Eason v. City of SenatobiaEason v. City of Senatobia
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment [47]. The Court, having reviewed the record and carefully considered the applicable law, is now prepared to rule.
FACTS
This case explores the legal parameters of arresting a ten-year-old child for public urination. In August 2023, Plaintiff Latonya Eason was visiting a law office in downtown Senatobia, Mississippi when she asked the owner if her ten-year-old son, Plaintiff Q.E., could use the restroom. The owner motioned towards a sign indicating “no.” Shоrtly thereafter, Q.E.—wanting to follow the rules but facing an increasingly urgent personal dilemma—quietly slipped outside and, in a Dickensian twist, “went” in the owner‘s parking lot which faced the county courthouse.
An alert police officer witnessed the child relieving himself and intervened. He found the boy‘s mother and scolded her, intent on letting the family go. This reasonable denouement was not to be. Just as the officer was sending the mother and child on their way, more police officers arrived and observed that the car the mother was driving had been involved in a recent burglary. This burglаry must have been a high-priority matter for the Senatobia Police Department for even though Ms. Eason was already scheduled to come to the station later that afternoon for questioning, and even though she had verbally affirmed her continued intention of making this appointment just moments earlier, these officers, wanting to make absolutely sure they would be able to question her, huddled and devised a plan: Arrest Q.E. and take him to the police station so his mother would be forced to come to the station to pick him up at which point the officers сould use the child as bait to question the mother about the burglary.
When the officers informed Ms. Eason that they were arresting her son and taking him to the station, she became upset. She could not make sense of why her ten-year-old son was being arrested for such a minor infraction. An officer transported Q.E. without restraints to the police station and processed the child before taking him to the conference room where they waited for his mother. Q.E. and the officer practiced math and talked sports while his mom was being questioned in an adjacent roоm. When the interrogation of Ms. Eason was complete, she and the child left the station.
The Tate County Youth Court had jurisdiction over Q.E.‘s charges. Although the court initially gave Q.E. probation and ordered him to write a two-page report, the court later dismissed the charges. Ms. Eason and Q.E. (collectively, “the Easons“) then sued the City of Senatobia (“the City“), chief of police Richard Chandler (“Chief Chandler“), and former police officer Zachary Jenkins (“Officer Jenkins“) claiming (1) excessive force, (2) negligence, (3) negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) fаilure to train and supervise, (5) false arrest and imprisonment, (6) respondeat superior, (7) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, (8) malicious prosecution, and (9) punitive damages. Defendants now move to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
Two plaintiffs bring nine claims against three defendants. To streamline analysis, the Court will divide these claims into three groups. First, the Court will group these claims by defendant. Then, it will
I. Grouped by Defendant
There are three defendants: the City, Chief Chandler, and Officer Jenkins. The Easons bring federal and state-law claims against each of these defendants. This Court will address the claims against the two individual defendants first.
A. Individual Defendants
The Easons sue two individual defendants: Chief Chandler in his official capacity and Officer Jenkins in both his individual and official capacities. Regarding Plaintiffs’ official capacity designations, a claim brought against a government employee in his official capacity is a claim against the government entity itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.“); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); McCarthy v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2004). Because Plaintiffs are also suing the governmental entity that Chief Chandler and Officer Jenkins worked for, i.e. the City, this Court will treat any official capacity claim against them as a claim against the City of Senatobia. Chief Chandler (who was sued solely in his official capacity) is hereby dismissed as a redundant defendant. See Fife v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, 945 F.Supp.2d 721, 731 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (“Plaintiff‘s official capacity claims against Defendant [] are redundant since her employer is a party to this lawsuit.“); Tuskan v. Jackson County, Miss., No. 1:13cv356–HSO–RHW, 2014 WL 3747606 (S.D. Miss. July 29, 2014) (dismissing official capacity claims as redundant). Officer Jenkins is now the only remaining individual defendant.
i. Federal Claims Against Officer Jenkins
The Easons sue Officer Jenkins in his individual capacity as well, bringing both federal and state-law claims against him. Officer Jenkins argues that the doctrine of qualified immunity bars the federal-law claims. Qualified immunity is a judicially created legal doctrine which “shields federal and state officials from money damages.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity applies to federal, and not state-law, claims. Tuttle v. Sepolio, 68 F.4th 969, 976 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 238–39 (5th Cir. 2008)). To survive a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735.
The Supreme Court has instructed that “lower courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” Id. Regarding the clearly-established-right prong, “A right is ‘clearly established’ if it is ‘one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.‘” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). “Unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the conduct at issue, an official will be entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam)).
The Easons do not satisfy this burden. In their response to Defendants’ qualified immunity argument, the Easons cite no law showing that a clearly established right was violated. Their analysis, in its entirety, reads:
In this matter, Defendants’ misconduct violated clearly established law and caused Plaintiffs injuries and damages. Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment rights. The above claims and supporting facts are illustrated in the pleadings. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ claims present genuine issues of material fact and are not foreclosed by qualified immunity. In accordance with the foregoing, Defendants’ motion should be denied.
For the Easons to sustain their federal claims against Officer Jenkins, they were required to show that a minor has a clearly established right to be free from arrest. They did not do this. “[C]onclusory statements, naked assertions, and threadbare recitals fail to plausibly show violations ... of [] clearly established constitutional rights.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023). Because the Easons have failed to satisfy their required burden, the federal claims against Officer Jenkins are dismissed.
ii. State-Law Claims Against Officer Jenkins
The Easons also sue Officer Jenkins under several state-law causes of action. Defendants argue that the Police Exemption of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA“) precludes liability for these claims. The Police Exemption prevents police officers from bеing held liable for actions taken “within the course and scope of their employment” unless they acted “in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury.”
The Easons cannot meet this burden. The “safety” referred to in the statute above and the “harm” referred in the caselaw are both physical. This is supported by the text of the statute and the cases interpreting it.
None of the one-hundred twenty-one Mississippi cases which cite
The text of the statute supports this as well. The Police Exemрtion requires reckless disregard for both “safety and well-being.”
Q.E.‘s physical safety was never disregarded. When the child was arrested, nо officer touched him or placed him in restraints, and he was carefully driven to the police station. Therefore, the Police Exemption of the MTCA applies, and the state-law claims against Officer Jenkins fail. The only remaining defendant is the City of Senatobia (“the City“).
B. The City of Senatobia
The Easons’ state-law claims against the City are also foreclosed by the Police Exemption of the MTCA. The full text of the Police Exemption reads:
A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any сlaim: Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury[.]
II. Grouped by Plaintiff
There are two plaintiffs: Q.E., the ten-year-old boy who was arrested, and Ms. Eason, his mother. Ms. Eason was never arrested or detained by the Senatobia Police Department. Her claims stem solely from what happened to her son.
The City argues that Ms. Eason‘s federal claims fail because “[t]he Fifth Circuit has long held that the Constitution does not protect citizens from witnessing police action as a bystander.” (citing Grandstaff v. Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 172 (5th Cir. 1985), Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 47 F. Supp. 3d 561, 571-72 (N.D. Tex. 2020)). The Easons completely ignore this argument in their Response. Ignoring an argument constitutes waiver of thosе claims. See McMullen v. Starkville-Oktibbeha Cons. Sch. Dist., 200 F. Supp. 3d 649, 653-54 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (finding claims were abandoned when plaintiffs failed to address arguments against them on summary judgment); Lewis v. City of Hous., No. 4:22-CV-00844, 2023 WL 2249991, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2023), aff‘d sub nom. Lewis v. Inocencio, No. 23-20098, 2024 WL 229274 (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024) (“failure to respond to arguments raised in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver or abandonment of those issues at the district court level“); Morton v Social Security Administration, 2016 WL 5724810 (E.D. La. 2016) (“Poorly organized, unclear arguments are waived due to inadequate briefing. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 462 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005); see Foster v. Townsley, 243 F.3d 210, 212 n.1 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that issues inadequately briefed are deemed waived).“). Ms. Eason‘s federal claims are therefore waived. Q.E. is the only remaining Plaintiff. The City is the only remaining defendant. Only Q.E.‘s federal claims remain.
III. Grouped by Claim
Q.E. asserts six remaining claims against the City: (1) exсessive force, (2), Fourteenth Amendment violations, (3) respondeat superior, (4) malicious prosecution, (5) failure to train and supervise, and (6) punitive damages. Although Q.E. does not specify whether his respondeat superior and malicious prosecution claims are brought under federal or state law, because the Police Exemption of the MTCA forecloses liability under state law, this Court will assume these claims were brought under federal law.
A. Excessive Force
Q.E. sues the city for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The City argues that Q.E.‘s excessive force claim fails because “he does not allege any force was used at all.” To establish a claim of excessive force, “a plaintiff must show that, in addition to being seized, he suffered (1) an injury that (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and that (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 846 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Cir. 2006)).
It is unclear whether “use of force” requires the physical application of force or not. Compare: Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “force” as “Strength or energy exerted; the cause of motion or сhange; esp., physical power...“), and Rodgers v. Paquet, No. Civ.A. 3:01-CV-0969N, 2004 WL 1672311 at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2004) (“Without proof of physical injury, an excessive force claim does not lie.” (citing Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1996))).) with: Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 398 (“[P]sychological injuries may sustain a Fourth Amendment claim.“), and Teague ex rel. C.R.T. v. Texas City Independent School Dist., 348 F.Supp.2d 785, 794 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (“Although excessive force claims usually involve physical force, there is no requirement that it be so. ‘Force’ can be psychological.” (citing Black‘s Law Dictionary)), and 5th Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) (2020) at 89 (“physical coercion or threat of coercion” in the instruction on excessive force clаims). Even if physical force is not required, however, it is clear that some amount of force, whether physical or psychological, is. Id.; Cf. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 n.10 (5th Cir. 1996) (“At least one court has suggested that no physical injury is required to state an excessive force claim when a police officer holds a gun to the head of a nine-year-old child and threatens to pull the trigger. See McDonald, III v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 292–95 (7th Cir.1992).“).
No force was used on Q.E. here. According to the bodycam footage, the arrest proceeded as follows: Officer One approached Ms. Eason, who was standing by her car while her son sat in the backseat, and Officer One told her, “Here‘s what we
If any force was used here, it was not excessive. Outside of Q.E. requesting that he be arrested, it is hard to imaginе how the officers could have used any less force than they did. The concerning conduct is not the force used to facilitate Q.E.‘s arrest, but rather that an arrest occurred at all. Q.E.‘s excessive force claim is not the proper mechanism to address this, and it therefore fails.
B. Fourteenth Amendment
Q.E. also sues the City for an unspecified Fourteenth Amendment violation. In his Response, Q.E. clarifies that “a person‘s bodily integrity is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir. 1994).” Thus, Q.E. brings a bodily-integrity claim.
“A violation of the right to bodily integrity follows from ‘behavior of the governmental officer [that] is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.‘” Tyson v. Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 517 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998)). The Fifth Circuit recognizes bodily integrity as a substantive due process right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, even “where the officer never physically touched the plaintiff.” Tyson v. Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 518 (5th Cir. 2022). The Fifth Circuit has found a violation of this right when: (1) a police officer forced a woman to strip naked in her home while the officer masturbated to completion, Tyson v. Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 518 (5th Cir. 20222), (2) a teacher groomed and molested a 15-year-old student, Doe v. Taylor Ind. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994), and (3) a teacher lashed a second-grade student to a chair for two school days. Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987). On the other hаnd, the Fifth Circuit has declined to find a violation when: (1) a police officer loaned a gun to a confidential informant who later used it to shoot the plaintiff, McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002), (2) a female case worker who was investigating the suspected sexual abuse of a child took naked pictures of a six year old girl without the mother‘s express consent, Roe v. Tex. Dept. Prot. Reg. Services, 299 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2002), and (3) a school resource officer used a stun gun on an unruly special needs student. J.W. v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440 (5th Cir. 2023).
The facts here fall well below all of these cases-even the cases where the Fifth Circuit found no Constitutional
In the bodily integrity cases, we often have considered criminal assaults committed by... persons to whom the Fourth Amendment does not readily or easily apply. Where the plaintiff alleges only harms stemming from a social worker‘s search, the Fourth Amendment provides the sole means for analysis.
Roe v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services, 299 F.3d 395, 412 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit went on to hold that because the Fourth Amendment “fully embraces the governmentаl action complained. We [] cannot consider plaintiffs’ [Fourteenth Amendment] substantive due process rights to...bodily integrity.” Id. Like in Roe, the Fourth Amendment fully embraces the conduct in question here—an unreasonable seizure. A Due Process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is likewise unavailing. For these reasons, Q.E.‘s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails.
C. Respondeat Superior
Q.E. sues the City under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine that holds an organization responsible for the actions of its agents. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 286 (2003) (citing New Orleans, M. & C. R.R. Co. v. Hanning, 82 U.S. 649, 657 (1873) (“The principal is liable for the acts and negligenсe of the agent in the course of his employment, although he did not authorize or did not know of the acts complained of.“)). Respondeat superior, then, is not a tort claim, but a mechanism for holding a supervisory entity responsible for the tort of another.
Even so, “[c]ities are not liable for constitutional violations committed by city employees unless those violations result directly from a municipal custom or policy.” Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989), Conner v. Travis County, 209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 2000)). In the eponymous case Monell, the Supreme Court held that “a municipality cannot be held liable under
D. Malicious Prosecution
Q.E. also sues the City for malicious prosecution. The elements of a malicious prosecution claim are “(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and (6) damages.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023). The City argues that this claim fails for lack of malice and the existence of probable cause.
i. Lack of Malice
The Supreme Court has held that malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 192 (1878). There is no Fifth Circuit case that defines “malice” in the malicious prosecution context without referencing state law, and the Circuit has
The actions of the City meet this definition. When the officers arrested Q.E., they did not do so to ensure justice or protect the public. They did so pretextually, to manipulate his mother and guarantee that she would show up at the police station. Q.E. was cannon fodder for an investigation he had nothing to do with. Then, once Q.E. had unwittingly lured his mother to the police station, the City, rather than let him go with a warning, charged him with being a child in need of supervision. All of this was done with utter disregard for Q.E.‘s rights, foreseeable emotional harm, and the inconvenience that an unwarranted youth court proceeding would cause. This constitutes malice, and, as will be shown below, it was also clearly against the law.
ii. Probable Cause
The Fifth Circuit has held, “For purposes of malicious prosecution, probable cause means the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.” Gordy v. Burns, 294 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 2002). The term “probable cause” is shorthand for “[probable cause] to conclude that the suspect had committed, or was in the process of committing, an offense.” Espinal v. City of Houston, 96 F.4th 741, 745 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 780 (5th Cir. 2022)).
Probable cause did not exist in this case. The City argues that since an officer saw Q.E. urinating in public, there was probable cause to believe he violated Mississippi‘s indecent exposure statute. See
A person who willfully and lewdly exposes his person, or private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place where others are present, or procures another to so expose himself, is guilty of a misdemeanor... It is not a violation of this statute for a woman to breast-feed.
iii. Monell
Of course, municipal liability is only allowed if Q.E. can show “that [his] injury wаs caused by a municipal policy or custom.” Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 30 (2010) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Q.E. can show this. In the first bodycam video, one of the officers, in an attempt to console the child after he was arrested, stated, “We just had to bring you up here. Part of our policy man.” In the second bodycam video at the 22:34 mark, a police officer with apparent supervisory authority instructed another officer to leave the door to the jail cell open while processing Q.E. because Q.E. was so young. The officer further instructed:
So juveniles, depending on the charge, {unintelligible} secured location. So, if he‘s in there and two doors are shut, {unintelligible} secured location. That way {unintelligible} spend money.
These interactions evince a juvenile arrest policy that, at this stage of litigation, could plausibly be the driving force behind Q.E.‘s arrest—an arrest that was a clear violation of Mississippi law.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-303 states:
(1) No child in a matter in which the youth court has original exclusive jurisdiction shall be taken into custody by any person without a custody order except that:
(a) A law enforcement officer may take a child in custody if:
(i) Grounds exist for the arrest of an adult in identical circumstances; and
(ii) Such law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that custody is necessary as defined in Section 43-21-301; and
(iii) Such law enforcement officer can find no reasonable alternative to custody[.]
This law—and Q.E.‘s related right to be free from unlawful arrest—was violated when Q.E. was taken into custody. Two of the three required elements were not met. The required probable cause was missing, and reasonable alternatives to custody existed.
The other elements of malicious prosecution are not disрuted, and each of them appears met. Q.E.‘s malicious prosecution claim survives.
E. Failure to Train and Supervise
Q.E. also brings a § 1983 claim for negligent hiring, training, and supervision. The Supreme Court has explained “that a municipality can be liable for failure to train its employees when the municipality‘s failure shows ‘a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants.‘” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840 (1994) (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). “Deliberate indifference is more than mere negligence.” Conner v. Travis County, 209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The municipality‘s failure to train must be the “moving force” that caused the specific constitutional violation. Brown v. Bryan Co., Okla., 219 F.3d 450, 461 (5th Cir. 2000).
A failure to train or supervise could be the moving force behind the Constitutional violation in this case. The officers appeared eager to follow the law, asking their supervisor if they were supposed to put handcuffs on a ten-year-old, and, for one officer, even going so far as to discuss individual Supreme Court cases with his supervisor before expressing a desire to be sent reading material on the subject to better understand the Constitutional limits on his job. In all likelihood, if the officers had been aware that arresting a child without a custody order was a violation of Mississippi law, they would not have done so. The fact that they arrested Q.E. suggests that thеy did not know about this law, which shows a failure to train or supervise. Surely, at a minimum, an officer should be made aware of the clear, statutory strictures on juvenile arrests. Q.E.‘s § 1983 claim, at least insofar as it relates to training and supervision, therefore survives.
F. Punitive Damages
Finally, Q.E. seeks punitive damages against the City. He argues that “[p]unitive damages may be awarded in Section 1983 cases.” The Supreme Court has held that “a municipality is immune from punitive damages under
CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, Defendants the City of Senatobia, Richard Chandler, and Zachary Jenkins’ Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment [47] is GRANTED IN PART.
All claims against Defendants Richard Chandler and Zachary Jenkins are dismissed, and both individuals are dismissed as defendants. All claims by Plaintiff Latonya Eason are dismissed, and she is dismissed as a plaintiff. Q.E. is the only remaining plaintiff, and the City of Senatobia is the only remaining defendant. All Q.E.‘s state-law claims are dismissed, and, with respect to the federal claims, only Q.E.‘s § 1983 claims for (1) malicious prosecution and (2) negligent training and supervision remain. All other claims are dismissed.
/s/Michael P. Mills
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI