STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, vs. MURPHY LEE RUTHERFORD, Appellant.
No. 22-0553
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Submitted September 14, 2023—Filed November 3, 2023
The defendant seeks further review from court of appeals decision affirming his sentence following guilty plea. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, Mansfield, McDonald, and May joined. McDermott, J., filed an opinion concurring specially.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
OXLEY, Justice.
Murphy Lee Rutherford entered a written guilty plea to second-degree theft and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (all class “D” felonies) after he was arrested for taking two firearms from an acquaintance‘s home. The district court sentenced him to three consecutive five-year sentences of imprisonment. Rutherford appealed, and we transferred the appeal to the court of appeals. The court of appeals found good cause to address Rutherford‘s challenge to his sentence as required by
We granted Rutherford‘s application for further review to confirm what we said last year in State v. Wilbourn: “An appellate court either has jurisdiction over a criminal appeal or it does not.” 974 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2022). If good cause is lacking, the court has no jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. See State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 110 (Iowa 2021) (dismissing appeal and explaining that “[b]ecause Treptow has not established good cause to pursue a direct appeal as a matter of right, this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal“). But “[o]nce a defendant crosses the good-cause threshold as to one ground for appeal, the court has jurisdiction over the appeal.” Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 66.
I. The Distinction Between Jurisdiction and Authority.
“Courts . . . have more than occasionally [mis]used the term ‘jurisdictional . . . .‘” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)); see also Holding v. Franklin Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 565 N.W.2d 318, 319 (Iowa 1997) (en banc) (noting the “poetic justice” of our court‘s attempt to correct a “widespread misimpression that often confused a court‘s lack of subject matter jurisdiction with a court‘s lack of authority to act in a particular matter” where the confusion could be traced to our own prior cases).
There is an important difference between a court‘s subject matter jurisdiction and its authority to act. See, e.g., State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993) (“The importance of this distinction becomes evident when issues of waiver arise.“). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). Once a case is within a court‘s adjudicatory power, other rules or statutes may limit the court‘s authority to act, but that does not make those provisions jurisdictional. In Holding v. Franklin County Zoning Board of Adjustment, we explained the distinction this way:
Subject matter jurisdiction is not lacking in the present case because the legislature has clearly given Iowa courts the power to act in challenges to decisions of county zoning commissions. At issue is only whether authority to act in this controversy should be withheld because of the claimed premature filing of the court challenge.
565 N.W.2d at 319. In Scarborough v. Principi, the United States Supreme Court explained a similar distinction: “In short, [28 U.S.C.] § 2412(d)(1)(B) does not describe what ‘classes of cases’ the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims] is competent to adjudicate; instead, the section relates only to postjudgment proceedings auxiliary to cases already within that court‘s adjudicatory authority.” 541 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added) (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455). Jurisdiction goes to a court‘s power to adjudicate a particular class of cases, while authority goes to a court‘s ability to act in a particular case within that class.
Section 814.7, on the other hand, addresses our authority over specific claims. It provides:
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief pursuant to chapter 822. The claim need not be raised on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.
The court of appeals was concerned about not circumventing our holding in State v. Treptow. See 960 N.W.2d at 109 (holding that defendant failed to establish good cause to appeal from a guilty plea because “[h]is failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment preclude[d] appellate
Once good cause is established under section 814.6(1)(a)(3) as to one issue, we have jurisdiction over the entire appeal even if section 814.7 otherwise limits our authority with respect to specific issues raised in the appeal. See Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 66 (“We may lack authority to consider all issues, but that is a different matter.“). Thus, when the court of appeals properly found good cause to address Rutherford‘s appeal of his discretionary sentence, see State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (“[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges . . . a discretionary sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to as part of her plea bargain.“), it had jurisdiction over the entire appeal. Indeed, the court of appeals exercised that jurisdiction by affirming the district court‘s judgment against Rutherford‘s challenge that the district court abused its discretion by not suspending his sentences in light of his medical condition. We let the court of appeals decision stand on this issue. See Farnsworth v. State, 982 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 2022) (“When we grant further review, we may exercise our discretion to let the court of appeals decision stand as the final decision on particular issues.” (quoting State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 n.1 (Iowa 2019))).
Having jurisdiction over the appeal, the court of appeals should have also addressed his challenge to the factual basis supporting his guilty plea. We do so now.
II. Rutherford‘s Challenge to the Factual Basis to Support His Guilty Plea.
Rutherford argues that his guilty plea to the charge of theft in the second degree is not supported by an adequate factual basis, see generally State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 55-63 (Iowa 2013) (discussing the requirements for ensuring a guilty plea is supported by a factual basis in the plea record), because there is no evidence in the record of the plea colloquy that he intended to permanently deprive the owner of the firearms he took from her home, see
Rutherford also attempts to avoid the limits of section 814.7 by arguing the district court had an independent obligation to ensure his guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, which, he asserts, it failed to do. See
arrest of judgment in order to preserve the right to make that challenge on direct appeal.
Thus, Rutherford might be able to avoid relying on his counsel‘s ineffectiveness in allowing him to plead guilty without a factual basis by pointing to the district court‘s independent obligation to ensure it exists, but there is another layer to challenging the factual basis on direct appeal: a motion in arrest of judgment. That brings us back up against what we said in Treptow and reaffirmed in Hanes: as long as a defendant is adequately informed of the need to file a motion in arrest of judgment and the consequences for failing to do so, the only way around that failure is through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109; Hanes, 981 N.W.2d at 460. And section 814.7 divests our authority to review that claim on direct appeal.2
We therefore do not reach the merits of Rutherford‘s challenge to the factual basis supporting his guilty plea to theft in the second degree.
III. Conclusion.
Rutherford‘s judgment of sentence is affirmed.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except McDermott, J., who concurs specially.
#22–0553, State v. Rutherford
MCDERMOTT, Justice (concurring specially).
Some twenty years ago, we boldly declared that “under no circumstances may a conviction upon plea of guilty stand if it appears that the facts of the charge do not state a violation of the statute under which the charge is made.” State v. Mitchell, 650 N.W.2d 619, 620 (Iowa 2002) (per curiam). But as the majority opinion once again demonstrates, our unflinching stance has not aged well.
Rutherford argues in this appeal that the district court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the record failed to establish facts to support his theft conviction. The majority affirms his conviction without addressing the merits, holding that because Rutherford failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment under rule 2.24(3)(a), we lack authority to address his claim. Although I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that Rutherford loses this appeal, I respectfully disagree that his failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment compels that result.
Rutherford requests that if we refuse to find that he had a right of direct appeal, we treat his notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari.
Rutherford argues that the judge acted illegally by accepting his plea without a factual basis in violation of rule 2.8(2)(b). Whether a factual basis exists for the guilty plea presents a purely legal challenge to the validity of his guilty plea. No additional fact-finding is required. “[O]ur first and only inquiry is whether the record shows a factual basis for [the defendant‘s] guilty plea to the charge.” State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999) (en banc). Appellate courts are unquestionably equipped to read the record made at sentencing and decide whether it contains a factual basis for the plea.
The majority declines to decide the merits of Rutherford‘s plea challenge and leaves him to pursue his claim through a civil postconviction-relief lawsuit. Using postconviction relief to resolve factual basis challenges such as this one creates waste (unnecessary delay and unnecessary burdens on parties and the judicial system) with little upside to show for it. And it raises a troubling question: What becomes of defendants who are not represented by counsel in these situations? A defendant can‘t claim ineffective assistance of counsel if the defendant had no assistance of counsel. See State v. Hutchison, 341 N.W.2d 33, 42 (Iowa 1983). In such a case, the district court‘s erroneous acceptance of a guilty plea would appear to have no remedy, leaving self-represented defendants “destined to serve out their sentences without any means to challenge the spurious conviction.” State v. Hanes, 981 N.W.2d 454, 466 (Iowa 2022) (McDermott, J., dissenting).
And let‘s be clear: Rule 2.24(3)(a)‘s requirement that defendants must file a motion in arrest of judgment before we will consider a plea challenge on appeal is not inviolate. How do we know? Because we do not require a motion in arrest of judgment to challenge a guilty plea in cases where a judge fails to advise the defendant that such a motion is required. See, e.g., State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 149–50 (Iowa 2003). Rule 2.8(2)(d) requires the court to “inform the defendant that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal.”
Our court is equipped to resolve the tension that exists in this situation between rules 2.8(2)(b) and 2.24(3)(a). I would get to the merits of Rutherford‘s challenge to the guilty plea. Based on my review of the sentencing record, I would affirm the conviction on the merits.
Rutherford argues that the record fails to establish that he intended to permanently deprive Melissa Beaudette of two AR-15 rifles that he took from her home. The plea agreement authorized the district court to review the minutes of testimony. The minutes stated that Beaudette would testify that “she is the owner of the firearms and that [Rutherford] did not have permission or authority to deprive her of those firearms.” Beaudette contacted the police to report that Rutherford “stole two AR-15 rifles and left [her] residence on foot.” When law enforcement located Rutherford, he had the two firearms and a backpack containing other items that belonged to Beaudette (a watch, notebook, phone card, and gloves). Rutherford claimed that Beaudette “asked me to get them out of the house.” But Beaudette asserted that she‘d done no such thing and that she wanted to pursue theft charges.
From Beaudette‘s statements and pursuit of theft charges and Rutherford‘s contradictory statements, the district court could infer that Rutherford fabricated an excuse about having permission to take the firearms. We have recognized that “[a] false story told by a defendant to explain or deny a material fact against him is by itself an indication of guilt.” State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1993). Rutherford‘s written waiver establishes the rest of the factual basis: “I admit that . . . I took control of property, 2 guns, that were not mine and deprived the owner of them.” So although I respectfully disagree with the majority‘s refusal to consider the merits of Rutherford‘s appeal, I conclude that the sentencing record provides a factual basis for the plea, and I thus concur with the majority‘s judgment affirming his conviction.