Eagle Rise Developments, LLC, Troy Scott Wilbur and Alexander Scott Wilbur, Plaintiffs, vs. Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Defendant.
No. 24–1331
In the Iowa Supreme Court
June 19, 2026
Submitted April 15, 2026
Oxley, J.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Brian Wright, magistrate, and Kimberly K. Shepherd, district associate judge.
Parties who were held in contempt of court by a magistrate seek a writ of certiorari. Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; Writ Sustained.
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
Billy J. Mallory and Trevor A. Jordison of Mallory Law, Urbandale, for plaintiffs.
Patrick J. O’Connell and Madison P. Huntzinger of Lynch Dallas Legal, Cedar Rapids, for defendant.
The City of Clinton sought to hold Eagle Rise Developments, LLC (Eagle Rise) in contempt of court after it refused to comply with the district court’s municipal infractions order to repair the roof of its building. The court ultimately entered an order finding Eagle Rise and its two member-managers, Troy Wilbur and Alexander Wilbur (collectively “petitioners”), in contempt. The court required both Troy and Alexander to pay a $100 penalty and serve thirty days in jail, and it held Eagle Rise in contempt without imposing a punishment. Eagle Rise, Troy, and Alexander petitioned for a writ of certiorari, challenging the court’s contempt order based on the City’s alleged failure to provide the petitioners with proper notice of the contempt proceeding.
Civil contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal because they can subject a contemnor to jail time. So, “[b]efore punishing for contempt, . . . the offender must be served personally with an order to show cause against the punishment” and given “a reasonable time” to respond.
On further review, we sustain the writ of certiorari challenging the district court’s order holding Eagle Rise and its member-managers in contempt.
Troy and Alexander Wilbur1 run a father-and-son business as the only two member-managers of Eagle Rise. Eagle Rise purchased a former middle school building in Clinton eight months before the August 2020 derecho ripped through Iowa and damaged the property. Residents complained to the City about the building sitting vacant in a state of disrepair for more than a year after the storm, so the City inspected the property in October 2021. The City found multiple violations of the Clinton City Code’s property maintenance ordinances. Eagle Rise failed to register the property as vacant or rectify the maintenance issues identified by the City. The City cited Eagle Rise with municipal infractions in the Iowa District Court for Clinton County in March 2022.
A. Municipal Infractions Proceedings.
The case went to trial on the district court’s small claims docket. See
B. First Contempt Proceedings.
Eagle Rise replaced the school’s gymnasium roof but not the roof over the rest of the building. Nor did it pay the
The City served Alexander personally as the registered agent of Eagle Rise. A hearing was held on that show cause order, where Troy and Alexander both appeared. The court found that Troy and Alexander, “as member-managers of Eagle Rise,” had willfully disobeyed its order. It ordered that Eagle Rise, the defendant in the matter, was in contempt of court. It also ordered Troy and Alexander to each serve thirty days in jail. The order gave them fourteen days to purge the contempt by paying the $6,500 penalty and registering the building as vacant. Troy and Alexander did so, and the court set aside the order to serve time in jail.
The City attempted to present evidence about Eagle Rise’s receipt of insurance funds at the contempt hearing, but the court excluded it as hearsay. Without that evidence, the court could not determine whether Eagle Rise willfully failed to replace the rest of the roof or whether it merely lacked the funds to do so. Nonetheless, its order expressly stated that “Defendant remains under obligation to abide by the Court’s August 7, 2022 Order regarding abatement of City Code and IPMC violations at the Property.”
C. Second Contempt Proceedings.
Less than a month later, the City filed another application for rule to show cause. The City asserted that Eagle Rise intentionally repaired only the roof over the gymnasium rather than the entirety of the building’s roof, as required by the court’s order. On January 15, 2024, the court “ORDERED that Defendant Eagle Rise Developments, LLC, by and through its Member-Managers, Troy Wilbur and Alexander Wilbur, appear before the Court to show cause why it should not be held in contempt at the Clinton County Courthouse located at 612 N 2nd Street, Clinton, Iowa, 52732 on March 14,
This time, the City had trouble serving the petitioners with the notice to show cause, as required by statute:
Before punishing for contempt, unless the offender is already in the presence of the court, the offender must be served personally with an order to show cause against the punishment, and a reasonable time given the offender therefor; or the offender may be brought before the court forthwith, or on a given day, by warrant, if necessary.
The City made ten unsuccessful attempts to effect personal service—four by the county sheriff’s office and six by private process servers. The county sheriff filed an affidavit of nonservice stating that he left a card at the registered address of Eagle Rise saying to contact the sheriff’s office. That address was also Troy and Alexander’s last-known address and where personal service was previously successful in the underlying action. The sheriff’s request went unanswered. Process servers were similarly unsuccessful in their attempts at personal service despite seeing lights turned on inside the residence, a dog inside the property, and the trash receptacles being set out and brought in between their attempts. No one would answer the door. One process server’s affidavit detailed how she saw Troy’s wife enter the residence and then refuse to come to the door. The same process server also went to Troy’s father’s address, and Troy’s father called Troy but was told not to divulge any information. Troy’s father then told the process server that he did not want to get involved.
The contempt proceeding was continued three times while the City tried to effect personal service to comply with
The City published notice in the Clinton Herald for the weeks of May 4, 11, and 18, 2024. See
Troy appeared at the July 11 contempt hearing without an attorney; Alexander was allegedly in the courthouse but did not come to the courtroom. Troy objected at the beginning of the hearing, claiming that neither he nor Alexander received notice of the show cause order or the hearing. He “just happened to find out” about the hearing the day before, but his attorney was not available to attend the hearing with him. Troy also claimed that the newspaper notices used to serve Eagle Rise by publication were unavailable online when he attempted to look them up the day before the proceeding. The magistrate denied Troy’s challenge to improper service and his request for a continuance until his
The magistrate then took evidence in the form of ten exhibits and testimony from two witnesses for the City. Troy contested the merits by making objections, cross-examining the City’s witnesses, and then testifying himself. The court entered an order on July 18 that held Eagle Rise, Troy, and Alexander in contempt of the court’s August 2022 municipal infractions order. It concluded that the City proved beyond a reasonable doubt that “Eagle Rise, specifically Troy Wilbur, very deliberately determined to fix only the gym roof, rather than comply with the Order by fixing the entire roof.” It also concluded that Alexander was “fully aware” of Eagle Rise’s obligations and had “lawful control over what [Eagle Rise] does or fails to do.” The magistrate entered an order finding “that Eagle Rise . . . and Troy Wilbur and Alexander Wilbur, individually, are in contempt of the Court’s August 7, 2022, Order.” The court ordered Troy and Alexander to each pay a $100 penalty and serve thirty days in jail. The contempt order provided that fifteen days of each sentence was suspended and could be purged if Eagle Rise caused the roof to be repaired by November 30, 2024. The order did not impose any punishment specifically on Eagle Rise.
D. Appeal to District Court.
Troy and Alexander each filed a notice of appeal from the magistrate’s ruling to the district court. The district court summarily denied the appeals because they had “not filed grounds for an appeal.”2 Eagle Rise, Troy, and Alexander then filed a petition for writ of certiorari
E. Writ of Certiorari Proceedings.
We granted the petition for writ of certiorari and transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals rejected the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction because
Eagle Rise and Troy applied for further review, arguing that the court of appeals erred in the following ways: by treating service via publication as a permissible way to provide notice of a contempt proceeding, by finding there was jurisdiction over Eagle Rise and Troy despite the City’s noncompliance with section 665.7 and the rules of civil procedure, by concluding there was subject
II. Analysis.
A. Standard of Review.
We review certiorari actions and findings of contempt for correction of errors at law. E.g., Spitz v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Mitchell Cnty., 881 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Iowa 2016); City of Dubuque v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Dubuque Cnty., 725 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Iowa 2006). To the extent a constitutional challenge is involved, our review is de novo. Spitz, 881 N.W.2d at 464. In reviewing “the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality of its actions,” we will sustain a writ of certiorari where “the district court’s finding of facts are not supported by substantial evidence or when the court has not applied the law properly.” Id. (first quoting Ary v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Benton Cnty., 735 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 2007)).
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
The petitioners claim the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the statutory requirement in section 665.7 to personally serve an offender with a show cause order is a prerequisite to the court’s jurisdiction. The petitioners confuse a court’s subject matter jurisdiction with its authority to act in a particular case. Jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a particular type of case. State v. Pagliai, 30 N.W.3d 226, 229–30 (Iowa 2026). Authority, by contrast, refers to the court’s “power to act in a case where it has jurisdiction.” Id. at 230. “Once a case is within a court’s adjudicatory power, other rules or statutes may limit the court’s authority to act, but that does not make those provisions jurisdictional.” State v. Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Iowa 2023); see also State v. Erdman, 996 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Iowa 2023) (“ ‘Jurisdiction,’ as it is referenced in Iowa Code sections 232.8 and 232.45,
Here, the Iowa Constitution vests the district court with jurisdiction over civil matters.
Whether the notice provisions for a contempt proceeding in section 665.7 were satisfied goes to the court’s authority, not its subject matter jurisdiction. See Franklin v. State, 905 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 2017) (“Although a court may have subject matter jurisdiction, it may lack the authority to hear a particular case for one reason or another.” (quoting In re Est. of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 789–90 (Iowa 2003))). The petitioners’ challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction therefore fails.
C. Service of Process for Contempt Proceedings.
When one party refuses to comply with a court order, the other party may use contempt
A proceeding to hold a party in contempt for refusing to follow a court’s order is supplementary to the underlying action, yet largely independent of it. First Congregational Church of Bloomington v. City of Muscatine, 2 Iowa (Clarke) 69, 71 (1855). The general assembly requires that a person facing a charge of indirect contempt—that is, contempt committed outside the presence of the court, Spitz, 881 N.W.2d at 465 & n.6—must be given notice before the court punishes them for contempt, see
Requiring a contemnor to be given notice through valid service of process is consistent with the due-process protections that we have recognized for these
There are two ways to provide the required notice under section 665.7: “the offender must be served personally with an order to show cause,” or the offender can be “brought before the court . . . by warrant, if necessary.”
The City concedes that its service by publication failed to comply with the requirement to also mail a copy of the notice to the last-known address of the party to be served. See
As an initial matter, we note that the parties conflate the issues of personal jurisdiction and service of process. We recently explained that there are two parts to a court obtaining personal jurisdiction over a party: “While the due-process and source-of-law requirements tell us whether a foreign defendant can be brought within a court’s power, lawful service of process is what actually brings that defendant into court.” Kelchner v. CRST Expedited Inc., 29 N.W.3d 315, 322 (Iowa 2025) (citing Lucas v. Warhol, 23 N.W.3d 19, 23 (Iowa 2025)). Here, the court had already exercised jurisdiction over Eagle Rise as the named defendant in the underlying action and over Troy and Alexander in the first contempt proceedings—also within the underlying action. See Opperman, 330 N.W.2d at 797 (“[T]he contempt proceeding was merely supplementary to the main suit. Because the court had personal jurisdiction over Opperman in the dissolution action, it had sufficient basis under traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to assert personal jurisdiction over him to enforce the decree.”). To the extent the parties rely on cases addressing constitutional minimum contact concerns, the court’s prior exercise of jurisdiction in the underlying action satisfies those concerns. See id.
Yet, even though a contempt action is supplementary to the underlying action where the court already exercised personal jurisdiction over the party,
We have previously referred to the notice requirements for contempt as jurisdiction or authority over the person. See, e.g., id. (holding that “[t]he court thus acquired personal jurisdiction over [the ex-husband] in the contempt proceeding” where he was personally served in Illinois with the show cause order); Beauchamp v. Iowa Dist. Ct. in & for Cass Cnty., 328 N.W.2d 527, 527–28 (Iowa 1983) (identifying the “determinative question in this certiorari review of a contempt order [as] whether the district court acquired jurisdiction of plaintiff” and holding that a contemnor’s special appearance challenging the method of service should have been sustained where the rule to show cause was served only on the contemnor’s attorney); Lutz, 297 N.W.2d at 354 (“In the circumstances presented here [where notice of a contempt proceeding was provided only to the party’s attorney], we hold trial court had no power to hold plaintiff in contempt of court.”). To the extent that we have referred to complying with section 665.7’s personal service requirements as conferring personal jurisdiction over a contemnor, we clarify that—as we discussed in Kelchner v. CRST Expedited Inc.—this is a reference to the “lawful service of process [that] actually brings that defendant” within the court’s authority. 29 N.W.3d at 322. Compliance with section 665.7 goes to the court’s authority to punish for contempt.
D. The District Court Lacked Authority to Hold Troy or Alexander in Contempt.
With respect to Troy and Alexander, we must first address to whom the show cause order was directed. To reiterate, the court ordered that
Troy, Alexander, and Eagle Rise are independent “persons.” See
It is not disputed that Troy and Alexander, as members of Eagle Rise, could be held in contempt for causing Eagle Rise to violate the district court’s order. E.g., Sound Storm Enters., Inc. v. Keefe, 209 N.W.2d 560, 569 (Iowa 1973) (en banc) (finding that corporate officers may be punished for contempt where they participate in the proscribed conduct); accord Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376 (1911) (“A command to the corporation is in effect a command to those who are officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs.”); Fargo Women’s Health Org. Inc. v. Larson, 391 N.W.2d 627, 633 (N.D. 1986) (“It is . . . well established that an officer or agent of a corporation may be found in
But before such persons—e.g., company officers, executives, managers, or employees—can be held in contempt for causing the company to violate the district court’s orders, those persons must be personally served with an order to show cause or brought before the court via warrant.
So, even if Troy and Alexander had been personally served with the order to show cause issued in this case, that service would have been deficient because there is no order to show cause directed to them in their personal capacities. The City’s application for rule to show cause only requested that the court enter an order for rule to show cause “for the Defendant as to why it should not be found in contempt of Court.” The terms “Defendant” and “it” are both singular and refer to Eagle Rise only. The district court’s rule to show cause ordered only
Because there was no application to show cause against Troy and Alexander and no order to show cause directed to Troy and Alexander, there was no notice to either of them of an order to show cause as “the offender” subject to potential punishment in compliance with the statute. See Drywall Tapers & Pointers of Greater N.Y., Loc. 1974 of I.B.P.A.T. AFL-CIO v. Loc. 530 of Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Int’l Ass’n, 889 F.2d 389, 398 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Not one of the [individual] contemnors, other than Local 530, received the notice to which they were entitled under Rule 43(a). In the absence thereof, an order of contempt against them as non-parties to the proceedings was inappropriate.”); Dole Fresh Fruit Co. v. United Banana Co., 821 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1987) (vacating contempt orders against two officers and one office manager of a company where the order to show cause named only the company on the basis that they “were entitled to notice that they were defendants in a contempt proceeding and adequate time to prepare a defense”); Phelps v. Super. Ct. for Maricopa Cnty., 424 P.2d 209, 210–11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) (“The petitioner, who appeared only as a representative of the defendant, was not given any notice as an individual relative to the contempt proceedings. Before he could be found in contempt, it was necessary that the petitioner be notified that the charges were also against him as an individual.”); Brandyco Enters., Inc. v. State, 1986 WL 2841, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 1986) (unpublished) (reversing a
E. Eagle Rise Was Not Given a Reasonable Time to Show Cause.
That leaves the court’s finding that Eagle Rise was in contempt of its August 2022 municipal infractions order. Troy appeared at the contempt proceeding and represented Eagle Rise. But before defending the merits, he challenged the City’s service of the show cause order as improper.
The City made ten unsuccessful attempts at personal service on Eagle Rise. The City’s process servers provided numerous detailed affidavits that explained why it could not effect personal service. The City proved that the petitioners were evading service; the magistrate specifically found that they did so intentionally. That finding allowed the court to order an alternative method of service through publication.
The City concedes that it failed to comply with the rules for serving by publication when it did not send a copy of the show cause order to Eagle Rise’s last-known mailing address. See
Regardless of whether Eagle Rise waived notice of the contempt proceeding by appearing at the hearing, section 665.7 requires that the contemnor be given “a reasonable time” to respond.
Eagle Rise was deprived of that opportunity when it received only one day’s notice before the contempt proceeding. The City concedes that its attempt at service by mail did not comply with our rules, see
III. Conclusion.
We sustain the writ of certiorari as to all three petitioners.
Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; Writ Sustained.