishes a general sunset scheme and that any exemptions were meant to end rapidly. They note that subparagraph (A) is titled “temporary exemption,” that it was permitted to expire in 2013, and that subparagraph (B)(i) speaks of extending “the exemption under subparagraph (A).” Context, however, suggests subparagraph (B) is not part of some sunset scheme. Subparagraph (A)(ii)‘s exemptions did not have to expire in 2013; they could have lasted indefinitely. Subparagraph (B)(i)‘s “at any time” language expressly contemplates exemptions beyond 2013. That looks nothing like readymade examples of sunset schemes, which Congress eschewed here. E.g., §247d–7f(b). Finally, even on respondents’ reading, a small refinery with an unbroken record of failing to comply with the RFP may continue to seek and obtain extensions forever. Pp. 11–12.
(c) In an appeal to public policy, respondents argue that subparagraph (B) was adopted to “funnel small refineries toward compliance over time” and that enforcing a continuity requirement helps advance that goal. Consistent with that view, the Tenth Circuit concluded the number of small refinery exemptions “should have tapered down” over time. Petitioners counter that the statute seeks to increase production of renewable fuel while offering an annual “safety valve” for small refineries. Neither the statute‘s text, structure, nor history affords sufficient guidance to choose between these competing narratives and metaphors. Instead, the analysis can be guided only by the statute‘s text—and that nowhere commands a continuity requirement. Pp. 12–16.
948 F. 3d 1206, reversed.
GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 20–472
HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2021]
JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress requires most domestic refineries to blend a certain amount of ethanol and other renewable fuels into the transportation fuels they produce. But when it first adopted these mandates, Congress temporarily exempted small refineries across the board. Looking beyond that initial period, Congress authorized individual small refineries to apply for additional hardship “extensions” from the federal government “at any time.” The
I
In 2005 and 2007, Congress created the renewable fuel program (RFP). §§201, 202(a)(1), 121 Stat. 1519,
From the start, EPA has apportioned the nationwide volume mandates into individualized ones for each refinery.
Congress tempered its mandates in other ways too. For example, if a refinery is unable to generate or purchase sufficient credits in a given year, it may “carry forward” any deficit to the following year.
Most important for our case, however, is a different, if related, set of tempering features. Evidently, Congress was concerned that escalating RFP obligations could work special burdens on small refineries that lack the “inherent scale advantages of large refineries,” Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA, 887 F. 3d 986, 989 (CA10 2017), and sometimes supply a major source of jobs in rural communities, Brief for State of Wyoming et al. as Amici Curiae 19–25. To protect small refineries
Here‘s how things played out for small refineries once the law went into effect. Under subparagraph (A)(i), all small refineries were exempt through 2010. See Dept. of Energy, Office of Policy and International Affairs, D. Vashishat et al., Small Refinery Exemption Study 25 (Mar. 2011). In 2011, EPA extended that exemption for 13 small refineries under subparagraph (A)(ii)—and it extended the exemption for an additional 11 small refineries under subparagraph (B)(i). Id., at 37. As time went on, and as economic conditions fluctuated, EPA extended more exemptions under subparagraph (B)(i) in some years than in others. For example, EPA granted 8 extensions in 2013, but expanded that number to 31 in 2018. EPA, RFS Small Refinery Exemptions, (May 20, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/rfs-small-refinery-exemptions.
This case concerns three small refineries that initially received an exemption, saw it lapse for a period, and then petitioned for an exemption again under subparagraph (B)(i). HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refining LLC received only the blanket exemption under subparagraph (A)(i) through 2010. See Renewable Fuels Assn. v. EPA, 948 F. 3d 1206, 1228 (CA10 2020). Wynnewood Refining Company received the blanket exemption under subparagraph (A)(i) and a 2-year extension under subparagraph (A)(ii) through 2012. Id., at 1229. HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC received subparagraph (A)(i)‘s blanket exemption, subparagraph (A)(ii)‘s 2-year extension, and then subparagraph (B)(i)‘s hardship exemption in 2015. Id., at 1227. After a lull, all three refineries petitioned for a hardship exemption under subparagraph (B)(i) in 2017 or 2018. EPA granted all three.
A group of renewable fuel producers objected. They petitioned for review of EPA‘s decisions in the Tenth Circuit, arguing the Agency acted “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations” by granting the petitions.
II
A
Where Congress does not furnish a definition of its own, we generally seek to afford a statutory term “its ordinary or natural meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). Before us, the parties agree on one thing: The key word here—“extension“—is nowhere defined in the statute
Sometimes, as the renewable fuel producers observe and the court of appeals held, an “extension” can refer to an increase in time. See, e.g., 5 Oxford English Dictionary 597 (2d ed. 1989) (OED) (“Enlargement in duration“);
Ultimately, however, we agree with the renewable fuel producers and the court of appeals that subparagraph (B)(i) uses “extension” in its temporal sense—referring to the lengthening of a period of time. We find three textual clues telling. First, the initial exemption described in subparagraph (A)(i) is described temporally (as lasting “until calendar year 2011“).
B
Resolving that much, however, does not resolve this case. Really, it only takes us to the heart of the dispute. The Tenth Circuit didn‘t just hold that an extension means an increase in time—it imposed a continuity requirement. On that court‘s view, a small refinery becomes permanently ineligible for a further extension of time once its exemption lapses. Even accepting that subparagraph (B)(i) uses the term “extension” in its temporal sense, the small refineries submit this was error. On their view, small refineries whose exemptions have lapsed in one year may still seek an “extension” in a following year. Indeed, the small refineries candidly characterize this as their stronger argument for reversal.
We agree. It is entirely natural—and consistent with ordinary usage—to seek an “extension” of time even after some lapse. Think of the forgetful student who asks for an “extension” for a term paper after the deadline has passed, the tenant who does the same after overstaying his lease, or parties who negotiate an “extension” of a contract after its expiration. Perhaps for reasons like these, the respondents and court of appeals are unable to point to a single dictionary definition of the term “extension” requiring unbroken continuity. To be sure, some definitions speak of an extension as a “continuation.” See, e.g., Black‘s Law Dictionary 703 (10th ed. 2014)
Much federal law proceeds on this same understanding. Under certain circumstances, a court “may . . . extend” a party‘s “time for appeal” even “after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal.”
Still other examples exist. Maybe most notably, just last year Congress twice passed laws providing for the “extension” of public benefits that had lapsed or been interrupted. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116–260, §203, 134 Stat. 1182 (providing an “extension” of unemployment compensation starting on December 26, 2020, after lapsing on July 31, 2020); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. 116–136, §2114, 134 Stat. 281 (providing an “extension” of unemployment benefits starting in 2020, after lapsing in 2013). The dissent gives these particular examples short shrift because they appear in statutes “passed in an emergency context” a decade after the statute at issue here. Post, at 7. We do not doubt that meaning may change with time, but unless the dissent thinks the ordinary meaning of “extension” changed in just 10 years, it‘s hard to understand why these enactments don‘t shed at least some light on today‘s question. If anything, the emergency context in which these laws were passed—forcing legislators to use a term on short notice—would seem to provide useful evidence of ordinary meaning.
Beyond that, the dissent counters by attempting to recast all these varied examples of temporal extensions after interruption. It imagines, for example, that when a teacher extends a paper deadline after a lapse, that act of grace always operates like a nunc pro tunc judicial decree—retroactively deeming the time originally allotted as now extending continuously to some new and future due date. But no one thinks extensions always work this way. As the COVID–19 statutes illustrate, a previously lapsed benefit can and sometimes is “extended” for a new period without any retroactive effect. Likewise, if a student misses the 4 p.m. deadline on Friday, his teacher may extend the deadline by authorizing him to hand in his paper the following Monday between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. Besides, even looking to the nunc pro tunc analogy, what does it prove? It cannot change the fact that, absent time travel, a lapse or interruption has occurred. The student cannot go back in time and turn in his paper when it was originally due on Friday afternoon. His lapse may be forgiven or overlooked, maybe even with a Latin term invoked in the process, but none of that means a break in continuity, a lapse,
We do not mean to suggest that every use of the word “extension” must be read the same way. On occasion, for example, Congress requires “extensions” to be “consecutive” or “successive.” E.g.,
Further statutory clues confirm this understanding. Recall that subparagraph (B)(i) authorizes small refineries to seek hardship exemptions “at any time.”
We find another feature telling too. Next door, subparagraph (A) uses the term “extension” without a continuity requirement. To see how subparagraph (A) was designed, imagine a small refinery avails itself of the blanket exemption in 2008 and 2009 under subparagraph (A)(i). Then in 2010, because of an increase in production capacity, the refinery loses “small refinery” status under
The
Against the petitioners’ evidence of statutory meaning, the respondents ask us to consider one of their own. They point to the fact that subparagraph (A) is titled “temporary exemption,” that it was permitted to expire in 2013, and that subparagraph (B)(i) speaks of extending “the exemption under subparagraph (A).” Together, respondents say, these statutory features suggest that the whole scheme of exemptions was meant to end rapidly, that subparagraph (B)(i) was designed as a narrow exception to a 2013 sunset rule, and that any further exemptions it allows should therefore be construed narrowly to end as quickly as possible.
But this much we do not see. In the first place, we do not construe subparagraph (B) as part of some sunset scheme. To be sure, subparagraph (A)‘s exemptions were permitted to expire in 2013, but did not have to do so. In theory, EPA could have granted a small refinery exemption under subparagraph (A)(ii) that lasted many years or indefinitely. See
III
Everything else the respondents offer in defense of the court of appeals’ judgment involves surmise about legislative purpose and arguments from public policy. Like the Tenth Circuit, they emphasize that, by the time the petitioners sought new exemptions in 2017 and 2018, small refineries already “had many years to ponder . . . whether it made sense to enter into or remain in the market.” 948 F. 3d, at 1247. The respondents argue that subparagraph (B) was adopted for the purpose of “funnel[ing] small refineries toward compliance over time.” Id., at 1246. And they submit that enforcing a continuity requirement helps advance congressional goals such as increasing “biofuel production, energy independence, and environmental protection.” Ibid.
The dissent seemingly agrees. It acknowledges that Congress provided other ameliorating provisions to address various challenges to the fuel market. Post, at 8–10. For example and as we have already seen,
But, as usual, the other side presents a plausible competing narrative. On the petitioners’ account, the statute seeks to increase production of renewable fuel while also offering a “safety valve” each year for small refineries that might otherwise face extinction. According to the small refineries, the respondents’ competing “funnel” metaphor makes little sense because a small refinery‘s compliance in one year is in no way dispositive of its ability to comply in a future year. Instead, compliance depends on numerous factors unique to each year and circumstances over which small refineries often have no control. Brief for Petitioners 42–44. In particular, most small refineries cannot comply with RFP mandates but must purchase credits from those that can. Each year more credits are required. And the price for those credits reflect the famously volatile nature of the fuel market—in one recent year, prices shot up by as much as 100%. See id., at 45. Aware of these market realities, the small refineries say, a rational Congress could have created (and did create) a means for small refineries to seek a hardship hardship exemption “at any time” rather than be forced to exit the market.
The petitioners say their “safety valve” analogy fits better for other reasons too. As the dissent acknowledges, Congress included many other “safety valve” provisions to address various challenges to the market that may arise at any time, including regional shortages and economic hardships. Post, at 8–10. Surely, Congress could have chosen to provide similar relief targeted to small refineries. Nor is there anything odd about the fact that Congress chose only to protect existing small refineries rather than new entrants. Often Congress chooses to protect existing market participants from shifts in the law while applying new restrictions fully to future entrants. Maybe, too, the petitioners suggest, Congress wasn‘t particularly concerned with new entrants in 2008 because, until last year, there had not been a new refinery of any size in this country for almost 50 years. See Blackmon, First Major U. S. Oil Refinery Since 1977 Targets Bakken Shale Crude, Forbes (July 25, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2020/07/25/first-new-us-oil-refinery-since-1977-targets-bakken-shale-crude/.
The petitioners stress as well that, even on the respondents’ account, Congress did create a “safety valve” rather than a “funnel” for some small refineries: Those with an unbroken record of failing to comply with the RFP may continue to seek and obtain extensions forever without being “funneled” toward compliance. Supra, at 11–12. Yet the respondents never explain why the least compliant refineries should be the most favored in this way. Nor do they confront the fact that their rule would have the strange effect of disincentivizing small refineries from ever trying to comply. Brief for Petitioners 22; Brief for State of Wyoming et al. as Amici Curiae 13–14. And even on the respondents’ account, EPA will have to consult its 2008 study in future years for these permanently noncompliant refineries.
Beyond that, the petitioners note, if subparagraph (B)(i) really did create a “miss one and done” rule for small refineries able to comply with RFP mandates in a single year the statute could wind up reducing overall domestic fuel supply—all without adding a single additional gallon of renewable fuel to the mix. See
We mention all this not because we pick sides. Neither the statute‘s text, structure, nor history afford us sufficient guidance to be able to choose with confidence between the parties’ competing narratives and metaphors. We mention this only to observe that both sides can offer plausible accounts of legislative purpose and sound public policy—and that it would therefore be a mistake to rely on appeals to some abstract intuition that the number of small refineries receiving exemptions “should have tapered down” over time. 948 F. 3d, at 1246 (emphasis added). Instead, our analysis can be guided only by the statute‘s text—and that nowhere commands a continuity requirement.
*
The respondents have not shown that EPA‘s approval of the petitioners’ extension requests was in excess of the Agency‘s statutory authority.
Reversed.
BARRETT, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 20–472
HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. RENEWABLE FUELS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2021]
JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
When Congress amended the Clean Air Act to add the Renewable Fuel Program (RFP), it gave small refineries a temporary exemption from compliance. Congress then vested the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with authority to grant “extension[s] of the exemption” in certain instances. The question in this case is straightforward: Does this provision limit EPA to prolonging exemptions currently in place, or does it enable EPA to provide exemptions to refineries that lack them? The statute‘s text and structure direct a clear answer: EPA cannot “extend” an exemption that a refinery no longer has. Because the Court‘s contrary conclusion caters to an outlier meaning of “extend” and clashes with statutory structure, I respectfully dissent.
I
Refineries regulated by the RFP come in all shapes and sizes—ranging from those run by Fortune–500 companies like HollyFrontier to local outfits with less fuel–blending capacity and access to capital. So, as the Court notes, Congress made certain accommodations for small refineries that might otherwise struggle to satisfy their RFP obligations.
To start, Congress in subparagraph (A)(i) gave all small refineries—including petitioners (HollyFrontier)—a “[t]em-porary exemption” from the program‘s renewable-fuel re-quirements; the exemption ran from the RFP‘s passage in 2005 until 2011.
Congress also provided small refineries an avenue to pe-tition for an “extension” of these initial exemptions. This is the provision at the heart of this case:
“A small refinery may at any time petition [EPA] for an extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.”
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i) .
Deciding that this subparagraph uses “extension” to mean “continuation” should be
A
HollyFrontier lays its cards on the table. It does not dis-pute that when used to refer to “an increase in the length of time,” the word “extension” can—and commonly does—refer to something that is prolonged without interruption. Brief for Petitioners 29. Yet, HollyFrontier insists, the term “extension” is not always used that way. Instead, it might sometimes refer to a “non-continuous extension“—in other words, an extension of something that used to exist but no longer does. Ibid. Because there is “nothing unnatural” about reading the term this way, HollyFrontier urges us to embrace this interpretation. Id., at 31.
One might think that this argument is an uphill climb—after all, we do not usually pin an interpretation to “the outer limits of a word‘s definitional possibilities” at the ex-pense of its ordinary or common meaning.1 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 407 (2011) (alterations omitted). But the Court takes HollyFrontier‘s framing and runs with it. The Court points out that the word “extension” “can” or “may” be used to refer to post-lapse renewals. Ante, at 6. And because the statute thus “commands” no “continuity requirement,” ante, at 16, the Court concludes that Holly-Frontier‘s reading must be right—which means that EPA can provide an “extension” of an exemption that is no longer in effect.
Boiled down, the Court‘s position is that HollyFrontier wins because its reading is possible. But I would ask, as we typically do, how the term “extension” “is most naturally read.” Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 39 (2008) (emphasis added); see also Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 4). The Tenth Circuit‘s answer to that question is spot on: The “ordinary definitions of ‘extension,’ along with common sense, dictate that the subject of an ex-tension must be in existence before it can be extended.” Renewable Fuels Assn. v. EPA, 948 F. 3d 1206, 1245 (2020).
1
In assessing the best reading of the phrase “extension of the exemption,” the Court is of course correct that context matters. Here, though, context cuts respondents’ way. Subparagraph (B)(i) does not use “extension” in a vacuum; rather, it permits EPA to grant an “extension of the exemp-tion under subparagraph (A).”
The Court acknowledges these definitions, yet still par-rots HollyFrontier‘s point that no definition of “extend” re-quires “unbroken continuity.” Ante, at 6. But without something that presently exists, there is nothing to “carr[y] forward” or “prolong.” The word “extension,” then, plainly contemplates a “continuation of the same” thing as cur-rently exists—in contrast to the term “renewal,” for exam-ple, which refers to a “restoring” or “reestablishing” of some-thing that used to exist. Compare Black‘s Law Dictionary 622 (8th ed. 2004), with id., at 1322. Or, to put it slightly differently, the word “extension” “[i]mports the continu-ance of an existing thing.” Brief for Federal Respondent 21 (quoting W. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 437 (1996)).
Common usage confirms as much. Consider a hotel guest who decides to spend a few more days on vacation. That guest likely would ask to “extend [her] visit.” Random House Webster‘s Unabridged Dictionary 684 (2d ed. 2001) (emphasis deleted). Now suppose the same guest returns to the same hotel three years later and, upon arrival, re-quests to “extend” her prior stay. The hotel employee would no doubt “scratch her head.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. Why? Be-cause it is highly unnatural to speak of “extending” a stay that ended years before.
Similar examples spring readily to mind. One would not normally ask to “extend” a newspaper subscription long af-ter it expired. Or request, after child number two, to “ex-tend” the parental-leave period completed after child num-ber one. Or report that an athlete signed a contract “extension” with her first team after spending several sea-sons with a rival squad. These examples do not derive their force by superimposing a “continuity requirement” on the word “extend.” Cf. ante, at 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16. Instead, continuity is inherent in the way that people usually use the word “extension“—namely, to reference something cur-rently “in existence” such that there is a “continuing con-nection with the thing to be extended.” Brief for Federal Respondent 21. That is so, moreover, absent any additional “modifying language” requiring the “extension” to be “con-secutive” or “‘successive.‘” Ante, at 8.
By dismissing the need for a continuing connection be-tween the first period and the second, the Court forgoes the “far more natural” reading of extend. Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 569 (2012). The upshot? A refinery could ask to “extend” an exemption it had in 2010 in the year 2040, with no need to connect the two periods. It defies ordinary usage to deem the second exemption “an extension” of the first, as opposed to a new, standalone ex-emption. HollyFrontier recognizes as much, seeking to de-flect this example as “extreme” and “highly unlikely.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Unlikely or not, it follows logically from HollyFrontier‘s reading of “extension“—which shows just how far this interpretation strays from the term‘s ordinary meaning.
2
The Court‘s counterexamples do not help its case. Take its discussion of deadline “extensions“—as given, say, to a student who seeks more time to complete a paper even after the due date has passed or to a party who requests leave to file a document after the court‘s original deadline.
Put aside for the moment that this case does not involve the extension of a deadline. The Court‘s reasoning still breaks down because when a deadline “extension” is granted, there is no “lapse“: The new deadline runs back to the old. In other words, a post-due-date extension does not start a new period for timely action. It forgives the missed deadline by retroactively prolonging the pre-existing pe-riod. Even in the Court‘s deadline-extension examples, then, there is continuity.4
Problems likewise plague the Court‘s other hypotheticals involving delay in “seek[ing] an ‘extension,‘” such as the tenant who asks to “extend” her lease after overstaying it or parties who negotiate to “extend” a contract after it ex-pires. Ante, at 6. These examples confuse the time at which one may permissibly request an extension with what is be-ing extended. It may be that the tenant could request an “extension” of the year-one lease at some point after the start of year two. But, if approved, the tenant‘s lease would still be continuous—running from year one to year two—and the tenant would no doubt owe rent for the intervening period. By contrast, the Court‘s reading of “extend” would capture a tenant who moves out in year one and returns in year five. In that scenario, no one would say that the tenant sought an “extension” of her lease—nor would anyone ex-pect the tenant to pay back-rent for the intervening years.
The Court next reaches for recent congressional enact-ments—or more specifically, for their captions. The title of two COVID–19 relief provisions, the Court notes, purported to provide an “extension” of certain unemployment benefits that had previously lapsed. See ante, at 7 (quoting Pub. L. 116–260, §203, 134 Stat. 1182; Pub. L. 116–136, §2114, 134 Stat. 281). I will start with the obvious: Invoking cap-tions from “different statute[s] altogether,” passed in an emergency context over a decade after the RFP, “does not have much force.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 172 (2012). The argument is made weaker still by the fact that Congress used “exten-sion” the other way in the RFP statute itself. See infra, at 8. And it is telling that apart from the COVID–19 relief provisions, HollyFrontier could identify no other instance in which Congress used “extension” in the way that Holly-Frontier proposes.
At the very most, the Court‘s COVID–19 examples show that “extend” does not ”always includ[e] a strict continuity requirement.”
B
1
Four structural features of the RFP, in particular, cut for respondents’ interpretation and against the Court‘s.
First, respondents’ reading of “extension” tracks the only other use of the term in the RFP. A nearby “[w]aiver” pro-vision allows EPA to issue an “order to reduce, for up to a 60-day period,” the biomass-based diesel fuel requirements under certain conditions.
Second, the RFP is replete with express grants of waiver authority of the type the Court reads into subparagraph (B)(i)‘s reference to “extension[s].” The statute‘s “general” waiver provision specifies that EPA, under certain eco-nomic or fuel-market conditions, “may waive the require-ments” of the RFP “in whole or in part on petition by” refin-eries, among other entities.
Together, these nearby RFP provisions show that Con-gress had an “easy way” to delegate standalone waiver au-thority when it wished. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 8). Yet Con-gress “did not adopt that ready alternative” in subpara-graph (B)(i)—it instead used “language whose most natural reading” does not contemplate freestanding waiver author-ity. Ibid. See also ante, at 8 (looking to “the absence of any parallel . . . language” as an interpretive “clue“).
Third, note that when assessing petitions for an “exten-sion of the exemption,” EPA must consider “the findings of the study under subparagraph (A)(ii)“—i.e., the Depart-ment of Energy study to be completed by 2008. See
Fourth, other provisions help ease the burden on small refineries in times of economic hardship. To ensure that EPA can appropriately adjust the RFP requirements it sets, the statute requires EPA to review “the feasibility of achiev-ing compliance” and “impacts of” the RFP on regulated re-fineries.
2
The Court‘s structural counters are not persuasive.
First, the Court cites the statute‘s instruction that a small refinery can file a subparagraph (B)(i) petition “at any time.” See ante, at 9 (quoting
This reading does not leave “at any time” without im-portant work to do. For one, the phrase means that refin-eries need not seek exemptions before EPA‘s fuel standards are due—which is November 30 in the calendar year before the refinery must apply.
In addition, the phrase helps account for the delayed-request scenarios the Court posits. See ante, at 7. To see why, suppose that a refinery with an exemption in 2014 planned to ramp up its operations in 2015 and anticipated that it would no longer need or qualify for exempt status. Then imagine that, halfway through 2015, the refinery con-cluded that it would in fact need an exemption for that year. The “at any time” provision allows it to file for one, thereby giving refineries the ability to adjust in the face of “market fluctuations and changing hardship conditions.” Ante, at 9. Unlike the Court‘s interpretation, this account of “at any time” respects the ordinary meaning of “extension” by re-quiring the “exemptions” themselves to run
Second, the Court leans on the fact that “subparagraph (A) uses the term ‘extension’ without a continuity require-ment.” Ibid. That must be so, according to the Court, because a refinery could fall out of small-refinery status, say, in 2010, yet still receive an “extension of the exemption” for 2011 under subparagraph (A)(ii).
It is hard to know quite what to make of the Court‘s the-ory. It never played out in practice, as EPA regulations meant that no small refinery lost exempt status during the years in question. See 72 Fed. Reg. 23925 (2007); 75 Fed. Reg. 14866 (2010); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 66–67. And the theory was neither passed on by the court below nor dis-cussed by respondents here, as it appeared for the first time in a footnote of HollyFrontier‘s reply brief. Reply Brief 10, n. 6. But in any event, the Court‘s account does not seem to prove that subparagraph (A) permits a “laps[e].” Ante, at 10. What EPA may “extend” via subparagraph (A)(ii) is “the exemption under clause (i)“—that is, the initial, auto-matic exemption that excused all small refineries from com-pliance through 2010. The “exemption under clause (i)” thus existed in the year 2010 by virtue of statute, even if a particular refinery was not in a position to take advantage of it. “Extending” that exemption into 2011—should the re-finery once again qualify for small-refinery status—would thus appear to be consistent with respondents’ reading of the term. Regardless, any ambiguity about the functioning of subparagraph (A) cannot save an argument that is oth-erwise overwhelmed by the term‘s ordinary meaning and other aspects of the RFP‘s structure.
II
The Court declines to “pick sides” in the parties’ dispute over which reading of subparagraph (B)(i) best fulfills con-gressional purpose. Ante, at 15. At the same time, the Court criticizes respondents’ reading for causing the “strange effect” of treating the least compliant refineries most favorably. Ibid. In the Court‘s telling, extensions that function as waivers (its view) give refineries that comply in some years a boost when they need help. Extensions that prolong a grace period (respondents’ view) reward refiner-ies that never manage to comply.
But respondents’ argument that subparagraph (B)(i) ex-tensions give small refineries an initial runway—rather than a down-the-road safety valve—is not at all odd if, as respondents assert, Congress intended the RFP to funnel all refineries into eventual compliance.5 Maybe respond-ents’ story about the statute‘s purpose is right; maybe it is wrong. In all events, though, it is not “strange“—in fact, the Court deems this account just as “plausible” as any. Ante, at 15.
Plus, the Court‘s reading of subparagraph (B)(i) yields its own odd results: It means that EPA‘s exemption power co-vers only those refineries in existence at the RFP‘s outset. This makes little sense if one accepts HollyFrontier‘s ac-count of the provision‘s “safety valve” purpose. Ibid. (inter-nal quotation marks omitted). If Congress’ point was to give leeway to refineries subject to unpredictable market
In the end, the parties’ dueling accounts of purpose un-derscore the wisdom of sticking to the statutory text and structure. Because, in my view, both clearly favor respond-ents’ reading, I respectfully dissent.